Tag: houthis
The war Netanyahu wanted is at hand
Prime Minister Netanyahu has spent the 31 years since the Oslo accords seeking two principal foreign policy goals: preventing establishment of a Palestinian state and destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is on the verge of getting a chance to achieve both. In the process, he is ending Israeli democracy, earning the enmity of much of the Arab street, and drawing the US into another Middle East war. I don’t like the result, but he is definitely stalwart.
Obliterating the idea of a Palestinian state
I recall in the mid-1990s a discussion at a mutual friend’s house with the then National Security Advisor to Vice President Gore. Leon Fuerth believed that Netanyahu would eventually come around to accepting a Palestinian state. I had my doubts. I still think I was right.
Netanyahu spent many years thereafter pumping up the idea that Israel was under siege, both by the Palestinians and the Iranians. The Second Intifada and the wall Israel built to isolate itself, successfully, from the West Bank boosted his credibility. Once Hamas took over Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2006/7, he worked hard to keep the two governing bodies separate. Dividing the Palestinians was one way to make sure they couldn’t get what they wanted.
Defeating Iran
Hezbollah is Iran’s most important ally/proxy in the region. Israel has now destroyed perhaps 50% of its rocket and missile supplies and killed an even greater proportion of Hezbollah’s leaders. The pager/walkie-talkie attack two weeks ago maimed thousands of its cadres. Israeli troops are now on the ground in southern Lebanon seeking to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.
Netanyahu is imagining that regime in Iran is imminent:
He will be content with the results of yesterday’s 180-missile Iranian attack. Israel appears to have suffered little damage and no known strategic losses. Many of the missiles were destroyed before hitting their targets by US, Israeli, and other unnamed defenses.
Retaliation is nevertheless all but certain. Netanyahu has been looking for an opportunity to hit Iran for decades. The Israelis will likely aim for nuclear and oil production facilities. The nuclear facilities will be difficult to destroy, as vital ones are ensconced well under ground. The best the IDF can hope for is to block some of the access routes. The oil facilities are more vulnerable. Oil and natural gas are Iran’s major exports. If they don’t flow, the economy will deflate.
Restraint is not in the cards
The Americans and Europeans will be urging restraint on Israel. They don’t want a regional war. Netanyahu isn’t listening. His own political future depends on continuing the fighting and achieving a spectacular military success. Hamas has denied him that in Gaza. So far, Hezbollah has proven an easier target. Netanyahu knows President Biden will do nothing to Israel’s block arms supplies. And he wants to boost Trump’s chances of winning the presidency. So he has no reason to restrain an attack he has wanted to launch for decades.
Netanyahu’s governing coalition has only a thin majority in the Knesset. But his allies and his own Likud political party have given him a blank check in pursuing a regional war. The Arab states are protesting the war in Gaza but doing little to prevent Israel from attacking Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran. All of them are anathema to the Gulf monarchies. The Arab street is still sympathetic to the Palestinians, but it has little say. Restraint is not in the cards.
More and wider war is inevitable, unless…
Prime Minister Netanyahu sent a clear signal with the assassinations of Hizbollah military leader Fouad Shukur in Beirut and Hamas negotiator Ismail Haniyeh last week in Tehran. Israel is not interested in a negotiated end to the war in Gaza and wants to widen the hostilities. Hamas has now signaled with the naming of Yahya Sinwar as its overall leader that it too is prepared to continue the fight. Sinwar is a hardliner compared to the more pragmatic Haniyeh.
More war
Israel has been trying to kill Sinwar since the October 7 attack that he launched against the Israeli communities bordering Gaza. It has so far failed and will no doubt now redouble its efforts. Sinwar advocates killing Jews and retaking all of Palestine, which he regards as an eternal Muslim endowment (waqf), back from them. He is a firm believer in violence rather than negotiations. He has demonstrated little or no interest in the suffering of ordinary Palestinians in Gaza. To him, their suffering is necessary collateral damage.
We should expect Sinwar to continue to hide and the Israelis to continue to search for him. He is a maximalist and will not yield as long as he lives. Finding him in the Gaza tunnels will require either luck or months more destruction.
Wider war
The wider war has been going on now for months. It includes rockets, drones, and artillery fire across the Lebanon/Israel border as well as rocket and drone attacks from the Houthis in Yemen against shipping in the Red Sea, US navy ships, and Israel. This wider war will continue and likely intensify.
No Arab states have indicated an inclination to join in the military offensive against Israel. Turkish President Erdogan has made some vague threats, but he is unlikely to make good on them. The US has pledged to help defend Israel if Iran attacks, but not to attack Iran in retaliation. So the wider war is not as wide as it could potentially get.
No doubt a less visible, less military war is ongoing as well. That war involves intelligence agencies, proxy forces, and individual saboteurs and assassins. The Iranians are particularly good at the proxy forces element. They have used Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Houthis to harass Israel. They seem far less adept at the intelligence piece. The Israelis have killed and sabotaged Iranian assets repeatedly for many years.
Negotiations are at an impasse, but…
The Americans continue to hope for a negotiated end to the current fighting in Gaza. They hope that would tone down, if not eliminate, the Hizbollah and Houthi attacks. It would also provide an opportunity to exchange prisoners/hostages and perhaps begin reconstruction.
They are likely to be disappointed. So long as Netanyahu and Sinwar hold power in their respective communities, the Gaza war will continue. They both need the conflict to survive. Nor is it clear that Hizbollah and especially the Houthis would stop their attacks on Israel if the Gaza war ends. The Middle East is now fighting a long war, not a short one.
The solution lies with the people of Gaza and Israel. If they decide the time has come, Sinwar and Netanyahu can be brought down, as Sheikh Hasina was in Bangladesh in recent days. Gazans show little inclination to topple Sinwar, not least because it would be risky for anyone trying. The situation in Israel is more promising. Most Israelis want to see an end to Netanyahu’s reign. They need to figure out how to make it happen.
When you are in a hole, stop digging
The world awaits retaliation against Israel for its assassinations last week. Both were relatively surgical affairs that killed the military commander of Lebanese Hizbollah in Beirut (as well as some women and children) and the political spokesman of Hamas in Tehran. Expectations for retaliation focus on a large missile and drone attack from all directions.
I doubt that. If successful, such a raid might mobilize the US to join Israel in a further escalation. That is something the Iranians don’t want.
It need not be an air raid
Israel has seemed invulnerable for decades. Its sophisticated air defenses have prevented thousands of missiles and drones from reaching population centers.
Iran and its partners might be better served to assassinate one or more major Israeli political or military figures. That would be a symmetrical response that some might argue does not justify further escalation. It would also strike fear into the hearts of every Jew in Israel. The only major Jewish figure murdered in modern Israel was Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, killed by a Jew.
The Israelis have demonstrated that they can track and strike major figures in the capitals of their adversaries. Is it really possible that the “axis of resistance” has not developed a comparable capability inside Israel?
The capability need not necessarily be technologically sophisticated. Knives, guns, and grenades can be smuggled and murderers deployed or hired. Targets of opportunity should not be difficult to find in a small and relatively open society.
Iran has assets it doesn’t want to lose
The Iranians will decide. Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis may have been relatively free to do what they wanted since October 7, but no doubt Tehran is now coordinating the retaliation.
Iran has reached nuclear threshold status. It is able to build a nuclear bomb within weeks with material in its possession. Prime Minister Netanyahu is looking for an excuse to damage that capability. In April, the Israelis demonstrated their ability to reach Iran’s nuclear facilities with drones that went undetected. Iran may want to hide its hand in the retaliation, mirroring Israel’s refusal to confirm its hand in the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
Netanyahu wins, Israel loses
A successful assassination or two, or a successful air raid, will put the Israelis again on the spot. President Biden has already made clear to Netanyahu that the US will not back further escalation. If Netanyahu pays heed, the cycle will end. If not, it will continue.
That said, Netanyahu has already accomplished several of his own goals. The Gaza talks can go nowhere until the escalation ends. He does not want the ceasefire/prisoner exchange that Washington is insisting on. The Democrats risk a major war during the election campaign, giving advantage to Trump, whom Netanyahu favors. The crisis will enable him to stay in power at least until October, when the Knesset returns from recess, and likely beyond.
Israel is the big loser. The ferocious October 7 attack was far from an existential threat, but Netanyahu and many Israelis have characterized it as such. That justified the ferocious response in Gaza that has in turn led to the assassinations and potential war with Iran and its partners. That really is an existential threat. When you are in a hole, stop digging.
Assassinations could mean war with Iran
Israel killed Fuad Shukr, military deputy to Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in Beirut yesterday with a targeted air strike. Though they have not confirmed their involvement, the Israelis apparently also killed Ismail Haniyeh, political leader of Hamas in Tehran today, likely also with an air strike. There is I suppose some possibility that this was not their doing, but rather an Iranian maneuver due to displeasure with his leadership of Hamas, but that is 100% speculation.
The ultimate impact of these two assassinations, if such they be, is uncertain. Sometimes decapitation works. Sometimes it doesn’t. But the success of both operations tells us a good deal about Lebanon, Iran, and Israel.
Lebanon and Iran have weak air defenses
That Lebanon has ineffective air defenses is not surprising. The country has been on the ropes at least since the Beirut port explosion in 2020, but even before that its army could not match the Israelis on the ground or in the air. Lebanese Hizbollah is the main threat to Israel from the north. Its air defenses are improving. But the killing of Shukr demonstrates that Israel has the intelligence capability to track Hizbollah leadership and the precision strike capability to hit a single building in crowded southern Beirut without apparently activating either Lebanon’s or Hizbollah’s air defense.
The same is true, and even more impressive, for Iran, if in fact the Israelis did it. Haniyeh was killed in a residence facility of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Israelis would have had to track him there, evade Iranian air defenses, and strike accurately at a distance of almost 1000 miles from Jerusalem. Iranian inability to prevent this in the aftermath of the presidential inauguration yesterday suggests weak air defenses. Or a special forces unit might have penetrated on the ground.
Israel wants war with Iran
The Israeli willingness to undertake these two assassinations, if in fact Haniyeh was their doing, would suggest that Prime Minister Netanyahu is prepared to risk escalation of the already simmering regional conflict. The two assassinations may well provoke another direct attack from Iran, which tried and failed in April to punish Israel for an earlier Beirut assassination. Escalation this time could be rapid.
There is no question that Tehran backs Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Yemeni Houthis. This is the much-vaunted “axis of resistance,” whose leaders were in Tehran for the inauguration of a new president. Netanyahu earlier this month in his speech in Congress blamed Iran bluntly for their activities. He appears to want a direct confrontation with Tehran, rather than dealing only with its allies.
The Americans do not, but what they can do about it at this point is not clear. Netanyahu sees an opportunity to damage Israel’s enemies while the Arab states stand by. They too want to see Iran diminished. He likely figures the Americans will be pleased if Israel is successful. He appears little concerned with the possibility of failure.
Implications for the US
It will be hard for the US to stay aloof if Netanyahu is successful in provoking Iran into entering the regional war. The Middle East would once again have to take priority. Ukraine and China would have to wait. American military supplies to Israel would be vital.
An Israel/Iran war would likely affect the US presidential race. Kamala Harris would find Democrats divided. The aging leadership in Congress would want to back Israel. But many Democrats, like most Israelis, want Israel to end the war in Gaza by cutting a hostage deal with Hamas. Donald Trump would gain some advantage in the presidential race, even if his running mate has wanted to shift attention from the Middle East to the Pacific. American popular opinion will heavily favor Israel if there is war with Iran.
The applause won’t echo for long
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s address to Congress yesterday was in sharp contrast to President Biden’s brief address from the Oval Office. Biden said he sacrificed himself for the sake of his country. Netanyahu is ready to sacrifice his country for himself.
The unmerited applause
The Congress members present, who were mostly Republicans, reacted positively to Netanyahu’s presentation. They applauded at virtually every sentence. There was particular enthusiasm for his introduction of wounded Israeli soldiers, one of whom was Druze and one Muslim. They represent however a small fraction of the force, especially at the officer level.
More important are the ultra-orthodox who serve in the IDF. Netanyahu did not mention them. The US has threatened their Netzah Yehuda (Judah’s victory) battalion with sanctions for their behavior on the West Bank. The US has already sanctioned settlers there. The IDF record of accountability for war crimes is weak. Its “much-vaunted “fact-finding mechanism” results in precious few indictments.
Quite a few Democrats, including the Vice President, absented themselves from the speech. Michigan Representative Rashida Tlaib held up a sign saying “war criminal.” Vermont Senator Sanders called Netanyahu a war criminal in advance of his speech:
Other things Netanyahu omitted
The Prime Minister neglected to mention other important things:
- His own responsibility for the intelligence and security lapses on October 7.
- The Israel Defense Forces have freed few hostages in rescue operations.
- The hostages freed so far have overwhelmingly been freed in negotiated exchanges with Hamas.
- A ceasefire is needed to enable further exchanges of hostages and prisoners.
- The majority of Israelis support a ceasefire and exchange.
- They also want Netanyahu out. He continues the war in order to prevent that.
- First-hand accounts of the IDF targeting of children and civilians in Gaza.
- Settler violence, supported by the IDF, in the West Bank against Palestinians.
- The expanding war with Lebanese Hizbollah in the north and Yemeni Houthis in the South.
- Iran becoming a nuclear threshold state because of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal.
Yes, the Hamas attack was barbarous
I can agree with Netanyahu that the October 7 Hamas attack was barbarous. But Israel’s response has not been civilized. It has been excessive and ineffective. That is a particularly bad combination. Israelis know this and want him out. Most Americans also have little or no confidence in Netanyahu. The applause in Congress won’t echo for long.
What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan
The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?
Security, security, security
In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.
The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.
The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.
The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.
The gaping hole in the draft agreement
The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.
But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.
Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.
I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?
The other security requirement
The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.
The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.
Prove me wrong
I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.