Tag: Iran
An opportunity that may be missed
The Middle East is in a rare period of rapid change. The Assad regime in Syria is gone. Its successor is still undefined and uncertain. Israel has crippled Iran’s Hamas and Hizbollah allies. It is trying to do likewise to the Houthis in Yemen. Egypt is on the sidelines, preoccupied with civil wars in Libya and Sudan. A weakened Iran is contemplating whether nuclear weapons would help to restore its regional influence.
The global powers that be are not anxious to get too involved. Russia, stretched thin, let Syria go. The United States is inaugurating a president known to favor withdrawal from Syria. He will support almost anything Israel wants to do. China is doing its best to guarantee access to Middle East oil but wants to avoid political involvement. The European Union has a similar attitude.
So what will be the main factors in determining the future of the Middle East? Who has power and influence in the region and outside it?
Turkiye
The Turks are so far the big winners in Syria. They are getting an opportunity to send back Syrian refugees and will try to decimate their Syrian Kurdish enemies. They have influence over the ruling Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leadership in Damascus, whom they supplied and unleashed.
When it comes to reconstruction in Syria, Turkish companies are experienced and nearby. Turkish pockets aren’t as deep as American or Chinese pockets. But they are deep enough to get things started fast, especially if World Bank money is put on the table.
The Turks will try to convince the Americans to leave. They’ll argue that they can and will suppress Islamic State and other terrorists. They may even promise to allow the Kurds to continue their local governance structures. But they would want the Syrian Kurds to cut their ties to Kurdish terrorists inside Turkey.
The Turks will want a not-too-Islamist government in Damascus, something akin to their own. Syria has an enormously diverse population. HTS governance in Idlib was autocratic. But that was during the civil war. It will be much harder to impose that on Damascus after liberation from Assad. Syrians want their freedom. Turkiye has an interest in their getting it. Only inclusive governance will permit the return of refugees.
The Gulf
Some of the big money for reconstruction in Syria will come from the Gulf. The Saudis may be willing, if they gain some political influence in the bargain. How they use that influence will be important. In the Balkans 30 years ago they sponsored Wahabist clerics and mosques. Mohammed bin Salman has marginalized those within Saudi Arabia. We can hope he will not export them now. But he will, like the Turks, want a strong executive in Damascus.
What Syria needs from the Gulf is support for inclusive, democratic governance. The UAE will weigh in heavily against Islamism, but the Emirates are far from democratic or inclusive. Qatar, more tolerant of Islamism, will prefer inclusion, if only because the Americans will pressure them to do so.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu has not achieved elimination of Hamas in Gaza. But he has weakened it. The Israelis have been far more successful in Lebanon, where they have dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. They are also destroying many Syrian military capabilities. And they have seized UN-patrolled Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.
Israel had already neutralized Egypt and Jordan via peace agreements. Ditto the UAE and Bahrain via the Abrahamic accords, though they were never protagonists in war against Israel. It would like similar normalization with Saudi Arabia. Now Israel controls border areas inside Lebanon and Syria. Repression on the West Bank and attacks on the Houthis in Yemen are proceeding apace.
Netanyahu is resisting the end of the Gaza war to save his own skin from the Israeli courts and electorate. Whether he succeeds at that or not, his legacy will be an “Israeli World.” That is a militarily strong Israel surrounded by buffer zones. But he has done serious damage to Israeli democracy and society.
Iran
Iran is weakened. That will encourage it to quicken the pace of its nuclear program. It won’t go all the way to deploying nuclear weapons. That would risk giving the Israelis an excuse for a massive attack, or even a nuclear strike. Nor can Ankara adopt the Israeli policy of opaqueness, as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That requires openness to inspections. So transparency about its nuclear threshold status is the likely policy.
Bottom line
Turkiye, Israel, and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) are the big winners from the current Middle East wars. They would be even stronger if they were to cooperate. All have an interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, in stabilizing Syria, and in preventing terrorist resurgence. So does the US. There is an opportunity, but one that may be missed.
Democracy doesn’t favor a serious peace
The headlines today say Hamas and Israel have reached a Gaza ceasefire deal that will
- allow exchange of hostages/prisoners,
- get Israeli troops to withdraw, and
- infuse humanitarian assistance.
All that is good.
What it is
But it is still only a ceasefire, not even a formal end to hostilities never mind a peace settlement. The ceasefire is to last seven weeks, during which negotiations on future arrangements for Gaza are to continue. As Tony Blinken put it yesterday:
The ceasefire deal itself requires the Israeli forces to pull back and then, assuming you get to a permanent ceasefire, to pull out entirely. But that’s what’s so critical about this post-conflict plan, the need to come to an agreement on its arrangements, because there has to be something in place that gives Israelis the confidence that they can pull out permanently and not have a repeat of the last, really, decade.
That is a good reminder. A ceasefire won’t last if there is no mutually enticing way out of the conflict. What might that be?
The rub
Therein lies the rub. The obvious way out would be a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. It could be run by a successor to the hapless Palestinian Authority. The current Israeli government is dead set against that. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu could accept it, which is doubtful, his coalition partners would not. A new Israeli government will be needed for any post-war settlement that appeals to most Palestinians.
But this government has been successful in doing what Israelis wanted in Gaza and Lebanon. It has diminished Hamas and all but disemboweled Hizbollah. It has also weakened Iran. Netanyahu would likely win a new election, but have no clear path to a parliamentary majority. Nor would anyone else. The pattern of indecisive Israeli elections would continue. There is no sign of a majority that favors a Palestinian state. Democracy does not favor a serious peace settlement.
Trump’s challenge
This is a big problem for the newly elected Trump Administration. It has assembled a mostly pro-Israel diplomatic team. It is difficult to picture Ambassador Huckabee bludgeoning the Israelis into accepting a Palestinian state. Trump’s threat that “all hell will break lose” absent an agreement was intended to threaten Hamas, not Israel.
Trump could turn the table and speak out for a Palestinian state. He did it at least once in his first term. But then he deferred to the Israelis:
If the Israelis and the Palestinians want one state, that’s OK with me. If they want two-state, that’s OK with me. I’m happy if they’re happy.
That is not resounding support for a Palestinian state.
The Saudi factor
It will be up to Riyadh to make it happen. Saudi Arabia wants normalization with Israel as well as a defense and nuclear agreements with the United States. It would be willing to help finance Gaza reconstruction. But it has to get a “concrete, irrevocable steps in a three to five year time horizon” to a Palestinian state in the bargain.
Israel wants normalization with the Saudis as well. Can fragmented Israeli democracy, American pro-Israel diplomats, and a Saudi autocrat combine to produce a Palestinian state? Anything is possible.
A stronger American still fumbles
President Biden made a farewell appearance at the State Department yesterday. As a former Foreign Service officer, I’m of course delighted that he did this. It is especially important and timely because the Department now faces Donald Trump’s threat of loyalty tests and mass firings.
Biden’s understandably directed his remarks at justifying what his Administration has done on foreign policy. So how did he really do?
The bar was low
Certainly Biden can justifiably claim to have strengthened America’s alliances. The bar was low. Both in Europe and Asia the first Trump Administration had raised doubts. Allies could not depend on Washington’s commitment to fulfill its mutual defense obligations. Biden’s claim that compared to four years ago America is stronger because of renewed and expanded alliances is true. He is also correct in claiming he has not gone to war to make it happen.
The extraordinary strength of the American economy is an important dimension of this strength. Voters decided the election in part on the issue of inflation. But the Fed has largely tamed that and growth has been strong throughout. Manufacturing is booming, including vital semi-conductor production. Investment in non-carbon energy sources has soared. The defense industrial based is expanding.
Biden is also correct in asserting that America’s antagonists are worse off. Russia has failed to take Ukraine because of the US effort to gather support for Kyiv. Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are weaker. Only the Houthis in Yemen are arguably stronger than four years ago.
China is facing serious domestic economic and demographic challenges. But I don’t know why Biden claims it will never surpass the US. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, it already has, though obviously per capita GDP in China remains much lower.
Some claims gloss over big problems
Biden is rightly proud that there is no longer war in Afghanistan, but he glosses over the chaotic withdrawal. He also doesn’t mention the failure of the Taliban to keep its commitments.
He vaunts progress on climate change, but without acknowledging that the goal of keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees centigrade will not be met.
Biden talks about infrastructure in Africa. But not about its turn away from democracy, civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and the unresolved conflict in Libya.
He urges that Iran never be allowed to “fire” a nuclear weapon. That is a significant retreat from the position that Iran should never be allowed to have one.
Biden mentions the impending Hamas/Israel ceasefire. But he says nothing about Israel’s criminal conduct of the war in Gaza. Nor does he blame Israel’s right-wing government for the long delay in reaching a deal.
Biden’s legacy
At the end, Biden seeks to bequeath three priorities to Trump: artificial intelligence, climate change, and democracy. He no doubt knows that Trump isn’t going to take the advice on climate or democracy. He might on artificial intelligence, as his Silicon Valley tycoons will want him to.
Sad to say, Biden’s legacy will lie in other areas. Fearful of nuclear conflict with Russia, he failed to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defeat Russia. He was reluctant to rein in Israel for more than a year of the Gaza war. He failed to stop or reverse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. America is stronger than it was four years ago, but it has not always used that strength to good advantage.
Between a rock, a hard place, and the US
Syria’s Kurdish forces were once spread along Syria’s northern border with Turkey in three main concentrations. Afrin lay in the west, Kobani east of the Euphrates, and Hasakeh in the east. They have now lost control of Afrin to Turkiye and its proxies, who are threatening Minbij. Ankara wants all Kurdish forces at least 30 km from the border.
Meanwhile Syria’s de facto new leader, Ahmed al Sharaa, wants Kurdish forces brought under the Ministry of Defense. The United States has long cooperated with the Kurds in fighting the Islamic State and imprisoning its cadres.
The American side of the triangle
The Americans won’t want anything to happen that weakens that mission. But American support for the Kurds is the least certain side of this iron triangle. President Trump has long wanted the Americans out of Syria. His National Security Advisor nominee, Mike Waltz, is known as a long-time friend of the Iraqi Kurds.
He is also strongly committed to destroying the Islamic State (IS). That goal requires Kurdish cooperation. But there are few IS fighters remaining in the wild, where the Americans bomb them often. The main IS threat now is from the fighters whom the Kurds have imprisoned. If the Kurds were to release the jihadis, that would revive IS. A secondary threat is from their families, mainly concentrated in a refugee camp in the south.
The rock and the hard place
Ankara and Damascus are the more rigid sides of the triangle. Both have vital interests vis-a-vis the Kurds.
Ankara wants the Kurds off its border with Syria. Or at least diluted with some of the three million Syrian (mostly Arab) refugees Turkiye wants to return to Syria. Ankara has said it would take responsibility for the IS prisoners and their families. Damascus wants the Kurdish forces either demobilized or absorbed into the new Syrian army. It will also want the Kurdish governing institutions in the north absorbed into the Syrian state.
None of this will appeal to the Kurds. But they are weaker militarily than the Turks. And they have long accepted that their institutions, including the armed forces, should be subservient to a post-Assad state. The Americans, their main supporters, will not support a bid for independence.
Nowhere to run, nowhere to hide
The Kurds are cornered. Iraq’s Kurds have their own problems and won’t want to support Syria’s Kurds, who espouse a different governing philosophy. They even speak a different Kurdish. Iran, which has sometimes appeared supportive of Syria’s Kurds, also has its own problems. It has evacuated most of its cadres and their leadership from Syria. Kurds still control a slice of Syria’s oil resources. Turning that over to Damascus could be a bargaining chip. Iran and Iraq have halted exports of oil to Syria.
Reaching an accommodation with Ankara and Damascus will not be easy, but the Syrian Kurds have little choice. Unless Syria descends into chaos, the days of their wide autonomy will end. They would do well to offer up their armed forces in exchange for Damascus acceptance of Kurdish governing institutions. Damascus might even want them to maintain a strong police force and intelligence capability. The Kurds should also try to convince Ankara of their willingness to break ties with Kurdish rebels inside Turkiye. In exchange they could ask that Kurds return to their homes along the border.
Politics rather than force
Kurds often portray themselves as the largest ethnic group without a state. That is a dubious claim. And in any case there are no guarantees of a state based on population size. The Kurds live in four contiguous states, none of which they can call their own: Iraq, Turkiye, Syria, and Iran. They need to use their political strength and savvy to gain what they can from these non-democracies. Necessary as it has been, military force has not produced a desirable outcome.
No free country without free women
Forty-two year old Ahmed al Sharaa is the leader of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). That makes him the de facto main power in Syria today. HTS led the successful assault on Syrian government-controlled territory that ended in the surprising fall of President Bashar al Assad.
Early indications
The question is how al Sharaa will use his power. We have some early indications. He has tried to reach out to the Syrian Kurds and other minorities. He has sought to reassure them that HTS intends to build an inclusive regime. But he has also appointed an interim government that HTS itself dominates. The ministers are the ministers of Idlib Province’s Syrian Salvation Government. It has ruled in Idlib for the last several years. The Health Minister is al Sharaa’s HTS-affiliated brother, who is a physician.
Al Sharaa’s political origins lie in Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq. The Americans imprisoned him there from 2006 to 2011. He established Jabhat al Nusra (JN) in Syria in 2012 with AQ support but broke with AQ in 2016. In 2017, JN rebranded to HTS, which established primacy in the parts of Idlib Assad did not control.
So al Sharaa is no cure all. His political pedigree is extremist. He was less draconian in Idlib than the Islamic State, but he was autocratic and jihadist. He applied what he called Sharia. Women and minorities were not treated equally with HTS-loyal men. His nom de guerre was Abu Mohammed al Jolani, that is father of Mohammed from Golan. Though born in Riyadh, his parents were from the Golan Heights, now in Israeli hands. He says the second Palestinian intifada radicalized him.
Current pressures inside Syria
Inside Syria, al Sharaa faces pressure from HTS cadres to reward them and to rule the way they would like. His coalition includes even more extremist forces. Its ideology is Islamist. Many of the fighters will have little use for minorities or women. They won’t bother with democracy. They will want an extreme version of Sharia that privileges men and their strict interpretation of Islam.
But al Sharaa also faces pressure from relatively liberal Syrians. Many of them want a secular regime based on equal rights, including for women and minorities. Pro-secular demonstrations have already occurred in Damascus. And al Sharaa has appointed a woman (for women’s affairs) to the interim government to respond to public pressure.
International pressures
The US, Europeans, UN, Turkiye, Arab Gulf states and others have united to call for an “inclusive” government in Syria. By this they mean one that includes minorities and women. Western governments are far less concerned about democracy than at times in the past. Islamist-governed Turkiye will want to clone something like its own semi-democratic system. Saudi Arabia and the UAE can live with that, even if they suppress pluralism and political Islam at home.
International leverage comes from two main sources. The first is al Sharaa’s need to get the Western countries to lift sanctions. That would allow international financing to flow. The second is Syria’s need for aid of all sorts. Once sanctions are lifted, the main lever will be aid flows, especially from the IMF and the World Bank. They have far greater resources available than those from individual governments.
Western governments are acutely aware of the Taliban precedent. The Taliban made all sorts of promises, but once in charge of Afghanistan they relapsed to extreme Islamism. Girls no longer go to school and they prohibit women from speaking and singing. No one in the West, or even in the Gulf, wants to finance that.
Triangulating
Whatever his own views, al Sharaa is a good triangulator. He is aware of the different pressures and looks for ways to respond, albeit only partially, to all of them. He has forsworn any new wars (read: with Israel) and has welcomed many different opposition forces to Damascus. Al Sharaa has met with foreign diplomats, including the Americans. He pledges himself to a unified and free Syria. He says he wants to implement UN Security Council resolution 2254, which calls for elections in 18 months. The Americans can depend on him to fight the Islamic State, which is more rival to HTS than ally.
But at some point there will be contradictions that he will need to resolve. The interim government is in place only until March 1. It is not clear how or with what it will be replaced. Nor is it clear how the new constitution al Sharaa has promised will be written and by whom. HTS has closed Syria’s courts. They will need to re-open under new management. Where will that come from? What laws will it apply? How will accountability be handled? What will be done to restore and ensure property rights? How will the health and education systems be reformed?
These would be difficult issues for any governance transition. They will need decisions that displease one constituency or another. It is not yet clear what kind of Syria will result. It could be a free and inclusive state. Or an autocracy like the previous one but with a different family in charge. Or Syria could break apart into warring fiefdoms. Al Sharaa won’t be able to decide, but his decisions will influence the outcome. Let’s hope he is wise beyond his 42 years.
Iran’s predicament incentivizes nukes
Iran is the biggest loser in the Middle East over the past year. Israel has been attacking Gaza for 14 months without restraint. Iran’s Hamas ally has lost most of its military capability and virtually all of its governing authority. Israel has also destroyed the bulk of Lebanese Hizbollah missiles and thousands of cadres. The Iran-friendly regime in Syria is gone, to the benefit of Iran’s rival Turkiye. Israel is now battering the Houthis in Yemen. The Americans are joining in.
Greater Israel
October 7, 2023 traumatized Israel’s citizens. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu figures he can hold onto power if he can eliminate the prospect of another such nightmare. To do this, he wants a Greater Israel. The aim is push Israelis enemies off its borders. That Netanyahu thinks will make it impossible for Israel’s enemies to launch ground attacks.
Israel is already safe from Egyptian and Jordanian threats. This is not only because of the peace treaties. Israel provides internal security technology and intelligence that President Sisi and King Abdullah regard as vital. Both Cairo and Amman complain, sometimes loudly, about Israeli attacks on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. But both Arab capitals, along with the rest of the Sunni Arab world, are happy to see Hamas destroyed.
The aim of the current ceasefire in Lebanon is to move the Iran-armed Hizbollah forces north of the Litani River. It runs about 30 km north of the border with Israel after turning towards the Mediterranean:
That won’t end rocket attacks. But it will end the risk of another ground attack, provided the Lebanese Army and UN keep Hizbollah away. Meanwhile, the Israeli Defense Force has seized a UN buffer zone on the Golan Heights. That will keep any future Syrian army or other armed force away from Israel’s border with Syria.
Where does this leave Iran?
Greater Israel makes Iran’s Forward Defense a fairy tale. It can no longer rely on Hamas, Hizbollah, or any Arab state to punish Israel for attacks on Iran. It can rely only on the Houthis, whose drone and missile capabilities have grown enormously. But so far they are unable threaten strategic targets in Israel or cause significant numbers of human casualties.
The Iranian regime is shaky in other ways as well. The economy is moribund. Energy is in short supply, despite the country’s big gas and oil reserves. Sanctions have hurt infrastructure and finance. Mismanagement is rife. The currency is weakening:
So too are the Islamic Republic’s social constraints. Emigration is increasing. Women are resisting the hijab:
Reasserting authority and legitimacy
Under attack in the region and weak at home, the Islamic Republic also faces an impending leadership transition. While Supreme Leader Khamenei’s health status is unclear, he is 85. Iran failed to respond to the last Israeli attack on its military sites in October. It has been ineffectual in preventing Israel from killing leading Hamas, Hizbollah, and Iranian figures in the “axis of resistance.” Even loyalists must be wondering when they will see a more vigorous leader.
There is one sign of vigor. Iran has re-accelerated production of highly enriched uranium. It would be surprising if hardliners in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were not arguing for nuclear weapons. They are a possible fallback defense, one that has worked well for North Korea.
Unlike North Korea, Iran has good reasons not to go all they way to building or deploying nukes. That would create uncertainty in Israel that could lead to a pre-emptive strike. But transparently assembling all the material and technology needed for nuclear weapons might serve Iran well as a deterrent. The deterrent might work not only against an Israeli attack. It might also against a Trump effort to squeeze the sanctions tighter.