Tag: Iran
The coming week’s peace picks
Too much this week, and most of it happening Wednesday:
1. Are economic sanctions the key to resolving the nuclear dispute? CSIS, February 27, 6-8 pm.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) is pleased to invite you to a debate on the recent sanctions imposed on Iran. These sanctions target Iran’s banking sector and are widely believed to have had significant effects not just on Iran’s ability to acquire materials for its nuclear program, but also its energy sector and economy as a whole. Although many agree that Iranian development of a nuclear weapon would have serious security implications for the Middle East, questions about whether or not this is truly Iran’s intent and what the United States should do about it remain hotly contested. Does diplomacy still offer a means of resolving this issue and, if so, are the economic sanctions being passed on Iran making a diplomatic solution harder or easier to achieve?
Two highly distinguished scholars will come to CSIS to present opposing views on this issue and debate the policy of sanctioning Iran on its merits. The debate will feature:
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
and
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Maloney will present her argument that sanctioning Iran has become counterproductive and that the U.S. “cannot hope to bargain with a country whose economy it is trying to disrupt and destroy.” Mr. Rubin will take the opposing view that “only overwhelming pain” will convince the Iranian leadership to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
A cocktail reception with appetizers will begin at 6:00pm and the debate will commence at 6:30pm.
RSVP to David Slungaard at dslungaard@csis.org.
Webast: For those that cannot attend, the debate will live streamed. A link to the webcast will posted on this page on the day of the debate.
This event is the 13th installment of PONI’s ongoing Live Debate Series, which is an extension of the PONI Debates the Issues blog. The objective of the series is to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of the arguments on both sides of key nuclear policy issues. Please join us for what promises to be an exciting debate on a crucial issue of concern for the nonproliferation community, international security analysts, and regional specialists focusing on the Middle East.
2. Policing Iraq, USIP, February 29, 9:30-11:30 am
Under Saddam Hussein, a complex web of intelligence and security institutions protected the regime and repressed the Iraqi people. Underfunded and mismanaged, the Iraqi police were least among those institutions and unprepared to secure the streets when Coalition Forces arrived in 2003 and disbanded the rest of the security apparatus. Iraq’s police forces have made important strides, and some 400,000 Iraqi police have been trained and stationed across the country. However, with the U.S. drawdown in Iraq, the future of the Iraqi police and U.S. police assistance is uncertain.
On February 29, the United States Institute of Peace and the Institute for the Study of War will co-host a panel of distinguished experts who will discuss the history of the Iraqi police and the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. This public event will introduce a new USIP Special Report by Robert Perito on “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire.”
Speakers
- General Jim Dubik (U.S. Army, ret.), Panelist
Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of War
Former Commander, Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq - Dr. Austin Long, Panelist
Assistant Professor, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs
- Ginger Cruz, Panelist
Former Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) - Robert Perito, Moderator
Director, Security Sector Governance Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Author, USIP Special Report, “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire” - Tara Sonenshine, Introduction
Executive Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace - Marisa Cochrane Sullivan,Introduction
Deputy Director, Institute for the Study of War
3. Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace in the Horn of Africa: A New Approach? Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th floor auditorium, February 29, 10-11:30 am
The Horn of Africa is one of the world’s most conflicted regions, experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990. In recent months, the region has been afflicted with drought, famine, refugee migrations and military confrontations. All of these dynamics have catapulted the Horn of Africa upwards on the priority list for US policymakers.
In response to this on-going crisis, the Wilson Center’s Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity established a Horn of Africa Steering Committee in 2010 that focused on developing a regional US policy framework for the Horn. A conflict mapping report that analyses the major patterns, cross-cutting issues, and interrelationships in the Horn’s ongoing armed conflicts was subsequently commissioned, as well as a set of recommendations for US policy in the region going forward.
On February 29, 2012, the Leadership Project, in partnership with Alliance for Peacebuilding and Institute for Horn of Africa Studies and Analysis (IHASA) The overall objective of the recommendations publication is to employ a conflict resolution-oriented approach to a US regional framework for the Horn, including the need to promote good governance, increase human security (not just state or regime security), strengthen regional cooperation, and boost economic development and regional economic integration.
This event will be taking place at the Woodrow Wilson Center in the 6th Floor Auditorium on February 29th from 10:00am-11:30am. Please RSVP to leadership@wilsoncenter.org.
Program Agenda
Scene-Setter
Paul Williams, Associate Professor, George Washington University
Discussants
Akwe Amosu, Director, Africa Advocacy, Open Society Institute (Invited)
Chic Dambach, Chief of Staff, Congressman John Garamendi, CA
Raja Jandhyala, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, US Agency for International Development
Ambassador David Shinn, Former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Professor, George Washington University
Location:
Event Information
When
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
10:30 AM to 12:00 PM
Where
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Participants
Panelists
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Natan B. Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Shibley Telhami
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
5. Presidential Elections in Russia – What’s Next?, Carnegie Endowment, February 29, 12:30-2 pm
Dmitri Trenin, James F. Collins
Register to attend
With Russia’s presidential election less than a month away, Vladimir Putin is facing the most serious challenge since the establishment of his “power vertical.” Tens of thousands of people have taken to the streets across Russia, undeterred by plunging winter temperatures. Moscow is also facing challenges abroad—its recent veto of the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian regime has threatened its relations with much of the Arab world, and the U.S.-Russia “reset” appears stuck in neutral.
Dmitri Trenin and Ambassador James F. Collins will discuss how Russia’s presidential elections will influence its policies.
6. China’s International Energy Strategies: Global and Regional Implications, Elliott School (Lindner Family Commons) February 29, 12:30-1:45 pm
Philip Andrews-Speed, Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, the German Marshall Fund of the United States; Associate Fellow, Chatham House
Discussant: Llewelyn Hughes, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, GW
China is now a major player in the international energy arena. Imports of all forms of energy are increasing; national energy companies are investing around the world; and the government is active in different forms of energy diplomacy. These behaviors are driven by a range of interests from within and outside China. The external political consequences are rather greater than the economic ones, and vary around the world. China is a key player, along with Japan, in the progress of energy cooperation in East Asia.
RSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/ASFeb29
Sponsored by Sigur Center for Asian Studies
7. Assessing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities Amidst Economic Challenges: The Foreign Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, 2172 Rayburn, February 29, 1:30 pm
Full Committee
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Full Committee to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
8. To What Extent Is Iran a Threat to Israel? 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW, Suite M100 February 29, 4-6 pm
9. Measuring and Combating Corruption in the 21st Century, SAIS Rome building rm 200, March 2, 12:30-2 pm
Summary: Nathaniel Heller, co-founder and executive director of Global Integrity, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact developmentroundtable@jhu.edu.
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This week’s peace picks
I somehow managed to commit myself to three events this week, one off-the-record and two public: on Syria with Mona Yacoubian at the Center for National Policy (1 MA Ave), February 23, 12-1:15 and on Algeria (the same day!) 3-4:30 pm in BOB (1717 MA) 500 at SAIS. The week is a short one and therefore crowded with other interesting events:
1. Campaign 2012 Series – Election Cycle Foreign Policy with Heather Hurlburt, February 21, 6-7:30 PM
Campaign 2012 Series:
Election Cycle Foreign Policy with Heather Hurlburt
While the upcoming presidential election this year may be dominated by domestic issues, foreign policy remains a critical factor in any election season. Every aspiring foreign policy leader needs to have the skills and savvy to navigate electoral politics. As we gear up for Election 2012, YPFP is reviving the popular Campaign Series from 2008 to give members the opportunity for spirited bi-partisan debate on both the role of foreign policy on the upcoming election, and the impact of the presidential contest on foreign policy.
In this election, Iran, Syria, and the new “Pacific Pivot” strategy have emerged front and center, while the endgame of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have begun to recede. Yet, nothing carries more influence than the economy, with most foreign policy questions being viewed through the lens of job creation or possible budget cuts for defense, diplomacy, and development.
Please join YPFP and our co-sponsor, America’s Impact, for the first installment of YPFP’s Campaign 2012 Series: a discussion about foreign policy in an election cycle with Heather Hurlburt, Executive Director of the National Security Network. Ms. Hurlburt, a veteran politico and frequent news commentator, will lead a discussion of these questions:
• How is the foreign policy landscape changing from 2008 to 2012?
• What do aspiring foreign policy leaders need to know about
presidential election cycles?
• What can we expect in this election and in the future?
• What role does U.S. politics play in the formation of U.S. foreign policy?
• How are other countries viewing the 2012 presidential election?
This will be the first event in a bi-partisan series that focuses on the foreign policy questions and challenges during the 2012 campaign cycle. Please join us for our next event in partnership with the Foreign Policy Initiative. Stay tuned for more details!
Before joining NSN, Hurlburt ran her own communications and strategy practice, working on global and political issues with political, entertainment, and educational leaders. From 1995-2001, Hurlburt served in the Clinton Administration as Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the President, speechwriter for Secretaries of State Albright and Christopher, and member of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff. She has also worked for the International Crisis Group, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Congressional Helsinki Commission. At the Helsinki Commission, she was a negotiating member of the US Delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and participated extensively in election monitoring, democracy-building and post-conflict missions in Central and Eastern Europe. She appears frequently as a commentator in new and traditional media and is a regular guest on Robert Wright’s Blogging Heads TV. Her work has been published by the New York Times, Washington Post, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Guardian, POLITICO, New Republic and other outlets. Hurlburt holds a BA from Brown University, magna cum laude, and an MA from the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.
About America’s Impact
America’s Impact is a nonprofit community of professionals dedicated to making U.S. foreign policy a domestic priority. By supporting Congressional candidates who embrace pragmatic U.S. engagement with the world, we hope to build a more prosperous and secure America. For
more information, visit www.americasimpact.org.
2. The Iranian Nuclear Dilemma: Risk of an Iraq Sequel? Rayburn B339, February 21, 10:45 am-noon
A panel discussion featuring:
Hans Blix
Former Director General of the IAEA
Colin Kahl
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East
Robert Kelley
Former Chief Inspector for the IAEA in Iraq
Moderator: Trita Parsi
President, National Iranian American Council
Tuesday, February 21st, 2012
Rayburn House Office Building B-339
10:45 AM-12:00 PM
Light lunch will be provided
Seating is limited, RSVP required: rsvp@niacouncil.org or (202) 386-6325
Less than a decade after allegations of Iraqi weapons programs pitted the Bush Administration, the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the international community in a high stakes drama that ended in a devastating conflict and occupation, war again appears on the horizon—this time with Iran. But while fears of an Iranian aspiration for nuclear weapons have heightened the threat of another disastrous war, the Iranian nuclear dilemma is far from unresolvable.
Dr. Hans Blix served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981 to 1997. He was appointed to lead the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission from 2000 to 2003 and was at the center of IAEA inspection efforts in Iraq prior to the Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Dr. Colin Kahl served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East from 2009 to 2011, developing and implementing the U.S. Defense Department’s strategy regarding Iran. He recently published “Not Time to Attack Iran” in Foreign Affairs.
Robert Kelley served as a member of the IAEA Iraq Action Team in 2003 and was Chief Inspector for the IAEA in Iraq, South Africa, and Libya. He questioned the evidence presented in the November 2011 IAEA report on Iran, in a Bloomberg piece, “Nuclear Arms Charge Against Iran Is No Slam Dunk”.
Sponsored by the Ploughshares Fund
The views of the speakers are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Iranian American Council.
3. Inside Egypt — The Path Forward, Gallup 901 F Street NW, February 22, 9-10 am
Over the past year, Egyptians have experienced a historic revolution, a surge in optimism, and a series of political and economic successes and challenges. Gallup scientifically measured Egyptians’ attitudes and hopes about the country’s politics and economics multiple times throughout this crucial year in the country’s history.
Gallup will share the key findings from these surveys at an in-depth briefing on February 22, 2012, in Washington, D.C. Gallup Senior Analyst Mohamed Younis will present the latest research on Egyptians’ views on the following topics:
- the coming presidential election
- Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel
- the Arab Spring and events in Syria and Libya
- the Egyptian military’s involvement in national politics
- Egyptians’ preferred path to civilian rule
Inside Egypt: The Path Forward will take place Wednesday, February 22, 2012 from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. at The Gallup Building at 901 F Street, NW, Washington, D.C. Please note that the entrance to The Gallup Building is on 9th Street. Gallup will provide light refreshments. While there is no cost to attend, registration is required. For more information, please contact Krista Volzke at 402.938.6001.
Event Registration
| Date | Location | Price | Register By | Status |
| February 22, 2012 | Washington, D.C. | Free | February 17, 2012 | Open |
3. The Changing Relationship between Civil Society and the Military, February 22, 12-1:30 pm
Where: Creative Associates, 5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. (nearest metro: Friendship Heights)
Civil society organizations are taking on more active and crucial roles in both conflict and post-conflict environments to allow for local stakeholders to quickly build capacity for social services in the absence of civilian government authority, create the infrastructure needed to expedite economic activity, and serve as an important voice of local populace to military authorities.
How should our changing understanding of civil society influence how the U.S. military should interact with local CSOs? Can the military and civil society work together without blurring the lines between military and civilian operations? Some have argued that well-intended efforts by the military-civil society partnerships to rebuild schools and playgrounds or provide medical assistance risks militarizing civilian activities in the eyes of hostile forces.
How does the military currently determine which organizations are reliable social partners? How should these partnerships be funded? And how much assistance, guidance, or support should military authorities provide without undermining CSOs’ independence and credibility?
On February 22, SID-Washington’s Civil Society and Crisis, Conflict and Transition workgroups will cosponsor a brown bag lunch featuring Dr. Evelyn Farkas, Senior Advisor for Public-Private Partnerships to SACEUR, J.Randall Tift, Senior Advisor for World Vision, and Paul Miller, Foreign Aid Advisor, Catholic Relief Services, who will lead an open discussion of relationship building between military and civil society leaders in conflict environments. This is not intended to be a presentation of military policy but a collaborative exchange on how to improve conflict environment management methods by both sides.
Speakers:
J. Randall Tift, Senior Advisor, World Vision
Evelyn N. Farkas, Ph.D., Senior Advisor for Public-Private Relationships to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)
Paul Miller, Foreign Aid Advisor, Catholic Relief Services
Beverages and light snacks will be provided.
Take-out lunch options near Creative Associates:
Friendship Heights Metro, south exit: Booeymonger, Cosi’s.
Friendship Heights Metro, north exit (one block from Creative Associates): McDonalds and Subway in Mazza Galarie, Cheesecake Factory on Wisconsin Ave.
Location: Creative Associates, 5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C.
For more information:
Moderated byBob Schieffer
Chief Washington Correspondent, CBS News;
Anchor, CBS News’ “Face the Nation”
Panelists:General James E. Cartwright, USMC (Ret.)
Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies, CSISAdmiral William J. Fallon, USN (Ret.)
Former Commander, U.S. Central Command
David Sanger
Chief Washington Correspondent, New York Times;
Author, The InheritanceThursday, February 23rd, 2012,
5:30 p.m. – 6:30 p.m.CSIS
1800 K St. NW,
Washington, DC 20006
Seating is limited. RSVP is required. Please RSVP (acceptances only) with your name and affiliation to schiefferseries@csis.org.
The TCU Schieffer School of Journalism and CSIS cosponsor a monthly series of dialogues hosted by award-winning journalist Bob Schieffer to discuss the most pressing foreign and domestic issues of the day.
5. The Arab Spring and International Law, February 23, GWU Law School, 12 noon
Event Information
Thursday, February 23, 2012, 12:00 PM
Jacob Burns Moot Courtroom, George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.
Event Link
The ABA Section of International Law, in co-sponsorship with the American Society of International Law and the George Washington University School of Law, presents the 2nd Annual “Live from the L”: The Office of the Legal Adviser,U.S. Department of State. This year”s discussion will focus on “The Arab Spring and International Law” and will be webcast. Speakers Include: Harold Hongju Koh Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State Linda Jacobson Assistant Legal Adviser for African and Near Eastern Affairs Please Save the Date for this incredible event, Registration will follow in the near future.
Contact Information
Curry Wilson, Meeting Planner/Committee Programs
curry.wilson@americanbar.org
(202) 662-1672
6. The Battle for Power in Iran: Revolutionary Guard Corps vs. Clerics, Carnegie Endowment, February 24, 12:15-2 pm
| ContactJessica Bouletjboulet@ceip.org 202 939 2212 |
EVENT DETAILS
|
DATE |
Friday, February 24, 2012 |
|
TIME |
12:15 to 2:00 p.m. |
|
LOCATION |
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |
|
SPEAKERS |
Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Mehdi Khalaji, Ali Alfoneh, and Karim Sadjadpour |
Is the Islamic Republic of Iran a theocratic regime led by clerics, or a military dictatorship ruled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? Ahead of the country’s March 2012 parliamentary elections, noted experts Mehrzad Boroujerdi of Syracuse University, Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Ali Alfoneh of the American Enterprise Institute will examine the evolving architecture of power in Tehran. Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour will moderate the discussion.
|
Speakers
Mehrzad Boroujerdi is associate professor of political science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, where he also serves as the founding director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program. He is also the editor of the forthcoming Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and Theory of Statecraft (Syracuse University Press) and is a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute.
Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shiite groups in the Middle East. Previously, Khalaji served on the editorial boards of two prominent Iranian periodicals, and he also worked for BBC Persian as a political analyst on Iranian affairs, later becoming a broadcaster for Radio Farda, the Persian-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Ali Alfoneh is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where his research focuses on civil-military relations in Iran with a special focus on the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Islamic Republic. He was previously a research fellow at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College.
Moderator
Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was previously an analyst with the International Crisis Group based in Tehran and Washington. He is the author of Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader.
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Wising up
Two weeks ago, I was getting ready to write a post suggesting that Bashar al Assad would likely win his current contest with Syrian protesters. It looked as if they had made a definitive choice in favor of a violent uprising, one that the Syrian security forces are capable of defeating. The net result would have been a low-level insurgency, aka civil war, one that would lead to increasing sectarian separation and destabilization of neighboring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. That outcome–the worst of all possible worlds for the United States–is still possible.
But Friday’s 41 peaceful demonstrations in Damascus, a few of them large, suggest that the opposition has wised up. Rather than a force-on-force confrontation they are bound to lose, the protesters spread out their efforts and kept them non-violent. Such coordinated risings in the capital are far more important for gaining adherents and defying the regime than killing a few soldiers or even Shabiha (non-uniformed regime goons) would be. It has forced the regime today to rush its security forces into the capital to squelch the defiance and re-establish fear. With any luck, they’ll find nothing to repress, as the protesters will hopefully be ready to ignite efforts elsewhere.
This is smart revolution. Drawing lines around specific territory and trying to defend it would be dumb revolution, because it identifies precisely the territory that the regime has to attack to kill its enemies. It has shown no hesitancy to do that. Safe areas and humanitarian corridors are unsafe unless defended with adequate force, which no one has yet shown any sign of readiness to field.
Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, the Chinese are showing some signs of veto remorse, averring openly that they support the Arab League plan calling for Bashar al Assad to step aside and allow his vice president to take charge of a transition to democracy. I’d be the first to admit that a similar scheme is not looking so great in Yemen, where yesterday’s one-candidate election will presumably lead to Vice President Hadi’s takeover of power and initiation of some kind of transition. The problem in Yemen is that those sharing power do not include the protesters who initiated the revolution and who reject amnesty for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The situation in Syria is different. There really is no question of amnesty for Bashar. The best he can hope for is exile in Iran, which backs him to the hilt. But he could just as well end up dead like Muammar Qaddafi or on trial like Hosni Mubarak, prospects that are presumably inspiring his murderous attempts to repress the demonstrations.
“Friends of Syria,” the international coalition in favor of the revolution, plans to meet Friday in Tunisia. This is a good occasion to reiterate support for the Arab League plan, tighten sanctions, press for greater unity among the Syrian opposition and reiterate support for nonviolent protest. It may also be a good opportunity to strategize about bringing China and even Russia into the fold. The Chinese seem halfway there. The Russians will need some guarantees on access to port facilities in Syria before signing on.
Meanwhile, watch those Iranian warships that traversed the Suez Canal yesterday. They have now docked at Tartus. If they deliver weapons or personnel to Syria, it would be a good moment for someone to intervene. That’s not trivial, since there is no arms embargo, but that’s why we’ve got all those clever lawyers in the State Department. I hope they are busy scribbling the decision memos.
PS: The Iranians claimed the ships docked, but the Pentagon says they never did. Maybe someone in Tehran understood the risk.
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Hard choices
My friends at Reuters published today my reaction to Dennis Ross’ New York Times piece yesterday on negotiating with Iran under the heading “What does Iran want?”:
Dennis Ross, until recently in charge of Iran in the Obama White House, has outlined why he thinks strengthened sanctions have created an environment in which diplomacy may now work to block Tehran’s development of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is being reported that Iran has finally responded to a European Union letter requiring that renewed talks focus specifically on ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
These are important developments, but they leave out half the equation. What can Iran hope to get from nuclear talks with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China — plus Germany? Iran will certainly seek relief from sanctions, which have become truly punishing. But they will want more.
It is clear that Tehran’s first priority is an end to American efforts at regime change. This is not an issue Americans know or think much about, but it obsesses the Iranians. They believe that Washington has tried to bring about regime change in Tehran for decades. Iranian officials can entertain you for hours with stories about American (and Israeli) assistance to Azeri, Baloch and Kurdish rebels. The Arab Spring uprisings took their inspiration in part from Iran’s own “Green Movement,” which protested fraud in the 2009 presidential elections before being brutally repressed. While some in Congress view President Obama as insufficiently supportive of the Greens, the regime in Tehran thought the Americans were behind the whole movement.
The nuclear program, in addition to beefing up Iran’s military muscle and regional prestige, is also intended to end attempts at regime change, as it is thought in Tehran that the U.S. will not attack a nuclear weapons state for fear of the consequences. To those looking for it, there is ample supporting evidence: Witness the contrast between North Korea, a severely repressive regime that has obtained nuclear weapons, and Libya, which gave up its nuclear efforts and suffered a NATO air war that brought about regime change.
So the question becomes this: will the Americans be prepared to take regime change off the table if the Iranians are prepared to give ironclad and verifiable assurances that their nuclear program is entirely peaceful? The answer to that question is not obvious. While it is barely possible to picture Washington recognizing Tehran and re-establishing diplomatic relations after a 32-year hiatus, it is far harder to picture a bilateral agreement promising mutual noninterference in internal affairs. Certainly an agreement of that sort would not find ready approval in Congress.
Another key question is whether the U.S. is prepared to accept Iran holding on to sensitive nuclear technology, in particular, uranium enrichment, even if Tehran can use that technology only under tight international controls. Many countries have this arrangement: No one took uranium enrichment or reprocessing technology away from Argentina and Brazil when they mutually agreed to back off the development of nuclear weapons. Japan, South Korea, Sweden and many others are presumably no more than a couple of years (and probably far less) away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon.
Iran, however, is not Sweden. It isn’t even North Korea, a country far more readily sanctioned and bribed back into line and unable to produce more than a few relatively primitive atomic bombs. Iran, once it has the capacity to enrich uranium to bomb grade (90 percent or more), will be no more than a few years from getting an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In the meanwhile, it will presumably continue to develop and deploy longer-range missiles that could target Israel and Europe, if not the U.S. Can the United States, and Israel, live with that short a fuse?
The hard choices in dealing with Iran on nuclear issues are not only up to the Iranians. There are hard choices for the U.S. as well.
P.S. Anyone who doubt that the U.S. will have trouble signing on to a diplomatic solution should read this from Jennifer Rubin at the Washington Post.
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Silence on the main issues
Sometimes the things that don’t happen are more important than the things that do. What did not happen last month were talks between the P5+1 (that’s the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China + Germany) and Iran. Turkey announced repeatedly its willingness to host such talks, but the Iranians apparently never responded to a European Union letter stating that the talks would have to focus on access to all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and demonstrating that it is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Likewise, sometimes the things not said are more important than what is said. Hossein Mousavian, in a Foreign Affairs article last week proposes a grand bargain between Washington and Tehran:
The United States and Iran should also work together on establishing security and stability in Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban’s full return to power; securing and stabilizing Iraq; creating a Persian Gulf body to ensure regional stability; cooperating during accidents and emergencies at sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, and fighting piracy; encouraging development in Central Asia and the Caucasus; establishing a joint working group for combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism; and eliminating weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking in the Middle East. Finally, the two countries could do much good by strengthening the ties between their people through tourism, promoting academic and cultural exchanges, and facilitating visas.
This is not new: it is well known that Iran and the U.S. have many common interests. But Mousavian, who has been associated with the Iranian nuclear program in the past but is on the outs with President Ahmedinejad and is now at Princeton, has only the vaguest things to say about it:
Together, the two countries should draft a “grand agenda,” which would include nuclear and all other bilateral, international, and regional issues to be discussed; outline what the ultimate goal will be; and describe what each side can gain by achieving it.
He nevertheless declares:
There is a peaceful path — one that will satisfy both Iranian and U.S. objectives while respecting Iran’s legitimate nuclear rights.
There may be such a peaceful path, but the only way of finding out is to open the Iranian nuclear program completely to international scrutiny, as the EU letter required. At this point, no one believes the Iranian claims. Silence on the issue does not bode well for an agreement.
Mousavian also calls for the U.S. to drop regime change as a goal. This is the issue on which the American Administration is silent. It is the primary issue for the Iranians, who no doubt see what is going on in Syria today as a proxy war fought with the U.S. If Bashar al Assad is forced to step down, it would not only hurt Iranian interests in Syria and in Lebanon but also, they fear, presage regime change in Tehran. In addition, they fear use of Iran’s many minority populations–Azeri, Kurdish, Baloch and others–to incite rebellion and weaken the regime.
It is not clear whether this or any American Administration can give up on regime change. Especially in the lead-up to the American presidential elections, all the political pressure is for a tougher stance on Iran, not a weaker one. The same is likely to be the case in Iran, where the political pressure will weigh heavily against opening the nuclear program to international inspection.
I fear that it will only be in November that political conditions in the U.S. will permit a serious dialogue to take place. It should focus on what really counts for both sides:
- for the Americans, that means guarantees that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons (even if it continues to have enrichment technology);
- for the Iranians, it means guarantees that the U.S. is not pursuing regime change.
How would the U.S. guarantee it is not pursuing regime change? I imagine mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations would be involved, and there might need to be a bilateral agreement of some sort pledging mutual non-interference in internal affairs. That would be very difficult for the U.S. to swallow.
Of course November is a long time in the future–perhaps past the time Israel is willing to wait before taking military action.
In the meanwhile, it may be wise to reach out to elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, as Mehdi Khalaji suggests, though he is notably silent on how and where to do this. The symmetrical advice to the Iranians would be to reach out to the Republicans. It is not obvious that will be any easier.
For a far more detailed treatment of the nuclear issues, see Mark Hibbs: “Engage Iran”–What Does It Mean? He does not treat the regime change part of the equation, which so far as I can tell is left out of all Western writing on the subject of Iran.
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Nonviolence in Syria revisited
Yesterday was busy on peacefare.net, with some vigorous comments and tweets about my post on Syria. I thought I might review the bidding this morning.
First my own error: I meant the first line to say that TheAtlantic.com‘s headline on my piece, “Why the Syrian Free Army should put down their guns,” was infelicitous, not felicitous (and I’ve made that change in the post). The piece never calls for them to put down anything. What I said was this:
It would be far better if defected soldiers worked for strictly defensive purposes, accompanying street demonstrators and rooting out agents provocateurs rather than suicidally contesting forces that are clearly stronger and better armed.
Taking guns away from people in the midst of war just doesn’t work, in Syria or anyplace else. Only when Syrians feel secure will they give up their weapons.
That day I fear is a long way off. One of my critics writes:
Assad will not go until there is a gun to his head, period.
That may be correct, but there is no telling when some brave soul will do the necessary. I believe the odds of that happening increase if the protesters can maximize the numbers of people demonstrably joining their effort. Violence by the regime is intended to keep their numbers down. But violence by the FSA does too.
One tweet yesterday asked if I would send my children off to a demonstration in Syria given the behavior of the regime. The answer is no, I would not. Nor would any responsible parent. That is why I suggested less dangerous forms of protest. If all the ones I have mentioned have been tried, maybe it is time to try some new ones.
Another commenter says:
Nonviolence may work where the government either worries about its international reputation (the British in India, the U.S. South, So. Africa), or where it has decided in advance to retreat (Russians from Eastern Europe), or where the power structures are willing to give up an unpopular ruler to preserve their own position (Romania, Serbia, Egypt).
I don’t think this accurately describes the situations cited, or exhausts the possiblities. All governments, even autocratic ones, depend on the consent of the governed. In autocracies, that consent is compelled through fear. Bashar al Assad is trying–with considerable success–to re-instil fear in the Syrian population. That is what the protesters need to counter: not the use of force, but the fear it engenders. Thinking strategically about how that can be accomplished–something I admit only Syrians can seriously do–is vital.
That is what I am not seeing, though of course it may be happening behind the scenes. It would require careful analysis of the regime’s main pillars of support (some minorities, middle class, army, intelligence services, police, Iran, Russia?) and definition of courses of action to undermine them. Some will of course prove “softer” targets than others, but all have a stake in the regime and need to be weaned from providing it support. I don’t see how the little violence of which the FSA is capable today contributes to the strategic objective.
Nor do I think the constant refrain of those calling for “safe areas” is wise. Safe areas aren’t safe. They have to be made safe. They did not succeed in Bosnia. They utterly failed to protect the people who were in them and exposed them to the worst genocidal behavior of the war. The failure brought international intervention, which I suppose is what some advocates of a safe areas in Syria hope will happen. I’m convinced it won’t. Eliminating Syria’s air defenses and destroying its artillery would be a major military operation conducted against a Russian ally a few weeks before Putin’s re-election. It isn’t going to happen, before the elections or thereafter.
A word about covert support to the FSA, which is what people I have a lot of respect for over at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs are touting as a “least worst” military option. Presumably the Turks, who apparently have “lost” some military officers on the wrong side of the border, are already engaged in this. Without air support (NATO’s contribution in Libya), I have little confidence that supplying weapons will do much for the FSA, which seems to have quite a few already. Organization and discipline count for a lot in war, and that is what the FSA lacks (and will find hard to obtain under current conditions).
Even if they manage somehow to get organized and under more centralized control, the best the FSA is going to be able to manage is a military contest that amounts to civil war, which from the American perspective is the worst of all possible worlds. Far better to support a ceasefire, withdrawal of the Syrian army from population centers, and return of the Arab League observers in far larger numbers than before, preferably with UN support. That won’t put Homs back to the status quo ante, but it will give Syrian citizens another chance at demonstrating nonviolently that they have withdrawn their consent from the murderous regime of Bashar al Assad.
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