Tag: Gulf states
Peace Picks | February 24 – 28
After Suleimani: Crisis, Opportunity, and the Future of the Gulf | February 24, 2020 | 9:00 AM – 12:15 PM | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
The killing of Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January 2020 sent conflicting signals about the depth of U.S. engagement in the Gulf. The United States seems intent to diminish its presence while keeping an active hand in regional affairs. Meanwhile, Russia and China are exploring ways to reshape their own presence in the region.
Please join the CSIS Middle East Program for a conference to examine the Gulf region in the wake of General Qassem Suleimani’s death. Two expert panels will explore security threats and new opportunities for diplomacy in the region. General Joseph L. Votel will then deliver a keynote address on Great Power competition in the Gulf, followed by a Q&A moderated by Jon B. Alterman, senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski chair in global security and geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program.
Speakers:
General Joseph L. Votel, President and CEO, Business Executives for National Security
Ambassador Anne Patterson, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. State Department
The Honorable John McLaughlin, Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Dr. Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
Ambassador Douglas Silliman, President, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
The Honorable Christine Wormuth, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation
Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinkski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program
Solving the Civil War in Libya | February 24, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM| Brookings Institute | Register Here
With armed factions vying for control of the country’s strategic assets and United Nations-facilitated negotiations leading nowhere, 2020 has seen no improvement to the turmoil that has plagued Libya since the ouster of Moammar al-Gadhafi in 2011.While the self-styled Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar continues, unsuccessfully, to try to take over the country militarily, the internationally-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez Serraj in Tripoli, propped up by militias opposed to Haftar, retains control over major institutions and sources of national wealth. With the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt backing Haftar, and Turkey and Qatar backing Serraj, weapons of increasing sophistication are flowing to opposing sides, pitting foreign powers against each other and violating U.N. sanctions.
Meanwhile, facing a stagnant economy and constant threats to infrastructure, the Libyan people are caught in the crossfire of this protracted jockeying. Unchecked migration and the threat of extremist groups taking hold in the country’s contested spaces likewise make Libya’s internal situation a security concern for Europe and the United States. Solving the civil war in Libya would restore needed stability to a strategically vital part of northern Africa, while laying the groundwork for the prosperity of the Libyan people.
On February 24, the Brookings Institution will host an event to discuss these issues. Moderated by Michael O’Hanlon, the conversation will feature Federica Saini Fasanotti, whose new book “Vincere: The Italian Royal Army’s Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922-1940” provides timely and salient insight into the history of warfare in Libya.
Speakers:
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator), Senior Fellow and Director of Research for Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute
Federica Saini Fasanotti, Nonresident Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings Institute.
Karim Mezran, Resident Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council
Turkey Forging Its Own Path: Looking at the Changing US – Turkish Relations | February 24, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Turkey’s relations with the West are at an all-time low. Scarcely a day passes without a report or headline on the front page of leading newspapers questioning Turkey’s reliability as a Western ally. The widening gulf between Turkey and the West and the increasing number and the growing complexity of the issues over which the two sides differ make it imperative to understand the dynamics of the relationship between Turkey and the West. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a launch event for Dr. Oya Dursun-Özkanca’s new book, Turkey–West Relations: The Politics of Intra-alliance Opposition. In her book, Dr. Dursun-Özkanca seeks to explain how and why Turkey increasingly goes its own way within the Western alliance and grows further apart from its traditional Western allies.
Please join us for a discussion on US-Turkish relations with Dr. Dursun-Özkanca and the director of MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies Dr. Gönül Tol. Books will be available for purchase at the event.
Speakers:
Oya Durson- Özkanca is the endowed chair of International Studies and Professor of Political Science at Elizabethtown College.
Gönül Tol, moderator, is the founding director of The Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies.
Colombian Human Rights Leaders Protect Their Peace | February 24, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here | Will be live webcast
Since the agreement with the FARC was signed in 2016, human rights leaders in Colombia have been operating in an increasingly high-risk climate. Just last month, the U.N. released a report detailing the elevated numbers of threats and assassinations targeting human rights leaders throughout 2019—particularly in rural areas and against those advocating on behalf of women and ethnic groups such as indigenous and Afro-descendant communities. But despite this growing security risk, the winners of the 2019 National Prize for the Defense of Human Rights have worked tirelessly to advance and protect core tenets of the peace agreement in their communities.
Organized by the Swedish humanitarian agency Diakonia and the ACT Church of Sweden, the Colombian National Prize for the Defense of Human Rights honors social leaders as they continue to defend their communities’ right to security, land, education, health, reparations, and access to justice under the 2016 deal.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace,
the Washington Office on Latin America, and the Latin America Working Group
Education Fund as we host the winners of the 2019 awards. These leaders will
discuss how they engage diverse social sectors as well as local, regional, and
national institutions and authorities to promote peace and ensure democratic
spaces for civic engagement.
The event will be streamed live. To follow the conversation on Twitter, use
#ColombiaPeaceForum.
Speakers:
Clemencia Carabali, 2019 National Prize for the Defense of Human Rights “Defender of the Year” Award Winner, Director, Association of Afro-descendant Women of Norte del Cauca
Ricardo Esquivia, 2019 National Prize for the Defense of Human Rights “Lifetime Defender” Award Winner; Executive Director, Sembrandopaz
Lisa Haugaard, Co-Director, Latin America Working Group Education Fund; Juror, National Prize for the Defense of Human Rights
Annye Páez Martinez, Representative of the Rural Farms Association of Cimitarra River Valley; 2019 National Prize for the Collective Experience or Process of the Year
Marco Romero, 2019 National Prize for the Defense of Human Rights “Collective Process of the Year” Award Winner, Director, Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y e Desplazamiento
Gimena Sánchez- Garzoli, Director for the Andes, Washington Office on Latin America; Juror, National Prize for the Defense of Human Rights
Keith Mines (moderator), Senior Advisor, Colombia and Venezuela, U.S. Institute of Peace
After Parliamentary Elections: Iran’s Political Future | February 26, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Woodrow Wilson Center | Register Here | Event will be live webcast
Iran’s parliamentary elections are set for February 21, 2020. Reformists won a plurality in 2016, but the balance of power is up for grabs after the failure of the reformists’ domestic and foreign agendas, growing discontent reflected in multiple rounds of protests, the tightening security crackdown, and economic woes spawned by the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.
Speakers:
Robin Wright (moderator), USIP- Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, Journalist and author of eight books, and contributing writer for The New Yorker
Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
Ariane Tabatabai, Visiting Assistant Professor, Georgetown University
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist, Middle East Affairs, Congressional Research Service
What’s in store for U.S. – Turkey relations in 2020? | February 27, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM | Turkish Heritage Organization | Register Here
Speakers:
Jennifer Miel, Executive Director, U.S.- Turkey Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Col. Richard Outzen, Senior Advisor for Syrian Engagement, U.S. Department of State
Mark Kimmit, Brigadier General (U.S. Army, ret)
José Andrés on Humanitarian Relief | February 27, 2020 | 6:00 PM – 7:00 PM | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
For a decade, Chef José Andrés and his nonprofit, World Central Kitchen, have been on the humanitarian frontlines. What have they learned? And how can the humanitarian sector renew and revitalize itself for the coming decade?
Carnegie President Bill Burns will host Chef Andrés for a wide-ranging and timely conversation, part of The Morton and Sheppie Abramowitz Lecture Series. The series honors former Carnegie president Morton Abramowitz and his wife Sheppie, two renowned leaders in the world of humanitarian diplomacy, and highlights prominent thinkers and doers who follow in their extraordinary footsteps. NPR’s Nurith Aizenman will moderate.
The event will be preceded by a light reception from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m.
Speakers:
José Andrés is an internationally-recognized culinary innovator, New York Times bestselling author, educator, television personality, humanitarian, and chef/owner of ThinkFoodGroup. In 2010, he founded World Central Kitchen, a nonprofit that provides smart solutions to end hunger He was named one of Time Magazine’s 100 Most Influential People in both 2012 and 2018, and awareded Outstanding Chef and Humanitarian of the Year by the James Beard Foundation.
Nurith Aizenmanis NPR’s correspondent for global health and development. She reports on disease outbreaks, natural and manmade disasters, social and economic challenges, and innovative efforts to overcome them. Her reports can be heard on the NPR News programs Morning Edition and All Things Considered.
William J. Burns is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of state. He is the author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal.
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Hard to know how to please the US
The Middle East Policy Council hosted a discussion January 25 assessing Trump Administration mid- term policy on the Middle East, with Philip Gordon, Fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was joined by Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute and Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Director of the Middle East Program.
Gordon described Trump Administration policy in the Middle East as based on a core contradiction. On one hand, it sets out to constrain Iran from meddling in the region, to defeat ISIS, to achieve a Palestinian/Israeli peace, and show US leadership. On the other hand, the President regards the Middle East as only sand and death where the US has spent around $6 trillion without getting anything in return. The US thus wants to leave and make others pay for the expenses incurred.
Two years of trying to inflict pain on the Iranian economy did not make Iran change its behavior in the region. However costly and risky the mission might be, Gordon thinks the US should have maintained troops in Syria to prevent a Turkish invasion, giving the Kurds the leverage they need in negotiations with Damascus, and finishing the job against ISIS. Trump wants Gulf states to invest invest in the US, buy US weapons, and fight ISIS in return for backing them on countering Iran. This policy has signaled a green light to do what they want to boycott Qatar, continue the bombing campaign in Yemen, and repress dissidents.
Doran offered a different assessment of Trump Administration policy in the Middle East based on what the President promised during his election campaign: doing more with less. Trump’s approach is totally different from Obama’s of no enemies or friends, only stakeholders and problems. The US works to reach an agreement accepted by all friendly parties. Trump looks after US interests and seeks to save blood and treasure by working with allies who accept the US security umbrella in the region, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This policy favors a coalition of allies to contain Iran. Doran claims this policy is much better than Obama’s.
Ultimately, it’s all about how you read the Iranians for Doran. Obama downplayed Iran’s aspirations. Trump thinks Iran wants to destroy the US alliance system and kick it out of the Gulf region and the Middle East.
Confused about US policy in the Middle East, Alterman pointed out what he sees as Trump’s contradictory policies in the region. John Bolton, National Security Adviser, stated the US is staying in Syria, while the president contradicted him by declaring the withdrawal. Trump said it would take thirty days to pull out and now it’s six months. In Gulf states, Trump disengaged on Yemen, embraced Saudi Arabia, and ignored the GCC conflict. The president is divorced from his government and has a poorly functioning staff. That said, Trump’s three main objectives are reasonably clear: building close ties with Saudi Arabia, countering Iran (and reversing Obama strategy of engaging it), and holding the Middle East at arm’s length.
But this strategy, Alterman argued, is not working. It is bizarre for Trump to make Iran the core of the Middle East strategy, since Tehran is weak. Its GDP is between the state of Maryland and Michigan. Mississippi, which has the lowest income per capita in the US, has seven times the income per capita of Iran. Iran has no allies in the Middle East. It can be a spoiler in the region but cannot be a winner.
For Alterman, the biggest mistake the US is making is an idiosyncratic embrace of some Middle Eastern states and the abandonment of many, rendering it hard for countries to understand how to please the US.
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Trump is right
Donald Trump said earlier this week about the Middle East:
Now, are we going to stay in that part of the world? One reason is Israel. Oil is becoming less and less of a reason because we’re producing more oil now than we’ve ever produced. So, you know, all of a sudden it gets to a point where you don’t have to stay there.
This is more sensible than 99% of what the man says, even if I think Israel can more than take care of itself. But the main reason for US military deployments in the Middle East is oil, which is far less important than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. That is what prompted President Carter’s 1980 pledge to defend the flow of oil from the Gulf:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
President Carter’s Doctrine was a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he feared presaged a thrust towards the Gulf. The Soviet Union is gone, Afghanistan is a mess, and the US economy is now far less dependent on oil imports and energy of all sorts than it was in 1980. The Gulf oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia, are far more dependent on oil exports, which they send predominantly to Asia, especially China, Japan, India, and South Korea.
The US nevertheless spends about 12% of the Pentagon budget on protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf and holds a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of well over 100 days of imports, thus protecting our principal economic competitors from the effects of an oil supply disruption while they free ride on our preparations. It is true of course that an oil supply disruption would also affect the US economy, since oil prices are set in a global market and US consumers would feel the price hike in imports of goods of all sorts. But changed circumstances should affect burden-sharing: we need to do less and other oil consumers need to do more.
There are other ways in which the Middle East merits lower priority for American foreign policy. Middle East terrorism now has little impact on Americans both at home, where right-wing attackers are far more common than Islamic ones, and abroad, where relatively few Americans have suffered harm, most of them either by sheer accident or by travel into known danger zones. Nuclear proliferation is still an issue, but mainly a self-inflicted one due to American withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, which is far from the giant threat the Administration is portraying it as. Even if that were not true, American deployments in the Gulf are far too close to Iran for war-fighting purposes. We would need to move them farther away in order to use them in an attack.
The problem is that withdrawal from the Middle East is as problematic as intervention there. That is what President Obama demonstrated. His restraint in Libya, Syria, and Yemen left vacuums filled by jihadis, Iranians, and Gulfies. The results have been catastrophic for each of the states in question. Intervention by middling powers without multilateral authorization and on one side or the other in a civil war is known to have little chance of success and to prolong conflicts. Where the US re-committed its forces in Iraq, whose state was in far better shape than those in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, the results were far more salutary, even if not completely satisfactory.
Part of the problem for the US is lack of diplomatic capacity. American diplomacy has become far too dependent, both physically and strategically, on military presence. Military withdrawal requires a diplomatic posture that can be sustained without the troops. Many other countries by necessity have learned the trick of hitting above their military weight with diplomatic capacity. Witness an extreme example like Norway, or a less dramatic one like Germany. These are countries that lead with their diplomatic and economic clout, not with their troops, ships and planes.
There has been to my knowledge no serious discussion of the difficulties of withdrawal and how they can be met. Part of solution lies in beefing up the political, economic, and cultural capacities of American diplomacy. But withdrawal will remain perilous anyplace a legitimate, inclusive, well-functioning state does not exist. Statebuilding has gotten a really bad name from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it remains a vital component of any effort to reduce US commitments abroad. About that, both Trump and Obama have been wrong.
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Iran’s offensive defense
The International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a panel of experts on Iran’s Regional Posture October 11. The panel consisted of Dina Esfandiary, fellow at the Century Foundation, Ambassador Barbara A. Leaf, former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, and Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director of the International Crisis Group.
Panelists revisited the nature and role of Iran today, dissecting Iran’s motivations, threats, and constraints, beyond traditional perspectives that privilege analyses based on American interests. With ethno-sectarian conflicts raging in Syria and Yemen as well as a tense political transition in Iraq, the Saudi-led Gulf states and Iran, the region’s major actors, have been embroiled in a competition of political and strategic influence.
But is it that simple? Esfandiary sought to move beyond polarity. She pointed out that Iran is not simply vying for power, but seeks to preserve its territorial integrity against Western and Gulf nations it views as aggressive. As a main center of Shi’a Islam, Iran sees itself as entitled to regional influence. Esfandiary elaborated that while religion was a foreign policy driver for the post-Revolution state’s early years, the Iranian government now leans towards nationalism as a better way to unify the nation’s people and frame its foreign policy endeavors. Elaborating on this point, Leaf said that Iran’s posture should be understood as an offensive defense, a response to the US presence and support of both the Israelis and the Saudis, which it sees as a threats to its territorial integrity and legitimate involvement in Arab affairs.
Iraq, Esfandiary said, is Iran’s highest regional priority. Tehran seeks a central government in Baghdad aligned with its interests. However, with the election of Barham Salih as Iraq’s new President, and his selection of Adel Abdul Mahdi as Prime Minister, many analysts have signaled a turn in Iraq away from the rigid ethno-sectarian politics that have dominated the post-invasion landscape. With many Iraqis disillusioned by dysfunctional governance resulting from proxy politics, Iran’s ability to sway the new government’s formation and the future of the nation’s politics are limited. Esfandiary further identified the Syrian civil conflict as Iran’s second priority, and the conflict in Yemen as its last priority, questioning whether Iran has a long-term strategic goal in Yemen at all. Leaf agreed, with Iraq as Iran’s greatest concern given the election year.
Invoking Iran’s Hezbollah model, Leaf listed the three major instruments in Iran’s toolbox:
- Creating and directing splintered proxy groups, preferably local actors, to shape civil conflicts as Tehran sees fit. In particular, supporting and directing Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
- Increasing its defense and intelligence architecture in Syria, part of its corridor to Israel and the Mediterranean.
- Exploiting disordered Arab states with sizeable Shi’a minorities.
Vaez added Iran’s nuclear program as another instrument of the state’s offensive defense strategy in the region: a deterrent to nuclear Israel and the aggressive Gulf states, all supported by the US.
Underscoring the constraints of current containment policies, Vaez underlined that Trump was misguided in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. While the goal is to deprive Iran of resources through sanctions, Iran’s regional proxy operations are not strongly correlated to sanctions, citing 2011 as a year in which Iran was able to expand its proxy operations while under increased pressure from multilateral sanctions.
With another round of harsher sanctions going into effect on November 4, Vaez fears that in the unlikely scenario of effective sanctions, Iran’s political system and elite will welcome a crisis, whipping up nationalist sentiment and acting in a less risk-averse manner throughout the region. Leaf, who submitted testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcomittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade in support of sanctions, brought up this fear in encouraging the committee to avoid mistiming sanctions, lest they strengthen Iranian nationalism.
For Esfandiary, the Gulf Arab states’ insistence that Iran pull out as a precondition for negotiations is one of the biggest constraints in reducing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. She argued that Yemen could have been ideal for negotiations with Iran, which has made it clear it is willing to negotiate. Leaf echoed this sentiment, stating that while the fractured Gulf states have tried to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table via Oman, only Tehran can succeed. Iran has been reckless in supporting the Houthis, rapidly transferring military training and technology to them. But the Houthis are independent, often operating against Iranian wishes as in their capture of both Sa’ana and Aden. Their relationship to Iran is very different from that of Hezbollah or other proxies. Further recklessness on the part of the Houthis, such as attacks on commercial ships, could be problematic for Iran.
All three panelists agreed that Iran’s image in the international sphere has improved significantly, regardless of its proxy activities. Esfandiary
and Vaez both pointed to the European Union’s effort to bypass US sanctions as well as the ICJ ruling in favor of Iran as indicators of a recovering international image. Despite the negative domestic impact of the war in Syria and Iraqi resistance to Iranian meddling, Iran appears uninterested in negotiating with the US in any capacity. Tehran instead is emphasizing its relationships with the EU, China, and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are especially important and have a higher level of familiarity with the Iranian economy than their Western counterparts.
Ultimately, Vaez warned of the need for a more inclusive security and intelligence architecture in the Middle East. The region needs a long-term strategy to escape the asymmetry and escalating armament in the region.
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Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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