Tag: Hamas
Beyond ceasefire, what can really happen?
The Gaza ceasefire went into effect today, after a few hours delay. Reports are that humanitarian supplies are entering. Hamas and Israel are arranging or exchange of hostages and prisoners. This phase is to last 6 weeks, after which a more permanent cessation of hostilities is to commence. What are the prospects for a longer agreement?
The next phase
Secretary of State Blinken helpfully outlined the Biden Administration’s plans for phase 2 at the Atlantic Council last week:
We believe that the Palestinian Authority should invite international partners to help establish and run an interim administration with responsibility for key civil sectors in Gaza, like banking, water, energy, health, civil coordination with Israel. The international community would provide funding, technical support, and oversight. The interim administration would include Palestinians from Gaza and representatives from the PA—selected following meaningful consultation with communities in Gaza—and would hand over complete responsibility to a fully reformed PA administration as soon as it’s feasible.
The administrators would operate in close cooperation with a senior UN official, who should oversee the international stabilization and recovery effort.
An interim security mission would be made up of members of partner nation security forces and vetted Palestinian personnel. Its responsibilities would include creating a secure environment for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and ensuring border security, which is crucial to preventing smuggling that could allow Hamas to rebuild its military capacity. We would stand up a new initiative to train, to equip, to vet a PA-led security force for Gaza to focus on law and order and gradually take over for the interim security mission.
These arrangements would be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.
Some of our partners have already expressed their willingness to contribute troops and police for such a mission—but if, and only if, it is agreed that Gaza and the West Bank are reunified under a reformed PA as part of a pathway to an independent Palestinian state.
This depicts a fairly conventional late 1990s style “integrated” intervention. The UN Security Council authorized interim administrations like this in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo (1999). They were not brilliantly successful, but they markedly improved the situation in all three places. Blinken omits one essential ingredient for success: executive authority. The UNSC will need to empower the interim authorities to issue laws, arrest people, and use force to protect civilians.
One new wrinkle here is the Palestinians, who are divided politically and geographically. Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas has already declared its readiness to take on its assigned role. I don’t know anyone who would agree with that proposition, as he has done little to reform it. Besides, it is going to have trouble gaining traction in territory ruled by Hamas for almost two decades. Hamas has said it is prepared to give up its governance role. But at least some of the remaining Hamas militants are going to make sure the PA has a hard time.
Other new wrinkles
I see little prospect that the current Israeli government will accept what Blinken proposes. Netanyahu will not want the ceasefire to last past 6 weeks. That would mark the beginning of the end for him. His right-wing coalition partners had a hard time accepting the ceasefire. They will not accept an international administration whose mandate includes eventual creation of a Palestinian state. In addition, if the war ends or his government collapses, Netanyahu will have to face prosecution and elections. He doesn’t want that.
It will not be possible to start up an international administration without Israeli cooperation. Neighbors are vital factors in determining the success or failure of post-war stabilization and reconstruction. Arab Gulf states won’t agree to contribute troops, police, and money without Israeli approval.
What remains of Hamas will also oppose the next phase, which threatens to end its rule permanently. After 6 weeks of recuperation and attempts to re-arm, extremists in Hamas will try to derail the process. It will only take an attack or two on innocent Israelis to restart the war.
The final new wrinkle
If ever we get to the next phase, it will be in the Trump Administration. In his first term, Trump gave the Israelis 100% support. He abandoned support for the two-state solution and moved the US embassy to Jerusalem. He accepted annexation of the Golan Heights and West Bank settlements as legal. His negotiators put forward a peace plan that paid little attention to the Palestinian goal of statehood.
Trump is reputed to have played a key role in getting the ceasefire. But he did that by threatening Hamas, not the Israelis. Blinken in his remarks at the Atlantic Council suggested that
Israelis must abandon the myth that they can carry out de-facto annexation without cost and consequence to Israel’s democracy, to its standing, to its security.
Trump isn’t going to tell them that. It will happen only if Israelis go to the polls and elect a government committed to Israeli democracy. That is what Netanyahu and his right-wing allies will try to prevent. If they succeed, the war will go on.
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An opportunity that may be missed
The Middle East is in a rare period of rapid change. The Assad regime in Syria is gone. Its successor is still undefined and uncertain. Israel has crippled Iran’s Hamas and Hizbollah allies. It is trying to do likewise to the Houthis in Yemen. Egypt is on the sidelines, preoccupied with civil wars in Libya and Sudan. A weakened Iran is contemplating whether nuclear weapons would help to restore its regional influence.
The global powers that be are not anxious to get too involved. Russia, stretched thin, let Syria go. The United States is inaugurating a president known to favor withdrawal from Syria. He will support almost anything Israel wants to do. China is doing its best to guarantee access to Middle East oil but wants to avoid political involvement. The European Union has a similar attitude.
So what will be the main factors in determining the future of the Middle East? Who has power and influence in the region and outside it?
Turkiye
The Turks are so far the big winners in Syria. They are getting an opportunity to send back Syrian refugees and will try to decimate their Syrian Kurdish enemies. They have influence over the ruling Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leadership in Damascus, whom they supplied and unleashed.
When it comes to reconstruction in Syria, Turkish companies are experienced and nearby. Turkish pockets aren’t as deep as American or Chinese pockets. But they are deep enough to get things started fast, especially if World Bank money is put on the table.
The Turks will try to convince the Americans to leave. They’ll argue that they can and will suppress Islamic State and other terrorists. They may even promise to allow the Kurds to continue their local governance structures. But they would want the Syrian Kurds to cut their ties to Kurdish terrorists inside Turkey.
The Turks will want a not-too-Islamist government in Damascus, something akin to their own. Syria has an enormously diverse population. HTS governance in Idlib was autocratic. But that was during the civil war. It will be much harder to impose that on Damascus after liberation from Assad. Syrians want their freedom. Turkiye has an interest in their getting it. Only inclusive governance will permit the return of refugees.
The Gulf
Some of the big money for reconstruction in Syria will come from the Gulf. The Saudis may be willing, if they gain some political influence in the bargain. How they use that influence will be important. In the Balkans 30 years ago they sponsored Wahabist clerics and mosques. Mohammed bin Salman has marginalized those within Saudi Arabia. We can hope he will not export them now. But he will, like the Turks, want a strong executive in Damascus.
What Syria needs from the Gulf is support for inclusive, democratic governance. The UAE will weigh in heavily against Islamism, but the Emirates are far from democratic or inclusive. Qatar, more tolerant of Islamism, will prefer inclusion, if only because the Americans will pressure them to do so.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu has not achieved elimination of Hamas in Gaza. But he has weakened it. The Israelis have been far more successful in Lebanon, where they have dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. They are also destroying many Syrian military capabilities. And they have seized UN-patrolled Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.
Israel had already neutralized Egypt and Jordan via peace agreements. Ditto the UAE and Bahrain via the Abrahamic accords, though they were never protagonists in war against Israel. It would like similar normalization with Saudi Arabia. Now Israel controls border areas inside Lebanon and Syria. Repression on the West Bank and attacks on the Houthis in Yemen are proceeding apace.
Netanyahu is resisting the end of the Gaza war to save his own skin from the Israeli courts and electorate. Whether he succeeds at that or not, his legacy will be an “Israeli World.” That is a militarily strong Israel surrounded by buffer zones. But he has done serious damage to Israeli democracy and society.
Iran
Iran is weakened. That will encourage it to quicken the pace of its nuclear program. It won’t go all the way to deploying nuclear weapons. That would risk giving the Israelis an excuse for a massive attack, or even a nuclear strike. Nor can Ankara adopt the Israeli policy of opaqueness, as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That requires openness to inspections. So transparency about its nuclear threshold status is the likely policy.
Bottom line
Turkiye, Israel, and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) are the big winners from the current Middle East wars. They would be even stronger if they were to cooperate. All have an interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, in stabilizing Syria, and in preventing terrorist resurgence. So does the US. There is an opportunity, but one that may be missed.
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It will end when Israel wants it to
Israel continues to enjoy military successes in both Gaza and Lebanon, but its adversaries fight on. The death of Yahya Sinwar leaves Hamas without clear leadership. The death of Hassan Nasallah likewise left Hezbollah without clear leadership. But both Islamist movements continue to attack. Their cadres seek “martyrdom.”
The options
Americans, official and unofficial, are urging Israel to take the win and embark on the day after. Israel has done enormous damage to both Hamas and Hezbollah. The Israel Defense Force has decimated, but not eliminated, their underground facilities, drones, rockets, and missiles, leadership, and personnel. Ending the fighting in Gaza as well as Lebanon would open the possibility of a prisoner/hostage swap in Gaza. It would also put pressure on the UN Security Council to move Hezbollah north of the Litani River. UNSC resolution 1701 requires that. It is the declared Israel war objective in Lebanon.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu isn’t buying. He wants to go after Iran, which is a state sponsor of both Hamas and Hezbollah. Israeli retaliation for Iran’s massive military attack on October 1, which did little damage, is still pending. His Defense Minister has promised it will be “lethal” and “surprising.” But it has also been delayed. The Americans want the Israelis not to target Iran’s nuclear program or its oil production facilities. The former will trigger an Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons. The latter would bump up world oil prices.
The politics
The wars in Gaza and Lebanon are not going to end before November 5. That would give Kamala Harris a big boost at the polls. Netanyahu doesn’t want that. He wants Donald Trump back in the White House. President Biden is threatening to withhold military assistance to Israel unless humanitarian assistance starts flowing again to Gaza. Trump would not do that. Judging from past experience, he would not seek to restrain Israel at all.
No matter whom the US elects, Netanyahu has his own political calculus. His only hope for remaining in power is a military victory so overwhelming Israelis will forget his faults. They include his personal malfeasance and his government’s failure on October 7. A dramatic blow to Iran would do the trick.
The civilians
In the meanwhile, civilians are suffering the brunt of war. The situation in Gaza is unprecedented. Virtually its entire population is displaced. Most of its housing stock, its educational and health systems, as well as its economy are destroyed. People are desperate. Some are starving. There is ample evidence the Israeli army has targeted civilians and children.
In Lebanon, the destruction is less extensive so far, but Netanyahu has threatened to make it like Gaza. The Israelis have obliterated some border communities. They have also hit Beirut, including areas that are not Hezbollah strongholds. Many Lebanese are displaced. Several thousand are dead.
How does this end?
Most Israelis want a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange. Most American Jews and Arabs have wanted that too. But Netanyahu wants to continue to fight Hamas and Hezbollah. He would also like to hit Iran hard. President Biden will to try to restrain him. A President Harris would do likewise. Trump would not.
Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated that he does what he wants. The Middle East wars won’t end until the Israeli government wants them to. That isn’t going to happen while Netanyahu is in office.
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Israel is its own existential threat
Last October’s Hamas attack on Israel was horrendous. It frightened Israelis more than any other single incident for decades. The numbers of Israelis killed were greater than those killed in the five years of the second Intifada. Hamas and its partners took more than 250 hostages to Gaza, more than 70 of whom are now dead. Several thousand Hamas fighters entered Israel in a well-rehearsed attack that Israeli intelligence operatives detected. Their superiors paid little attention.
But October 7, 2023 was not an existential threat to the Israeli state. Israeli citizens, both Jewish and Arab, responded spontaneously and quickly. The Israel Defense Force was slower and disorganized. It took the IDF three days to push all the Gazan fighters back into the Strip. Gazan fighters penetrated at the farthest about 15 miles into Israel. Most of the targets were much closer than that to the Gaza border:
Al Aqsa flood was not an existential threat
Hamas’ intent was to kill and capture as many Israelis as possible. The attackers were brutal and cruel. I’ve seen no evidence they cared whether their victims were Jews or Arabs, who can be difficult to distinguish. Many of the Jews came from peacenik kibbutzim near the Gaza border.
The operation likely succeeded beyond Hamas military leader Yahya Sinwar’s wildest dreams. Israel’s border was penetrated as it had never been penetrated before. The attack shook public confidence in the country’s intelligence and military. The cruel killing and raping of civilians infuriated Israelis. Fear and distrust in Israel spiked. Gazans celebrated.
But the Israeli state was never in danger. It is not even clear what that means. A few thousand fighters were not going to take Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. Hamas might have killed more Israelis and taken more hostages. It might have destroyed more kibbutzim. It might even have tried to hold on to territory for a few more days. None of that would have destroyed the Israeli state.
Netanyahu’s escalation is real
If last year’s attack was not an existential threat, this year’s conflict with Hezbollah and Iran is. That threat is the result of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s decisions. He has ignored American and other pleas for a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange in Gaza. His government also refuses to prepare for the “day after.” He prefers to continue the fight there indefinitely.
Additionally, he has widened the war to the West Bank. There both the IDF and the settlers are chasing Palestinians from their homes:
Netanyahu has also widened the war
Netanyahu has also widened the war to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran. Israel succeeded in killing and maiming thousands with its cellphone/walkietalkie attack in Lebanon. It also succeeded in assassinating Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders in both countries. Those successes far exceeded the usual tit for tat. They have led to escalation.
Iran’s large rocket and missile attack 10 days ago failed to kill Israelis or to destroy strategic assets. But it penetrated Israeli defenses and no doubt taught the Iranians more about what they need to do to succeed. Israel’s Defense Minister Gallant is now threatening a more robust response:
In contrast, our attack will be deadly, pinpoint accurate, and most importantly, surprising – they will not know what happened or how it happened. They will just see the results.
We’ll have to wait and see what this means.
Where might this end?
The spiral will be difficult to end without disaster. Hezbollah was initially an easier target than Hamas. Israel compromised the cell phones and walkietalkies its fighters and leaders use. But the ground war in Lebanon is a tougher grind, as is the continuing fight with Hamas in Gaza. The IDF has had to return repeatedly to areas in Gaza where Hamas has again popped up. Israel has lost more than 700 soldiers in the Gaza war. Another 40 or so have died in Lebanon.
Israel has already destroyed upwards of 70% of Gaza’s housing and killed more than 40,000, the Hamas Health Ministry says. Netanyahu is threatening to do in Lebanon what the IDF has already done in Gaza:
Why would Lebanese take advice from Netanyahu on their future?
The current level of destruction all but guarantees chaos in Gaza. It will do likewise in Lebanon if the war there continues.
Netanyahu aims to eradicate Hamas, upend the political system in Lebanon, and change the regime in Iran. Some in Washington have bought into those possibilities. But few who know Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran well think Israel can be the much-needed agent of change. Hamas and Hezbollah control vital social service networks that guarantee popular support. The Iranian regime has successfully resisted several popular uprisings. Bombing is notoriously ineffective at bringing about political change. It is more effective at mobilizing people to rally around the flag.
The more likely outcome
The more likely outcome of Israel’s multi-front war against its very real enemies is hatred and chaos. Hatred and chaos next door are not something Israel should be facilitating. America knows something about local resistance from Iraq and Afghanistan. Good intentions failed to counter the Taliban or bring stability to Iraq. But there withdrawal was an option. Gaza and Lebanon are Israel’s inevitable neighbors. Iran is its greatest security threat. Netanyahu has made Israel’s military success its own existential threat.
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It’s time to wake up and smell the coffee
So many people issue have written so much in response to October 7 and its aftermath! It is difficult to imagine saying anything new or even interesting. But after much hesitation I will discuss one issue: the difficult choice Arab Americans face in voting this year.
It had seemed to me that Arab American voters would come around to my perspective, so there was no need. But polling suggests that isn’t happening in the numbers I’d like. So here are some unsolicited views on why Arab Americans should vote for Harris, not Trump.
The Trump record
The Trump record on Israel is unequivocal. He called himself “the best friend Israel ever had in the White House.” But that isn’t correct. He was a best friend to the Israeli right. He gave them a lot of what they asked for:
- withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal,
- approved annexation by Israel of Syrian territory in the Golan Heights,
- moved the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,
- closed the Jerusalem consulate that functioned as an embassy to the Palestinian Authority (PA),
- cut funds for the PA,
- closed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington,
- rejected the claim that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal,
- cut the humanitarian and other assistance to Palestinians administered by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA),
- offered a take it or leave it pro-Israel peace plan,
- withdrew the US from the UN Human Rights Council because of its criticism of Israel, and
- sided with Israel against the International Criminal Court’s investigation of alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza and the West Bank.
Trump would do next what he did before
It’s hard to say for sure what Trump would do next. He hasn’t said much. He knows it would cost him critical votes in Michigan, Wisconsin, and elsewhere. But his advisers are the same people who established the record above. That suggests Trump would give unconditional support to Prime Minister Netanyahu to do whatever he wanted to do. A vote for Trump will condemn innocent people in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran.
Maybe all one really needs to know is that Trump is Netanyahu’s favored candidate. Israel’s Prime Minister has stiffed many of Biden’s efforts to moderate his offensive in Gaza and reach a ceasefire agreement. Netanyahu also rejected Biden’s pleas not to expand the war to Lebanon. That is not only because the Israeli Prime Minister wants the war to continue so he can stay in power. He also doesn’t want to give Biden any goodies before the election.
The Jewish vote
Trump is frustrated that his vigorous pro-Israel stance doesn’t get him more Jewish votes:
That’s at least in part because many Jewish Americans dislike what Netanyahu is doing as much as Arab Americans do. Many Jews were horrified at what happened October 7 but recognize that Israel is behaving unjustly. In Gaza, it has sought revenge rather than justice and ignored the civilian toll. It has also rejected reasonable proposals for a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange. In the West Bank, Israel is allowing and even encouraging settler violence against Palestinians. In Lebanon, it is destroying civilian infrastructure and killing people who have nothing to do with Hezbollah.
Most Jewish Americans want what most Israelis want. That is a ceasefire in Gaza and an exchange of prisoners and hostages, as well as a Palestinian state. Sixty-eight percent of Jews voted in 2020 for Biden. I would guess more will vote for Harris this November.
Jews and Arabs should be voting together
Jews will vote for Harris agreeing more with Arabs right now than at many times in the past. Arab American supporters of Hamas and Hezbollah are few and far between. Many understand that Hamas’ brutality on October 7 gave Israel motive and opportunity to brutalize Gaza. Hezbollah has participated both in a corrupt Lebanese political system and a war against civilians in Syria. Its rocket attacks on Israel likewise gave Israel motive and opportunity. But Arab Americans, like American Jews, want the wars to stop.
What troubles Arab Americans most is that Biden has not compelled Netanyahu to agree to a Gaza ceasefire. It troubles me as well. But I am convinced that Harris will have a far better chance of succeeding than Biden. Netanyahu will know that he faces at least four more years of her. If Trump is elected, it will mean four more years of a license to kill.
It’s time we all wake up and smell the coffee. Some have already done so. Emgage Action has endorsed Harris in a thoughtful and comprehensive statement. Harris has not promised the squeeze on Israel’s military supplies many would like. But she is clearly more sympathetic to Palestinian needs than Trump. Not voting, voting for a third party candidate, or voting for Trump, would be a serious mistake. Jews and Arabs who want peace in the Middle East should vote for Harris.
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The war Netanyahu wanted is at hand
Prime Minister Netanyahu has spent the 31 years since the Oslo accords seeking two principal foreign policy goals: preventing establishment of a Palestinian state and destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is on the verge of getting a chance to achieve both. In the process, he is ending Israeli democracy, earning the enmity of much of the Arab street, and drawing the US into another Middle East war. I don’t like the result, but he is definitely stalwart.
Obliterating the idea of a Palestinian state
I recall in the mid-1990s a discussion at a mutual friend’s house with the then National Security Advisor to Vice President Gore. Leon Fuerth believed that Netanyahu would eventually come around to accepting a Palestinian state. I had my doubts. I still think I was right.
Netanyahu spent many years thereafter pumping up the idea that Israel was under siege, both by the Palestinians and the Iranians. The Second Intifada and the wall Israel built to isolate itself, successfully, from the West Bank boosted his credibility. Once Hamas took over Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2006/7, he worked hard to keep the two governing bodies separate. Dividing the Palestinians was one way to make sure they couldn’t get what they wanted.
Defeating Iran
Hezbollah is Iran’s most important ally/proxy in the region. Israel has now destroyed perhaps 50% of its rocket and missile supplies and killed an even greater proportion of Hezbollah’s leaders. The pager/walkie-talkie attack two weeks ago maimed thousands of its cadres. Israeli troops are now on the ground in southern Lebanon seeking to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.
Netanyahu is imagining that regime in Iran is imminent:
He will be content with the results of yesterday’s 180-missile Iranian attack. Israel appears to have suffered little damage and no known strategic losses. Many of the missiles were destroyed before hitting their targets by US, Israeli, and other unnamed defenses.
Retaliation is nevertheless all but certain. Netanyahu has been looking for an opportunity to hit Iran for decades. The Israelis will likely aim for nuclear and oil production facilities. The nuclear facilities will be difficult to destroy, as vital ones are ensconced well under ground. The best the IDF can hope for is to block some of the access routes. The oil facilities are more vulnerable. Oil and natural gas are Iran’s major exports. If they don’t flow, the economy will deflate.
Restraint is not in the cards
The Americans and Europeans will be urging restraint on Israel. They don’t want a regional war. Netanyahu isn’t listening. His own political future depends on continuing the fighting and achieving a spectacular military success. Hamas has denied him that in Gaza. So far, Hezbollah has proven an easier target. Netanyahu knows President Biden will do nothing to Israel’s block arms supplies. And he wants to boost Trump’s chances of winning the presidency. So he has no reason to restrain an attack he has wanted to launch for decades.
Netanyahu’s governing coalition has only a thin majority in the Knesset. But his allies and his own Likud political party have given him a blank check in pursuing a regional war. The Arab states are protesting the war in Gaza but doing little to prevent Israel from attacking Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran. All of them are anathema to the Gulf monarchies. The Arab street is still sympathetic to the Palestinians, but it has little say. Restraint is not in the cards.
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