Tag: Hezbollah
Not only wider, but higher
Israel yesterday bombed Hezbollah headquarters in Dahiyeh, south of Beirut’s center, and killed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Israelis are celebrating:
So are anti-Assad Syrians in Idlib:
Decapitation ups the ante
This Israeli move signals that Prime Minister Netanyahu wants not only to widen the war from Gaza to Lebanon but also wants to up the ante. The assassination of an enemy leader forecloses negotiations and makes it harder to manage the conflict. Israel’s successful cell phone/walkie-talkie attack less than two weeks ago had already infuriated and discombobulated Hezbollah’s militants. The loss of its leader of more than three decades will cause further confusion and distrust in their ranks.
The impact of decapitation on insurgencies is a subject of debate. There is evidence that decapitation can shorten anti-terrorist campaigns, increase the odds of insurgent defeat, and decrease conflict intensity. Others think decapitation has greater chances of success in countering insurgency “when conducted by local forces against a centralized opponent in conjunction with larger counterinsurgency operations.” Those conditions were not fulfilled in yesterday’s raid. Local forces did not conduct it, Hezbollah is a networked opponent, and there was no “larger” counterinsurgency operation.
That said, Hezbollah will need time to regroup. The Israelis likely also killed some of Nasrallah’s lieutenants. A leadership strike of this sort requires inside intelligence. Somehow Israel knew where the Hezbollah leaders were at a specific time. Hezbollah depends a great deal on personal trust among its adherents. The choice of a new leader and the search for a culprit will disrupt that network for some time to come. That may not prevent retaliation in the form of rocket attacks, but those have been militarily ineffective.
Mixed reaction in Lebanon and the Arab world
Lebanese will have a mixed reaction: horror at the civilian lives lost in buildings in the capital, but also some Schadenfreude. Hezbollah has lost its heroic mettle for many Lebanese, both because it went to war against the Syrian opposition and because it is now part of a corrupt, self-perpetuating elite in Lebanon that has delivered little in recent years to its citizens. Even before the Beirut port explosion in 2020, the Lebanese economy’s wheels were coming off. The Lebanese pound has lost well over 90% of its value. Most of the population is impoverished, frustrated, and desperate.
The
The Arab world will likewise have a mixed reaction. Most Arab elites are allergic to Islamist movements like Hamas and Hezbollah. Before today’s event, they were protesting mistreatment of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank but doing little about it and nothing to defend Hamas and Hezbollah, which are Iranian allies. However, most Arab streets are sympathetic to the Palestinians and want the Gaza war to end (as do most Israelis). That was Hezbollah’s declared aim. It was rocketing Israel since October 8 of last year, it said, to get Israel to end the Gaza war.
It will be interesting to see now whether the Arab street gets agitated enough to change the Arab world’s relative quiescence (relative, that is, to its past military attacks on Israel). The Syrian exception (see video above) is due to Hezbollah’s fighting the opposition on behalf of President Assad.
The West won’t cry crocodile tears but needs to worry
The West won’t mourn Nasrallah, but many in Europe and the US will worry that his death will incentivize a major Hezbollah retaliation. While its rockets have so far caused little strategic damage in Israel, the Israelis would likely respond with further escalation. That will heighten the hostilities. Neither the US nor Europe wants a the wider war heightened.
The West will also need to worry about Hezbollah operations beyond Israel. Hezbollah has terrorist cells in many countries, including the US, which presumably supplied the large bombs that leveled Hezbollah headquarters. US embassies and government offices in Washington could become targets.
Iran is in a bind
Tehran has been trying to avoid war with Israel, which has demonstrated it could bomb Iran’s nuclear sites. Now two of its key allies have suffered a great deal of damage. Israel has not destroyed Hamas, but Iran needs to be concerned how long it will take for Hamas to regain its former military strength. Now Israel has decapitated Lebanese Hezbollah, killed other leaders, and injured thousands of its militants in addition to destroying a significant percentage of the rockets and missiles Iran has supplied.
Asking Tehran to continue to show restraint may be asking too much. Advocates of Iran’s nuclear program in Tehran will be emboldened. They will argue that Israel is looking for war with Iran and that only acquiring nuclear weapons will prevent an Israeli attack. That in turn could create incentives for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to get nukes. Their leaders have both said they will match Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The Middle East with four nuclear weapons states will not be a safe place.
There is another way out. Tehran could tell Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River, as required by the UN Security Council, and end the rocket attacks. This would enable Israelis to return to their homes along the border with Lebanon. It would also give the US leverage in pressing Israel for a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange in Gaza. The war there would be unlikely to end entirely, as Netanyahu needs the war to continue until he can declare unequivocal victory. But relative calm could allow far more humanitarian aid and early reconstruction assistance to flow.
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Stevenson’s army, October 19
This from Dahlia Scheindlin and Yezid Sayigh is well worth listening to, even if 4 days old.
– Border crossing still closed.
– US denies Israeli reports that Biden promised to join fight against Hezbollah.
– But US may be pressuring Israel on ground war.
– US forces already facing drone attacks
– WaPo says Hamas may have surprise weapons.
– FT says Israel may follow lessons learned from earlier Gaza fighting
-Disputes over Gaza hospital deaths
– FP on Israel’s intelligence failure
– Possible outcomes of House speaker drama
– Biden chooses Kurt Campbell as Deputy SecState
– HuffPost warns of “mutiny” and dissent cable at State
– US & EU can’t resolve steel tariff fight
-I used to say the Ag committees, like the appropriators and armed services panels, could overcome politics to get bills done. Not this year, apparently.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Middle East without Soleimani
Following the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who was an IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) general and the Quds Force commander, Iran retaliated against the US by launching a missile attack on US bases in Iraq. What further impact will Soleimani’s death have? And what will it mean for US interests in the region?
On January 22, Carnegie Endowment for International Studies hosted a panel discussion on The killing of Soleimani and the future of the Middle East. The discussion included three speakers: Rasha Al Aqeedi, the managing editor of Irfaa Sawtak (Raise Your Voice) and a research analyst of contemporary Iraqi politics and political Islam, Dexter Filkins, a journalist for The New Yorker, and Emile Hokayem, a senior fellow for Middle East Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The panel discussion was moderated by Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow with the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Soleimani projected Iran’s power in the region
Filkins described Soleimani as a “master spy” and “a man in the shadow.” His influence was pervasive. Lebanese people didn’t decide their government, Soleimani did. Assad was not running the war, Soleimani was. Soleimani was a product of the Iran-Iraq War, during which he worked on strengthening and allying with the Shia around the Middle East.
Hokayem depicted him as one of the most influential actors in the Levant for securing Iran’s long-term interests. Soleimani turned Hezbollah from a formidable insurgent group into a conventional actor with missile forces menacing Israel. He was implicated in Hariri’s assassination in 2005, led efforts to shore up the Assad regime in 2012, and was also involved in the Battle of Kirkuk in 2017.
Al Aqeedi noted that when ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) took over Mosul in 2014, Soleimani reacted by forming security forces/militias to help Iraq, based on Iran’s interests. Since then, Soleimani had kept the US-trained Iraqi army as weak as possible, while strengthening and formalizing the Shia militias in Iraq. In 2017, Soleimani rallied the Iraqi army to forcefully retake Kirkuk and suppress the results of Kurdistan’s independence referendum.
Further retaliation?
Sadjadpour believes that the assassination has energized the radicals of the Iranian regime, who may intensify their repression, but the downing of the Ukrainian airline has constrained popular support for retaliation. Filkins doubts benefits to US interests from the assassination.
Al Aqeedi noted that if any Iranian retaliation targeted US embassies or Americans, the US may intensify its retribution against Iran. Hence, Iran and the US need to think twice before taking any further actions. Hokayem suggested Iran possesses lots of tools to retaliate, not necessarily against American targets but also against regional American proxies, such as Saudi Arabia.
Impacts
Hokayem emphasized that the assassination neither mitigates Iran’s threat to its regional rivals nor changes the ordering of the region. Iran has secured its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. He also claimed that the Trump administration doesn’t care much about Iraq. The US military presence was keeping a low profile even before the Iraqi parliament urged the government to expel foreign troops from its territory.
Al Aqeedi agreed with Hokayem that the US isn’t interested in being involved in the Iraqi protests. She underlined that the US presence in Iraq is not an occupation, and there is no US military base in Iraq. Hence, she argued that the current campaign against US presence in Iraq is a distraction from the protest, which targeted the IRGC. The Iraqi protesters are reluctant to be dragged into the US-Iran confrontation and want Iraq to avoid becoming a proxy for any external actors. Al Aqeedi is deeply concerned that Iraqi protesters are likely to encounter more violence from the IRGC and forces it controls.
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Accountability should not wait
On September 27, the Middle East Institute and the Pro-Justice jointly hosted a panel to launch the new book, Blacklist: Violations Committed by the Most Prominent Syrian Regime Figures and How to Bring Them to Justice. Blacklist identifies and provides detailed information on nearly 100 individuals accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria over the past eight years. The book sheds light on the crimes themselves and outlines potential political and judicial avenues available to bring the perpetrators to justice.
The panel consisted of Anne Barnard, a New York Times journalist who has extensively covered the conflict in Syria, Wael Sawah, the president and director of Pro-Justice and former executive director of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression, and Charles Lister, a senior fellow and director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism program at MEI. The event was moderated by Joyce Karam, who is the Washington correspondent for The National and adjunct professor at George Washington University.
The Syrian conflict is approaching its ninth year and increasingly becoming forgotten by the international community. Lister gave a broad overview of wartime consequences to remind the panel and audience of the ongoing atrocity. Syria is a disastrous humanitarian crisis with roughly 500,000 deaths since 2011. The conflict has an extensive history of war crimes, most of which are perpetuated by the central government of Syria. The Assad regime is responsible for 89% of civilian deaths, 99% of torture deaths, 89% of arbitrary arrests, and 85% of forced displacements. Barnard noted that even before the conflict, there were high rates of detention in the elaborate prison system established throughout the Assad dynasty, but as the conflict escalated from 2011 onward, the situation worsened. The UN has labeled the prisons in Syria as exterminate conditions with a system of sadistic torture and high levels of disease.
Sawah continued by saying that these facts and figures are important to note because without accountability and justice, there will never be a lasting peace in Syria. He stated that Blacklist is an important publication to act as an open guide to identify the perpetuators and assist legal professionals in creating a foundational narrative to work towards holding those responsible of crimes against humanity. Barnard agreed and said that the industrial prison system has fostered the ability of the regime to commit these crimes. 100,000 Syrians have not been located after their time detained. It is important to work towards identifying the fates of these people to take initial steps towards reaching justice through administering accountability.
Lister discussed how legal accountability does not seem likely for Assad and high-ranking members of the regime because the general perception is that the Syrian conflict has been won by the regime. He notes that it is far from over, but in the short-term sanctions on these individuals can restrict their international travel and ability to act as legitimate statesmen. Doing so will isolate the regime and not allow it to operate with impunity.
Sawah talked about the pivotal role Hezbollah, Russia, and Iran have played in enabling the Assad regime to survive throughout the civil war. The regime would have collapsed by 2013 without their support. They must be held accountable for their support of Assad and their own war crimes. Lister echoed this by mentioning the Russian precision strikes on civilian hospitals in opposition-held regions. He suggested that the US needs to begin an investigation of Russian war crimes to develop a portfolio of reports to name and shame their heinous actions against Syrian civilians.
The panel agreed that continued investigations such as Blacklist are needed to reach a stable peace in the future. Without making accountability for injustices, opposition groups will flourish, and civilians will continue to disdain the regime.
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The Yemeni quagmire
Hudson Institute held a panel discussion April 18 about the crisis in Yemen and its strategic threat to US interests and allies. The panel included Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst at Arabia Foundation, Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.
Haykel gave an overview about the Houthis (who call themselves Ansar Allah), a group belonging to a particular caste of Yemeni society who ruled the country for a thousand years. Before rising again in 2000, They were marginalized since the late 1960s and displaced in 1992 with the revolution. Hussein El Houthi, founder of the group is influenced by Iranian ideology and draws inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini. El Houthi and the Supreme Leader share the view that the US and Israel are enemies of Yemen, the Arabs, and Islam. This ideological connection was cemented from the middle of 1990s between the Zaydis (a Shia sect which the Houthis belong to) and Lebanese Hezbollah, which provided military, ideological and media training.
Although a small group in Yemen, the Houthis are the most disciplined, best trained and most ideologically motivated group. They are unlikely to be defeated military. Haykel urges that other ways of dealing with Houthis be conceived. Yemen, a poor country, has never been integrated into the labor market of the Gulf. A broad strategy that encompasses development and socioeconomic elements is needed. But Riyadh is not going to be easily convinced to end the war because the Saudis see the Houthis as a Hezbollah-like force on their southern border.
Alasrar argues that neither a military solution nor a political one has worked so far in Yemen. Incentives for the Houthis to come to the table are insufficient. Even when they do negotiate, they are not sincere, due in large part to the ideological alignment with Hezbollah and Iran. The Houthis are likely to remain the de facto authority on the ground given the reluctance of the international community to solve this issue military or politically. The Houthi’s core belief is legitimacy through force. Yemen’s future is therefore bleak. ,
But Alasrar also argues that many in Yemen recognize that the state marginalized the Houthis. Younger Yemenis would like to see a political reconciliation process to help the Houthis become a legitimate political actor. The Houthis did not subscribe to the national reconciliation process conducted in the aftermath of Yemen’s “Arab Spring.” They seized power easily at a vulnerable time when the transitional government after had no army. Weapons and ballistic misled smuggled to Houthis created a means for Iran to attack Saudi Arabia.
Doran stated that the US as a super power has to create a stable regional order in the Middle East. The Khashoggi murder was immoral and ugly, but the campaign to shift US policy on Saudi Arabia is wrong. Its roots lie in President Obama’s outreach to Iran, which he hoped would become a partner in establishing regional stability, which meant down-grading US relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. There are only two American allies who are contesting Iranians on the ground: Israelis in Syria and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The argument that Mohammed bin Salman is unacceptable morally does not mean US should end its support for the Yemen war, which would weaken Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis Iran and leave a Hizbollah-like force on the Red Sea threatening shipping and hitting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles. Ending support to Saudi Arabia is not going to improve the Yemen situation or get the Iranians out.
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Iran’s offensive defense
The International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a panel of experts on Iran’s Regional Posture October 11. The panel consisted of Dina Esfandiary, fellow at the Century Foundation, Ambassador Barbara A. Leaf, former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, and Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director of the International Crisis Group.
Panelists revisited the nature and role of Iran today, dissecting Iran’s motivations, threats, and constraints, beyond traditional perspectives that privilege analyses based on American interests. With ethno-sectarian conflicts raging in Syria and Yemen as well as a tense political transition in Iraq, the Saudi-led Gulf states and Iran, the region’s major actors, have been embroiled in a competition of political and strategic influence.
But is it that simple? Esfandiary sought to move beyond polarity. She pointed out that Iran is not simply vying for power, but seeks to preserve its territorial integrity against Western and Gulf nations it views as aggressive. As a main center of Shi’a Islam, Iran sees itself as entitled to regional influence. Esfandiary elaborated that while religion was a foreign policy driver for the post-Revolution state’s early years, the Iranian government now leans towards nationalism as a better way to unify the nation’s people and frame its foreign policy endeavors. Elaborating on this point, Leaf said that Iran’s posture should be understood as an offensive defense, a response to the US presence and support of both the Israelis and the Saudis, which it sees as a threats to its territorial integrity and legitimate involvement in Arab affairs.
Iraq, Esfandiary said, is Iran’s highest regional priority. Tehran seeks a central government in Baghdad aligned with its interests. However, with the election of Barham Salih as Iraq’s new President, and his selection of Adel Abdul Mahdi as Prime Minister, many analysts have signaled a turn in Iraq away from the rigid ethno-sectarian politics that have dominated the post-invasion landscape. With many Iraqis disillusioned by dysfunctional governance resulting from proxy politics, Iran’s ability to sway the new government’s formation and the future of the nation’s politics are limited. Esfandiary further identified the Syrian civil conflict as Iran’s second priority, and the conflict in Yemen as its last priority, questioning whether Iran has a long-term strategic goal in Yemen at all. Leaf agreed, with Iraq as Iran’s greatest concern given the election year.
Invoking Iran’s Hezbollah model, Leaf listed the three major instruments in Iran’s toolbox:
- Creating and directing splintered proxy groups, preferably local actors, to shape civil conflicts as Tehran sees fit. In particular, supporting and directing Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
- Increasing its defense and intelligence architecture in Syria, part of its corridor to Israel and the Mediterranean.
- Exploiting disordered Arab states with sizeable Shi’a minorities.
Vaez added Iran’s nuclear program as another instrument of the state’s offensive defense strategy in the region: a deterrent to nuclear Israel and the aggressive Gulf states, all supported by the US.
Underscoring the constraints of current containment policies, Vaez underlined that Trump was misguided in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. While the goal is to deprive Iran of resources through sanctions, Iran’s regional proxy operations are not strongly correlated to sanctions, citing 2011 as a year in which Iran was able to expand its proxy operations while under increased pressure from multilateral sanctions.
With another round of harsher sanctions going into effect on November 4, Vaez fears that in the unlikely scenario of effective sanctions, Iran’s political system and elite will welcome a crisis, whipping up nationalist sentiment and acting in a less risk-averse manner throughout the region. Leaf, who submitted testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcomittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade in support of sanctions, brought up this fear in encouraging the committee to avoid mistiming sanctions, lest they strengthen Iranian nationalism.
For Esfandiary, the Gulf Arab states’ insistence that Iran pull out as a precondition for negotiations is one of the biggest constraints in reducing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. She argued that Yemen could have been ideal for negotiations with Iran, which has made it clear it is willing to negotiate. Leaf echoed this sentiment, stating that while the fractured Gulf states have tried to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table via Oman, only Tehran can succeed. Iran has been reckless in supporting the Houthis, rapidly transferring military training and technology to them. But the Houthis are independent, often operating against Iranian wishes as in their capture of both Sa’ana and Aden. Their relationship to Iran is very different from that of Hezbollah or other proxies. Further recklessness on the part of the Houthis, such as attacks on commercial ships, could be problematic for Iran.
All three panelists agreed that Iran’s image in the international sphere has improved significantly, regardless of its proxy activities. Esfandiary
and Vaez both pointed to the European Union’s effort to bypass US sanctions as well as the ICJ ruling in favor of Iran as indicators of a recovering international image. Despite the negative domestic impact of the war in Syria and Iraqi resistance to Iranian meddling, Iran appears uninterested in negotiating with the US in any capacity. Tehran instead is emphasizing its relationships with the EU, China, and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are especially important and have a higher level of familiarity with the Iranian economy than their Western counterparts.
Ultimately, Vaez warned of the need for a more inclusive security and intelligence architecture in the Middle East. The region needs a long-term strategy to escape the asymmetry and escalating armament in the region.
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