Tag: Iran
Assad is imploding, but it’s not over yet
With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine and Iran weakened, Syria’s President Bashar al Assad is now under siege. The forces opposing him include both Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish-supported rebel groups. Opposition forces in several Syrian provinces are joining the fray, as are the Syrian Democratic
Forces. HTS and the Turks have been governing in Syria’s northwest Idlib and Afrin provinces. The Syrian Democratic Forces are affiliated with Kurdish institutions that govern in much of the east.
How far, how fast?
The HTS offensive has moved fast and far. It controls most of Aleppo, Syria’s largest or second largest city depending on how you count. HTS has also evacuated Kurdish forces from Aleppo and advanced south to the outskirts of Hama. In the meanwhile, the Turkish-supported groups have chased Kurds from their strongholds in Aleppo province. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish led but partly Arab manned, have evicted Iranian and Shia militias from the east.

The question is whether rebel forces can sustain their momentum and move further south to Hama and Homs. So far, there has been little fighting. The Syrian Army is evaporating. It is poorly staffed, trained, and equipped after more than 13 years of fighting rebels. After hesitating at first, Russian air attacks are now battering rebel-held territory, including civilian targets. Lebanese Hezbollah, a major Iranian-supported factor in Syria, has let it be known it will not send more forces. Israel has battered Hezbollah badly in both Lebanon and Syria.
The quandaries
For the US and EU, these sudden developments pose a difficult issue. They don’t like Assad and have maintained vigorous sanctions against him. But they also don’t like HTS, which is a spinoff from Al Qaeda. And Washington won’t want the Turkish-supported forces beating up on the SDF. They have been helpful in fighting remnants of the Islamic State in eastern Syria.
Israel has its own issues. It did not mind the Assad devil it knew and won’t want a jihadist state in Syria. But if he falls, the Israelis will be happy to see Iran and its proxies disappear from their border. And they will want some cred with whoever takes over. In the past they have been supportive to at least some of the opposition to Assad.
The endgame
HTS is trying hard to project a more tolerant image than many jihadists. It has reached out to the Kurds:

HTS has sought to justify its more tolerant approach (translation from a Tweet by Aaron Zelin):
The jihad in Syria has the duty to repel the attacks of the Assad regime. It is part of sharia politics that the mujahidin in Syria should only fight those who fight them, and refrain from attacking those who refrain from attacking them, and strive to disperse the enemies and reduce them.
Assad will have well-equipped, loyal forces defending Damascus. But if HTS takes Hama and Homs, he won’t have much country left. Opposition forces are rising in the south even as the SDF clears regime forces and its allies from the east. The western, Mediterranean coast would still be his, but vulnerable.
The greatest threat to the opposition forces will arise if Turkiye unleashes its proxies against the Kurds. That would divide the opposition and provide an opportunity for Assad to complicate the fight. He might try to strike a deal with the Kurds. Assad is imploding, but it isn’t over yet.
Mushroom clouds over the Middle East
Former IAEA inspector Pantelis Ikonomou writes:
After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear deterrence became the strongest parameter in projecting geopolitical power. Nuclear weapons could eventually be decisive in the Middle East.
Israel and Iran are now in direct confrontation
Safeguarding state security and regional dominance are the fundamental aims of the main protagonists, Israel and Iran. Since spring, they have been confronting each other directly. Two exchanges of missiles have resulted. Further escalation seems irreversible.
Serious questions need serious answers. Where is this dynamic leading? What is next? Is there hope for an end to the escalation after next week’s presidential elections in the US? Is the global superpower willing or even capable of rerouting the war dynamics towards a peaceful direction?
The next American President
Candidate Donald Trump in 2018 withdrew the US unilaterally from the Iran nuclear deal. A few days ago Trump urged Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Doing that would force Iran to end its doctrine of strategic patience. Iran would exit the NPT, develop the military dimension of its nuclear program, and construct nuclear warheads. Iranian parliamentarians are already proposing this course of action.
The other candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, was an important voice in Washington as the current Middle East crisis developed. President Biden has struggled to prevent the escalatory spiral. His effort slowed but not stopped it.
The consequences are dire
Continuation of this situation could force Israel to abandon its doctrine of nuclear opacity. It neither confirms nor denies its nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Meir considered using nuclear weapons during the 1973 Yom Kippur war to respond to Egyptian army advances. Prime Minister Netanyahu could also be forced to consider or threaten their use.
An Iranian decision to pursue nuclear weapons or Israeli confirmation of its nuclear capability would change the situation dramatically. Either or both would challenge the credibility of the Non Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA, and the UN Security Council. Adding Iran to the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) could undermine the global security architecture. Mushroom clouds would loom over the Middle East.
It will end when Israel wants it to
Israel continues to enjoy military successes in both Gaza and Lebanon, but its adversaries fight on. The death of Yahya Sinwar leaves Hamas without clear leadership. The death of Hassan Nasallah likewise left Hezbollah without clear leadership. But both Islamist movements continue to attack. Their cadres seek “martyrdom.”
The options
Americans, official and unofficial, are urging Israel to take the win and embark on the day after. Israel has done enormous damage to both Hamas and Hezbollah. The Israel Defense Force has decimated, but not eliminated, their underground facilities, drones, rockets, and missiles, leadership, and personnel. Ending the fighting in Gaza as well as Lebanon would open the possibility of a prisoner/hostage swap in Gaza. It would also put pressure on the UN Security Council to move Hezbollah north of the Litani River. UNSC resolution 1701 requires that. It is the declared Israel war objective in Lebanon.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu isn’t buying. He wants to go after Iran, which is a state sponsor of both Hamas and Hezbollah. Israeli retaliation for Iran’s massive military attack on October 1, which did little damage, is still pending. His Defense Minister has promised it will be “lethal” and “surprising.” But it has also been delayed. The Americans want the Israelis not to target Iran’s nuclear program or its oil production facilities. The former will trigger an Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons. The latter would bump up world oil prices.
The politics
The wars in Gaza and Lebanon are not going to end before November 5. That would give Kamala Harris a big boost at the polls. Netanyahu doesn’t want that. He wants Donald Trump back in the White House. President Biden is threatening to withhold military assistance to Israel unless humanitarian assistance starts flowing again to Gaza. Trump would not do that. Judging from past experience, he would not seek to restrain Israel at all.
No matter whom the US elects, Netanyahu has his own political calculus. His only hope for remaining in power is a military victory so overwhelming Israelis will forget his faults. They include his personal malfeasance and his government’s failure on October 7. A dramatic blow to Iran would do the trick.
The civilians
In the meanwhile, civilians are suffering the brunt of war. The situation in Gaza is unprecedented. Virtually its entire population is displaced. Most of its housing stock, its educational and health systems, as well as its economy are destroyed. People are desperate. Some are starving. There is ample evidence the Israeli army has targeted civilians and children.
In Lebanon, the destruction is less extensive so far, but Netanyahu has threatened to make it like Gaza. The Israelis have obliterated some border communities. They have also hit Beirut, including areas that are not Hezbollah strongholds. Many Lebanese are displaced. Several thousand are dead.
How does this end?
Most Israelis want a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange. Most American Jews and Arabs have wanted that too. But Netanyahu wants to continue to fight Hamas and Hezbollah. He would also like to hit Iran hard. President Biden will to try to restrain him. A President Harris would do likewise. Trump would not.
Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated that he does what he wants. The Middle East wars won’t end until the Israeli government wants them to. That isn’t going to happen while Netanyahu is in office.
Israel is its own existential threat
Last October’s Hamas attack on Israel was horrendous. It frightened Israelis more than any other single incident for decades. The numbers of Israelis killed were greater than those killed in the five years of the second Intifada. Hamas and its partners took more than 250 hostages to Gaza, more than 70 of whom are now dead. Several thousand Hamas fighters entered Israel in a well-rehearsed attack that Israeli intelligence operatives detected. Their superiors paid little attention.
But October 7, 2023 was not an existential threat to the Israeli state. Israeli citizens, both Jewish and Arab, responded spontaneously and quickly. The Israel Defense Force was slower and disorganized. It took the IDF three days to push all the Gazan fighters back into the Strip. Gazan fighters penetrated at the farthest about 15 miles into Israel. Most of the targets were much closer than that to the Gaza border:

Al Aqsa flood was not an existential threat
Hamas’ intent was to kill and capture as many Israelis as possible. The attackers were brutal and cruel. I’ve seen no evidence they cared whether their victims were Jews or Arabs, who can be difficult to distinguish. Many of the Jews came from peacenik kibbutzim near the Gaza border.
The operation likely succeeded beyond Hamas military leader Yahya Sinwar’s wildest dreams. Israel’s border was penetrated as it had never been penetrated before. The attack shook public confidence in the country’s intelligence and military. The cruel killing and raping of civilians infuriated Israelis. Fear and distrust in Israel spiked. Gazans celebrated.
But the Israeli state was never in danger. It is not even clear what that means. A few thousand fighters were not going to take Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. Hamas might have killed more Israelis and taken more hostages. It might have destroyed more kibbutzim. It might even have tried to hold on to territory for a few more days. None of that would have destroyed the Israeli state.
Netanyahu’s escalation is real
If last year’s attack was not an existential threat, this year’s conflict with Hezbollah and Iran is. That threat is the result of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s decisions. He has ignored American and other pleas for a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange in Gaza. His government also refuses to prepare for the “day after.” He prefers to continue the fight there indefinitely.
Additionally, he has widened the war to the West Bank. There both the IDF and the settlers are chasing Palestinians from their homes:

Netanyahu has also widened the war
Netanyahu has also widened the war to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran. Israel succeeded in killing and maiming thousands with its cellphone/walkietalkie attack in Lebanon. It also succeeded in assassinating Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders in both countries. Those successes far exceeded the usual tit for tat. They have led to escalation.
Iran’s large rocket and missile attack 10 days ago failed to kill Israelis or to destroy strategic assets. But it penetrated Israeli defenses and no doubt taught the Iranians more about what they need to do to succeed. Israel’s Defense Minister Gallant is now threatening a more robust response:
In contrast, our attack will be deadly, pinpoint accurate, and most importantly, surprising – they will not know what happened or how it happened. They will just see the results.
We’ll have to wait and see what this means.
Where might this end?
The spiral will be difficult to end without disaster. Hezbollah was initially an easier target than Hamas. Israel compromised the cell phones and walkietalkies its fighters and leaders use. But the ground war in Lebanon is a tougher grind, as is the continuing fight with Hamas in Gaza. The IDF has had to return repeatedly to areas in Gaza where Hamas has again popped up. Israel has lost more than 700 soldiers in the Gaza war. Another 40 or so have died in Lebanon.
Israel has already destroyed upwards of 70% of Gaza’s housing and killed more than 40,000, the Hamas Health Ministry says. Netanyahu is threatening to do in Lebanon what the IDF has already done in Gaza:
Why would Lebanese take advice from Netanyahu on their future?
The current level of destruction all but guarantees chaos in Gaza. It will do likewise in Lebanon if the war there continues.
Netanyahu aims to eradicate Hamas, upend the political system in Lebanon, and change the regime in Iran. Some in Washington have bought into those possibilities. But few who know Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran well think Israel can be the much-needed agent of change. Hamas and Hezbollah control vital social service networks that guarantee popular support. The Iranian regime has successfully resisted several popular uprisings. Bombing is notoriously ineffective at bringing about political change. It is more effective at mobilizing people to rally around the flag.
The more likely outcome
The more likely outcome of Israel’s multi-front war against its very real enemies is hatred and chaos. Hatred and chaos next door are not something Israel should be facilitating. America knows something about local resistance from Iraq and Afghanistan. Good intentions failed to counter the Taliban or bring stability to Iraq. But there withdrawal was an option. Gaza and Lebanon are Israel’s inevitable neighbors. Iran is its greatest security threat. Netanyahu has made Israel’s military success its own existential threat.
The war Netanyahu wanted is at hand
Prime Minister Netanyahu has spent the 31 years since the Oslo accords seeking two principal foreign policy goals: preventing establishment of a Palestinian state and destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is on the verge of getting a chance to achieve both. In the process, he is ending Israeli democracy, earning the enmity of much of the Arab street, and drawing the US into another Middle East war. I don’t like the result, but he is definitely stalwart.
Obliterating the idea of a Palestinian state
I recall in the mid-1990s a discussion at a mutual friend’s house with the then National Security Advisor to Vice President Gore. Leon Fuerth believed that Netanyahu would eventually come around to accepting a Palestinian state. I had my doubts. I still think I was right.
Netanyahu spent many years thereafter pumping up the idea that Israel was under siege, both by the Palestinians and the Iranians. The Second Intifada and the wall Israel built to isolate itself, successfully, from the West Bank boosted his credibility. Once Hamas took over Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2006/7, he worked hard to keep the two governing bodies separate. Dividing the Palestinians was one way to make sure they couldn’t get what they wanted.
Defeating Iran
Hezbollah is Iran’s most important ally/proxy in the region. Israel has now destroyed perhaps 50% of its rocket and missile supplies and killed an even greater proportion of Hezbollah’s leaders. The pager/walkie-talkie attack two weeks ago maimed thousands of its cadres. Israeli troops are now on the ground in southern Lebanon seeking to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.
Netanyahu is imagining that regime in Iran is imminent:
He will be content with the results of yesterday’s 180-missile Iranian attack. Israel appears to have suffered little damage and no known strategic losses. Many of the missiles were destroyed before hitting their targets by US, Israeli, and other unnamed defenses.
Retaliation is nevertheless all but certain. Netanyahu has been looking for an opportunity to hit Iran for decades. The Israelis will likely aim for nuclear and oil production facilities. The nuclear facilities will be difficult to destroy, as vital ones are ensconced well under ground. The best the IDF can hope for is to block some of the access routes. The oil facilities are more vulnerable. Oil and natural gas are Iran’s major exports. If they don’t flow, the economy will deflate.
Restraint is not in the cards
The Americans and Europeans will be urging restraint on Israel. They don’t want a regional war. Netanyahu isn’t listening. His own political future depends on continuing the fighting and achieving a spectacular military success. Hamas has denied him that in Gaza. So far, Hezbollah has proven an easier target. Netanyahu knows President Biden will do nothing to Israel’s block arms supplies. And he wants to boost Trump’s chances of winning the presidency. So he has no reason to restrain an attack he has wanted to launch for decades.
Netanyahu’s governing coalition has only a thin majority in the Knesset. But his allies and his own Likud political party have given him a blank check in pursuing a regional war. The Arab states are protesting the war in Gaza but doing little to prevent Israel from attacking Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran. All of them are anathema to the Gulf monarchies. The Arab street is still sympathetic to the Palestinians, but it has little say. Restraint is not in the cards.
It’s about Iran as well as the Palestinians
Israel is now conducting a different war in Lebanon than the one it has conducted in Gaza. As Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib (@afalkhatib) has noted, “Gaza is a war of revenge, not precision.” So far, the war in Lebanon has been far more precise and targeted, though of course it has also killed hundreds of innocent civilians.
The “precision” war
This is likely to continue. The Israelis know most Sunnis, Christians, and Druze in Lebanon do not trust Shia Hezbollah. There is no point in hitting them. Support for President Assad’s war against the (mainly Sunni) Syrian opposition and involvement in Lebanon’s corrupt sectarian politics have blotted Hezbollah’s copybook. Leveling communities that don’t like Hezbollah would make no sense.
Hezbollah opposes the existence of Israel, but it has done little for the approximately 200,000 Palestinians who live in Lebanon. The Israelis are letting it be known that they are contemplating a ground invasion, but that is likely to be unrewarding. The Israel Defense Force will prefer to continue to destroy Hezbollah large rocket and missile inventory from the air. Any ground incursion is likely to be limited to the south.

The Arab openness
The Jordanian Foreign Minister yesterday made the Arab and Muslim position clear:
This is not new for the Jordanians, who protect Israel’s security every day, in return for Israeli help with internal security. But “all of us are willing to right now guarantee the security of Israel” is a bold formula, even with the traditional conditions that follow. He was apparently speaking after a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, whose 57 members include the non-Arab Muslim states.
There is more Muslim and Arab acceptance today of Israel’s existence than at any other time since 1948. But Israel isn’t paying any attention. Why not?
Two reasons
The first reason is the one Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi cites. Netanyahu wants to prevent the formation of a Palestinian state. He has devoted the last 30 years to that cause. He is not going to give it up now.
Just as important: for him, the fight with Hamas and Hezbollah is about Iran, not only Palestine. The IDF is well on its way to destroying Tehran’s best deterrent, which was Lebanese Hezbollah’s stock of rockets and missiles. Tehran’s Syrian deterrent is already in tatters. Hamas isn’t destroyed but will need time to recover. So Netanyahu is clearing the way for an Israeli attack on Iran, focused on its nuclear facilities. I find it hard to understand how Iran would use a nuclear weapon against a place as small as Israel without killing a lot of Muslims. But Israeli prime ministers have been willing to do some frightening things to prevent neighbors from getting nukes.
The consequences
With its deterrent gone and at risk of losing its nuclear assets, Tehran will likely amp up its nuclear program. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will no doubt see production of nuclear weapons as a necessary deterrent against an Israeli attack. An Iranian sprint for nuclear weapons will ignite Turkiye and Saudi Arabia rivalry. That would make four nuclear or near nuclear powers in the Middle East, with many complicated relations among them. It is hard to see how that will serve Israeli or American interests.