Tag: Gulf states
Keeping our bases covered
The Persian Gulf region has seen a buildup in American military power in recent decades. With major bases in various countries – Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base), Bahrain (headquarters of the Fifth Fleet), Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base), and the UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) among them – the US has grown its military footprint across many of the Gulf.
Today, the operation of American bases has been complicated by the ongoing feud between Qatar and rival Arab Gulf states, most notable Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have cut diplomatic and trade relations since June of 2017. With the crisis showing no sign of resolution, the US is caught in the struggle between its Gulf allies, with America’s military bases put increasingly into question. Will the US follow the demands of its Gulf allies and cut its alliance with Qatar, as some in the White House have indicated?
On April 5, the American Security Project held an event to discuss US military bases in the Persian Gulf region, and their role in furthering American strategic interests in the wake of this crisis. The event featured the Inspector General of the Qatari Armed Forces, Staff Major General Nasser AbdulAziz Al-Attiyah. Joining him were USMP (Ret.) David Des Roches, Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, and Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, along with Asha Castleberry, Professor at Fordham University, who served as moderator in the discussion. Watch a full video recording of the event here:
Takeaways:
The Qatari government is very eager for U.S. bases to remain open. As Asha Castleberry and Stephen Cheney opened the event, they noted that it was put together rather quickly, predicated upon the participation of their Qatari guest. Nasser Al-Attiyah, for his part, repeated that the government of Qatar has been a friend and steadfast ally to the US for over 20 years, as exemplified by readiness to accept American air forces after pressure from Saudi Arabia forced them to move in 2003. Al-Attiyah emphasized Qatar’s value to the United States in both economic terms (as the 2nd-largest global buyer of American weapons) and strategic (as Qatar plans to expand Al Udeid Air Base and construct a new US naval base in coming years). His government sees its relationship with the US “as one of our top priorities,” echoing the views of the Qatari palace.
Qatar has been a particularly comfortable host of American troops in the Middle East. Both Stephen Cheney and David Des Roches noted the tricky nature of hosting military bases in the Middle East. The US government insists on legal immunity for American soldiers, despite the Mideast’s distaste for “capitulations” to foreign powers. Bilateral relations can easily become strained. Qatar has given the US few headaches. American soldiers face fewer restrictions based on cultural taboos than other bases in the region (in contrast to Saudi, in particular). The air base at Al Udeid has been notably comfortable for American troops, with ample creature comforts and enough capacity to handle America’s largest aircraft.
The gains of keeping military bases abroad outweigh the liabilities. The speakers listed the benefits of having military bases distributed around the world: ability to respond to situations quickly, maintaining readiness for larger operations, training with allied nations, and allowing public diplomacy to the host country. But there are drawbacks too. Host countries can gain a certain amount of leverage over the United States by threatening to deny troops’ freedoms, but this is only possible when base residents were highly dependent on local infrastructure (as in Panama).
US strategy in the Persian Gulf benefits from keeping an array of regional allies. Building on Stephen Cheney’s comment that withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would be “inherently foolish” given US interests, Des Roches argued that keeping a “constellation of bases” in the region is an asset in case access to any one is suddenly rescinded. While Al-Attiyah assured that Qatar had agreed to lease its base at Al Udeid to the US until 2023, his promise was couched with the caveat that “in our region everything can be changed overnight.”
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It’s the region, stupid
The Middle East suffers from a whole range of problems. War and conflict are besetting wide parts of the region and have caused massive destruction as well as displacement in several countries, including Syria and Yemen. Climate change has brought about enormous environmental degradation such as desertification and water scarcity. At the same time, stressed domestic economies are increasingly unable to provide job opportunities for the region’s disenchanted youth. The Middle East faces enormous challenges that transcend borders and hence require answers that narrow-minded national policy making is no longer able to provide. Indeed, the region is today in dire need of regional responses.
On March 7, the Middle East Institute presented a roadmap of how future cooperation should look like in the Middle East. Resulting from Track 1.5 initiative involving current and former officials and senior experts from across the Middle East as well as from China, Europe, Russia, and the United States, the so-called Baghdad Declaration outlines 12 good neighborhood principles for the region. The discussion featured three major participants in the Middle East Dialogue. Naufel al-Hassan, deputy chief of staff to Prime Minister Haider al Abadi of Iraq, Abdullah al-Dardari, who serves as a senior advisor on reconstruction at The World Bank, and MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs Paul Salem provided their perspective on the Baghdad Declaration and the Middle East’s future. A full recording of the event is here:
Regional integration is already prevalent in the Middle East. Abdullah al-Dardari stresses that, excluding oil and gas, intraregional trade accounts for some 40% of total trade in the Middle East; taking the informal economy into consideration, this figure might even reach 60%. Moreover, the Middle East has the world’s highest level of intraregional level of remittances. Paul Salem underlines this observation and adds that only because of the high level of existing regional interdependence and interaction conflicts were able to spread that easily across the Middle East. However, the integration of today is neither well-structured nor reflected in the political relationships between Middle Eastern states.
The region is still in dire need of better cooperation among its members. Al-Dardari argues that the model of country-based economic growth has reached its apex in the Middle East. Self-sustained economic development is no longer possible as national labor markets, productive bases, and consumption levels have become too narrow. Instead, only regional economic integration and the resulting creation of an open regional market can attract extensive investment and the money needed to rebuild war-ravaged countries: an estimated one trillion dollar of assets has been destroyed since 2011. Naufel al-Hassan also points out that political and environmental challenges such as transnational terrorist networks and water scarcity go beyond the problem-solving capacities of single states and require common answers. In the same vein, the region’s governments can only bring back hope to the Middle East’s youth when they collaborate on providing decent job opportunities. A new regional framework is hence not an option, but a necessity.
Although the contemporary conflicts in the Middle East seem to make increased regional cooperation almost impossible to achieve, change is possible. Salem stresses that other regions of the world were able to transition from a conflict system to a stable order. Not even a century ago, Europe suffered from two wars which much exceeded the level violence that has beset the contemporary Middle East. Yet Europe has been able to overcome its international divisions and conflicts and has established a strong system of cooperation, the European Union. At the same time, the Middle East has proven to be able to move beyond regional standoffs, as the surmounting of rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia of the 1950s has demonstrated. We can thus be hopeful whereby al-Hassan emphasizes that a new stage of integration has already begun. To defeat ISIS, the region has displayed a new level of cooperation, which can serve as a blueprint for future efforts to unite in face of political, economic, and environmental challenges.
A better future is hence possible for the Middle East. The Baghdad Declaration offers a distinct vision that can show the path towards deeper integration in the region. When this transition will materialize will however depend on the readiness of the region’s current leadership to cease hostilities and acknowledge that small-minded national agendas cannot act as a remedy. For the sake of the Middle East and its people, this change of mentality and political outlook should occur soon.
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A weakened America
Is America stronger after 11 months of Donald Trump or not?
It is demonstrably weaker, mainly because of his diplomatic moves and non-moves, but also because Trump has done nothing to reduce American military commitments and a good deal to expand them. Let me enumerate:
The diplomatic front:
- Trump withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) early in the game. The remaining negotiating partners have X-ed out the provisions the US wanted on labor and environmental protection and are preparing to proceed, without American participation. TPP was America’s ace in the Asia Pacific.
- He is withdrawing as well from the Paris Climate Change accord. That is also proceeding without the US, which will be unable to affect international deliberations on climate change unless and until it rejoins.
- He has withdrawn from UNESCO, which excludes the US from participation in a lot of cultural, scientific and educational endeavors.
- He hasn’t announced withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but the negotiations on revising it are thought to be going very badly, mainly because of excessive US demands.
- He has refused to certify that the Iran nuclear deal is in the US interest, which is so patently obvious that the Republican-controlled Congress is making no moves to withdraw from it.
- His ill-framed appeal to the Saudis to halt financing of terrorists has precipitated a dramatic split among US allies within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
- Through his son-in-law he encouraged the Saudis to try to try to depose Lebanon’s prime minister and embargo Qatar, making the prime minister more popular than ever and shifting Doha’s allegiance to Iran.
- He has continued American support for the Saudi/Emirati war effort in Yemen, while at the same time the State Department has called for an end to the Saudi/Emirati blockade due to the humanitarian crisis there.
- His decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem heightened tensions between Israel and the Palestinians, undermined his own peace initiative, and obstructed the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia he hoped for.
- He has done nothing to counter Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and Syria, or Russia’s position in Syria and Ukraine.
- He initially embraced Turkey’s now President Erdogan but has watched helplessly while Turkey tarnishes its democratic credentials and drifts into the Russian orbit.
- He has also embraced other autocrats: Philippine President Duterte, China’s President Xi, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to name only three.
- He has failed to carry the banner of American values and preferred instead transactional relationships that have so far produced nothing substantial for the US.
The military front:
- Use of drones is way up.
- So is deployment of US troops in Europe, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, not to mention ships and planes in the Asia Pacific.
- The Islamic State, while retreating in Syria and Iraq, is advancing in Afghanistan, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are also holding their own.
- Allies are hesitating to pitch in, because the president is erratic. Japan, South Korea, and the Europeans are hedging because the US can no longer be relied on.
- The US continues to back the Saudi and Emirati campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, precipitating a massive humanitarian crisis.
- Cyberthreats to the US, including its elections, have increased, without any counter from the administration.
- Promises that North Korea would not be allowed to develop a missile that could strike the US have gone unfulfilled, and Trump did nothing effective once it accomplished that goal.
- Military options against North Korea, which are all that Trump seems to be interested in, will bring catastrophic results not only for Koreans but also for US forces stationed there and in the region.
- Russia continues to occupy part of Ukraine, with no effective military or diplomatic response by the US, and Moscow continues its aggressive stance near the Baltics, in the North Sea, in the Arctic, and in the Pacific.
The diplomatic record is one of almost unmitigated failure and ineffectiveness, apart from new UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea. The military record is more mixed: ISIS is defeated on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, but that is a victory well foreshadowed in the previous administration. It is also far from reassuring, since ISIS will now go underground and re-initiate its terrorist efforts. None of the other military pushes has done more than hold the line. Anyone who expected Trump to withdraw from excessive military commitments should be very disappointed. Anyone who expects him to be successful diplomatically without a fully staffed and empowered State Department is deluded.
The US is more absent diplomatically than present, and more present militarily than effective. We are punching well below our weight. This should be no surprise: the State Department is eviscerated and the Pentagon is exhausted. Allies are puzzled. Adversaries are taking advantage.
Where will we be after another three years of this?
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It may not last
I spent three days last week in Baghdad: two talking with people from all over the Middle East (with the important exception of Turkey) about the current situation and one talking with Iraqis.
First Baghdad: It is looking and sounding far more peaceful than it did six years ago, when I last visited. No detonations, lots of trees and other plants, heavy traffic, and bustling sidewalks. I didn’t get out of the Green Zone a lot, but we did stop in Kadhimia and Adhamiyah to see the main mosques. Apart from the all too evident sectarian character of both (the former Shia and the latter Sunni), there was nothing remarkable: just people going about normal life shopping, chatting, praying, strolling, and honking. What a change from 2004-2011, when I visited a couple of times per year. Adhamiyah during part of that time had to be surrounded with T-walls and checkpoints to protect its population from slaughter.
The Iraqi leadership: We of course only met a few people in high places, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of parliament, and one minister, in addition to a member of parliament and some of the prime minister’s staff. All are happy to see the Islamic State defeated on the battlefield and all are concerned not to allow it to revive. All are also looking to make cross-sectarian or cross-ethnic alliances in advance of next year’s May 12 election. None were waving sectarian or ethnic identity as their main calling card. This data suggests why (sorry for the size–Wordpress won’t scale it up):
In the general population, sectarian and ethnic identities are still terribly important. While Ayatollah Sistani’s call for volunteers roused some Sunnis to the cause of fighting ISIS, the Popular Mobilization Units he spawned are mostly aggressively Shia and believed to harbor political ambitions. Nor has the Kurdish retreat from pursuing independence reduced popular Kurdish enthusiasm for their own, independent state.
But the leadership has come to understand that gaining a majority in parliament and thereby control of the state requires, under the somewhat ramshackle 2005 constitution, coalitions. Besides, most Iraqis are looking for civil or secular technocrats to run the country. That reduces the relevance of ethnic and sectarian identity, of which Iraqis seem to have had their fill, at least as qualifications for governing.
None of this means the competition among the elite is finished, or even attenuated. To the contrary: all the main sectarian and ethnic blocks are fragmenting. The Kurds are no longer as united as once they were, among the Shia both the Dawa party and what used to be the Supreme Council are split, and there is no clearly dominant figure among the Sunnis. This should make cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian alliances a far more important factor than they have been in the past.
The other Middle Easterners: The mood among the other Middle Easterners attending this session of the Middle East Institute’s Dialogue was likewise more sanguine and friendly than I would have anticipated. All, like the Iraqis, are glad to see the Islamic State dealt defeat in Iraq and Syria, even if they anticipate that it will go underground and re-emerge as an insurgency. All disapproved but seemed more puzzled than angry about President Trump’s announcement on moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. All were happy to see Iraq in a better place.
There the commonalities seemed to end. The Iranians, who in the past have sometimes appeared irascible, were calm and analytical as well as concerned that their victory in Syria brought responsibilities they would rather avoid and anxious for a political solution in Yemen. They also seemed concerned that Iran’s effort to defend itself by supporting Shia proxy forces in the region was at its limit.
The Saudis and Emiratis were enthused about the new direction Riyadh is taking not only in Iraq but also in Yemen and in domestic Saudi policy. Others from Arab countries (Egypt and Jordan) were more reflective and a bit unsure what to make of the “new” Saudi Arabia. Several were concerned that the war is not really over: an Israeli or American attack on the Iranians or Hizbollah there could renew hostilities, not to mention the risk of an American clash with the Russians.
Unfortunately there were neither Turks nor Kurds in these group discussions. Had there been, the atmosphere and substance would have been more contentious. The uncertainty about American policy towards the Syrian Kurds is still big: will the Americans restrain them from attacking inside Turkey, or helping the Kurdish insurgents there? Will the Americans try to take back the heavier weapons they provided? Will the Americans withdraw precipitously? There are a lot of known unknowns that could affect the situation in Syria dramatically.
The extra-regional great powers: While a Moscow-based participant was quick to suggest that Russia had defeated ISIS, the Russians and Chinese were concerned, not happy, that post-ISIS Syria is their responsibility. They want the US involved, for both political and financial reasons. The Americans are showing no such inclination. Their assumption is that the Astana/Sochi process run by the Russians with cooperation from Iran and Turkey has superseded the Geneva process run by the UN to resolve the political conflict in Syria. They see no reason beyond defeating ISIS and possibly countering Iran for the American presence in Syria.
Bottom line: Despite the war in Yemen and the uncertainties surrounding how the war is ending in Syria, there is more reason to be sanguine about the region than people in Washington perceive. The bad news is it may not last.
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Peace picks December 18 – 22
- The Middle East Through Gulf Eyes: Trip Report from Riyadh, Muscat, and Abu Dhabi | Monday, December 18 | 10:00 – 11:30 am | Washington Institute for Near East Policy (event is available to the public through livestream) | Watch Here | During an eventful week for U.S. Middle East policy—highlighted by President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital—a fifty-person delegation from The Washington Institute traveled to the capitals of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates to meet with senior leaders, engage with a broad range of local society, and learn about important changes under way in each country. To share their findings and impressions from the trip, the Institute is pleased to host a special midmorning Policy Forum discussion with four of its experts: executive director Robert Satloff, managing director Michael Singh, and fellows Katherine Bauer and Lori Plotkin Boghardt.
- The Jerusalem Decision: The View from Washington, Tel Aviv, and Ankara (THO Teleconference) | Tuesday, December 19 | 10:00 – 11:00 am | Turkish Heritage Organization (event will take place over the phone) | Register Here | Please tune in to THO’s latest teleconference to hear from Prof. Dr. Cagri Erhan (Rector of Altinbas University), Dr. Raphael Danziger (Senior Research Advisor, Policy & Government Affairs and Editor-in-Chief Emeritus, Near East Report American Israel Public Affairs Committee), and Moran Stern of the Center for Jewish Civilization, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, as they discuss the ramifications of this decision. Prof. Dr. Mark Meirowitz (Assistant Professor of Humanities at SUNY Maritime College and Chair of THO’s Advisory Board Chair) will moderate the teleconference.
- Making Peace in Donbas? The Role of a Peacekeeping Mission | Tuesday, December 19 | 9:00 am | Atlantic Council | Register Here | For years, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has proposed a peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine as an important instrument to achieving a peace settlement. This fall, Russian President Vladimir Putin also suggested a limited peacekeeping mission as one element towards a settlement. Are international peacekeepers or peace enforcers instrumental or even necessary for ending the war in Donbas? The Atlantic Council and the Razumkov Centre are assembling a panel of experts to discuss Russia’s war in Donbas and the prospect of a peacekeeping operation. Speakers will include Ambassador Kurt Volker of the US Department of State, Dr. Sarah Mendelson of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Dr. Evelyn Farkas of the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow of the Atlantic Council, and Mr. Oleksiy Melnyk of the Razumkov Centre. The Council’s Ambassador John Herbst will moderate the event and deliver welcoming remarks.
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Will they build it?
Three questions arise about President Trump’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem:
- why did he do it?
- what will the consequences be?
- will it ever get built?
The why is domestic politics. He promised to do it during the campaign and his deepest-pocketed supporters wanted it done. The move gets a lot of support in the Christian evangelical community and far less among Jews, but the President needs concrete examples of fulfilling his campaign promises, many of which he has abandoned in office.
The opposition of allies and friends in Europe and the Middle East had little impact beyond inclusion in the announcement the assertion that it is not intended to prejudice a future decision on the boundaries of Jerusalem. That is specious, since he also implied that Jerusalem would remain undivided, which is the key issue. The announcement included nothing attractive from the perspective of Palestinians, Arabs, or Muslims more generally, which is why they see it as vitiating any potential role of the US as an honest broker in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
As for other consequences, we’ll have to wait and see. Protests are the least of it. There are many other longer-term possibilities. Trump has certainly cast doubt on the viability of the two-state solution most Israelis and Palestinians as well as the US and most of the rest of the world have been supporting for decades. Palestinians don’t want a state that doesn’t have its capital in Jerusalem any more than Israelis do.
If Palestinians can’t have their own state, they will seek equal rights within the single one, which will bring into doubt the state’s Jewish character. Arabs are likely the majority already, or soon will be, in the area Israel currently controls, if we count Gaza as well as the West Bank. The Israelis might want to give Gaza to Egypt, which controlled it in the past, but the Egyptians won’t take it: they don’t want to absorb a destitute Palestinian population that is in part Islamist. They’ve got enough trouble already in continuous Sinai.
The Trump administration is a radical one that enjoys upsetting the apple cart. The President likes to think this will open the way to progress. It is far more likely to end his own peace initiative, which son-in-law Kushner is heading. I even wonder whether, having realized that initiative was going no place, Trump decided to do something that would distract attention and engender enough violence so that its demise could be blamed on the Palestinians. But I suppose that just shows I’ve spent too much time lately in the Middle East, which loves conspiracy theories.
It is far more likely that ignorance and bullheadedness led to the decision to move the embassy. Now let’s see if Congress, which pushed for it, is ready to appropriate the several hundred million dollars it will cost to build the kind of fortress the United States will require in Jerusalem. Is it possible that we’ll suffer the consequences of this decision, but not see the facility built?
PS: For interesting Israeli responses to the Jerusalem move, see the short statements from Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.
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