Tag: Gulf states
US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
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Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state, and it’s hard to see it go away
Chatham House’s Lina Khatib recently launched a paper entitled How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state. The paper deals with the past trajectories through which Hezbollah has become the pivotal actor in Lebanese politics. To discuss her findings and their implications for the state of crisis that has gripped Lebanon for over a year, Chatham House convened a panel discussion July 8. The panel agreed that Hezbollah has played its cards well and has become engrained in Lebanon’s corrupt and non-functioning political system. In fact, it has become its most powerful player in many ways. The current crisis has made its transition from a purported ‘defender of the oppressed’ to an established and corrupt part of the political elite all the more clear. Unfortunately, the panel considered the most needed reforms that would actually benefit the Lebanese people unlikely to succeed in the near future.
The speakers were:
Joseph Daher
Visiting Professor,
University of Lausanne
Lina Khatib
Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme,
Chatham House
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Adviser,
U.S. Institute for Peace
Emile Hokayem (moderator)
Senior Fellow for Middle East Security,
IISS
Hezbollah as a unique, but entrenched part of the corrupt system
Lina Khatib summarized the findings of her new paper. She describes what is commonplace for Lebanese: that Hezbollah has become an entrenched part of the Lebanese system. There is no ‘state-within-a-state’: “Hezbollah permeates the state in Lebanon.” It employs many of the practices that have come to define the corrupt political system. There is no transparency on government tenders, and using ministries to provide rents to constituents is the standard.
Joseph Daher maintains that Hezbollah is the primary defender of the Lebanese neoliberal, sectarian political system. It presents itself as a defender of the oppressed (following the Iranian ideology of ‘Khomeinism‘), but this has proved mainly rhetorical. In practice, it oppresses labor unions and favors wealthy industrialists and crime bosses through the ministries it controls. In short, it behaves exactly as the other political entities in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, Khatib explained that Hezbollah is also unique in Lebanon. It has surveillance capacity. Not just within the state, but within its opponents too. This gives it a large advantage over others. Similarly, most parties take advantage of Lebanon’s corrupt political institutions. Hezbollah is different because they have been systematic in using any opportunity – no matter how small – to advance their influence. Hezbollah has political and coercive leverage over both its allies and its opponents, which gives it a great advantage within the Lebanese state. Even opponents of Hezbollah make deals with it behind closed doors – or sometimes even openly. This is what keeps the system in place. As Mona Yacoubian put it, Hezbollah has transformed into the “praetorian guard” of the corrupt Lebanese system.
Toeing the line between state and non-state
Hezbollah’s other major advantage is its status as a hybrid actor. Khatib explains that toeing the line between state and non-state is an ideal situation for Hezbollah. It has influence and legitimacy due to its ties to the state, but is not really a state actor, and is not seen as really in charge of state institutions. There are four main reasons why Hezbollah has no intention of changing this situation:
- The Lebanese state is very weak and not appealing to take over
- There is no Shia majority in Lebanon; outright Hezbollah rule would not be tolerated
- Hezbollah avoids accountability by shirking ownership of the state
- Hezbollah is under sanctions as a terrorist organization in the West, complicating its role as would-be regime.
All of them means all of them
Yacoubian pointed out that Hezbollah’s image has been tarnished, even among its own constituency. The slogan of the Lebanese protest movement ‘all of them means all of them’ refuses to differentiate among the political class. “You see now a political class that is defined purely by self-enrichment and is utterly devoid of any pretense of representing any higher ideal or value.” Yacoubian would go so far as to maintain that there are few real political divisions left among Lebanon’s ruling class.
Hezbollah’s resilience: Iranian support and no alternatives
According to Khatib, Iran’s support to Hezbollah is absolute. Anyone who thinks that Hezbollah can Lebanonize and be removed from Iran’s orbit is dreaming. Steadfast Iranian support makes it stronger than its domestic opponents. With its constituency, it proves resilient because it argues that there is no alternative. Hezbollah’s constituency might not like the party, but they see that there is no realistic alternative to the services it provides. Daher added that Hezbollah’s humanitarian outreach is very large. It claims to have helped some 50.000 families on top of their normal activities in the months of April and May alone. No other actor in Lebanon can match that.
Prospects for reform
So how to move forward? Khatib made it clear that the solution is not to extract Hezbollah from Lebanon, as this would be impossible. A solution would be to reform the Lebanese political system. This needs to be Lebanese-led, but it will require foreign aid. Yacoubian agreed. She proposed a number of concrete reforms that foreign actors can contribute to:
- Support the Lebanese Armed Forces, the only state institution standing between where we are today and total chaos. This is one of the few policies that is continuing today, primarily by the US.
- Cabinet formation and the ability to move forward with reforms are essential. The US, Gulf, and EU can do more to pressure the political elite to form a technocratic government. Steps towards this could be sanctions against the most corrupt political leaders who are obstructing government formation. This is currently happening haphazardly, but it could be done more concertedly.
- The international community can and should do more in the way of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable Lebanese. Bypassing the government is vital to avoid corruption. Perhaps a special UN agency could be tasked with this.
Khatib warned that economic pressure and sanctions alone are unlikely to change Hezbollah’s behavior on its own. As with the IRGC, a weakened currency only benefits Hizbollah, as they make their money abroad, in US dollars. The same is true for Assad in Syria. Sanctions are important, but they aren’t a primary tool. They need to be part of a comprehensive approach.
The panel was pessimistic about the prospects of efficient foreign support for reform. Khatib warned that Hezbollah benefits from the common attitude that sees Lebanon as a lost cause. If the international community gives up and maintains the status quo, Hezbollah benefits. Therefore, bottom-up reform is key. But Daher believes that the Lebanese protest movement has failed to create a unified answer to the corrupt system. He sees the international response as lacking originality. They are now attempting to get Saudi Arabia back to the table and to resume cabinet formation. These efforts will sustain the sectarian parties and system in the paradigm that has been employed for the last several decades.
Khatib emphasized that incremental change must be possible. The gradual approach by which Hezbollah grew its influence can be reversed in small steps. Nonetheless, Hokayem summarized Daher’s pessimistic view. Reform won’t come from the top down in Lebanon, it isn’t emerging in an organized form from the bottom up, and meaningful change is unlikely to come from the outside.
Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/CHMENAProg/videos/1419092855114088
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Peace Picks | June 14-20, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Carnegie Connects: What Will the New Israeli Change Coalition Actually Change? | June 14, 2021 | 2:00 PM EST | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
If the inauguration of a new Israeli government—the first in over a decade without Benjamin Netanyahu—takes place this Sunday, it raises a series of questions that bear consequentially on the politics of Israel, the conflict with Palestinians, relations with key Arab states, and the Iran nuclear accord. What will the new coalition government, comprised of eight parties across the political spectrum but led by a new, right-wing prime minister, mean for the future of Israel? How will this new government address heightened tension with Palestinians following the most recent Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in Jerusalem and Gaza? And what does the new coalition portend for relations with the Biden administration, U.S. Congress, and the American Jewish community?
Speakers:
Anshel Pfeffer
Senior writer for Haaretz, Israel correspondent for the Economist, author of Bibi: The Turbulent Life and Times of Benjamin Netanyahu
Natan Sachs
Director, Brookings Institution Center for Middle East Policy
Tal Schneider
Political Correspondent, the Times of Israel
Aaron David Miller
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Iran’s 2021 Presidential Elections: The Final End of the Reform Movement? | June 15, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Register Here
Iran holds presidential elections on 18 June. The entire process is carefully organized. From seven carefully vetted men who were allowed in the race to presidential debates that are entirely devoid of any serious policy discussion, this is an election that has by all accounts failed to excite the Iranian voters. Key policy challenges, including the role of Iran’s foreign policy in resulting in sanctions and dire economic conditions, are largely left unaddressed.
To many observers, this election is also the final nail in the coffin of the reform movement and the idea that gradual political change in the Islamic Republic is possible. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is delighted to host three prominent Iranian observers to discuss this election process and its implications.
Speakers:
Ali Afshari
Iranian Political Analyst and Activist
Nazenin Ansari
Managing Editor, Kayhan London
Negar Mortazavi
Journalist and political analyst
Alex Vatanka
Director, Iran Program, MEI
- Covid-19 in the Middle East: Regional Impact and Future Recovery | June 15, 2021 | 10:30 AM EST | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to hold the second event in a four-part series in cooperation with Arab Barometer, on the occasion of the publication of Arab Barometer’s findings from the sixth wave of its surveys. This most recent poll was conducted in the wake of the outbreak of Covid-19, and assessed regional perspectives on the impact of the pandemic on public health, domestic conditions, vulnerable populations, and the way the region sees the outside world.
The second panel will bring together experts from the US and Middle East alongside Salma Al-Shami, senior research specialist with the Arab Barometer, to discuss the findings as they relate to the impact of Covid-19 and the prospects for long term recovery. How has Covid-19 impacted the region and what vulnerabilities remain? What are the respondent’s perceptions of how their governments addressed the crisis? What does localized and regional recovery look like in conjunction with other ongoing crises?
Speakers:
Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow, Brookings-Doha
Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist, Arab Barometer
Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar, MEI; Deputy regional director, Mercy Corps
Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy, MEI
- The Art of War in an Age of Peace | June 15, 2021 | 11:15 AM EST | Brookings Institute | Register Here
As President Joe Biden and his team settle into their new jobs, how should they view the national security challenges facing the United States? And what should U.S. national security policy seek to achieve? Four months into the new administration, it is no longer enough to be the antidote to former President Donald Trump’s unilateralism; a more forward-looking and visionary foreign policy framework is needed. In his new book, “The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint,” Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon argues that the United States should be resolute in its commitment to defend its core territories, populations, polities, and the economies of its allies, as well as the free and open skies and oceans on which the global economy depends. However, America also needs to show restraint, avoiding costly mistakes that could lead to escalation with great power rivals — such as expanding NATO to include new members — while relying instead on asymmetric defense and deterrence, including economic and military tools to preserve the international order.
Speakers:
Michele Flournoy
Chair, Board of Directors, Center for a New American Security; Co-Founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Michael E. O’Hanlon
Director of Research, Foreign Policy; Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy and Technology, Africa Security Initiative; Senior fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
Helene Cooper (moderator)
Pentagon Correspondent, The New York Times
- Viennese Waltz: How Can the U.S. Balance its Priorities with Gulf Arab Concerns as it Engages Iran? | June 16 | 10:00 AM EST | The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | Register Here
U.S.-Iranian relations seem poised on a knife’s edge, primarily in the indirect negotiations in Vienna aimed at reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement.
Where do the talks stand? What are the prospects of an agreement, and what sticking points and pitfalls remain between the parties? If the agreement is revived, how much can be accomplished in 2022, particularly considering the rapidly expiring sunset provisions and Iran’s progress on centrifuges and other critical technology? If the agreement is restored on a compliance-for-compliance basis, is there any serious prospect of additional understandings, particularly that address non-nuclear concerns such as Iran’s missile development program and regional network of violent nonstate actors? Will U.S. regional partners in the Gulf influence the negotiations? Could progress between Washington and Tehran help to promote more robust dialogue between Iran and Gulf Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?
Speakers:
Thomas L. Friedman
Columnist, New York Times
Suzanne Maloney
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution
Ambassador Frank G. Wisner
Chair of the Board, AGSIW
Hussein Ibish (moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar
- Secularism & Islam in France | June 16, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The Wilson Center | Register Here
Laïcité or secularism is a key part of the French political fabric but also causing friction and divisions – especially with Muslim communities. A new “Islamist separatism” bill, which would further expand on the separation of church and state, is currently being passed through the French parliament. It would prohibit any civil servant or contractor for the public sector from wearing religious symbols. Although the bill does not explicitly mention Islam as such, many fear that it could unfairly target and further alienate Muslims in France.
Is secularism in its current form still working in France? What can be done to guarantee the separation of church and state, but also protect religious freedoms and religious minorities? How do legitimate security concerns, and the debate about political Islam and freedom of speech heighten tensions?
Speakers:
Amel Boubekeur
Sociologist, EHESS (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales)
Steven Philip Kramer
Global Fellow ; Professor of National Security Studies, Eisenhower School, National Defense University
Hakim El Karoui
Senior Fellow, Institut Montaigne; Senior Partner & Paris Office Head, Brunswick
William Drozdiak (moderator)
Global Fellow; Author “The Last President of Europe: Emmanuel Macron’s Race to Revive France and Save the World.”
- Human Rights Violations in Black Sea Occupied Territories | June 16, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | Middle East institute | Register Here
Human rights violations in illegally-annexed Crimea and the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become a constant element of Russian aggression in the Black Sea region. In both cases, unlawful killings and detentions, enforced disappearances, abductions, and torture are some of the most flagrant human rights violations that Russian and de facto authorities are committing. Additionally, Russian and de facto authorities in occupied territories have also developed targeted policies against the local population, such as borderization in Georgia and militarization and passportization in Ukraine. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, rights in the occupied territories have worsened, and authorities have further restricted freedom of movement, access to education and healthcare, freedom of religion, and workers’ ability to secure a livelihood.
What are the similarities between the human rights violations of Russian and de facto authorities in occupied territories across the Black Sea region? How has the pandemic impacted the human rights situation in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine? What are the next steps in improving the human rights situation in these territories and deterring Russian aggression?
Speakers:
Maria Tomak
Coordinator, Media Initiative for Human Rights, Ukraine
Ann Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili
Project manager, East-West Management Institute (EWMI), Advancing CSO Capacities and Engaging Society for Sustainability (ACCESS), Georgia
Iulia Joja (moderator)
Senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
- Preventing Catastrophe in Afghanistan | June 16, 2021 | 3:00 PM EST | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
On April 14th, President Biden announced a complete U.S. troop withdrawal by September 11, 2021, with a peace conference between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban initially set for April 24th in Istanbul, Turkey. However, the peace conference has been postponed indefinitely due to the Taliban reneging. As of April 2021, civilian casualties in Afghanistan have increased by 29 percent as compared to April 2020, with significant increases in woman and child casualties.
As the U.S. withdrawal develops, the economic, political, and human rights future of Afghanistan remains uncertain. These issues in Afghanistan also play into United States interests in the surrounding region, including in human rights, development, and political and economic stability. One school of thought argues that ending U.S. military presence accelerates a real dialogue amongst the parties in Afghanistan. Another posits that a U.S. withdrawal will result in the collapse of development, human rights, and economic progress, specifically gains in social, political and women’s rights issues made in the last 20 years. A current and future challenge will be in determining what role the United States can and should play in Afghanistan following a military withdrawal and what pathways remain for a resolution of the regional conflict.
Speakers:
Earl Anthony Wayne
Senior Advisor, Project on Prosperity and Development
Annie Pforzheimer
Senior Associate, Project on Prosperity and Development
Richard Olson
Senior Associate, Project on Prosperity and Development
Daniel F. Runde
Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development
- Digital Occupation: The Implications of Media Moderation in Palestine | June 17, 2021 | 1:00 PM EST | Middle East Institute | Register Here
As the international community has further opened its eyes to the dangerous patterns of censorship and discrimination against Palestinians and Palestinian narratives online, particularly on social media platforms, many have called for legislative reform, policy changes at the company level, and more attention to the needs and concerns of Palestinians on the part of stakeholders in the technology industry. While some limited partnerships and reforms have made progress on this issue, there is still an enormous gulf in the area of policy responses to the problem of online discrimination against Palestinians.
What are some of the implications of this phenomenon? How might it impact movements for Palestinian rights, and broader international attention to the Israel-Palestine question? What are some potential policy steps – both for social media and technology companies, governments and states, and other civil society groups and stakeholders – that might start to address this challenge in a more systematic way? This panel will explore the policy responses to this complex issue and hope to draw attention to some concrete policy reforms for the future.
Speakers:
Radhika Sainath
Senior staff attorney, Palestine Legal
Mona Shtaya
Local advocacy manager, 7amleh
Ashraf Zeitoon
Advisor and investor; former director of public policy, Middle East, Turkey & Africa, Netflix; former head of policy, Middle East and North Africa, Facebook
Eliza Campell (moderator)
Associate director, Impact and Innovation, MEI
- President Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: Reexamining his legacy forty years later | June 17, 11:00 AM EST | The Brookings Institute | Register Here
Beginning in 1977, Former president Jimmy Carter’s administration was one of the most consequential for American foreign policy in the Middle East. His determination to secure an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty transformed the Arab-Israeli confrontation in many ways. During his presidency, the shah of Iran was replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini and the ensuing hostage crisis doomed Carter’s re-election. The Iran-Iraq war also began on his watch. In Afghanistan, Carter devised the strategy and alliances that defeated the Soviet Union and won the Cold War. However, Carter has been an outcast in American politics for four decades.
On June 17, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host award winning author Kai Bird for a discussion of the Carter administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East and Bird’s new book, “The Outlier: The Unfinished Presidency of Jimmy Carter,” which considers the triumphs and failures of the Carter presidency. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, whose career in the CIA began during the Carter administration, will join Bird for a discussion of the legacy of the Carter administration forty years later.
Speakers:
Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Director, The Intelligence Project
Kai Bird
Contributing Editor, The Nation; Executive Director and Distinguished lecturer, Leon Levy Center for Biography, City University of New York
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Taking score of the GCC at 40: better on economics than politics
On 05/27, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) celebrated this weeks’ 40 year anniversary of the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council by discussing the organization’s origins, achievements, and future challenges. A Eurocentric approach to the GCC yields few results. The member states’ and region’s different dynamics make an EU benchmark counterproductive. Nonetheless, the panel agreed that this anniversary should be an opportunity to reconsider and renew the GCC’s Charter and mission. The GCC’s achievements are many. As the recent inter-GCC conflict showed, however, it faces serious challenges for the future too.
The speakers were:
Abdullah Baabood
Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies & Visiting Professor
School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Matteo Legrenzi
Professor of International Relations
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Emma Soubrier
Visiting Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kristin Smith Diwan
Senior Resident Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
The GCC’s origins: no ‘Gulf-EU’
Matteo Legrenzi thinks it is important to acknowledge the different factors that led to the GCC. It is true that worries about Iran were a key reason. However, Gulf cooperation had been on the rise since independence from the UK in the 1970s. Furthermore, the GCC was intended to keep Iraq out, as much as it was intended to unite against Iran. Iraq had been seeking inroads in the Gulf in the context of its Arab nationalist leadership aspirations. Keeping Iraq out of the GCC was a clear signal in the context of the Iran-Iraq War. Diwan remarked that ironically the GCC’s secretary-general’s speech this week emphasized the efforts underway to involve Iraq in the GCC more. Baabood added that the Arab state system’s instability at the time also contributed to the Gulf’s desire for cooperation. Egypt’s peace with Israel and the Arab League’s outrage at the time put regional security on shaky footings.
Emma Soubrier explained that the GCC never became a regional security system, nor was it intended to. It did achieve a strong Gulf identity alongside the prevailing Arab identity of the time. This succeeded both domestically and internationally. Abdullah Baabood commented that the GCC achieved a tariff and trade union. It managed to become greater than the sum of its parts and outperformed expectations in doing so.
Matteo Legrenzi took some time to emphasize the differences between the GCC and the EU model. The domestic organization of GCC states – where a small ruling class wields absolute power – allows quick action to be taken when leaders agree. However, GCC institutions should not be expected to develop supra-national powers. All countries freely admitted to this from the start. Because of this, certain fields see less cooperation than others. Security and defense are less integrated than trade and economics for this reason.
Facing today’s challenges
The Middle East faces a new security order today. Rather than a post-US order, this is a multipolar order in which the US plays a definite part, according to Soubrier. We should therefore not be afraid to be a little US-centric. The conclusion of the al-Ula agreement (which ended the blockade of Qatar) mere weeks before Biden took office is no coincidence, for example. The conflict surrounding Qatar is a major elephant in the room in the GCC.
Baabood acknowledged that it is unprecedented. Its scope went beyond the political to include the societal and public opinion. It hurt the Khaleeji (Gulf) identity that the GCC had so successfully helped establish. Furthermore, it went directly against the GCC common market, without using any GCC mechanisms for resolving disputes. This seriously harmed the trust the GCC is built upon. Much remains to be restored after al-Ula particularly between Qatar and the UAE. Soubrier did emphasize that the GCC leaves much room for bilateral projects and cooperation. This “integration at different speeds” is one of the GCC’s strengths.
The war in Yemen is another conflict in which the GCC might play a part. However, Legrenzi warned that the GCC should not be expected to play a role in political resolutions. Rather, its strength will be in reconstruction of the Yemeni economy, once the political disputes have been resolved. Yemeni accession to the GCC is unlikely because the monarchical model is central to the GCC.
The future
The panel concluded with discussion of the directions the GCC could and should take in the near future. Soubrier emphasized the need for more human-based security. Humanitarian issues in the region are at a peak and the disconnect between Gulf leaders’ vision and public sentiment – e.g. on the recent Gaza war – shows the need for a new focus. Legrenzi and Baabood agreed that the 40th anniversary would be a good occasion to review the GCC Charter. As Legrenzi noted, the charter is a product of the 1970s and 80s. It is full of language relating to Arab nationalism, making it a historical document rather than a modern guideline. There are some mechanisms and aspirations mentioned in the charter which never came to fruition. The GCC countries should take the opportunity to reassess their vision for the organization. This could reinvigorate the project in the process.
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Peace Picks | May 24-28, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Africa Day at the Atlantic Council: A vision for the African Century | May 25, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
In celebration of Africa Day, which marks the founding of the African Union, and to introduce the new Africa Center team and vision under Director Ambassador Rama Yade, the Atlantic Council is launching its African Conversations Series. The series aims to shine a light on high-profile US officials’ connections to the continent and engagement with Africa policy.
High-profile US officials speak to US-Africa policy under the Biden administration, spotlighting Africa’s strategic importance and dynamic outlook.
Speakers:
The Hon. Dana L. Banks
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council
James L. Jones, Jr.
Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council
H.E. Hilda Suka-Mafudze
Ambassador to the United States, African Union
The Hon. Linda Thomas-Greenfield
Representative to the United Nations, US Department of State
Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council
Rama Yade (moderator)
Africa Center Director, Atlantic Council
2. Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance: A U.S. Strategy for Clean Energy Supply Chains| May 25, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | CSIS | Register Here
This event is a presentation and discussion of the new CSIS report Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance: A U.S. Strategy for Clean Energy Supply Chains. Asrenewable energy technologies mature and get deployed at scale, there is a greater need to think strategically about this system. Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance argues that the United States can apply some of the mental models, tools, and institutions used for conventional energy sources to think about supply chains in clean energy—and, in doing so, grow its economy and boost its national security.
Speakers:
Nikos Tsafos (Introduction)
Interim Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS
Sarah Ladislaw
Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS
Laszlo Varro
Chief Economist, International Energy Agency
3. In Search of Peace for Afghanistan: Historical Perspectives | May 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Last month’s announcement that all U.S and international troops will leave Afghanistan before September 11, 2021 has sparked intense debate over the country’s future after over four decades of near-continuous conflict. Deteriorating security conditions, uncertainty over the level of international engagement moving forward and political instability pose great risks to the fragile peace process and the prospects for a sustainable political settlement. Many analysts have compared the current moment to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, an alarming parallel given the years of civil war and Taliban rule that followed.
These issues are at the heart of a recently published book by the Kakar History Foundation and Heart of Asia Society titled In Search of Peace for Afghanistan: Historical Letters of President Najibullah and Dr. M. Hassan Kakar — A Collection of Essays. This essay collection considers the correspondence between the former Afghan president and one of the country’s leading scholars regarding Afghanistan’s post-Soviet future and the lessons that can be drawn as the country navigates the U.S. troop withdrawal. Several of the contributing authors to this book will reflect on Afghan politics and the country’s relationship with the international community as U.S. troops withdraw.
Speakers:
Amb. Lakhdar Brahimi (Keynote)
Former U.N. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Syria; former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria
Amb. Richard Olson (Introduction)
Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace; former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Belquis Ahmadi
Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
Robert Crews
Professor of History, Stanford University
Kawun Kakar
Executive Director, Kakar History Foundation
Amb. Janan Mosazai
Former Ambassador of Afghanistan to Pakistan and China; Co-Founder and Vice President, Heart of Asia Society
Omar Sharifi
Country Director, American Institute of Afghanistan Studies
Omar Sadr
Assistant Professor of Political Science, American University of Afghanistan
Dipali Mukhopadhyay (Moderator)
Senior Expert, U.S. Institute of Peace
4. Re-balancing U.S. Security Engagement with Arab States | May 26, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
The Biden administration’s desire to reduce the U.S. presence in the Middle East is just the latest attempt by an American president to pull out of the region, and yet the legacy of U.S. entrenchment in the Middle East continues to draw it in. To what extent has the heavily militarized nature of U.S. engagement with Arab states met its goals for regional peace and self-reliance? Can the United States draw down its military presence, reduce security assistance, and be more selective about arms sales without sacrificing critical interests and American jobs? What would less securitized U.S. policies mean for competition with China and Russia in the region?
Speakers:
Chris Murphy (Keynote)
Senator for Connecticut, US Senate; Member, Foreign Relations Committee; Chairman, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism
Frederic Wehrey
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Michele Dunne
Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Kim Ghattas
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
David Schenker
Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Jalel Harchaoui
Senior Fellow, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
5. Deal or No Deal: US-Iran Talks and Implications for the Middle East | May 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Most signs at the moment suggest that US-Iran nuclear negotiations are making incremental progress. There might be a deal, which would have to include the US lifting some of the sanctions on the country, while the government of President Hassan Rouhani is still in place. Alternatively, the talks can drag on for months more to come. What is undeniable is that the prospects of a revived nuclear agreement to be sustainable is best served by broadening the US-Iranian dialogue as quickly as possible. A number of issues will continue to pit American and Iranian interests against each other. On this list of disagreements, US-Iran competition in Iraq is among the most contentious.
Can Iraq provide a platform for the US and Iran to co-exist? What other high-stake regional areas of competition could be impacted depending on the outcome of the US-Iran negotiations?
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Rend al-Rahim
Co-founder and President, The Iraq Foundation; former Iraqi Ambassador to the US
Michael Rubin
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Ali Vaez
Senior Advisor to the president; Iran project Director, International Crisis Group
Alex Vatanka
Director, Iran Program, Middle East Institute
6. MEI Lebanon Policy Conference – Breaking the Lebanese Political Logjam | May 26, 2021 | 11:15 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
How can Lebanon overcome the domestic and international obstacles to forming a truly independent, reform-minded government? Is such a government even possible with the current political establishment? Which political scenarios are the most likely to unfold in the weeks and months ahead? How far has the Lebanese protest movement come since October 2019? How can an increasingly busy United States and international community support the people of Lebanon in their quest for real change? Where does Lebanon even fall on the international community’s list of priorities?
Speakers:
John Alterman
Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
Paul Salem
President, Middle East Institute
Maha Yahya
Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, Middle East Institute
7. China in the Middle East: What Lies Ahead? | May 27, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Watch Here
Conflict and instability in the Middle East show no signs of abating. Recent jousting between Israeli and Palestinian forces, the ongoing war in Yemen, and continued Saudi Arabia-Iran friction threaten to further destabilize the region. Though President Biden is attempting to restore coherence in the U.S. approach to the Middle East, his administration remains focused on responding to the pandemic domestically and on countering China in the international arena. Beijing, for its part, appears intent on playing a larger role in Middle Eastern affairs. It continues to foster stronger ties with regional countries through its Belt and Road Initiative and securing cooperation agreements, such as the twenty-five-year investment deal with Iran. How will China’s growing influence in the region affect the interests of the United States and other actors?
Speakers:
He Wenping
Professor at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Karim Sadjadpour
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Paul Haenle
Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
8. Women and Iran’s Presidential Elections: What Role Will They Play? | May 27, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Iranian women emerged as a force of change in 1997 after they voted overwhelmingly for Mohammad Khatami, bringing to power a reformist cleric. Although candidates and political parties have issued plans to improve their status to win their votes, women have seen little improvement in their rights at home and in society. Many see the country’s civil code and constitution, which were written based on Islamic Law after the revolution, as the source of discrimination.
Nevertheless, women’s role in the presidential elections on June 18 remains crucial. Will they vote and who will they vote for? What are their concerns? Or, will they stay away from the polls in a sign of protest to create a legitimacy crisis for the regime?
Speakers:
Roya Boroumand
Executive Director, The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center
Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
CEO and co-founder, Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy; Iranian scholar; women’s rights advocate
Susan Tahmassebi
Director, FEMENA; women’s rights activist
Nazila Fathi (Moderator)
Non-resident scholar, MEI
9. The Gulf Cooperation Council at 40 | May 27, 2021 | 10 AM ET | The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | Register Here
As the GCC marks its 40th anniversary, what has been the organization’s real impact on its member states, the Gulf, and international relations? Is the GCC living up to its potential to foster regional economic integration? Can the organization still function as an effective forum for cooperation on defense and security issues, despite political divisions among its members? Will the January signing of the Al Ula agreement ending the crisis with Qatar help to build back trust and collaboration?
Speakers:
Abdullah Baabood
Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies and Visiting Professor, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Matteo Legrenzi
Professor of International Relations, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Emma Soubrier
Visiting Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kristin Smith Diwan (Moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
10. Next Steps for U.S. Policy in the Ongoing Crisis in the Middle East | May 27, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Center for American Progress | Submit questions Here
The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas has had devastating human costs and exposed long-time vulnerabilities and inequities among Palestinians and Israelis. The Biden administration has stepped up its engagement to work toward ending the conflict, but what steps should the United States take to address the underlying conditions that led to this latest violence?
Speakers:
Ghaith Al Omari
Former Palestinian Authority adviser; Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ezzedine C. Fishere
Former Egyptian diplomat; Senior Lecturer, Dartmouth College
Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Ofer Zalzberg
Director of the Middle East Program, Herbert C. Kelman Institute
Mara Rudman (Moderator)
Executive Vice President for Policy, Center for American Progress; former U.S. Deputy Envoy for Middle East Peace
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Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground
It’s been hard to write more about Gaza, both because I’ve been busy with professorial responsibilities this week and because so much has already been said. But a few points merit reiteration:
- The fighting is not really about Gaza. Israeli moves against Palestinians in East Jerusalem and on the Haram al Sharif triggered the Hamas rocket barrages. Hamas gains by claiming the mantle of resistance in Jerusalem. Netanyahu gains by creating an emergency situation that may give him another lease on the prime ministry.
- American influence is marginal. Biden doesn’t want to leave his right flank open to Republican criticism. Washington doesn’t talk with Hamas but may exert some pressure via Qatar or Egypt. Having paid a price in international opinion, Israel will want to meet its military objectives before stopping.
- Israeli measures to minimize civilian casualties are grossly insufficient. Some think they target civilians. I can’t really say they don’t, but it is also possible the damage is collateral. They do warn before bombing civilian structures, but Gaza is such a densely populated place even the best-intentioned belligerent would likely kill civilians. The bombing of Hamas’ underground tunnels in populated areas ensures that above-ground structures will collapse.
- The fighting inside Israel between Arab and Jewish citizens is new and important. The center of gravity of this conflict has moved from Gaza and the West Bank to Israel inside the Green Line and East Jerusalem. The successful Israeli efforts to mitigate threat by fencing off the former cannot be applied to the latter. Only ethnic cleansing will rid Israel of its own Palestinian population. That is precisely what Netanyahu and his extremist supporters want to do.
- The Palestinian Authority and the Gulf States are more irrelevant than ever. Mahmoud Abbas disappointed Palestinians by postponing long-postponed elections. Pleased to see Hamas hammered, the Gulf states have failed to use their new-found relations with Israel to protect Palestinians. Iran will gain sway with Palestinians for its support of resistance.
- The fighting has undermined American support for Israel. Already in trouble with Democrats because of his blatant preference for the Republicans, Netanyahu has managed to provoke even stalwart backers to object to what Israel is doing in Gaza. Biden gave Netanyahu lots of room to maneuver, but even he is now insisting on a ceasefire.
- Liberal American Jews (that’s most of us) are fed up. They don’t like Hamas but also do not want to support an Israel that causes dozens of civilian casualties in Gaza every day, treats Jewish and Arab citizens differently, attacks worshippers on the Temple Mount, and coddles right-wing Jewish supremacist thugs.
Israel will benefit from destroying Hamas leadership, infrastructure, and hardware in Gaza, but most of the points above suggest that the political terrain is shifting against Netanyahu, if not Israel per se. Things will not be the same after this war: Palestinian citizens of Israel, liberal Jews in the US, Democratic leadership in the White House and congress, Gulf states, and others will have shifted their sympathies noticeably in the Palestinian direction, even if not towards Hamas.
There is no sign of a similar shift inside Israel. Netanyahu’s buildup of siege mentality among its Jewish citizens has worked well in his favor. Hamas’ rockets help. The gulf between Israeli Jewish public opinion and the rest of the world is widening. Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground.
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