Tag: Iran Nuclear Deal
Siyasa Podcast: Episode 1: US-Iran negotiations and the region — with Vali Nasr
The first episode of podcast Siyasa, which discusses Middle East policy and politics.
Episode 1: Are both sides interested in reaching a new deal? What are the main obstacles? What do the Saudi-Iranian negotiations in Baghdad mean for the region? The podcast’s host Ibrahim Al-Assil discusses these and other questions with professor Vali Nasr.
You can also listen to the podcast on:
Spotify
Google Podcast
The podcast will be available on Apple podcast within a few days.
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Stevenson’s army, June 20
[Mark Twain was onto something when he wrote: “When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years.”]
New Yorker has several archived pieces on fathers.
Glenn Kessler explains the difference between substantive foreign policy amendments and “messaging amendments.“
Paul Kane explains the House dilemma over whether to meet or campaign.
David Sanger explains, counter-intuitively, that the election of a hard-line president may open a brief window for reviving the JCPOA.
Charlie also writes:
What should be done when a government agency does a poor job on one of its key missions? Cutting funds sends a strong message but may also feed a spiral of decline. Adding money may be wasteful. Imposing more oversight and regulation may expose problems earlier, but it may also stultify its operations. Good governance is filled with trade offs and dilemmas.
The New York Times magazine has an excellent article on the Centers for Disease Control, “Can the CDC Be Fixed?” It recounts many of the missteps CDC made in responding to the pandemic, but also makes these points:
- The C.D.C. we have is hardly a monolith: Some of its many pockets are bursting with innovation; others are plagued by inertia. But scientists and administrators who have spent decades working with and for the agency say that three problems in particular affect the whole institution: a lack of funding, a lack of authority and a culture that has been warped by both. Some of these problems come down to politics, but most are a result of flaws in the agency’s very foundation.
- Today the C.D.C. is both sprawling in its reach and extremely constrained in what it can do. It consists of more than a dozen centers, institutes and offices and employs more than 11,000 people in all, in a gargantuan roster of public-health initiatives — not just infectious-disease control but also chronic-disease prevention, workplace safety, health equity and more.
- The C.D.C.’s multibillion-dollar annual budget is both too small — it has barely kept pace with inflation in the last two decades — and subject to too many restrictions. Around half of the agency’s domestic budget is funneled to the states, but only after passing through a bureaucratic thicket. There are nearly 200 separate line items in the C.D.C.’s budget. Neither the agency’s director nor any state official has the power to consolidate those line items or shift funds among them.
- The C.D.C. is resistant to change, slow to act and reluctant to innovate, according to critics. The agency’s officers are overly reliant on published studies, which take time to produce; and are incapable of making necessary judgment calls. Agency departments are also deeply siloed. “We are really good at drilling down,” Darrow says. “But terrible at looking up and reaching across.”
Sadly, similar complaints could be made of several U.S. government agencies, including DHS and DOD. My advice is to acknowledge the conflicting pressures and try to balance between extreme remedies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Conservative will likely win, but foreign policy will change little
Candidates in Iran’s presidential election scheduled for June 18 were vetted more heavily than before. Only seven were allowed to run out of some 500 applicants. Most are prominent conservatives. Judiciary chief Ibrahim Raisi is likely a shoe-in. If and how will these elections affect the negotiations in Vienna and Iran’s regional activities? How do Iranians view this process and what should we make of the predicted record low turnout?
A Chatham House panel convened June 9 agreed the election will consolidate the regime in a conservative direction. However, foreign policy and Iran’s activities in Syria, will change little, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have long been in firm control of those projects. The domestic implications of the elections are significant, not due to the results but rather to the vetting process and the public’s increasing apathy.
The speakers were:
Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist;
Non-resident scholar
Middle East Institute
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs
Congressional Research Service
Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
Non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council
Raz Zimmt
Research fellow
Institute for National Security Studies
Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme
Chatham House
A predictable outcome, but nonetheless significant
The panel agreed that Rais is the likely winner, though Nasr warned that surprises are possible, as the 1997 and 2005 elections demonstrate. Nazila Fathi also pointed out that the greater freedom to criticize one another that exists among the candidates could hurt Raisi.
The real shock in this election cycle was the vetting process, according to Zimmt. The regime prevented any serious moderate or reformist candidates from running. Fathi pointed out that the reformists (such as former president Khatami) have been isolated and persecuted since the protest movement that followed Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election in 2009. Rouhani was not considered part of the reformist camp. His transition towards more moderate viewpoints is what caused the regime to remove moderate and even some conservative candidates from the roster this year. A particular surprise was the exclusion of the conservative former speaker of the parliament Larijani, who the regime considered to be at risk of moderating, according to Fathi.
Rather than the winner, voter turnout might be an indicator of public sentiment. Vakil cited a recent poll that indicates turnout could be as low as 38%. This would be a record low for Iran, where turnout has never fallen below 50%. Fathi affirmed that disillusionment within Iran is high. Due to the impact of COVID and economic hardships, there were calls to boycott the election even before the vetting process was completed. The 2019 parliamentary elections also contributed, as the stringent vetting process then led to harshly repression of protests.
Nasr warned that voter turnout is a bigger issue to Western observers than to the Iranian regime. Engineering an election can be done after the vote (as in 2009), but this led to major resistance. This is why the regime used the vetting process this time, after testing the waters with the parliamentary elections of 2019. The deep state understands that a low-turnout election is advantageous to conservative candidates. Its primary goal is to end up with a reliable, and controllable president. Raisi is the ideal candidate for this purpose. He has few connections, as Rouhani had within the religious establishment in Qom and even within the IRGC.
The core issues for Iranians are economic. Runaway inflation and price hikes on primary goods force people to work multiple jobs. This hit the middle classes as much as the poor. According to Fathi Iranians only care about the JCPOA to the extent that it contributes to economic improvements. The candidates have failed to put forward any clear plans for solving these issues.
The role of the new president
As for the new president’s role and significance, the panel saw a clear divergence between domestic and foreign affairs. Nasr suggested Iran is on the cusp of a ‘Third Islamic Republic’ for three reasons:
- Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advanced age indicates that his decades-long rule might soon be over, potentially leading to a constitutional overhaul, as after Khomeini’s death.
- Iran is moving to relieve maximum pressure, which will lead to major changes in its economic and foreign outlook.
- The deep state is increasingly strengthening its grip on the country.
The IRGC is starting to look more like the Pakistani military, controlling key foreign policy agendas and exerting major influences on the political process. They are positioning themselves for the post-Khamenei era.
A new president will have little influence on Iran’s foreign policy. As Katzman warns “these elections are not for the ‘leader’ of Iran.” The real leader, Khamenei, has indicated that Iran will recommit to the JCPOA if the US does so. The negotiations in Vienna are not at risk. Nasr indicated that the key foreign policy dossiers are all in the hands of the IRGC. Iran’s regional activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen fall under IRGC control. The same is true for the Saudi-Iranian negotiations now underway in Baghdad, where the Saudis are talking with top IRGC brass, rather than the Foreign Ministry.
The view from Israel and Washington
According to Zimmt, the outcome of these elections matter little to Israel, which viewed Ahmadinejad as a wolf in wolf’s clothing, while Rouhani was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Israel is mainly concerned with the nuclear program, Iran’s regional activities (particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza), and its long-range missile capabilities. None of these issues are controlled by the government or president, but rather by the deep state.
For Israel a controversial, conservative president is preferable because it makes it easier to rally support against Iran. Ahmadinejad was Israel’s biggest asset, because he openly denied the Holocaust and the existence of homosexuals in Iran. Raisi’s controversial viewpoints and his involvement in the 1988 prison massacres could serve a similar purpose. Nasr also thought that a post-JCPOA Iran seeking to establish trade relations with the world might be served poorly by a controversial president.
The Biden administration does follow these elections with interest according to Katzman, who spoke in an official capacity. According to him, Iran is becoming a major regional and even supra-regional power. Its missile and drone capacities are extensive and sophisticated, and Tehran has extended them to allies and used them itself. The attacks on Saudi oil in Abqaiq, as well as the strike on the American al-Asad base in Iraq, were examples. Katzman called the strike on al-Asad “the most significant missile strike on American troops in American history.”
Iran’s serious capacities mean that they should be taken seriously by the US. Meanwhile, US sanctions have had no effect on Iran’s regional strategy or Iran’s regional influence. In 2014 Iran was under sanctions but became more involved in Syria and Yemen. When sanctions were lifted these policies continued. Iran’s regional activities are extremely inexpensive and sanctions don’t affect them significantly.
The key is to get some resolution to regional conflicts. Iran has expressed an interest in doing so. Iran won’t project power if there are no opportunities or interests that require it.
Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=197859625537872&ref=watch_permalink
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Economic sanctions work, but…
The continued use of US economic sanctions against Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and Cuba was the focus for a Brookings panel, Economic Sanctions: Assessing their use and implications for U.S. foreign policy on January 27. Moderated by James Goldgeier, Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow, the panel included Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow Center for Middle East Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Jung H. Pak, Senior Fellow Center for East Asia Policy Studies, and Ted Piccone, Nonresident Senior Fellow Security and Strategy.
Four Case Studies
Maloney believes the US uses sanctions in tandem with diplomacy with Iran, but usually is not joined by others. Two changes have occurred that altered the effectiveness of sanctions on Iran:
- After the 9/11 attacks, US sanctions became more targeted and were no longer only trade sanctions.
- The energy market has shifted with increased production outside the Persian Gulf.
US sanctions have not achieved their political goal of a dramatic reversal of core Iranian policy, but rather have only impacted the economy. Maloney argues that economic sanctions are effective in countries that already have dysfunctional economies, allowing the sanctions to compound structural problems.
Pak, an expert on North Korea, claims that the US only started piling on sanctions on North Korea since 2016, focused on sectors like seafood, iron, oil. The targeted sanctions of 2005 on Banco Delta Asia, which was helping facilitate North Korean illicit financing measures, led to serious economic problems. This sanction signaled to other banks and investment funds that doing business with North Korea was risky.
Piccone emphasizes that Cuba is an example of ineffective US sanctions, since they did not achieve their specified target of dislodging the Communist regime and removing Castro from power even if they were successful in stifling the economy. The US failed with Cuba sanctions to gain multilateral support. Due to the devastated economy, Cubans suffered and migrated: over 10% of the Cuban population lives outside Cuba, with the majority residing in the US.
Piccone contrasts Cuba sanctions with Venezuela, where the US shifted from targeted sanctions to sectoral ones, particularly on oil and gas. These sanctions amplified many of Venezuela’s existing economic problems. Sanctions effectiveness is closely tied to how dependent a country is on the US.
All panelists emphasized that even economically ‘successful’ sanctions can still be rendered ineffective if the political goals behind the sanctions are not realized.
Credibility is important
Maloney underlines the importance of sustaining credibility with regards to sanctions. Even before the May 2019 JCPOA withdrawal, Iran felt that the US was not upholding its side of the deal, as there continued to be new sanctions placed on the country.
All the panelists noted how muddled sanctions can be when the US makes exceptions for a program like the JCPOA, but maintains other sanctions related to support for terrorism and human rights violations. Maloney suggests that these remaining sanctions deter international banks and investors and reduce investment in Iran. The US withdrawal from the agreement undermined US credibility. Piccone adds that the inconsistencies between US administrations only further confuse the aims of sanctions, particularly in the case of Cuba.
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The nuclear race has begun
As Iran steps up its enrichment of uranium, the harbingers are clear:
- Turkish President Erdogan is asking questions out loud about why his country doesn’t have nuclear weapons,
- Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince is making it clear the Kingdom won’t be left far behind,
- Israel is lying low with its 100 or more warheads somewhere between ready and almost ready to launch, and
- North Korea is successfully resisting American pressure to give up its dozen or so nukes, making it clear to the whole world that Washington is a toothless tiger when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation.
The nightmare many of us feared in the 1970s and 1980s of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East has begun.
The trigger was President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and reimposition of sanctions have released Tehran from its obligations, which it is gradually and deliberately breaching. Turkey, which has long relied on the American nuclear umbrella and NATO, has cozied up to Russia–even purchasing its advanced air defense system–as relations with Washington worsened over how to deal with the Syrian Kurds. Erdogan has no doubt heard the talk about removing American nuclear weapons from Turkey and has drawn the obvious conclusion: if the American umbrella won’t protect you, get your own.
The Saudis increasingly view President Trump as unreliable, especially vis-a-vis Iran. They would be fools not to try to keep pace with the Turks in the race with Iran for nuclear weapons capability. What they can’t develop themselves, they’ll buy. The once prevalent and now quaint notion that no nuclear-savvy country would sell its crown jewels disappeared with Pakistani nuclear merchant A.Q. Khan. The Saudis can pay any price if need be.
The Middle East had gotten used to the Israeli nuclear capabilities, which have been regarded for decades as a deterrent for use only as a last resort. They play little roll in the balance of power beyond ensuring that Israel will continue to exist. The same cannot be assumed about Iranian, Turkish, and Saudi capabilities. Multi-sided games are much more complex than one- or two-sided ones. We can be thankful for the modus vivendi between nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan, but it is no harbinger for a four-sided nuclear standoff in the eastern Mediterranean. And the subcontinent’s standoff may not last forever, since at least Pakistan regards nuclear weapons as useful in warfighting, not just the last resort.
We have at least a few years, perhaps even a decade, before this race reaches some sort of equilibrium. In the meanwhile, the push and shove will be made all the more dramatic by US withdrawal from the Middle East. Its interests there have declined markedly with the development of advanced oil and gas recovery technology and the continued reduction of the US economy’s dependence on energy, especially in the form of hydrocarbons.
The big challenges for American diplomacy today are to slow the Middle East nuclear arms race and build some sort of regional security structure in which the Turks, Iranians, Saudis, and ultimately Israelis can work out their differences without resort to either the proxy wars they are already engaged in or the nuclear exchanges that will all-too-soon become possible. US withdrawal from its over-exposure in the Middle East is inevitable and desirable. But the risks are colossal. Diplomacy can reduce but likely not eliminate those risks.
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The US and Iran at loggerheads
Brookings held a panel discussion March 28 about constraining Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, with Richard Nephew, Senior fellow at the Center of Twenty-first century, Vann H. Van Diepen, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and Suzanne Maloney, Deputy director at the Center for Middle East Policy.
Nephew argues the US current strategy towards Iran won’t work and recommends a renewed diplomatic approach. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a good agreement and should serve as the basis for future negotiations. Especially important are provisions that deal with transparency, the plutonium path, and controls on uranium enrichment. Renewed talks and economic pressure will enable the US to achieve a more durable agreement with Iran.
Iran however is no longer so keen on the JCPOA, because it has not gotten the sanctions relief it anticipated. This was a problem even before Donald Trump became president. With the passage of time, new issues are emerging, especially the question of when the agreement will end (“sunset”). The existing sunset provisions of the JCPOA might have made sense in the context of more diplomacy and engagement between the US and Iran. But the current confrontation limits the opportunities for diplomacy.
Van gave an overview of the Iranian missile program. Iran can already cause serious disruption of regional targets. The situation will get worse Iranian missile accuracy improves.
Iran is determined to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles able to reach the US. It is developing the necessary ICBM technology, including making intermediate-range ICBMs mobile. It is also developing a large liquid-propellant rocket engine in cooperation with North Korea in addition to a solid rocket motor produced in Iran. Iranian missile forces already pose a threat to the US and its allies in the region. Van believes the US should focus on deterring attacks and intimidation and delaying Iran capability that can reach beyond the immediate region, especially the US.
Maloney stated the sanctions have had a tremendous impact on Iran’s trade and investment. The value of the currency has plummeted and oil exports are half what they were prior to the sanctions. Growth is slowing, with a shortage in key commodities.
This situation has had a political impact, leading to some reshuffling at the top of the government, resignations and impeachment, as well as eroding to some extent the legitimacy of the government. The Islamic Republic depends not only on religion and ideology but also on its capacity to deliver promises of a better life and social justice.
But sanctions alone are not a strategy; they are a means to an end. The Trump administration has left ambiguity about what the end might be: regime change, a bigger and better nuclear deal, or simply leaving Iran stewing in deteriorating economic and international relations.
Maloney thinks Iran can manage this impasse, as it did in the past under even greater economic strain. Tehran has survived a long period of isolation. But it cannot escape economic constraints without a conversation with the US. Iran could restart its nuclear program and provoke more crisis in the region, but that will not solve the economic crisis, which is the high priority for Iranian leaders.
The US also faces a stalemate. There is no evidence the Trump administration is looking at the various contingencies, thinking about how it is going to respond, and finding a way to direct the Iranians toward the most constructive option, which is negotiation. The Americans need a clearer strategy that can garner bipartisan support.
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