Tag: Gulf states
Beyond success and failure lies attractive possibility
Michael Picard, a first-year Conflict Management student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:
The Wilson Center February 24 hosted a panel discussion on “Revisiting the Arab Uprisings at 10: Beyond Success and Failure.” that weighed the societal impacts of the Arab uprisings 10 years after they broke out. The term “Arab Spring” is a misnomer as the revolts did not result in democratic reform – the term Arab uprisings was used instead.
The key question was whether the Arab uprisings werea failure that is now over or are they the beginning of a longer process of societal transformation?
Panelists
Liz Sly (moderator): Beirut Bureau Chief, Washington Post
Amy Austin Holmes: International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Asher Orkaby: Fellow, Transregional Institute, Princeton University
Anas El Gomati: Founder and Director, Sadeq Institute
Focusing specifically on the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, the panelists presented and weighed the legacy of each country’s uprising 10 years on. Despite initial popular hope, there was never a serious expectation among observers that these states would transition to democracy overnight. What we have witnessed so far is the beginning of a long-term transformation of the MENA region. The memories of pre-uprising realities are still pertinent, and the youthful composition of Arab societies highlights the need for political and economic reforms.
Several panelists noted the US must examine how its policies and signals have impeded demoratic transitions. Regarding the 2013 coup that deposed Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected leader, the African Union immediately expelled Egypt in response to this setback. The US did not react until the Rabaa massacre, which killed hundreds of pro-Morsi demonstrators. This reflects a broader theme: that the US must consider its democracy promotion goals and what its precise role ought to be in realizing these goals.
The panel also discussed the role of the Gulf monarchies in the Arab uprisings, noting that they saw such movements – both those originating domestically and in nearby states – as existential threats. Ottaway offered an anecdote about a Saudi official who anticipated expatriate students would demand greater civil liberties. This compelled the Gulf states to act – near unanimously – to crush domestic uprisings and take an active international role in promoting counterrevolutions. This has caused immense destruction throughout the region, derailing local conflict management efforts and restraining Gulf proxies from negotiating settlements.
Ottaway observed that perhaps the most pessimistic lesson of the Arab uprisings was that removal of large, unitary, Arab regimes that dominated political life has revealed that the building blocks of democracy were absent, with the narrow exception of Tunisia. Tunisia was able to avoid fates similar to Libya and Yemen because it is a) socially homogenous with relatively few ethnic and sectarian minorities, and b) politically pluralistic. Historically salient political organizations already existed and held society together, albeit in uneasy, unstable balances.
The panelists spoke to new dynamics and outcomes that continue to emerge. Several elaborated on “second generation” protest movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan. In these contexts, protestors demonstrated greater understanding of how their movements could be more inclusive, better organized, and better at extracting meaningful government concessions. This has helped them avoid the high-stakes losses of the “first generation” protest movements.
The panelists noted unanimously that the Arab uprisings have had positive implications for women and some minorities. In several countries, women initiated the initial protest movements, focused on detention of their kin. In war-torn states, women have taken on a more active role in daily economic and social life. The panelists hope that these gains will be locked in with female participation quotas in emergent governance institutions. In Egypt, the Nubian minority gained recognition in the constitution and procured the right to return to ancestral lands from which they were forcibly displaced.
Conclusion
The panel agreed that the Arab uprisings were not failures that are now over but the beginning of a longer transitional process and state-building experiment. Orkaby noted these uprisings sparked the creation of local civil society organizations or strengthened existing ones. El Gomati noted the renewal of social protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan, indicating civilians are still willing to take to the streets. Austin Holmes emphasized that much will depend on how the Biden administration postures itself toward the region, especially with regard to countries that have retained despotic features.
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This isn’t easy, but it’s worth the try
President Biden has decided to ignore the attack on US forces deployed in Erbil, Iraq earlier this week and proceed with talking to Iran about returning to the nuclear deal, at the invitation of European allies. This move entails political risk, as surely Republicans and others will criticize talking with people who are rocketing American troops. But the alternative is worse: making a strategic priority subject to tactical moves of uncertain origin. Tehran may have ordered the attack in Erbil, or it may have originated with an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) proxy anxious to prevent US return to the nuclear deal. Or maybe someone else did it.
The US has little other option at this point. Iran is moving rapidly now to enrich more uranium, transform it to metallic form, and block some International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Tehran could be a good deal less than a year from being capable of making an atomic weapon. I doubt it will do so, as that would give others in the region unequivocal incentive to follow suit, and a nuclear Iran would be on a hair trigger alert with Israel every day of the week. But betting on the rationality of the IRGC and the Supreme Leader would be a serious mistake.
Four years of Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” on Iran have yielded nothing but evidence that economic sanctions won’t cause Tehran to re-enter nuclear negotiations in order to deepen and extend their nuclear commitments. Trump also failed to get Iran to expand the talks to discuss the missile and regional issues, as America’s Israeli and Gulf allies would like. It remains to be seen whether Biden’s approach will work better, but the main thing for the moment is to restore as much as possible of the status quo ante, that is the situation from before the Trump Administration’s ill-advised and poorly executed withdrawal from the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA, aka Iran nuclear deal).
This will not be trivial. The know-how Iran has gained can’t be reversed without killing scientists, which the Israelis have been willing to do. But if they continue, Iran will itself withdraw from the JCPOA. The current Israeli government might be pleased with that, as it appears to want a good excuse to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. But their Gulf allies would quickly part company with that move. Their capitals all lie within striking distance of Tehran’s missiles, as do their oil tankers. The Abrahamic accords could quickly see the Gulf part ways with Israel as quickly as Ishmael and Isaac did.
The Biden Administration is entering a complex diplomatic maneuver. The Trump sanctions have unquestionably provided leverage, but history suggests you get what you want from sanctions not when you impose them but when you negotiate relief from them. That can be done gradually and in phases corresponding to Iranian moves. But some in Congress will be sniping at you from behind and some in Tehran will be trying to torpedo the effort with attacks on Americans throughout the Middle East. This isn’t easy, but it’s worth the try.
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Stevenson’s army, November 28
WaPo says the administration is giving career protections to political appointees and stripping it from careerists at OMB.
NYT has details of the confused effort to reform WHO.
Nimitz to the Persian Gulf. What next?
WSJ tells why Netanyahu-MBS meeting failed.
Politico has background on Jake Sullivan.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Biden’s Middle East won’t look like Trump’s
If Biden wins, what difference will that make in the Middle East?
- Iran: Biden will have the same goal as Trump: an expanded and extended agreement that prevents Tehran from getting nuclear weapons, limits its missile ambitions, and gets it to pull back from interference in the region, especially in Yemen and Syria. But the two candidates differ on means. Trump used only “maximum pressure” through sanctions, gray zone warfare, and threats of military action. Biden will add incentives through some sanctions relief and possibly security assurances, but he will be critical of Iranian human rights abuses.
- Israel/Palestine: Trump has sought, with his right-wing Israeli friends, to prevent the formation of a viable Palestinian state. Biden will differ on this goal and try to restore the prospect of a two-state solution by limiting Israeli settlement expansion on the West Bank while ensuring Israel’s security. Biden will not reverse Trump’s move of the US embassy from Jerusalem. He may consider renewed American contributions to Palestinian relief through the UN.
- The Arab Gulf states: Biden will differ from Trump on both goals and means. He will be prepared to raise human rights issues and will not shield the Saudis from international criticism, as Trump has done. Acting on the basis of a growing bipartisan consensus in Congress, Biden will seek to end the Trump/Obama policy of support for the Yemen war. Wanting to phase out fossil fuels, Biden will not intervene as Trump did to raise oil prices (when Moscow and Riyadh engaged in a price war last spring). Biden will be supportive of the “Abrahamic” agreements for recognition of Israel by the UAE and Bahrain (as well as Sudan).
Biden shares with Trump the conviction that the US needs to draw down in the Middle East and will look for opportunities to do so. But he won’t do it capriciously or unilaterally, as Trump did in Syria and threatened to do in Iraq. Biden will deliberate carefully in making decisions and consult with allies and partners before making dramatic moves. That is a far better way, as abrupt withdrawal could lead to a perilous nuclear arms race among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey that would be difficult to stop.
Here are two additional propositions for Biden to consider:
1. Cooperation with the Gulf’s biggest oil and gas customer, China, in providing security for the Gulf. The US takes little oil through the strait of Hormuz and no gas, so all of the Gulf’s Asian partners (including Japan and South Korea as well as India and China) are free-loading on gigantic US defense expenditures (12% or so of the Pentagon’s budget). It would be much smarter to get China and India to cooperate in a multilateral naval effort, as well as to join the IEA in holding 90 days of strategic stocks. China already patrols (for pirates) just outside the Gulf. Tehran will not be interested in menacing a multilateral effort to protect Hormuz that includes its main oil customers.
2. A regional security arrangement that includes the Gulf Arabs, Turkey, and Iran. Intervention in the Middle East hasn’t worked well for the US. Neither has withdrawal. We need to prepare the region diplomatically to ensure its own stability by helping its states to construct a regional security arrangement like those that exist in virtually ever other corner of the world. This diplomatic effort could be much more cost-effective than the last two decades of successful military interventions followed by governance failures.
The Middle East faces a daunting array of issues: unfinished civil wars, sectarian strife, youth bulges, climate change, water shortages, the oil curse, autocracy, state fragility, unemployment, economic underperformance, and growing geopolitical rivalry among China, Russia, and the US. No one should minimize the difficulties, but Biden can make a difference if he eschews unilateralism, seeks to consult all the countries of the region, and tries to get a minimum of agreement among the great powers on a course forward while encouraging the states of the region to stabilize their own neighborhood.
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Trouble in the Gulf will require more than arms
Here are the speaking notes I used yesterday at the Third Annual Conference of the Gulf International Forum:
- The Gulf today is engulfed with multiple dimensions of conflict and instability.
- Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are still at odds with Qatar as well as with Turkey and Iran about leadership in the region and the role of political Islam in the Muslim world.
- The US is pursuing a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran that has repercussions throughout the Gulf and the Levant, especially Iran and Iraq.
- Iran is responding with “maximum resistance,” which includes continued support for the wars on their own people by Bashar al Assad and the Houthis as well as shifting Iranian foreign policy in the direction of Beijing and Moscow.
- Global warming, declining oil prices, youth bulges, sectarian resentments, and COVID-19 are challenging the ability of Gulf states to maintain their social contract: authoritarian stability and material prosperity in exchange for political quiescence.
US Interests and Disinterest in the Region - US priorities in the Gulf have shifted. Oil is far less important economically and politically than it once was, and America’s main terrorism threat is domestic, not international.
- Higher priority in Washington now goes to countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction and limiting the influence of rival powers in the Middle East.
- The problem for the United States is that none of its interests in the Gulf are well-served by coercion, but neither are they well-served by withdrawal, which hurts partners and allies, even giving them incentives to develop nuclear weapons, while opening new opportunities for rivals.
- Whoever is elected President next month, the US interest in reducing its commitment to the Gulf will continue, but it needs to be done without endangering friends and encouraging adversaries or unleashing a regional arms race.
- Biden and Trump should be expected to behave differently in pursuing US goals.
- President Trump is impatient and transactional. He will likely pull the plug on US troops in places not prepared to protect or pay for them (Iraq and Syria). The “Abrahamic” agreements are transactional: Israel gets recognition in exchange for its help in sustaining Gulf autocracies.
- Biden did not invent this idea, but he isn’t opposed to it.
- Where the candidates differ is on Palestine and on governance in the Arab world. Biden continues to favor a two-state outcome for Israel and Palestine, whereas Trump and his Israeli partners seek to eliminate any possibility of creating a viable Palestinian state.
- While safeguarding Israel’s security, Biden would push for a better deal for the Palestinians than the one Trump has offered. He would also be less tolerant of Gulf human rights abuses.
- Biden and Trump also differ on the value of the Iran nuclear deal, but it is important to recognize that they share the same goal: to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Trump’s approach is “maximum pressure,” mainly through unilateral sanctions but also including the threat of kinetic action. He aims to force Iran back to the negotiating table to negotiate a “better deal” that would include regional issues, missiles, and extending and expanding the nuclear agreement.
- Biden wants to negotiate with Iran on the same issues but is prepared to lift some sanctions to incentivize a return to the status quo ante: Iranian and US compliance with the nuclear deal. Whichever candidate wins, Iran is unlikely to change course before its June election, if then.
A Much-Needed Regional Security Framework
- Neither Trump nor Biden rules out war with Iran, which would be catastrophic for the Gulf states. Doha has the most to lose.
- But war is not an attractive proposition for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama either. Israel and the Gulf states don’t want Iran to get nuclear weapons and will cooperate to prevent it, but the Arabs will not want to risk joining Israel and the US in an overt conventional war with Iran whose winner may be predictable but whose consequences could be catastrophic for the Gulf.
- President Trump has been a welcome figure in the Arab Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. He has shielded the Kingdom and its Crown Prince from accountability for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and continued the Obama Administration’s support for the Yemen war, despite growing bipartisan discomfort in the US.
- Because of his human rights commitments, Biden will be less favored in the Gulf. He will not be sword dancing in Riyadh or cheering the war in Yemen.
- But the differences should not obscure the similarities. The two candidates share the desire to reduce US commitments in the Gulf and the interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Several of their predecessors also had these goals and failed to achieve them.
- The reason is all too clear: the Americans have relied too heavily on coercion and too little on diplomacy.
- The United States has enormous destructive military, political, and economic power. But that alone cannot build what is needed: a regional security network that will reduce threat perceptions in all the Gulf states, Iran included, decrease incentives to develop nuclear weapons, and prevent encroachments by rival powers.
- This framework will require a stronger diplomatic nexus of mutual understanding, restraint, and respect. Continued low-intensity and gray zone conflict, or a real war, will make that much more difficult to achieve. The Gulf is not a military challenge, but rather a diplomatic one.
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The hurdle in Lebanon is political
Randa Slim and I published a piece on Beirut reconstruction today in Foreign Affairs today. As we focus in the piece on investigation of the explosion and reconstruction, it did not treat the heinous behavior of the Lebanese security forces towards demonstrators, hence my temptation to include the video above from Human Rights Watch.
Lebanon is a failing state. It was failing even before the August 4 explosion that devastated a large part of the city center near the port. Such states offer profit opportunities to whoever holds power, while impoverishing everyone else. It is no easy task to help such a country without helping its power elite.
Randa and I offer in the Foreign Affairs piece a combination of two ideas for rebuilding the destroyed area: a contractual relationship for reconstruction and an internationally controlled but Lebanese-staffed “authority” to set priorities and do most of the actual contracting. The “contract” idea has often been used in recent years, at various levels of operation: the Millennium Challenge Corporation we site does it at the project level. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund does it at a higher policy level. The European Union does it with candidate members. It amounts to conditionality: you get the money only if you do such and such.
The wise choice of “such and such,” and the willingness to follow through on the conditionality, are key elements of this approach. If our approach were to be adopted, the focus should be mainly on economic policy reform as well as transparency and accountability for government expenditure. But that creates an obvious problem: the international community would be asking for reforms from a central government that would not suffer any direct loss if aid were to be cut off. I think the importance of Beirut reconstruction to the government would be sufficient to mitigate this mismatch, but I’m in favor of examining downsides of any policies I suggest.
The idea of an International Beirut Reconstruction Authority is the more innovative of our propositions. Something like it existed in Sarajevo during the 1992/95 Bosnian war, but its capability was limited due to the siege and continued fighting. Randa and I cite the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but the entity we have in mind is more hands-on than that. It would actually contract for and execute the reconstruction, as independently of the Lebanese government as feasible. Critics will say that proposition would weaken the Lebanese government. I would suggest the government has even more important things to do by way of economic and political reform.
We went light on the political reform piece, which is fraught. Lebanon is in form a democracy. If only technically competent people formed the government, they would likely have little connection to the political forces in the parliament, whose cooperation is necessary for many reforms. Meaningful political reform would give less weight to Lebanon’s sectarian political organizations, including Hezbollah, and more to its vibrant and competent civil society, including the demonstrators abused in the above video. Shifting power in that way is an enormous challenge, even in a small country. And it will have to be Lebanese who design a political system that delivers more to citizens and less to sectarian leaders.
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