Tag: Iran
What doesn’t happen counts
Sometimes what matters in diplomacy is what doesn’t happen. That was certainly the case with Saturday’s defeat of the Arab League effort to get the UN Security Council to approve its plan for Bashar al Assad to begin a transition in Syria. Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat’s chief, suggested in a tweet that it was a non-event:
But in end it was non-event – no resolutn, just reaffirmation of division. Much talk; Effect on the ground, sadly, nil.
Far from it: the Syrian regime has taken it for what it was: a sign that the international community is not united in asking him to step down and he can therefore proceed for the moment to try to finish off his opposition using military force. The residents of Homs know what I mean.
The notion, purveyed most recently by Senator Lieberman, that Bashar al Assad’s end is “inevitable” is comprehensible only if you understand the peculiar American meaning of that word. Most dictionaries think it means that something will happen no matter what. But in the American diplomatic lexicon it means that we have to do something to make it happen. And Lieberman clearly intended the second meaning, as he immediately began talking about assistance to the Free Syria Army. Secreteary of State Clinton has been less clear, but she is talking about forming a multilateral contact group for support to the Syrian opposition. If the failure of the UNSC resolution triggers an intensified crackdown and military assistance to the Free Syria Army, it will certainly be an important event in the Syrian uprising.
Something else hasn’t happened lately, but no one has noticed: the P3 plus 1 (US, UK, France and Germany) meeting with Iran long rumored to take place in Turkey in late January seems not to have occurred, or if it did happen some place else no one reported it. This may be even more important than the non-resolution on Syria of the Security Council, but it is hard to know how to interpret it. President Obama in his Super Bowl interview yesterday seemed almost nonchalant in saying that Iran has to make it clear that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. According to press reports of the recent International Atomic Energy Agency visit to Tehran, this they have not done, but another visit is scheduled for this month.
There was of course an implied “or else” to what the President said. He made it clear the military option is still on the table. But while sounding belligerent for the domestic American audience, it seems to me he was also offering an olive branch to the Iranians, essentially saying that they can keep their uranium enrichment and other technology so long as the world can reliably verify that they are not using it for weapons purposes. This is the deal many other countries have: anyone who thinks Sweden, Japan, Korea, Brazil, Argentina and a couple of dozen others don’t have the technology they require to build nuclear weapons within a year or two is living in a different world from mine.
The problem of course is that Iran is not one of those relatively reliable countries. There is ample evidence that it has begun to do high explosives research that is only useful in the context of a nuclear weapons program. If we get to summer without a clear and verifiable commitment on Iran’s part, that will be another non-event that matters. By then, talk of an Israeli attack will have quieted. That will be the clear signal that it is imminent. It’s not only what isn’t done that matters, it’s also what isn’t said.
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Threats should drive responses
I’m not big on Administration testimony in Congress, as it tends to the soporific. But I enjoyed skimming Director of National Intelligence James Clapper’s testimony Tuesday in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This “Worldwide Threat Assessment” is worth a glance.
First the obvious caveats: this is unclassified testimony lacking in vital details. Clapper would not want to tip our policy hand by saying too much about Iran, China, Al Qaeda or any number of other challenges. This is testimony meant to give a broad picture of many challenges, not a deep dive into even the top priorities. The fact that the media has focused principally on its mention of the possibility of Iranian terrorist acts in the U.S. tells us more about the U.S. media than about Clapper’s view of the threats.
His introductory remarks give a hint of where he is going:
Although I believe that counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank—in terms of long-term importance—the numerous, potential threats to US national security. The United States no longer faces—as in the Cold War—one dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge. Indeed, even the four categories noted above are also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly changing international environment of rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to nonstate actors and ever greater access by individuals and small groups to lethal technologies.
It is nevertheless striking that many threats have receded and others have developed more slowly than many of us imagined they might. According to Clapper, global jihad is fragmenting, a mass casualty attack in the U.S. is unlikely, Al Qaeda central is in decline, Iran and North Korea are not imminent nuclear threats, Afghanistan faces problems that arise as much from its own government as from the Taliban… Of course the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, as the sign in our high school coaches’ room said, but this is not the worst of all possible worlds.
It behooves us to use this respite well. It won’t last. The odds are for trouble with Iran this year, and there is no ruling out a successful terrorist attack, no matter how weak Al Qaeda gets. Clapper is remarkably silent on Pakistan and even China–I imagine that most of what he had to say is classified. Either one could cause serious difficulty, Pakistan by continuing to exploit the Taliban inside Afghanistan and China by challenging U.S. efforts to contain its growing military and political presence in the Pacific, the Middle East and Africa.
In the meanwhile, it would be wise to prepare well for the priorities Clapper cites. Their distinguishing characteristic is that none of them are amenable to purely military solutions. Terrorism, proliferation, cybersecurity and counterintelligence all fall in the unconventional warfare box. They are far more amenable to policing, diplomacy, strategic communications, and cooperation with allies than the more conventional military threats.
This is the context in which we should be evaluating the Defense, State and intelligence community budgets. The civilian side of the budget equation should be strengthened, in the name of national security. The military side should be maintained and even improved in important respects, but the notion that current cuts in personnel and hi-tech conventional weaponry are sufficient is not likely to hold. Fighter aircraft are just not very useful in dealing with the main threats, and the improved performance of the new ones is bought at a very high price.
What we need to do is begin considering the defense budget in a broader context. What can the weapons we are buying do to counter the threats we are facing? This is such an obvious question it is almost embarassing to ask it. But threats should indeed drive responses.
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This week’s peace picks
Far too much this week. I’ve pared it down, but not enough:
1. A Discussion on the Obama Administration’s National Security Policy, Center for American Progress, January 30, 12-1 pm
Streaming Video
About This Event
Please join the Center for American Progress for a discussion of the Obama administration’s national security policy and the new challenges we face around the world with Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications. Neera Tanden, President of the Center for American Progress, will lead a session examining the first three years of the Obama administration’s record on foreign policy and looking ahead to the emerging national security challenges in 2012.
Distinguished Speaker:
Benjamin Rhodes, White House Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications
Moderator:
Neera Tanden, President of the Center for American Progress
A light lunch will be served at 11:30am.
Location
Center for American Progress
1333 H St. NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
2. Briefing: Egypt One Year after the Revolution (AAI Event), 2168 Rayburn, January 31, noon-1 pm
A discussion hosted by the Arab American Institute featuring:
Ashraf Khalil – Journalist & Author, Liberation Square
Dr. James Zogby – President, Arab American Institute
Lunch will be served
Ashraf Khalil is a journalist and author of the recently-published book Liberation Square: The Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation. Ashraf has reported for numerous publications including the Los Angeles Times, The Times of London, and Foreign Policy, among others. Liberation Square has received excellent reviews. Foreign Policy listed Liberation Square in its 21 books to read in 2012. Salon calls it a “thrilling account of Egypts revolution” and Publishers Weekly says, “Khalils account is essential reading, evoking the urgency and vitality of the Arab springs Egyptian chapter.”
Dr. James Zogby is the founder and president of the Arab American Institute (AAI), a Washington D.C.-based organization which serves as the political and policy research arm of the Arab American community. Since 1985, Dr. Zogby and AAI have led Arab American efforts to secure political empowerment in the U.S. He is the author of Arab Voices: What They Are Saying to Us, and Why it Matters.
RSVP to Samer Araabi at saraabi@aaiusa.org or 202-652-4984
3. Nigeria on the Edge, Atlantic Council, January 31, 2-3:30 pm
The Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center is pleased to an invite you to a panel discussion, ‘Nigeria on the Edge’ on January 31. In recent weeks, the murder of almost three hundred Nigerians by the mysterious Boko Haram sect have begun to spark reprisal attacks, an alarming development that could signal a reprise of the deadly “ricochet riots” that haunted northern Nigeria through the 1990s. Boko Haram claims it is avenging Muslims killed by police brutality and communal violence, and its attacks have targeted both Christians and Muslim supporters of the Nigerian government. Whether the violence committed by Boko Haram is ultimately attributed to jihadis, disgruntled politicians, or criminal gangs – or is found to be a haphazard combination of the three – the group has emerged as a powerful disordering force, one that threatens the non-violent coexistence of Christian/Muslim and north/south populations in Nigeria.
The government, grappling with an ill-timed credibility crisis of its own making, has been unable to restore any sense of security to the nation. On the contrary, President Goodluck Jonathan’s sudden removal of a long-standing subsidy has abruptly doubled the price of fuel, sending shockwaves through Nigerian society. Days of panic-driven national strikes paralyzed the country, as thousands of cash-strapped Nigerians took to the streets, and the country’s primary oil union threatened to shut down output and plunge the economy further into chaos. Jonathan has managed to subdue the unrest – by partially backtracking on the subsidy, deploying soldiers against the crowds, and threatening to jail protestors – but will his inconsistency and show of force ultimately do more harm to his administration’s credibility than good?
How alarming is the crisis and what does it mean for Nigeria? In the words of Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka: “When you’ve got a situation where a bunch of people can go into a place of worship and open fire through the windows, you’ve reached a certain dismal watershed in the life of that nation.” The question is whether Nigeria, under President Goodluck Jonathan’s leadership, will manage to pull back from the brink, or descend further into regional, civil, and religious conflict.
A panel discussion featuring
Ambassador John Campbell
Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies
Council on Foreign Relations
Peter Lewis
Director, Africa Studies
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Phillip van Niekerk
Former Editor, Mail and Guardian
Managing Partner, Calabar Consulting
Moderated by
J. Peter Pham
Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center
Atlantic Council
| DATE: |
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
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| TIME: |
2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.
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| LOCATION: | Atlantic Council 1101 15th Street, NW, 11th Floor Washington, DC 20005 |
RSVP with name and affiliation (acceptances only) to africa@acus.org. Photo credit: Total-facts-about-nigeria.
Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E Street, NWJake Sullivan, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of StateReception: 6:30-7:00 PM
Lecture: 7:00-8:00 PMRSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/sullivanSponsored by the Security Policy Forumand the Elliott School of International Affairs5. Peace Corps 50th Anniversary: A Celebration of Service, CSIS, February 1, 10-11:30 am
6. Stopping the Clock on Iran’s Nuclear Development, 902 Hart Senate Office Building, February 1, 10-11 am
Featuring
Senator Dan Coats (R-IN)
Former Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA)
Co-Chair, BPC’s Iran Initiative
General (ret.) Chuck Wald
Co-Chair, BPC’s Iran Initiative
John Tanner
Vice Chairman, Prime Policy Group
Member, BPC’s Iran Initiative
Opening Remarks by
Michael Makovsky
Director, BPC’s National Security Project
7. Shifting Sands: The Future of the US-Egyptian Relationship, Center for National Policy, February 1, 12-1:15 pm
Gregory Aftandilian
Former Middle East analyst at the U.S. Department of State
Nathan Brown
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Michele Dunne
Atlantic Council
Paul Sullivan
National Defense University
With Islamist parties dominating the new parliament and the powers of the yet undetermined president uncertain, what changes can we expect in Egyptian foreign policy? Will the military continue to have an instrumental political role after it returns to the barracks post-June 2012? Join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel to discuss how Egypt’s new political map might affect the future of the US-Egyptian relationship.
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800
Map
Click here
8. North Korea After Kim Jong Il: The Future of Inter-Korean and US-DPRK Relation, Kenney Auditorium SAIS, February 1, 2-4 pm
Join us for a discussion about the future of North Korea under Kim Jong Un, and the policy implications for inter-Korea and and US-DPRK relations. Featuring:
Venerable Pomnyun Sunim
Chairman, Good Friends and the Peace Foundation
Dr. Alexandre Mansourov
Visiting Scholar, US-Korea Institute at SAIS
Feburary 1, 2012
Kenney Auditorium at SAIS
1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036
Venerable Pomnyun Sunim, a respected Buddhist monk and activist, is the chairman of The Peace Foundation in Seoul, which supports policy research and analysis aimed at Korean unification and humanitarian issues in North Korea. He concurrently serves as the chairman of Good Friends for Peace, Human Rights, and Refugee Issues, whose weekly publication “North Korea Today” provides detailed, up-to-date information about conditions on the ground in North Korea. Venerable Pomnyun is also chairman of the Join Together Society, an international relief agency with offices worldwide, including in North Korea. He has worked extensively to supply humanitarian aid to famine victims in North Korea and defend the human rights of North Korean refugees in China, and is a Zen master with the Seoul-based JungTo Society, which he originally established in 1988 to facilitate self-improvement through volunteerism. In recognition of his efforts, Venerable Pomnyun received the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Peace and International Understanding in September of 2002.
Dr. Alexandre Mansourov is a Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea institute at SAIS, John Hopkins University, founding member of U.S. National Committee on North Korea, and Senior Associate of Nautilus Institute. He is a specialist in Northeast Asian security, politics, and economics, focusing primarily on the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Mansourov worked as Full Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies from 2001 to 2007. Dr. Mansourov received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, New York. He edited three books, including A Turning Point: Democratic Consolidation in the ROK and Strategic Readjustment in the US-ROK Alliance (2005), Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula (2005), and The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (2000), as well as published numerous book chapters and academic articles on Korean and Northeast Asian affairs.
9. Burma’s Changing Political Landscape: A Conversation with Three Leading Activists, NED, February 2, 9:30 am-2 pm
Featuring remarks by
Zaganar, comedian, founder of Thee Lay Lee and the Multi-Colour Troupe and former political prisoner
Khin Than Myint, leading advocate for women’s rights and member of the National League for Democracy
Bauk Gyar, Kachin activist and member of the National Democratic Force political party
and a luncheon address by
Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Thursday, February 2, 2012
9:30 a.m. – 2:00 p.m.
1025 F St, NW 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20004
RSVP via e-mail with name and affiliation by January 30.
About the Event:
Since it released Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in November 2010, the Burmese government has embarked on a series of unprecedented and dramatic steps that appear to recognize both the need for political reform and the role of the political opposition in the process. Towards this end, the government allowed the National League for Democracy to register as a party and to contest in the upcoming by-elections; relaxed restrictions on the press; invited back exiles; suspended construction on a Chinese-financed dam; announced cease-fire deals with a number of ethnic nationality forces; and released hundreds of political prisoners, including 88 leaders Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi, Shan leader Khun Htun Oo, and Saffron Revolution leader U Gambira.
The international community has responded accordingly – ASEAN awarded Burma the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014; and the United States and the United Kingdom dispatched their top diplomats to the country for the first time in over 50 years.
To make sense of these developments, three civil society leaders from Burma will offer their perspectives on the changing political dynamics in the country. In addition, Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U.S. Department of State, will share the U.S. government’s perspective on developments in Burma.
Agenda:
9:30 – 10:00: Coffee and introductions
10:00 – 12:00: Conversation With Three Burmese Activists
- Zaganar
- Khin Than Myint
- Bauk Gyar
12:30 – 2:00: Luncheon Speaker: Michael Posner
About the Speakers:
Maung Thura, aka “Zarganar,” is widely considered to be the most popular comedian and satirist in Burma. Known for his sharp wit and criticism of the government, Zarganar is also a popular actor, director, and social activist. In September 2006, the government banned Zarganar from performing publicly or participating in any kind of entertainment-related work due to his pointed criticism of the regime. In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, Zarganar organized more than 200 volunteers to provide aid and assistance to victims of the devastating storm that killed an estimated 130,000 and left millions homeless. Zarganar provoked the regime by speaking to foreign media about the dire situation of millions of Burmese living in the devastated Irrawaddy delta region. For this, he was arrested in June and handed a 59-year sentence in November. He was released on October 11, 2011, as part of a mass amnesty of prisoners. Zarganar is the recipient of numerous international awards, including the Fund for Free Expression’s Lillian Hellman and Dashiel Hammett Award and PEN Canada’s One Humanity Award.
Khin Than Myint is a member of the National League for Democracy (NLD), teacher, and women’s rights activist. Khin Than Myint joined the NLD in 1995 and is a close associate of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. She is active in the NLD’s youth and women’s wings. Khin Than Myint was arrested in September 2000 for helping to arrange Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Mandalay. She was released from prison in January 2001.
Daw Bauk Gyar is a member of the National Democratic Force (NDF) and 
a founder of Vision of Peace. Daw Bauk Gyar is a Kachin activist dedicated to promoting peace and democracy in Burma particularly in Kachin State. Daw Bauk Gyar contested the 2010 general election in the Pha Kant Township Constituency in Kachin State as a member of the National Democratic Force but lost to a member of the regime-backed party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Daw Bauk Gyar filed a complaint with the Election Commission alleging fraud. Despite her experience in 2010, she is planning to once again run for a seat in the by-election, scheduled for April 1, 2012. Daw Bauk Gyar is also a co-founder of Vision of Peace, a group of ethnic leaders dedicated to working for a nationwide ceasefire and peaceful negotiations between the Burmese government and ethnic armed groups as well as combating illegal land confiscation by the authorities and private companies.
Michael H. Posner was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor on September 23, 2009. Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Posner was the Executive Director and then President of Human Rights First. As its Executive Director he helped the organization earn a reputation for leadership in teh areas of refugee protection, advancing a rights-based approach to national security, challenging crimes against humanity, and combating discrimination. He has been a frequent public commentator on these and other issues, and has testified dozens of times before the U.S. Congress. In January 2006, Mr. Posner stepped down as Executive Director to become the President of Human Rights First, a position he held until his appointment as Assistant Secretary.
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How bad could Syria get?
It is hard to be optimistic about Syria. The question is, how bad could it get? The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:
- the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
- the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.
These two factors yield four scenarios:
- Divided sovereignty: Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others. Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas. A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
- The regime wins: Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail. The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
- Protesters win: international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not. The regime loses control of the country and has to yield. Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
- Civil war: Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection. Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines. Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.
1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.
2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid. Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government. The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.
2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns. We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent. But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.
The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4. Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help. If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.
Let there be no doubt: “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities. Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better: “protesters win.” For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.
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This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
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The diplomatic screw turns
While Americans are distracted today by Newt Gingrich’s South Carolina primary victory over Mitt Romney and the entry of the New York Giants and New England Patriots into football’s “Superbowl,” the big international news is the European Union agreement to halt imports of Iranian oil within six months. Yawn. No wonder it hardly gets a headline.
This may not be the final turn of the diplomatic screw, but it is an important one. Iran’s economy and currency are in a tailspin. The stage is now set for P5 (that’s U.S., UK, France, Russia and China) + 1 (Germany) talks with Iran on its nuclear program. Turkey wants to host, but a date has not been announced.
If this next stage of the diplomatic efforts fails, as the effort a year ago did, the slide towards war will accelerate. Iran is rattling its saber, which is long enough to try to close the strait of Hormuz to outward-flowing traffic, thus denying the world oil market about 20% of its supplies and causing a sharp price spike. They will also make trouble for Americans in Iraq and possibly elsewhere. The Americans and Europeans, whose warships traversed the strait today in a show of force, will then draw their oil stocks to dampen the price and use military force to keep the strait open, and possibly to deny its use to the Iranians (who need it to import oil products).
While talking about military action less than at times in the past, the Americans and Israelis are conducting a “stealth” war against the Iranian nuclear program, blocking supplies of vital materiel, infecting software with at least one computer worm and assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists. None of this effort can stop the Iranians in their tracks if they are committed to nuclear weapons. Even bombing of their nuclear facilities won’t do that–they will almost surely react by redoubling their efforts. In the absence of an agreement, the best we can hope for is to slow Iran down.
Today’s turning of the diplomatic screw is intended promote a negotiated solution. It is unrealistic to imagine that Iran will cease and desist from trying to obtain all the technology it needs to build nuclear weapons. But it is still possible they will agree to abide by the terms of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) they have signed and ratified. Many other countries have stopped on the threshold of nuclear weapons–the ones I know best are Brazil, which acquired the necessary technology but reached an agreement with Argentina for a mutual standdown, and Italy, which opted for a dual key arrangement for control of American weapons deployed on Italian territory.
Arrangements of these sorts are not possible with Iran. No matter how much my idealist friends press the idea of a Middle East nuclear free zone, it is impossible to imagine the Israelis going for it, especially under the current Netanyahu government. And if the Americans, who asked Israel decades ago not to build nuclear weapons in the first place, can’t even get the Israelis to stop building settlements, what are the odds of success in getting Israel to give up nuclear weapons? “Never again” is not only a slogan–it is an objective that all Israeli governments will adhere to. Nuclear weapons are an important means to that end.
So is there no hope? On the contrary, I think there is. Iran gains little and losses a lot if it actually deploys nuclear weapons: it gets targeted by both Israel and the United States, with the former likely to launch on warning. The United States is committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. Against nuclear weapons states, first use is not prohibited in American doctrine.
What does Iran hope to gain by developing nuclear weapons? Prestige, to be sure, and a more secure and powerful role in the Middle East. But most important is that the Iranians believe that nuclear weapons will guarantee no American invasion and thus survival of the theocratic regime. This is a perception problem: even if we resort to bombing, there isn’t going to be an American invasion of Iran, which is far too large and populous a country for the Americans to imagine that things would come out better than in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the price of blocking Iran from developing nuclear weapons is a pledge that the United States will not invade, it is not too much to pay.
We need however to be cautious. We should not sell out Iran’s Green Movement, or the rebellion against Bashar al Assad in Syria. Nor should we do anything that will help Hamas and Hizbollah to continue their trouble-making. We should not be guaranteeing regime survival in Tehran, only saying what we all know to be true: America hasn’t got the resources or the desire to take on another major ground war in the Middle East.
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