Tag: Gulf states
Renewing the old may be better than new
A distinguished group of colleagues has offered “a new policy framework” for Syria to President Biden and Secretary Blinken. It advocates a more robust Western effort in Syria focused on security (including both stabilization in the northwest and northeast as well as continuing the fight against ISIS), increased humanitarian and early recovery assistance, and continued pushback against the Assad regime.
US troops would stay in northeastern Syria. Implicit is that President Assad would remain in power in Damascus, but the group opposes “normalization,” which several Arab states are pursuing.
The virtues
There is great virtue in many of the specific ideas offered. More cross-border assistance, if need be outside the UN framework, is needed. Better international coordination and cooperation with Turkiye is vital. Repatriating ISIS prisoners and their familities is important to reducing the threat of resurgence. Accountability for war crimes and missing people is indispensable.
These are not new ideas. The group is essentially recommending that the Biden Administration take more seriously its existing objectives and pursue them more aggressively. They take it to task for failing to meet its own objectives:
The Biden administration’s foreign policy priorities of great power competition, international and Middle East stability, human rights, humanitarianism, or combating food insecurity are insufficiently advanced through the current Syria policy.
The new policy framework is mostly the old framework, renewed.
The defects
That said, there are some defects as well. The group advocates a formalized ceasefire, without however specifying how it would be monitored and enforced. They also advocate renewed civilian stabilization assistance in the northeast, where conflict between Iranian proxy forces and the Americans is growing. Civilian assistance requires civilian presence, which is becoming more difficult, not less. They urge accounting for 100,000 missing Syrians, without however specifying a mechanism.
A lot of what the group suggests would require more Western focus on Syria. The more than ten years of war and chaos there as well as the requirements in Ukraine militate against Europe and the US paying greater attention. Three American presidents have decided that US interests in Syria are not a priority. The group is not asking for a major new effort. But even a marginally increased push in Syria may lie beyond what President Biden’s limits. Pressure for removal of the US troops is more likely to increase than decrease.
Alternatives
What are the possible alternatives? That is always an important question, especially when the obstacles to success are formidable. Let me offer a few, without however recommending any of them:
- Negotiated withdrawal of US troops: At some point, maybe now, US troops in northeastern Syria will reach the point of diminishing returns in the fight against ISIS. The US could negotiate with the Russians and the Syrian regime withdrawal of US troops in exchange for commitments to their Kurdish and Arab allies, promising “normalization” in exchange. Of course there would be little guarantee that the commitments would be kept once the withdrawal is complete.
- A big push for stabilization and reconstruction in the northeast: The US could pour a few billion into civilian stabilization and reconstruction directed by their Kurdish and Arab allies. This would create a de facto state in the northeast, financed on a continuing basis by revenues from the oil produced there. That parastate would attract however the enmity of both the regime and Turkiye, making its survival in the long term parlous.
- Back a Turkish takeover of the entire border area and the northeast: President Erdogan has long been threatening another invasion of segments of the northern Syria border Turkiye does not already control. Washington could back his ambition in exchange for commitments to its Kurdish and Arab allies. Such commitments would however likely prove worthless. The Turks see the Kurds as terrorists, not freedom fighters.
- Renew the civilian and military effort against the Assad regime: The US and Europe could urge Gulf partners to renew the armed rebellion against President Assad and Syrian activists to return to the streets. But neither the Arab partners nor anti-regime Syrians are anywhere near ready to do this.
It is easy to see why the group that wrote yesterday’s statement stuck with more modest proposals. All the more dramatic ones have obvious downsides.
Conclusion
It is not satisfying to propose more and better when you know that something else is needed. But under current circumstances, enewing the old may be better than new.
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Goodies but mostly oldies
President Biden’s first trip to the Middle East took him to Israel and the occupied territories of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as Jeddah and Riyadh. So what difference will this much-anticipated trip make?
Israeli security first
In Jerusalem, Biden reaffirmed, for the umpteenth time, US commitment to Israeli security. He promised, again for the umpteenth time, that the US would use all necessary elements of national power to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. He also reiterated support for the Abrahamic accords and for an (eventual) two-state solution for the Israel/Palestine conflict. The Israelis did not join that commitment. Both Lapid and Biden favored improvement of the Palestinian economy and quality of life. They opposed anti-Semitism and BDS (the peaceful boycott, divest, sanctions movement against Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory).
The only novelty was a new dialogue on technology. That is a natural extension of the decades-long, fruitful cooperation on air defense. Also new to me was reference to India/Israel/UAE/US (I2U2) cooperation of a vague sort.
Notably missing was any reference to Israeli repression in the occupied territories. Biden ignored the killing in May by Israeli security forces of Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.
Palestine not even a close second
President Biden’s visit to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Bethlehem was low key. Biden made it clear the two-state solution is not for now. But he announced hundreds of millions in assistance to hospitals in the occupied territories (without of course calling them that).
The only novelty was a visit, without an Israeli escort, to a Palestinian hospital in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians hope it will some day house the capital of their state. But that sop did not do anything to reduce Palestinian disillusion with American policy. The Americans support the Palestinian Authority’s repressive security apparatus but fail to press Israel for meaningful concessions on Jewish settlements in the West Bank
Riyadh reconnected
Biden’s objective in Saudi Arabia was to get past a years-long rough patch in US/Saudi relations. Despite Trump’s sword-dancing with the Saudis at the beginning of his term, his Administration was a disappointment to the Saudis. They thought it did not do enough to respond to Houthi attacks on the Kingdom’s oil infrastructure. Biden as a candidate labelled Saudi Arabia a pariah, because of the murder of Washington Post journalist and Saudi citizen Jamal Khashoggi in the Kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul. But oil prices are peaking as a result of the Ukraine war and Israel is anxious to extend the normalization process to Saudi Arabia. Washington decided continuing friction was not advisable.
So with a fist bump and a private complaint to Mohammed bin Salman about the murder, Biden sought to reset relations. Their immediate reciprocal gesture was minimal. The Saudis will allow Israeli civilian aircraft to fly over the Kingdom, as Biden’s did from Tel Aviv. There was no public commitment on oil production. The Saudi Foreign Minister made it clear the opening of airspace was not a gesture only to Israel and that the Saudis will continue to insist on a peace settlement with the Palestinians before diplomatic recognition of Israel. Riyadh and Washington agreed however on a long agenda for US/Saudi cooperation.
Normalization is a process. It appears to be proceeding in internal security and air defense, even if the Israelis exaggerate that cooperation in public. Three years ago I was sitting in the business class lounge in Riyadh hearing nothing but Hebrew around me, spoken by mostly men carrying the kind of cases that contain electronic equipment. When I asked why the somewhat cold-eyed response was clear enough: if I told you, I’d have to kill you.
Notable, but little noted
Notable, but not much noted, is that the US will withdraw its multinational observer force from the strategically important island of Tiran. It sits just outside the Bab al Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea. Egypt has agreed to transfer sovereignty over Tiran and another small island to the Kingdom. US withdrawal wouldn’t be happening without Israeli concurrence, as the observers were put there in fulfillment of the 1979 Egypt/Israel peace treaty.
Horror vacui
Biden met in Jeddah Saturday with leaders of the six GCC states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait) as well as Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. This was a first for an American president. He also held bilateral meetings with Egyptian President Sisi, Iraqi Prime Minister Kadhimi, and United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Zayed. The Americans were keen to underline that they do not want to leave a vacuum in the Middle East that China and Russia can occupy.
Even if they don’t, Moscow and Beijing will be more present in the region than in recent decades. Russia is OPEC’s partner in maintaining oil prices, a protector of the Syrian regime, and increasingly an arms supplier in the region. Moscow is seeking drones from Iran to use in Ukraine. Beijing is the major consumer of regional oil and gas and supplier of manufactured goods.
Bottom lines
Only time will tell how the geopolitical rivalry in the Middle East will work out. So far, the perception of reduced American commitment has led to a process of rapprochement in several directions. Saudi Arabia has been busy improving relations not only with Russia and China but also with Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. Normalization with Israel may not be in the cards anytime soon, but Israel’s technology is welcome because it comes with few strings attached. The Americans are not going to find it easy to press the case for democracy, which Biden vowed to do, while their proxy befriends the autocrats.
Here is the event on the trip I did with Gulf International Forum and a great lineup of speakers on Monday, after the trip:
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Stevenson’s army, July 14
But let’s avoid “Aux armes, citoyens,
Formez vos bataillons,
Marchons, marchons !”
– NYT says there is an emerging deal to allow Ukrainian grain exports.
– Economist has background on the grain shortage.
– NYT says Israel has been cooperating with Arab states to shoot down Iranian drones.
– FP says China is a loser in the Sri Lanka conflict.
– US & China trade blame in South China Sea incident.
– After classified briefing on semiconductors, suggestions that Congress may carve out a separate bill.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The time to remember has come
My esteemed Middle East Institute colleagues Paul Salem and Brian Katulis have set a low bar for President Biden’s trip to the Middle East this week. They want him to send a signal of renewed diplomatic commitment to the region.
There’s a hitch
It’s an important objective, but there is a hitch. It is the signs of reduced US commitment that have incentivized many improvements in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This is clear in Yemen. The current ceasefire came about in part because of US reluctance to continue supporting Saudi efforts to counter the Houthis. Iraq’s current role mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia would be inconceivable if the Americans hadn’t withdrawn most of their forces. The wars in Syria are calming partly because the Americans have mostly withdrawn. The remainder are limiting action exclusively to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
Israel’s newfound ambition to help guard Arab Gulf security is also a consequence of reduced American commitment. The Ibrahim/Abraham accords that President Trump initiated essentially trade Arab recognition for Israeli security assistance. The Arab Gulf monarchies regard that as better than American help. The Israelis don’t demand respect for human rights. Spyware and air defense have proven attractive propositions. Diplomatic recognition hasn’t proven costly to the Arab states that have done it so far (UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco), but the Saudis have hesitated.
And a fly in the Saudi ointment
That’s because of the fly in the ointment. Israel is refusing not only to make peace with the Palestinians but even to accept two states as the basis for a future peace. Israel’s current ambitions are clear: to keep the Golan Heights and all of Jerusalem as well as many of the settlements on the West Bank. The Palestinians would then get only a “state-minus.” That would lack not only an army but sovereign control over its very limited territory. Israel’s attitude is unlikely to change, even after its next election. Prime Minister Netanyahu is gone, but not his singular accomplishment: killing the spirit of Oslo.
Plus an elephant in the room
The elephant in the room is Iran. Negotiations for re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are faltering. If they fail, Iran will have the option within a year of producing enough enriched uranium to make several atomic bombs. Attacks on its nuclear facilities and personnel would only delay the inevitable, perhaps by years but more likely by months. They would also give Tehran reason to attack the Gulf states, either directly or through proxies.
The situation will improve only marginally if the JCPOA is revived. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will then use sanctions relief to reinvigorate their proxy military interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. That is precisely what the Gulf states don’t want.
Diplomacy>military
Paul and Brian rightly underline the good things American diplomacy could try to do: improve governance, encourage regional de-escalation and integration, and build civilian ties to the United States, both with citizens and institutions. But Washington has proven inept so far at beefing up diplomatic efforts once the troops are gone. Witness Iraq, where a mostly civilian-focused strategic framework agreement has languished after the military withdrawal. As Chas Freeman pointed out years ago, our diplomats have forgotten diplomacy without force. The time to remember has come.
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We know for sure there will be surprises
The New Year doesn’t look all that happy: Russia is threatening to invade Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, Iran is progressing toward nuclear weapons, the Taliban are retrogressing, and ongoing conflicts in many parts of the world remain unresolved (Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Israel/Palestine…). COVID-19 is appearing in its most virulent version yet. Flights are being cancelled worldwide, school openings after the holidays are at risk, recovering economies are teetering, democracies are faltering, and autocracies are proclaiming victory.
I am still optimistic, partly because it is far easier to improve from a lousy situation than from a good one. This applies in particular to COVID. The Omicron version is far more in infectious than even its Delta predecessor, but it also appears to be less deadly. Evolution favors a mutant virus that spreads easily, not one that kills its host. That’s good news. COVID is on its way to becoming endemic and far less acute. Not quite the common cold, but closer to it than the disease we have seen ravage the world over the past two years, at least for those who get vaccinated and don’t have pre-existing conditions.
The Russian threat to Ukraine is looking like a negotiating ploy, albeit a dangerous one that could still lead to military action. Moscow wants Washington to agree that Ukraine and other former Soviet states will never join NATO but become instead Russian fiefdoms. It also wants NATO to withdraw forces from member states that border the Russian “near abroad.” The former is a non-starter. The latter is conceivable. Remember that Kennedy withdrew (obsolete) missiles from Turkey to get Soviet missiles out of Cuba. A full-scale invasion of Ukraine seems unlikely at this point, but President Putin could still opt to expand the area controlled by the insurgents he backs or to seize critical infrastructure he envies, if Washington is uncompromising.
A full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan is also unlikely. Cross-strait trade is enormous: $150 billion or so. Millions of Taiwanese visit China each year and millions more Chinese visit Taiwan. Taiwanese are big investors in China and Chinese are big investors in Taiwan. These economic relations do not preclude political tension, in particular over Taiwan’s status, but they will make Beijing hesitate to try to seize Taiwan by force. Taiwan is not Hong Kong. The US, Japan, and South Korea all have interests in ensuring its independence (not its sovereignty). China can make life hard for Taiwan and squeeze it for political concessions, but violating its air space is a long way from an amphibious assault on its coasts.
Iran’s nuclear progress is looking unstoppable. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are no doubt trying to match it, quietly so as not to arouse the US. A Middle East nuclear arms race is an ugly prospect, but it is not one that in the first instance threatens the US. We are going to have to learn to live with it, hoping that the Iranians decide not to go all the way but rather remain a “threshold” nuclear state. Actually making and deploying nuclear weapons would put all of Iran at risk of an Israeli nuclear strike, a scenario bad enough to make even hardliners in Tehran hesitate.
It is hard to be as sanguine about some of the other conflicts. Syrian President Bashar al Assad is not going anywhere, but the conflict there is no longer killing as many people as once it did. Nor are the Houthis and Taliban likely to stop oppressing Yemenis and Afghans, though there too the killing has likely passed its peak. Arab/Israeli relations have generally improved with the Abrahamic accords, but that has made peace with the Palestinians look even more distant. Why should Israel concede a state to Ramallah if the Gulf Arabs are willing to recognize Israel (either de facto or de jure) without insisting on it? In Somalia, DRC, Myanmar and some other states conflict and instability are now endemic. Like COVID-19, it is hard to see how they could get rid of its entirely.
So the world isn’t pretty on the first day of 2022. But like the domestic situation, I think it marginally more likely to improve than to deteriorate. Of course that assumes no surprises. The one thing we know for sure is that there will be surprises, which usually don’t bode well.
Happy New Year!
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Democracy on the defensive, but not lost yet
I read the Biden/Putin phone call on Tuesday and the Summit of Democracies differently from many others. The former was a clear even if not conclusive win for the US. The latter is more equivocal.
President Putin went into the phone call having mounted most of an invasion force and demanding a binding legal prohibition on Ukraine joining NATO. He came out accepting an official-level dialogue with Washington on European security. That is a win for Biden, even if the invasion force remains in place for now. Moscow will continue at the dialogue to demand a commitment that Ukraine not join NATO, but the Americans won’t yield on that.
Ironically, the best guarantee that Kiev won’t join NATO lies in the current NATO members, few of whom are prepared to take on an obligation to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression. Redoubling the irony: Putin’s mounting of an invasion force has convinced any loyal Ukrainian that NATO membership is highly desirable. That makes two own goals for Putin: he has spent a fortune on an invasion force that was unnecessary and counterproductive.
The Summit of Democracies convening remotely today is harder to judge. It is one more sign of what we already know: democracy is under attack both in the US and in many places abroad. The Republican campaign against the validity of the 2020 US election and Republican legislation limiting the franchise in many states have cast doubt on whether the US can survive as a democracy. Events in Myanmar, Sudan, Belarus, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and other places have cast more than doubts. Democracy in all those places has suffered severe setbacks in the past year. Not to mention Russia, Serbia, Hungary, Brazil, and other countries that are suffering longer-term erosion of at least semi-democratic institutions and processes. Not to mention the survival of long-standing authoritarian regimes in Syria, Jordan, the Gulf, China, Thailand, and Vietnam.
What good can the Summit of Democracies do? It is difficult to judge. I suppose preparations for it in countries invited and reactions to it in countries not invited may marginally increase pressure for upholding democratic values. Certainly Washington is well aware of its own limitations as a leader of the democratic world and convener of the Summit. The Biden Administration isn’t doing all it might, as it has hesitated to eliminate the anti-democratic filibuster in order to pass Federal voting rights legislation, but it is prosecuting January 6 rioters and suing states that limit voting rights in Federal court.
There is a possibility that some would-be authoritarians in other places will find themselves pressured and even on the ropes, but the overall trend appears to be in their direction. Authoritarians have learned how to weather less draconian political environments, as totalitarian control has become far more difficult due to modern communications and social media. They have also learned how to help each other survive, in order to avoid any domino effects, especially among neighbors. The pendulum has swung in the authoritarian direction, due in part to the corona virus epidemic and the consequent economic slowdown as well as the rallying cries of ethnic/sectarian/linguistic/racial nationalists.
The pendulum can also swing in the other direction, but the Summit looks incapable of making that happen. A successful Russian invasion of Ukraine, or US agreement to block Ukraine from NATO membership, would make things much worse than they already are. Democracy is on the defensive, but not lost yet.
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