Tag: Humanitarian aid
Stevenson’s army, August 23
– Retiring Sen. Pat Leahy [D-VT] laments changes in politics and the Senate. A GOP friend of mine chatted with him in Nov., 2020 and reported he said, “We don’t talk to each other any more.”
-A new NBC poll has a lot of surprises; one is that “threats to democracy” is now the “most important issue facing the country,” ahead of jobs and the cost of living. [Scroll to the end]
– FP says most of Indo-Pacific sides with Beijing.
– FP says Poland and Hungary have a falling out.
– NYT says Ukraine is siphoning humanitarian aid from other countries.
– Politico has more details on classified materials at Mar-a-Lago.
– Politico also reports WH is at odds with intelligence community over reducing classifications.
– WaPo has a friendly profile of SecState Blinken.
– A California prof says VP Pence had no authority to summon troops to protect Capitol.
– Fearing attacks in civilian areas, US warns Americans to leave Ukraine.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Parsing the Afghanistan quandary: humanitarian aid now, nothing more
The UN is anticipating that virtually the entire population of Afghanistan will soon require humanitarian assistance. The country’s economy is imploding. The new Taliban government is broke. The neighbors currying favor with the new authorities in Kabul are not traditional sources of aid: Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia, not to mention Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekhistan, and Tajikistan. The UN and non-governmental relief organizations will be willing, but they depend on financing from the usual suspects: the US, the EU, Japan, and other developed countries. The one willing Gulf donor is presumably Qatar, which played a role in the negotiations between the US and the Taliban and now runs Kabul airport.
The humanitarian imperative is clear: provide the aid to those in need, no matter what the politics. Life with dignity is everyone’s right. But this is an odd situation: the Taliban just ousted the internationally recognized government, they have not fulfilled the minimal requirements the UN Security Council has levied, and the countries now expected to provide aid are those the Taliban spent twenty years fighting. American taxpayers, having just witnessed the humiliation of the US withdrawal, are now expected to ante up in ways that will make the Taliban regime sustainable?
The problem extends beyond humanitarian assistance. At least that can be done without putting cash in Taliban pockets. The Taliban will still benefit, as otherwise the burden of feeding the population would fall to them. But assistance with government expenditures, including so-called “early-recovery” and reconstruction, will directly help the Taliban to hold on to the power they gained by force, as will unfreezing of Afghanistan’s foreign currency reserves and allowing the Taliban to cash in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights. The Taliban will be no less clever than the previous government in skimming off some percentage.
American interests in this situation need to be parsed. Collapse of Taliban rule and the likely subsequent civil war would be awful from Washington’s perspective. An Islamic State (Khorasan) takeover would be worse. The Americans want what the UNSC resolution specified: exit of those US citizens and supporters who want to leave, access for humanitarian relief, respect for human rights (especially those of women and girls), and an inclusive transitional government. The Taliban have already disappointed by naming a government of their own militants, including people linked to Al Qaeda. While it is early days, they have not demonstrated respect for human rights. Nor have they allowed the exit of more than a minimal number of people.
So do we discount the Taliban failures so far and go ahead with humanitarian relief? I’m afraid we don’t have a lot of choice, both as a matter of principle and pragmatic policy. Humanitarian relief may not save the Taliban government from collapse, but it is the right thing to do and could help to stave off civil war or an IS takeover. We should provide the funds with eyes wide open, trying to verify that access is unhindered and that food and other assistance flows to those in need and is not monetized or otherwise pocketed by Taliban-connected warlords.
There is an argument for at least partially unfreezing reconstruction assistance and Afghanistan’s hard currency assets, because that too could help prevent civil war or worse. Certainly the Taliban will try to extract hard currency with promises to fight the Islamic State. The Pentagon may be sympathetic to this argument. Here I would be far more cautious. The Islamic State is a rival of the Taliban: a jihadi group that wants to govern Afghanistan (and more). The Taliban have their own reasons for wanting to crush IS (Khorasan). I’d prefer to see them doing it for their own good reasons.
As for Al Qaeda, it is clear from inclusion of the Haqqani network, an Al Qaeda affiliate, in their government that the Taliban are not prepared to treat it as an enemy. There is still a question whether a government that includes Sirajuddin Haqqani as “interim” Interior Minister will allow the use of Afghan territory to plot or organize attacks on the US. It is arguable that it is better to have Al Qaeda in the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in. I wouldn’t buy it though: it really doesn’t matter that much where Al Qaeda plots its next attack against the US–9/11 may have been conceived while Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan, but most of the plot was organized and conducted elsewhere. Wherever the Haqqani network helps Al Qaeda, the US interest is clear: weaken both.
Bottom line: Humanitarian assistance yes, but nothing more until it is clearer how the Taliban will govern and whether they will cooperate with those who target, or allow others to target, the United States. Hoisting their flag over the presidential palace in Kabul on 9/11 was not a good omen.
PS: What Ahmed Rashid has to say is always interesting:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Restore humanitarian access in Ethiopia!
Michael Thomas Knaak, a first-year Conflict Management master’s student at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, writes:
CSIS February 22 convened a discussion of restoring humanitarian access in Ethiopia’s Tigray province, the scene of recent fighting between local forces and the Federal government. Panelists included:
Judd Devermont, Director of the CSIS Africa Program
Daniel Bekele – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Chief Commissioner
Catherine Wiesner – Head of External Engagement at the UNHCR Regional Bureau for East Africa, Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes
Jan Egeland – Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council
Jacob Kurtzer – Director of the Humanitarian Agenda at CSIS, who moderated
Key Points
- The humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia is substantial, chaotic, and unlikely to improve without increased access for humanitarian personnel.
- There is a general dearth of detailed information on the situation in Tigray, as access to humanitarian personnel and journalists is severely restricted.
- Such access is currently being denied due to a lack of political will in the Ethiopian government and in international state-level or higher actors.
- Significant civil-military and Federal-regional governance coordination problems are further hindering access by humanitarian assistance personnel.
Judd Devermont
The humanitarian crises is one of many problems afflicting Ethiopia, but is the most acute flashpoint at this time. Other sources of conflict include the significant governance reforms ongoing within the Federal government, the government’s apparent mistreatment of dissidents, the contentious redrawing of political borders, and the formation and growth of unregulated militias. The continuation of the humanitarian crises complicates the overall political landscape within Tigray and across states.
In addressing the crises, the main difficulty is political will, rather than technical issues or capacity. Rectifying the limited accessibility to the region by humanitarian aid workers is critical. One idea towards this end might be appointment of a US special envoy. The envoy would need to have a close relationship with the State Department and have access to real power and resources, enabling her or him to own the process and act as a main driver for US action in the region.
Daniel Bekele
There are three key points that need immediate attention. First, local governance and administration must be reestablished to secure the restoration of critical services within the region. Second, restrictions on media access must be removed to allow for a free flow of valuable information reported in a timely manner. Third, the bureaucratic and political hurdles delaying humanitarian assistance must be overcome.
On this third point there is at least engagement between the Ethiopian government and aid organizations on the need for civilian protection and the applicability of international humanitarian law. However, they disagree on implementation of civilian-military coordination. The government lacks the will to permit regional access to assistance personnel.
Increased United Nations access and involvement through a special rapporteur has been floated as an idea for addressing the crisis. While such a step might be viewed positively, it would be important for the international community to recognize that the international process should complement rather than displace existing national processes, institutions, and efforts. A “fly-in and fly-out” type effort could fail to be coherent with the domestic Ethiopian led response.
Catherine Wiesner
Scattered reports and satellite imagery confirm that two refugee camps were assaulted by armed militants, and many thousands of refugees and IDPs are now unaccounted for. Migration from the destroyed camps to new ones has strained capacity in safe spaces. Other priority needs are unaccompanied children, restoration of basic services, and food aid.
Civil-military coordination is lacking, and the threat of violence against aid workers limits their efforts. Sudan and Djibouti have helped ease the crisis by keeping their borders open to refugees, though particularly in Sudan the border area is remote and suffers from poor infrastructure, complicating the process of moving aid staff and materiel.
Early financial appeals to address the crisis were 70% funded, but the original plan was limited in size and scope. The revised plan addresses the whole of Ethiopia in 2021 rather than just the Tigray region, and is 50% funded ($150 million), which is enough to continue operations through June. But aid efforts will have limited effectiveness without access to the areas worst hit by the crisis.
Jan Egeland
Impeding the humanitarian response is surprising coming from Ethiopia, which has a long history of generosity towards refugees. With the sudden restriction of access, agencies lost contact with numerous staff members. The trickle of information coming out of the region describes massacres and populations fleeing for their lives. Additional information remains scarce, but firsthand accounts remain horrific.
More international pressure is required to convince the Federal government to allow humanitarian workers access to the restricted areas. There are hundreds of volunteer workers prepared, with significant quantities of resources warehoused and ready for deployment. It would be helpful if the UN, US, or the African Union could secure the needed access to get aid where it is needed most, including to opposition-held areas. Federal and regional governance coordination needs improvement, as aid organizations find permission to intervene from Federal authorities can be blocked by local authorities, and vice versa.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, October 10
Do you know what US policy is toward Turkey this morning? I can’t figure it out. The president called the Turkish invasion “a bad idea” but also lambasted the Kurds for not having helped America at Normandy. [He got this fact from what he called “a very powerful article,” presumably this.] Trump also warned Turkey about its invasion, but gave no details as to what actions would be unacceptable.
The Graham-Van Hollen sanctions bill, outlined here, might well pass the Senate, but I doubt such a measure could sustain a presidential veto, and GOP leaders might work to limit the blowback to a single vote instead of a regular bill.
NYT has messages showing US officials didn’t want to publicize the release of aid to Ukraine.
FP says budget officials raised bureaucratic nitpicks to prevent disbursement of millions in humanitarian aid as the fiscal year ended.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
RSS - Posts
