Tag: Iran
Empty threat?
Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani in a soft-spoken but hard-hitting performance today at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy touted Iraqi Kurdistan’s political, economic, commercial and social success, underlining its safe and secure environment as well as its tolerance, relative prosperity, literacy and attractiveness to foreign investors, including American oil companies.
But he lambasted Iraq, describing its central government as headed towards dictatorship, unwilling to implement its constitution (by proceeding with the Article 140 referenda in disputed territories) or abide by the November 2010 Erbil agreement that was supposed to institute serious power-sharing among Kurdish, Shia and Sunni dominated political forces. Prime Minister Maliki is accumulating all sorts of power: over the security forces, the intelligence services, the judiciary and even over the central bank. If a constitutional solution to the current political impasse cannot be found, Barzani threatened to “go back to the people,” by calling as a last resort a referendum on a question to be posed by Kurdistan’s parliament at a time unspecified.
The threat was clearly stated, but left a lot of open questions. In addition to the timing and content, it was not clear how Kurdistan would handle the disputed territories in a referendum scenario or whether it was prepared to defend itself by military means from strengthening Iraqi security forces. Barzani foreswore the use of force, but indicated that an eventual clash might be inevitable. He did not comment on how he thought Ankara and Washington would react to an independence referendum.
On other issues, Barzani made it clear Kurdistan is trying to mend fences with Turkey, which has changed its tune on Kurdish issues. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would cooperate “without limit” he said with non-military, non-violent efforts against the PKK (Kurdish insurgents who use Kurdistan as a safe haven but attack inside Turkey).
Barzani promised moral, political and financial assistance to the Syria’s Kurds, but said the decision whether to join the revolution would be left to them. The KRG would not provide weapons, he said.
Barzani noted the KRG’s common interest with the United States on Iran issues. Presumably Kurdish assistance in this respect was discussed in some detail in official meetings. Kurdistan supports UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, including those regarding sanctions in particular. U.S. influence in Iraq, Barzani said, depends not on the presence of American troops but on the degree of commitment in Washington. He clearly hoped to see more commitment to diverting Maliki from his current course.
Barzani declined to criticize Iraqi Parliament Speaker Nujayfi, noting that he has not accumulated or abused power the way Prime Minister Maliki has. On Iraqi Vice President Hashemi, who fled to Kurdistan to avoid arrest in Baghdad, Barzani said the Iraqi judicial system is inadequate to the task because the Prime Minister controls it.
Barzani sounded determined, but a referendum threat is only as credible as the likelihood that an independent Kurdistan will gain significant recognition. He may be buttering up Turkey and the U.S. in hopes of neutralizing their opposition to such a move, but he has a long way to go before they will contenance it.
Peace picks this week
The big event is Carnegie’s with Islamists on Thursday, but the week somehow starts on Wednesday with an event of my very own, he said unashamedly:
1. Does an Asterisk Make a Difference? SAIS Rome auditorium, 10-11:30 April 4
Belgrade and Pristina–after sustained U.S. and EU pressure–have agreed that Kosovo will be identified with an asterisk in European regional meetings. The asterisk will make reference to both UN Security Council resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The asterisk deal is causing second guessing on both sides. What does it tell us, or not, about Kosovo’s status? How does it affect the relationship between Pristina and Belgrade? What implications does it have for U.S. and EU approaches to conflict management?
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
10:00-11:30 a.m.
Rome Auditorium
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Moderator:
Michael Haltzel
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Speakers:
David Kanin
Adjunct Professor of European Studies
Daniel Serwer
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Professor of Conflict Management
2. Delegation of Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party, Georgetown University, 12:30 April 4
Event Details
**Please note venue: Lohrfink Auditorium**
A Discussion with
Official Delegation of Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party (FJP)
Wednesday, April 4 -12:30pm
Lohrfink Auditorium
Rafik B. Hariri Building (2nd floor)
Georgetown University
Panelists:
Member of Parliament, Freedom and Justice Party – Luxor
Member, Foreign Relations Committee, Freedom and Justice Party
Businessman
Advisor, Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice PartySondos Asem
Senior Editor, Ikhwanweb.com
Member, Foreign Relations Committee, Freedom and Justice Party
Khaled Al-Qazzaz
Foreign Relations Coordinator, Freedom and Justice Party
Chair:
John L. Esposito
University Professor & Founding Director, Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
For a map showing the location of the Rafik B. Hariri Building, please visit:
http://maps.georgetown.edu/rafikbhariribuilding/
For more information, please visit:
http://acmcu.georgetown.edu
3. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty CATO 4 pm April 4
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
4:00 PM (Reception To Follow)
Featuring the coauthor Daron Acemoglu, Killian Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; with comments by Karla Hoff, Senior Research Economist, Development Economics Group, World Bank; moderated by Ian Vasquez, Director, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute.
The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
If you can’t make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org.
Institutions — not geography, culture, or other factors — explain why some nations succeed and others fail. So says Daron Acemoglu in an ambitious new book drawing evidence from thousands of years of human history and from societies as diverse as those of the Inca Empire, 17th century England, and contemporary Botswana. Inclusive political and economic institutions, influenced by critical junctures in history, produce virtuous cycles that reinforce pluralism in the market and in politics. Acemoglu will contrast that pattern of development with that experienced under extractive institutions. He will also describe the conditions under which institutions favorable or inimical to development tend to arise. Karla Hoff will provide critical comments.
4. Islamists in Power: Views from Within, Carnegie but at the Grand Hyatt
Thursday, April 5, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
8:45 AM – 4:45 PM EST
Islamist parties have emerged as the strongest contenders in recent elections in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, and are likely continue to do well in future elections in other countries. It is clear that Islamist parties will have a dominant impact on the outcome of Arab transitions, but there is little understanding in Washington of what that will mean for governing.
On April 5, high-level representatives of Islamist parties from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Libya will participate in a one-day event convened by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Agenda
8:45-9:00 a.m. | Opening RemarksJessica Mathews, President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |
9:00-10:45 a.m. | Building New Regimes after the UprisingsModerator Marwan MuasherPanelists Mustapha Elkhalfi (Morocco) Abdul Mawgoud Rageh Dardery (Egypt) Nabil Alkofahi (Jordan) Sahbi Atig (Tunisia) |
11:15 a.m.-1:00 p.m. | Writing a New ConstitutionModerator Nathan BrownPanelists Khaled Al-Qazzaz (Egypt) Osama Al Saghir (Tunisia) Mohamed Gaair (Libya) |
1:00-2:30 p.m. | Recess |
2:30-4:30 p.m. | Economic Challenges of the TransitionModerator Masood AhmedPanelists Hussein Elkazzaz (Egypt) Mondher Ben Ayed (Tunisia) Nael Al-Masalha (Jordan) Abdelhadi Falahat (Jordan)—not yet confirmed |
4:30-4:45 p.m. | Closing Remarks |
5. What is in and what is not in the much-disputed newest constitution in Europe: the Fundamental Law of Hungary, National Press club, 4 pm April 5
Jozsef Szajer
April 5, 2012 4:00 PM
Location: Zenger Room
National Press Club “AFTERNOON NEWSMAKER”
News Conference
Thursday, April 5, 2012, 4 p.m.
National Press Club (Zenger Room)
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and Author of the new Hungarian Constitution,
JOZSEF SZAJER
Contacts: National Press Club: PETER HICKMAN, 301/530-1210 (H&O/T&F), 301/367-7711 (C), 202/662-7540 (NPC, pjhickman@hotmail.com
Mr. Szajer: Andras Szorenyi (Embassy of Hungary), 202/415-3653 (t), Andras.Szorenyi@mfa.gov.hu
For More Information On This Event,
Please Contact:
Peter Hickman
301-530-1210
6. The Afghanistan Security Transition: the Role and Importance of Afghanistan’s Neighbors, USIP, 10-12 April 6
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am on April 6, 2012 at www.usip.org/webcast.
As the 2014 security transition in Afghanistan approaches, multiple tracks need to be pursued to ensure sustainable peace in the country. A regional solution is often touted as a critical element in achieving such a peace. Without collaborative buy-in for such a solution, however, the potential increases that Afghanistan’s neighbors will play a destabilizing role in the country given their own domestic and international objectives. Despite much debate on this issue, the core interests policies, and views of Afghanistan’s neighboring states are still not well understood.
Join USIP to discuss how Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors – Pakistan, Iran, and the bordering Central Asian Republics – view the present situation and impending transition in Afghanistan, and what their role and policies are likely to be between now and 2014, and beyond. What measures can the U.S. and other allies take to incentivize policies of cooperation and collaboration from these neighbors with the ultimate objective of promoting stability in Afghanistan? USIP works on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote the nonviolent resolution of conflicts and build local capacity to prevent and address disputes through nonviolent means.
This event will feature the following speakers:
- Abubakar Siddique, panelist
Senior News Correspondent
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
- Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, panelist
Associate Researcher, Peace Research Institute Oslo
Professor MPA/Sciences Po (Paris) - Alireza Nader, panelist
Senior International Policy Analyst
RAND Corporation
- Moeed Yusuf, moderator
South Asia Adviser
United States Institute of Peace
7. Global Nuclear Security and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, National Press Club, 10 am April 6
Location: Zenger Room
Panel to Discuss Global Nuclear Security and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
Date and Time: April 6 at 10 a.m.
Place: Zenger Room, National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, 13th floor
With the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran a concern of many world leaders, particularly those in the United States and Israel, a panel of foreign policy practitioners will speak at a Press Club Newsmaker on global nuclear security and ways to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Panel participants will be:
• Robert Gallucci, president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and former chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994
• Sharon Squassoni, director and senior fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Joseph Cirincione, president, Ploughshares Fund
• Alexander Glaser, assistant professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
Contact Info: Keith Hill (khill@bna.com)
The joke is on us
The temptation to do an April Fool’s post is great, but the barriers are greater: how can anyone joke about Bashar al Assad murdering Syria’s citizens and managing nevertheless to stay in power? Or about nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian theocracy? A war we are losing in Afghanistan? A peace we are losing in Iraq? A re-assertive Russia determined to marginalize dissent? An indebted America dependent on a creditor China that requires 7-8% annual economic growth just to avoid massive social unrest? I suppose the Onion will manage, but I’m not even one of its outer layers.
Not that the world is more threatening than in the past. To the contrary. America today faces less threatening risks than it has at many times in the past. But there are a lot of them, and they are frighteningly varied. Drugs from Latin America, North Korean sales of nuclear and missile technology, Al Qaeda wherever, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the wrong hands, bird or swine flu… Wonks are competing to offer a single “grand strategy” in a situation that does not permit one. Doctrine deprived Obama has got it right: no “strategic vision” can deal with all these contingencies. They require a case by case approach, albeit one rooted in strength and guided by clear principles.
American military strength is uncontested in today’s world and unequaled for a couple of decades more, even in the most draconian of budget situations. A stronger economy is on the way, though uncertainty in Europe and China could derail it. All America’s problems would look easier to solve with a year or two, maybe even three, of 3-4% economic growth. The principles are the usual ones, which I would articulate this way:
- The first priority is to protect American national security
- Do it with cheaper civilian means as much as possible, more expensive military means when necessary
- Leverage the contributions of others when we can, act unilaterally when we must
- Build an international system that is legitimate, fair and just
- Cultivate friends, deter and when necessary defeat enemies
My students will immediately try to classify these proposition as “realist” or “idealist.” I hope I’ve formulated them in ways that make that impossible.
There are a lot of difficult issues lying in the interstices of these propositions. Is an international system that gives the victors in a war now more than 65 years in the past vetoes over UN Security Council action fair and just? Does it lead to fair and just outcomes? Civilian means seem to have failed in Syria, and seem to be failing with Iran, but are military means any more likely to succeed? If the threats to American national security are indirect but nonetheless real–when for example North Korea threatens a missile launch intended to intimidate Japan and South Korea–do we withhold humanitarian assistance?
America’s political system likes clear and unequivocal answers. It has categories into which it would like to toss each of us. Our elections revolve around identity politics almost as much as those in the Balkans. We create apparently self-evident myths about our leaders that don’t stand up to scrutiny.
The fact is that the world is complicated, the choices difficult, the categories irrelevant and the myths fantasies. That’s the joke: it’s on us.
Missive offense and defense
America’s patriots were hard at work this week, not attacking the nation’s enemies but each other. First the Romney brigade launched a missive, apparently the first salvo in a planned barrage. The Obama missive defense went ballistic. The question is this: how much difference is there, really, between the two presumed candidates?
On one issue, defense spending, there is a clear and present difference: Obama is in the midst of cutting close to half a billion dollars from projected increases in the Pentagon budget over the next ten years. Romney says he would not do that (without explaining how he would avoid it). He has committed himself to a naval buildup, apparently in anticipation of a Chinese challenge that will be decades in the making. Presumably to cover the interim, he has declared Russia America’s main foreign threat. Obama is already moving to shore up America’s presence in Asia and the Pacific, but he shows much less concern about Russia and more about Iran.
Romney has said Iran will not get a nuclear weapon if he is elected president. Obama says Iran will not get a nuclear weapon while he is president. Romney is clearly thinking more about military threat that enables diplomacy and Obama more about diplomacy enabled by military pressure. That’s a distinction with a difference in emphasis.
Both candidates are Israel‘s best friend. Obama has its back. Romney has its front. Neither is willing to pressure his best friend to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians. Romney seems inclined to ignore their existence. Obama does not but has reached a dead-end on the issue.
Both candidates are also Castro’s worst enemy. Romney would pursue a tougher isolation policy with Cuba, one that has failed for more than 50 years to bring results. Obama would try to undermine the Castro regime with soft power, a more recent approach that has also failed to work.
On Iraq and Afghanistan, there are again some real differences. Romney says it was a mistake for Obama to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq. Obama asks how they could stay if Iraq did not want them and refused to allow immunity from prosecution. Romney says the drawdown in Afghanistan is too fast. Obama leans toward accelerating it. That difference too is real: Romney would stay in Afghanistan to win, Obama wants to get out before we lose.
Then there are the issues that have not yet been launched. Romney will likely say Obama hasn’t done enough to support the rebellion in Syria. Obama won’t say it, but he hesitates on Syria because he wants to keep his powder dry and needs Russian support on Iran. Obama will vaunt his accomplishments against Al Qaeda. Romney will criticize Obama for failing to bring around Pakistan.
There are also the intangibles. Romney says the United States needs to be number 1 and lead. Obama says the United States needs to collaborate with others and share burdens. Romney says he would never apologize for the United States. Obama apologizes when we are responsible for something going terribly wrong. Romney will say Obama is too soft. Obama will say Romney is too simplistic.
There are some who think this kind of missive exchange is clarifying or otherwise edifying. I’m not so sure, even if I think my team–that’s the Obamites–got the best of it on this occasion. I guess I am nostalgic, but it would be nice to return to the “water’s edge”: that’s a foreign policy that ignores partisan differences once we leave the east and west coasts to go abroad. We shouldn’t hide the real differences, but there is more similarity here than either side would like to admit. Nor will they do so any time before November.
Geography and oil are fate
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki seems for the moment to be winning his high stakes bet on hosting the Arab League summit this week in Baghdad. The first bar is set pretty low: if the meeting comes off without any major security incidents or diplomatic kerfuffles, Iraq will be able to herald it as a successful milestone marking the return of Baghdad to regional prominence and a renewed role in the Arab world.
It could amount to more. It already says something about the Arab League that a Kurdish president and a Shia prime minister are leading an Arab League summit. Maliki has successfully courted improvements in relations with Sunni-dominated Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the last couple of months. Some are hoping he might use the occasion to tilt Iraq away from Iran, perhaps even capturing a significant role with Russia in the effort to manage a negotiated transition in Syria.
Of course the whole thing might still blow up, too. Either literally, if Al Qaeda in Iraq slips through Baghdad’s well-manned but still porous security cordons, or figuratively, if heads of state decline to attend or the Syria issue leads to a serious diplomatic breach with the Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar that would like to boot Bashar al Assad.
A successful Arab League summit could significantly improve Maliki’s standing at home, where he has also been doing some fence mending. His big achievement was passing the budget in parliament. His Sunni and Kurdish putative allies in parliament might still like to bring him down, but they have been unable to mount a serious threat and have not managed even to suggest an alternative majority. Besides, they like their cushy jobs.
Maliki may be mending his fences, but they are still fences. His majority is increasingly dependent on support from the Sadrists, whose reliance on Iran will limit his room to maneuver.
What does this mean for the U.S.? The most immediate issue is Syria: Washington would like Baghdad to help get Bashar to walk the plank. Tehran will resist that mightily, and if it happens will redouble its effort to create in Iraq any “strategic depth” it loses in Syria. Maliki can only gain from an end to the Assad regime if it gets him serious support from the Kurds and Sunnis within Iraq, as well as the broader Arab world. I’d like to believe that would happen, but he is unlikely to have enough confidence it would.
The longer-term issue is the political orientation of Iraq. Will it stand on its own and develop strong ties with the West, as well as with the Arab world and Iran? Or will it tilt inexorably in Iran’s direction, risking internal strife as well as its own independence? The Arab League summit is unlikely to have much long-term impact in determining this question. Iraq’s Sunnis are convinced Maliki is an Iranian stooge. The Americans still hope he’ll come around in their direction.
One major factor determining the outcome is rarely discussed, even in expert circles: how Iraq exports its oil and eventually also its gas. If it continues to put the vast bulk of its oil on to ships that have to pass through the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz under Iranian guns, Tehran’s influence will grow. But there is an alternative. If Baghdad repairs and expands the “strategic” pipeline to enable export of large quantities of oil (and eventually gas) to the north (to Turkey) and west (to Syria or Jordan), any government in Baghdad will see its links to the West as truly vital. Maliki’s government has been doing the needed feasibility studies, but it is not yet clear that it is ready to make the necessary decisions, since export to the north and west would mean crossing Kurdish and Sunni controlled territory.
Iraq once seemed hopelessly divided. But those divisions can be bridged, if there is political will to do so. Geography and oil are fate.
This week’s peace picks
Maybe I’m getting more exigent. Just four events this week, though the first first one lasts three days:
1. Southeast European Economic Forum: SAIS, Day 1, 7-9 pm March 26
2. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, CNAS, 5:30-8:30 pm March 27

Location:The W Hotel
515 15th Street NW
(enter on F Street between 14th and 15th Streets)
Washington, DC 20004
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) cordially invites you to the book launch for The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East by Dr. Marc Lynch, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CNAS and Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. On Tuesday, March 27, 2012 from 6:00 to 8:30 p.m., Dr. Lynch will discuss one of the most fundamental changes throughout the history of the modern Middle East: the empowerment of a new generation of Arabs who reject the world they inherited. Hisham Melhem, Washington Bureau Chief for al-Arabiya , will interview Dr. Lynch, followed by Q&A with the audience. Please RSVP online here or call (202) 457-9427.
The Arab Uprising will be on sale and Dr. Lynch will be available to sign copies during the book-signing cocktail reception from 7:15 to 8:30 p.m.
In The Arab Uprising, Dr. Lynch examines the emerging regional landscape in the Middle East, one in which, he argues, the old heavyweights – Iran, al Qaeda, even Israel – have all been disempowered, and nations like Saudi Arabia are powering a new cold war. Dr. Lynch highlights the new fault lines that are forming between forces of revolution and counter-revolution and shows what it all means for the future of U.S. foreign policy. Deeply informed by inside access to the Obama administration’s decisionmaking process and first-hand interviews with protestors, politicians, diplomats and journalists, The Arab Uprising is an unprecedented and indispensible guide to the changing lay of the land in the Middle East and North Africa.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
5:30-6:00 p.m.: Guest registration and book sales
6:00-7:15 p.m.: Moderated discussion followed by Q&A
Hisham Melhem is the Washington bureau chief of Al-Arabiya, the Dubai based satellite channel. He is also the correspondent for Annahar, the leading Lebanese daily. For four years he hosted Across the Ocean, a weekly current affairs program on U.S.-Arab relations for Al-Arabiya. Mr. Melhem speaks regularly on U.S.-Arab relations, political Islam, intra-Arab relations, Arab-Israeli issues, media in the Arab world, Arab images in American media and U.S. public policies and the Arab world. Mr. Melhem has interviewed many American and international public figures, including Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush.
3. Constitution-Making, Electoral Design, and the Arab Spring, NED, 12-2 pm March 29
a luncheon presentation featuring
Andrew Reynolds, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
John Carey, Dartmouth College
with comments by
Donald L. Horowitz, Duke University
Thursday, March 29, 2012
12 noon–2:00 p.m.
(Lunch served 12:00–12:30 p.m.)
1025 F. Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone: 202-378-9675
RSVP (acceptances only) with name and affiliation by Tuesday, March 27.
About the Event:
In December 2010, a Tunisian fruit vendor burned himself to death to protest his treatment by police, marking the start of what has become widely known as the “Arab Spring.” Mass popular protests spread throughout most of the region, and a little more than a year later violent conflict is still raging in Syria and Yemen. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, however, dictators have fallen, and these countries are currently engaged in the struggle to achieve successful transitions to democracy. Among the most difficult challenges that they face are those of drafting and approving new constitutions and of designing electoral systems that will foster both fairness and stability. Getting their new constitutions and electoral systems right will be of crucial importance to their efforts to build functioning and enduring democracies. Andrew Reynolds and John Carey will assess the various paths chosen by these would-be democratizers, drawing upon and updating their co-authored articles in the October 2011 and January 2012 issues of the Journal of Democracy. Donald L. Horowitz will provide comments.
About the Speakers:
Andrew Reynolds is associate professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, where his research focuses on democratization, constitutional design, and electoral politics. He has advised a number of organizations including the UN, NDI, and the State Department. He is currently writing (with Jason Brownlee and Tarek Masoud) The Arab Spring: The Politics of Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).
John Carey is the Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences and the chair of the government department at Dartmouth College. He is co-editor of the Legislative Studies Quarterly, and his most recent book is Legislative Voting & Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Donald Horowitz, the James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University, is currently a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace, where he is completing a project on “Constitutional Design for Severely Divided Societies.”
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001




In the months since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued its November 2011 report, which raised new questions about Iran’s nuclear program, the debate in Washington, D.C., over Iran has grown hotter. Policymakers, politicians, scholars, and pundits are now offering wildly divergent predictions and prescriptions.
While these open debates are an improvement over the Beltway groupthink that accompanied the run-up to the Iraq War, many questions remain about the Obama administration’s policy. This conference examines the two central questions surrounding U.S. policy toward Iran: Can diplomacy work? What are the options if diplomacy fails?
Please join us for a vigorous discussion of these critical issues.
8:30 a.m. | Registration |
9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. | Panel 1: Can Diplomacy Work?Is the current policy — or any diplomatic offer — likely to work? Has the administration defined “diplomacy” as being limited to sanctions and pressure? Could a different approach hold a better chance of success? How is success defined?Michael Adler, Woodrow Wilson Center Justin Logan, Cato Institute Alireza Nader, RAND Corporation Barbara Slavin, Atlantic Council |
10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m. | Break |
10:45 a.m. – 12:15 p.m. | Panel 2: The Options if Diplomacy FailsIf diplomacy fails, what are the military and non-military options the U.S. administration would have? What are the prospects for success? What likely repercussions would follow from bombing Iran?Jamie Fly, Foreign Policy Initiative Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University Nuno Monteiro, Yale University Joshua Rovner, U.S. Naval War College |
12:15 p.m. | Luncheon |
This Cato Conference is free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by 9:00 a.m., Wednesday, March 28, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.
The Cato Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of the Ploughshares Fund in helping make this event possible.