Tag: Hamas
What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan
The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?
Security, security, security
In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.
The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.
The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.
The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.
The gaping hole in the draft agreement
The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.
But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.
Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.
I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?
The other security requirement
The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.
The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.
Prove me wrong
I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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One key to Gaza’s future is inside Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu refuses to define an end-state for Gaza, beyond Israeli control of security there. But it is becoming clear what he intends. Along with his extreme-right coalition partners, Netanyahu wants to reproduce something like the West Bank in Gaza. The Palestinians would be limited to relatively small enclaves. Israeli security forces, possibly with support from Jewish settlements, would control corridors that separate them. The first of those already exists. Israel would control all movement in and out of the Strip, including from Egypt and the Mediterranean.
Occupation is occupation
In the West Bank, the Palestinians control security and civil administration only in Area A, which represents 18% of the territory. That control is often merely nominal. Nothing like it will be allowed in Netanyahu’s concept for Gaza. At best, the model for Gaza is Area B, where Israel controls security and the Palestinians nominally control civil administration. That represents 22% of the West Bank. But the reality will more than likely be close to Area C, where Israel controls both security and civil administration. Area C makes up 59% of the West Bank.
This is a formula for occupation but without the protection the 4th Geneva Convention affords. Israel claims the Convention does not apply because Palestine was not a state or legitimately part of one before Israel occupied it. Whatever the legalities, the fact is that Israel has not respected the Convention in the West Bank or Gaza in the past and cannot be expected to do so in the future. But occupation is occupation, even if you claim the Convention does not apply.
What could prevent it?
Netanyahu’s intentions are not however the only factor in determining what is going to happen. America, Europe, Arab states, Iran and its allies, and the rest of the world all have some influence. So too do the Palestinians.
US concurrence in this formula is possible if Donald Trump is re-elected. President Biden’s constituency would object vehemently. But Biden has demonstrated little capacity to influence the Israelis, even when he has had the will. Would he really cut off arms supplies to get a better deal for the Palestinians in Gaza? The Europeans have been mostly supportive of Israel so far. They aren’t likely reverse course. Even if they did, their influence is negligible.
Arab states will be under greater popular pressure not to accept Netanyahu’s ambitions. But they have not been willing during the war to levy any serious pressure on Israel. The fact is they are mostly glad to see Hamas battered. They are also interested in normalization with a state that will help them maintain internal security and improve their economic and technological prospects. The popular pressure has proven manageable. Why say or do anything that might make it less so?
Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen will speak up loudly against Israeli occupation and lob occasional missiles and drones at the Jewish state. But they have not been effective during the war and are unlikely to improve their performance afterwards. China and Russia will also shout denunciations of Israeli behavior, but they too have not been very effective in the past.
The rest of the world doesn’t like Israel’s occupation of the West Bank or Gaza, but what can they do about it?
Opposition has to come from within Israel
Within Israel, the main preoccupation so far among Netanyahu’s opponents has been the hostages. Israelis want them back. Netanyahu says military pressure will achieve that. A plurality of Israelis prefer a deal with Hamas. That implicitly would leave Hamas intact, even if weakened.
This situation is changing. Within the last week, Israeli officials, including the Defense Minister, have let it be known they are unhappy with not having a plan for how the war will end. They do not want the responsibility for a permanent occupation. Now Benny Gantz, by default Netanyahu’s key political rival, has demanded the Prime Minister enunciate a post-war plan by June 8.
Israelis would do well to contemplate what the failure to produce one could mean. Gaza may already be ungovernable. Chaos next door is never a good strategy. Burning down your neighbor’s house is a dangerous thing to do. Repression forever is no better. Like any agglomeration of more than 2 million people, Gaza reconstruction will need water, shelter, food, health, education, and security. That will require a major international effort. It is well past time to have begun thinking about it and organizing for it.
The odds of success for such a reconstruction effort are not high. But the outcome, even if only partly successful, would be a lot better than chaos or re-imposed occupation.
Resistance will continue
Whatever the Israelis decide–chaos, repression, or reconstruction–Palestinian resistance will continue until the Palestinian state becomes a reality. Jews should understand that better than they do, and better than those who have not suffered oppression, dispossession, and displacement. The question is whether the Palestinians will choose a more moderate path than the mass murder the Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades led them on, or an even more radical one.
There are signs of discontent with Hamas in Gaza. Encouraging the emergence of a more moderate resistance should be an Israeli priority. Israelis should be supporting aid into Gaza, not ransacking it. The International Criminal Court, whose prosecutor is seeking warrants for the arrest of Netanyahu and the Defense Minister as well as three top Hamas leaders, is doing so because of abuse of the civilian population of Gaza:
That gives Israelis an opportunity to reverse the decisions that have deprived Palestinians of the physical necessities of life. Israel can’t erase the past. But it can reverse counterproductive policies.
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The Gaza war will likely continue
That’s precisely what Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is doing. The Israel Defense Forces have seized the Rafah Crossing into Gaza. The attack is proceeding. Netanyahu hopes thereby to accomplish the complete victory over Hamas that has so far eluded him. Only that would have any chance of keeping him in power.
Netanyahu claims Hamas or Qatar made last-minute changes in the ceasefire agreement. Whatever they may be (or not be), it is hard to imagine that they justify an attack on a place where more than a million civilians are crammed together. This attack will be remembered for creating an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than the more than six months of war on Gaza have generated so far.
A test for Biden
President Biden has firmly opposed the attack on Rafah without a clear plan for protecting civilians. That is nowhere in sight. The Israelis are encouraging civilians to evacuate some areas, as they have previously, but the attacks are not limited to those. And there are few places left for civilians to go.
The question now is how Biden, who has supported Israel’s objective of eliminating Hamas’ military capabilities, will react. Axios has reported that the US has put a hold on some shipments of ammunition for Israel. But it is unclear how vital these are and how long the hold will last.
More important than a shipment or two of ammunition is the overall posture of the US towards Israel. In recent years, it has become “Israel right or wrong.” Netanyahu has taken advantage of that attitude not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank, where he has unleashed racist settlers to attack Palestinians. Arabs chant “from the river to the sea.” Netanyahu and his allies are doing it. They are also making Gaza uninhabitable.
Biden cannot continue to pose as a champion of democracy worldwide if he allows Israel to continue its disproportionate killing of civilians in Gaza. But stopping Netanyahu at this point will require a dramatic reversal of US policy.
The problem is domestic politics
That will be difficult. Biden faces some domestic pressure to rein in Israel. Many liberal Jews, as well as Arab and Muslim Americans, oppose continuation of the war. The campus protesters represent only the most visible part of that electorate. But the far more numerous evangelical Christians still favor “Israel right or wrong.” Most of them will vote Republican anyway, despite Donald Trump’s obvious disdain for religion and morality. But the center of gravity of American politics still favors Israel. Shifting toward more conditionality will not help Biden in November.
The opposite is true in much of the rest of the world. While much of Europe is still backing Israel, many in Africa and Asia view Israel as a colonial power and therefore support the Palestinians. America could benefit internationally from shifting policy away from “right or wrong,” as Eisenhower did when he got Israel, Britain, and France to back off the Suez Canal in 1956. But foreigners don’t get to vote in US elections.
Biden isn’t likely to pass the test
I would not bet on Biden forcing Israel to back down in Rafah. He is more likely to try to get Netanyahu to make the attack shorter and less violent. But Netanyahu is looking for a real victory–the modern equivalent of Yahya Sinwar’s head on a pole–and won’t settle for less. The Gaza war isn’t over and may continue for a long time still.
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Equality is for everyone
This week I joined dozens of colleagues in signing this letter to President Biden about Gaza. I suppose some would say it reflects the herd mentality of the Washington foreign policy establishment. I prefer to think it reflects a judicious appraisal of a bad situation likely to worsen if Israel continues its large-scale assault at Rafah.
That said, let me offer a speculation or two.
Elite Arab attitudes have changed
Arab sympathies are predominantly with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. That has not and will not change. But it is all the more striking that consultations between the US and key Arab states have continued despite Israeli abuses in Gaza and the West Bank. It seems to me clear that Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others want to be seen as supporting the Palestinians but welcome the damage the Israelis are doing to Hamas. They may doubt the feasibility of completely destroying Hamas’ military capabilities. But there is no talk of an oil boycott or other escalation.
To the contrary, the Saudis have made it clear they want to pursue normalization with Israel once conditions permit. Discussion of that option is continuing even during the Gaza war. It is now half a dozen years since I met Israelis carrying lots of electronics in the Riyadh business class lounge. They were likely helping with internal security in the Kingdom. The Saudis also want a defense agreement and civilian nuclear cooperation with the US. That’s what “normalization” is really about.
Nor are the Arab states expressing any sympathy for wiping Israel off the map. That may still be a day dream in the Arab street, but only Iran, Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis–the axis of resistance–are really backing “from the river to the sea.” I have no doubt but that some of them are serious. But it isn’t happening. Iran is in economic crisis and political ennui, Hizbollah is trying not to get into all-out war with Israel, and Hamas is hiding underground. Only the Houthis are flexing their capabilities, which are however limited for now in their reach and impact to shipping in the Red Sea.
The Israelis are doing from the river to the sea
The Israeli settlers on the West Bank, who object to Arabs saying “from the river to the sea,” are doing it. They are on a killing and displacement spree, taking advantage of the Netanyahu government’s tolerance for violence against Palestinians. The displacement so far is not massive. Things could get a lot worse. Certainly that is the settlers’ intention. They get ample support from more Orthodox Jewish communities in the US, but their really important political backing extends as well to some American Christian evangelicals.
The Biden Administration has begun to react. It has started to sanction Israeli settlers who perpetrate violence on the West Bank against Palestinians. But the Administration needs to do much more, focusing on the political leadership that condones such abuse as well as the American Jewish and Christian networks that support and finance it. Terrorism is terrorism. Blocking American financing for violent settlers should be a priority.
American Jewish attitudes are changing too
The settlers claim religious justification for their claims to what they call “Judea and Samaria.” But liberal American Jews couldn’t care less about that. And most American Jews are more liberal, if I can use that term to encompass nonpracticing as well as Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative Jews. They have generally supported the idea of a Jewish homeland. But one that is more secular than religious and treats its Arab citizens as equals and Arab neighbors with respect. You’ll find some of the people who signed the above letter in this category.
Let me speak though only for myself. I want to see an end to warfare between Jews and Arabs. That will only be possible with mutual respect for Palestinian and Jewish rights, whether in one state or two. I still think two is more feasible than one. But admittedly two become more difficult with the extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. That is one of many reasons they should be stopped and rolled back.
Also critical is treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as many of what we used to call Israeli Arabs today prefer to be called. They constitute more than 20% of the country’s population. Equality for them is vital to Israel’s claim to be a democratic state and a free society. But you don’t have to look far to find ample evidence that the reality is far from the ideal. Separate but equal never worked in the US. It won’t work in Israel either. It is high time for Israeli practice to rise to the level of Jewish ideals. Human dignityt and therefore equality is for everyone.
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Stevenson’s army, February 11
– Opposition wins in Pakistan.
– Senate resumes voting today on foreign aid package
– WSJ reports Hamas tunnels beneath UNRWA HQ
– Egypt threatens end of Camp David accords
– WaPo has background on Abraham Accords
– Venezuela builds troops on Guyana border
– Trump questions NATO treaty, encourages Putin
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What is needed to stop the fighting in Gaza
As Shibley Telhami underlines, the priority right now is to end the fighting in Gaza. But war is an enterprise with political objectives. So we need to consider what the parties involved want and what might bring the fighting to a negotiated end.
Hamas objectives
Hamas’s heinous mass murder and mayhem on October 7 likely had several objectives: to claim leadership of the Palestinian movement, to counter the Israeli occupation both in the West Bank and Gaza, to garner credit for a spectacular act of “resistance,” and to block impending Saudi normalization of relations with Israel. Israeli right-wing infringement on the Haram al Sharif (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem and settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank provided an attractive opportunity. All Hamas’ main objectives were at least partially achieved on the day.
But the successes came with consequences. The Israelis have responded by destroying much of Gaza and displacing most of its population, with devastating humanitarian consequences. The IDF has killed, wounded, or captured many Hamas fighters. Saudi Arabia has not entirely forsaken normalization and none of the Arab world has done much more than talk smack about the Israelis. Only Iran and its partners (mainly Lebanese Hizbollah, Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq) have provided any military support. They would like to use this occasion to drive the US out of the Middle East, regardless of the harm to Palestinians.
Palestinian objectives
The war has predictably and understandably rallied Palestinians to their cause, more in the West Bank than in Gaza. On the use of violence, support for Hamas, and disdain for the Palestinian Authority (especially President Mahmoud Abbas) attitudes have hardened. No doubt the Hamas military leadership is celebrating that as success, but the Palestinians desperately need aid and relief. Small anti-Hamas demonstrations have started up and could grow. Ordinary folks unaffiliated with Hamas will want an end to the war sooner rather than later.
Armed groups are not monolithic. Some in Hamas will be starting to worry about survival. As the Israelis push south, they will kill, wound, and capture more militants as well as civilians. Hamas’ “resistance” ideology can survive that push and even prosper, if need be among organizational successors. But its current leadership and at least some of its cadres will be worrying about their own lives and fortunes. Once physical survival becomes unlikely, some will turn to negotiations. They will hope a pause or end to the war will do what continuing seems unlikely to do. Consolidating Hamas’ position as the leader of the Palestinians and the main negotiating interlocutor with Israel would spell success.
Israeli objectives
Israel’s announced objectives are to destroy Hamas so that nothing like October 7 can ever happen again and to free the hostages Hamas and other more militant groups in Gaza still hold. The war is still far delivering those outcomes.
Prime Minister Netanyahu knows that perfectly well. He welcomes it. A hardened Hamas and divided Palestinians help him to justify continuing the war and hold onto power. Israelis so far have not wanted to replace Netanyahu while the fighting continues. Palestinian division, the growth of West Bank sympathy with Hamas, and a hardened Hamas help him to claim that Israel has no viable negotiating partner.
But Israel is a pluralistic society, so not everyone shares Netanyahu’s objectives. The right-wing of his governing coalition (and perhaps Netanyahu tacitly) is using the war as thinly veiled cover for collective punishment, including by blocking humanitarian assistance, supporting the IDF in loosening its targeting, and encouraging the expulsion of Palestinians from both the West Bank and Gaza. While they complain that Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea,” violent Jewish settlers in the West Bank are doing it.
Many in the much-diminished liberal Israeli opposition want to prioritize hostage release. Opponents of Netanyahu, they prefer negotiations sooner rather than later, as they recognize the risks to the hostages of delay. They presumably also understand that negotiations now will allow Hamas to survive. Many will think that inevitable even if the war continues.
American objectives
The US government, in particular President Biden, shares the Israeli objectives of destroying Hamas so that it can no longer attack Israel and ensuring release of the hostages. Most of the Congress supports those objectives, with some also supporting Netanyahu’s remaining in power and collective punishment of the Palestinians.
But President Biden also wants to be re-elected. The widening regional conflict threatens an unwanted war with Iran. The Gaza war is weakening his support among younger people countrywide and among Muslims, most consequentially among Arabs in the “swing” state of Michigan. It no longer suffices to claim, accurately, that the US is the biggest funder of humanitarian assistance for Gaza and that Washington is pressing the Israelis to let more in.
That has made at least a pause in the fighting a priority. It also makes renewed talk of a two-state solution important, because that is the one area in which the Americans can agree with the change in Palestinian attitudes. It in addition provides a welcome area of agreement with Arab and Muslim states, in particular Saudi Arabia:
The spoiler is Netanyahu, as he has made clear in his reaction to the Hamas proposals:
He is dead set against a Palestinian state and has said so. He has also rejected President Biden’s suggestion that the issue can be fudged. It is true, as Biden claimed, that there are many varieties of “states,” some with limited sovereignty, but Netanyahu won’t accept any of them.
The elephants aren’t leaving the room
This puts Biden in a tough spot. He needs Netanyahu and his right-wing sidekicks gone. Only then will it be possible to pursue some sort of more permanent ceasefire. A pause would be an important first step, but negotiations won’t end the fighting until its main protagonist has departed from power. Only Israelis can engineer that. None seem willing yet.
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