Tag: Iraq

Hope is where the wild things are

My wife and I hosted a long-scheduled reunion for US Institute of Peace people last night. They were not for the most part current employees but rather people who worked there in 2005. Friday the current employees of the Institute were abruptly, but not unexpectedly, terminated.

I worked at USIP from 1998 to 2010. I left to teach at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. So my regret for what has happened is personal, not just intellectual. Caveat emptor.

A bit of history

The USIP website is now blocked, allegedly for security reasons. You can be pretty sure that isn’t true, but it means a bit of history is in order. Congress created USIP in 1984 during President Reagan’s presidency. It started life mainly as a grant and fellowship giver but evolved into a thinktank .

After the Bosnian war, it went in a new direction. We called it a “do-tank.” USIP tried to apply what had been learned through its grants, fellowships, and scholarship to real-life conflict situations. That started in the Balkans and then expanded to Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the last two decades many other places. Funding came both from direct Congressional appropriations and through the various Administrations, which would sometimes decide USIP could be helpful.

What USIP did

A few stories may be worth the telling. In about 2004, Don Hays–then the deputy High Representative in Bosnia–got the State Department to fund his effort after leaving Bosnia to help the Bosnians negotiate constitutional amendments. I don’t remember the cost, but it was well under $100,000, plus Don’s salary, which State was already committed to paying. The negotiations succeeded, but the constitutional amendments failed in the Bosnian parliament. They missed a two-thirds majority by just two votes. I think it now clear that those constitutional amendments would have vastly improved the situation in Bosnia.

After the invasion of Iraq, USIP requested and received $10 million for peacebuilding work there, focused mainly on preventing sectarian strife and helping establish rule of law. That effort aimed to tamp down a mostly Sunni rebellion against the Shia majority. USIP helped to train a network of Iraqis of all ethnicities who continue to this day to try to prevent sectarian and ethnic frictions from turning violent.

I could continue. USIP worked with amounts of money that were small in Defense Department terms to support US national security objectives in conflict zones abroad. Some of us were politically liberal and some of us were politically conservative, but we all recognized that benefits of preventing violent conflict in places the US had vital interests.

Fast forward

USIP made it through the Bush and Obama Administrations in decent shape financially, though it relied increasingly on transfers through the administration rather than direct appropriations from Congress. It also moved in 2011 to its new building at 23rd and Constitution. Its President, Richard Solomon, raised a lot of private money for the building. He also got the Navy to transfer the land to USIP.

USIP remains a non-governmental organization run by a bipartisan board appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Administration had three ex-officio members on the Board: the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the President of the National Defense University.

What Trump is doing

The Trump Administration now claims that the President has fired all the appointed members of the board (Democrats and Republicans, with one independent). The ex-officio members have appointed a new USIP chief executive. Courts will decide whether the Trumpkins can get away with this. But it is a dramatic departure from how USIP has been run in the past. Whether a quorum was required to fire the then acting president of the Institute is unclear.

Trump has not made clear what he intends to do with the Institute. But it won’t be surprising if he tries to close it entirely. That’s what he has done with so many vaguely similar “quangos,” that is quasi-nongovernmental organizations. Their claims to independence are offensive to the right-wing would-be autocrats who believe in the “unitary executive.” They refuse to tolerate any independent institutions, governmental or quasi-governmental. Trump will try to get his patsies on the Supreme Court to validate their views. They are also trying to limit the independence of nongovernmental institutions like law firms and universities.

Hope, or not?

I don’t have much hope for USIP’s future. I do hope its lawyers win in court and get a big settlement for its employees. But by that time the Institute will be nothing more than a shell. A future Administration could rebuild it, but not in the current political environment. Bipartisanship has gone the way of the dodo.

The baton passes now to other institutions worldwide. Europe has an Institute of Peace, as do any number of countries that mimicked USIP, to one extent or another. Hope lies wherever the restraining and suffocating writ of the Trump Administration does not extend. That’s where the wild things are.

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Between a rock, a hard place, and the US

Syria’s Kurdish forces were once spread along Syria’s northern border with Turkey in three main concentrations. Afrin lay in the west, Kobani east of the Euphrates, and Hasakeh in the east. They have now lost control of Afrin to Turkiye and its proxies, who are threatening Minbij. Ankara wants all Kurdish forces at least 30 km from the border.

Meanwhile Syria’s de facto new leader, Ahmed al Sharaa, wants Kurdish forces brought under the Ministry of Defense. The United States has long cooperated with the Kurds in fighting the Islamic State and imprisoning its cadres.

The American side of the triangle

The Americans won’t want anything to happen that weakens that mission. But American support for the Kurds is the least certain side of this iron triangle. President Trump has long wanted the Americans out of Syria. His National Security Advisor nominee, Mike Waltz, is known as a long-time friend of the Iraqi Kurds.

He is also strongly committed to destroying the Islamic State (IS). That goal requires Kurdish cooperation. But there are few IS fighters remaining in the wild, where the Americans bomb them often. The main IS threat now is from the fighters whom the Kurds have imprisoned. If the Kurds were to release the jihadis, that would revive IS. A secondary threat is from their families, mainly concentrated in a refugee camp in the south.

The rock and the hard place

Ankara and Damascus are the more rigid sides of the triangle. Both have vital interests vis-a-vis the Kurds.

Ankara wants the Kurds off its border with Syria. Or at least diluted with some of the three million Syrian (mostly Arab) refugees Turkiye wants to return to Syria. Ankara has said it would take responsibility for the IS prisoners and their families. Damascus wants the Kurdish forces either demobilized or absorbed into the new Syrian army. It will also want the Kurdish governing institutions in the north absorbed into the Syrian state.

None of this will appeal to the Kurds. But they are weaker militarily than the Turks. And they have long accepted that their institutions, including the armed forces, should be subservient to a post-Assad state. The Americans, their main supporters, will not support a bid for independence.

Nowhere to run, nowhere to hide

The Kurds are cornered. Iraq’s Kurds have their own problems and won’t want to support Syria’s Kurds, who espouse a different governing philosophy. They even speak a different Kurdish. Iran, which has sometimes appeared supportive of Syria’s Kurds, also has its own problems. It has evacuated most of its cadres and their leadership from Syria. Kurds still control a slice of Syria’s oil resources. Turning that over to Damascus could be a bargaining chip. Iran and Iraq have halted exports of oil to Syria.

Reaching an accommodation with Ankara and Damascus will not be easy, but the Syrian Kurds have little choice. Unless Syria descends into chaos, the days of their wide autonomy will end. They would do well to offer up their armed forces in exchange for Damascus acceptance of Kurdish governing institutions. Damascus might even want them to maintain a strong police force and intelligence capability. The Kurds should also try to convince Ankara of their willingness to break ties with Kurdish rebels inside Turkiye. In exchange they could ask that Kurds return to their homes along the border.

Politics rather than force

Kurds often portray themselves as the largest ethnic group without a state. That is a dubious claim. And in any case there are no guarantees of a state based on population size. The Kurds live in four contiguous states, none of which they can call their own: Iraq, Turkiye, Syria, and Iran. They need to use their political strength and savvy to gain what they can from these non-democracies. Necessary as it has been, military force has not produced a desirable outcome.

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The regional war is likely to intensify

With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu about to address the US Congress, it is time for an assessment of where things stand currently in the Middle East. Israel is fighting Arab opponents on four fronts. In Gaza, it is fighting Hamas and killing a lot of civilians. In the north, Israel is fighting Hizbollah and sometimes Syria. In the south Yemen’s Ansar al Allah (the Houthis in a word) has taken up the cudgels against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. And on the West Bank, settlers and the security forces are fighting Palestinian civilians.

Iran stands behind it all

Iran supports all of Israel’s opponents, the “axis of resistance,” in the Middle East and North Africa. It supplies training and equipment as well as some degree of central coordination and financing. Hamas, Hizbollah, the Houthis may each have their own interests and initiatives, but they are broadly consistent with Iran’s denial of the legitimacy of the Israeli state and its objective of destroying it in favor of a one-state solution on the entire territory of Palestine.

From Tehran’s perspective, the fighting is a good deal. It is confronting its sworn enemy using non-Iranian forces not on Iranian territory. Only once, in April, has Iran tried to attack Israel with its own missiles and drones, in response to an attack on an Iranian diplomatic facility. Israel responded, but in a way that did not escalate the direct tit for tat.

The fourth front

The fourth front in the current fighting is the West Bank. There Israel is not only fighting armed resistance, some of which might or might not be connected to Iran. It has unleashed Israeli settlers, who are establishing new outposts, destroying Palestinian property, and killing Palestinians. 2023 was an especially bad year but 2024 is not far off the pace.

The West Bank fighting redounds to Iran’s benefit as well. It keeps Israeli security forces busy and makes it difficult for the Palestinian Authority, a secular organization with little connection to Tehran, to claim it can effectively govern.

Arab states are mostly maintaining the peace

Egypt and Jordan are maintaining their peace agreements with Israel. Saudi Arabia is continuing to pursue a similar accommodation, albeit one that would necessarily open a path to a Palestinian state. It would also need to give Saudi Arabia a formal US security guarantee of some sort. Iraq talks tough but is not either willing or capable of joining the fight. Turkey has suspended trade with Israel and speaks up for the Palestinians, but it is unwilling to go further. Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan are more or less maintaining their “Abrahamic” agreements with Israel, though Khartoum may rethink that after its civil war.

Qatar is acting as a mediator, along with Egypt, in talks that engage both Hamas and Israel. While often accused of supporting Hamas, Doha views its relations with Hamas as fulfilling requests of the US government, as does Cairo. Egyptian President Sisi is no friend of the Muslim Brotherhood, which gave birth to Hamas.

Hamas has survived, many hostages haven’t

The immediate cause of the current fighting was Hamas’ ferocious, unconventional attack on Israel last October 7, which killed about 1200 people. Israelis understood that to be an existential threat. Its ferocious conventional response has killed in the past 8 months about 40,000 Palestinians and others, according to the Hamas health ministry.

Israel’s main objective is to eradicate Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas appears to have survived the intense bombing campaign and numerous ground incursions. While there are signs of dissatisfaction with Hamas among Gazans, polling has not confirmed that sentiment.

Israel also seeks release of hostages seized on October 7. Netanyahu claims military pressure will achieve that. Many Israelis prefer a deal. Hamas or other Palestinian groups still hold about 120. More than 100 were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. Few have been rescued. Dozens have been killed.

No agreement means the regional war will intensify

Prime Minister Netanyahu, apparently against the wishes of many in his government, has refused to sign on to a proposed ceasefire agreement with Hamas that the Americans say originated with Israel. Hamas claims to have agreed, but it appears to be asking for changes as well. There is no sign of a real agreement emerging.

Many in Israel wanted Netanyahu to sign on before coming to Washington. He did not do that. It seems unlikely he will sign on during his visit, if only because doing so would help the Democrats. Netanyahu has allied himself firmly with Donald Trump. I expect his address in Congress to be more of the same fire and brimstone that he preaches in Israel.

The result will be more fighting in all four directions. The Houthis are unbowed. Lebanese Hizbollah is less belligerent but will have little choice if Israel continues to kill its commanders. Hamas hopes its continuing resistance will give it traction not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank, where the settlers can be expected to continue rampaging.

Hamas reportedly agreed in Beijing this week to join the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognizing it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (a key provision of the Oslo accords with Israel). Such reconciliation agreements have not stuck in the past. If this one does, it could put the Palestinians in a better position to negotiate with Israel, or it could incentivize the Israelis to continue the fighting. Or both. Stay tuned.

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Justice demands the truth

Claudio Gatti, an Italian and American journalist, has updated the results of his decades-long inquiries into an incident known often in Italy simply as “Ustica” (or the strage di Ustica). That refers both to a small Italian island about 49 miles north of Palermo and the crash nearby of an Itavia DC-9 on June 27, 1980. The crash killed all 81 people aboard.

Forty-four years later, the cause of the Ustica crash is still unknown. The crew had no warning. There is no evidence of mechanical failure. Experts have (mostly) discarded the hypothesis of a bomb on board. Gatti examines other hypotheses involving a American, French, Italian, or Libyan missile. Justice demands the truth.

What didn’t happen

He concludes that none of these hypotheses is valid.

There is technical evidence favoring a missile. The downing of the aircraft might have been a mistake. I often noted while Deputy Chief of Mission in Rome 1990-93, and still believe, the Americans could not have kept such a mistake secret. The French or Italians, who some imagine to have mistaken the plane for one in which Qaddafi was traveling, had other, better options for killing him. Qaddafi himself claimed to be the target, but the Libyans have never provided evidence that he was flying (or planned to fly) in the area that night. The Libyans had no motive, even if the later crash in Sicily of a Libyan MIG raised questions about their possible involvement.

The decades since the incident are replete with suspicious behavior, missing data, allegations of coverups, military and technical incompetence, and conspiracy theories. These are standard in Italy. The judiciary, sometimes more serious than the journalism, has failed to elucidate the cause.

What might have happened

Gatti, whom I have known for decades (caveat emptor), thinks he knows the answer: Israel. His theory is that Prime Minister Begin, worried (literally) sick about Iraq’s acquisition of nuclear technology from France and Italy, authorized the downing of a plane carrying weapons-grade enriched uranium fuel for the Osiraq reactor. The Israelis destroyed that in an air raid a year later. Gatti thinks the Israeli pilots, operating in low-visibility conditions at the outer limits of their capabilities, mistook the Itavia plane for one that was supposed to be traveling a similar route.

I won’t rehearse all the details. This RAI documentary by Luca Chianca deals with some of them. I play a minor role there saying no more than intended here. I don’t believe the Americans did it. The Israelis had the technical means to do it. But I have no idea whether they did.

Caveat emptor here as well. I was involved in the late 1970s in American diplomatic efforts to prevent the Italians from transferring nuclear technology to Iraq. I now wonder whether preventing Israel from taking military action motivated my vigorous State Department instructions.

Gatti offers much more in his Il Quinto Scenario: Atto Secondo, but that is available only in Italian. The evidence for an Israeli missile downing the DC-9 is compelling. But not quite a smoking gun. It passes what the experts term a “hoop test.” As in jumping through a hoop. The facts, as best he thinks them determined, are consistent with Israeli culpability. The hypothesis thus fulfills a necessary but not sufficient criterion.

More investigation is needed

In the absence of competitive hypotheses, more investigation is warranted. It is appalling to think any state would down a passenger plane. But of course it has happened in the past. The Israelis downed a Libyan Arab Airlines Boeing 727 in 1973 when it unintentionally flew over Israeli-occupied Sinai. And it could happen again.

The Ustica mystery needs a solution. The families of 81 people should not have to live with uncertainty about what happened. Justice demands the truth, whatever it may be.

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The wider war has arrived, when will peace?

Iran yesterday retaliated against Israel for its bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which killed high ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The barrage of hundreds of drones and missiles was ineffective, due to Israeli, American, British, and Jordanian air defenses. The Iranians made no secret of what they intended to do and presumably are hoping it will not trigger another round.

Multiple vectors

But it is still reasonable to conclude that the wider Middle East war many have feared has already begun. Israel continues its attack on Gaza. Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel are exchanging shots across the border. Israel is frequently targeting Iranian assets in Syria. Yemen’s Houthis are targeting shipping and warships in the Red Sea. Iraq’s Iranian-sponsored “Popular Mobilization Forces” have been targeting American military bases. Israeli settlers have been chasing Palestinians from their homes on the West Bank.

Of course the pace and lethality of this wider war could heighten. So far, its most deadly axis by far has been Israel/Hamas. Hamas has killed about 1500 Israelis and the Israelis have killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, in retaliation for the mass murder, kidnapping, and mayhem of October 7. Elsewhere the wider war is more than symbolic, but still far less fatal.

Worsening prospects

Once such things start, the natural tendency is towards escalation. Certainly things have gotten worse in the past six months. They are likely to get worse still. The murder of an Israeli teenager on the West Bank last week sparked heightened settler violence against Palestinians there. Hizbollah could do a lot more damage if it unleashes its missiles. So could the Israelis if they decide to push into southern Lebanon. Iran still has lots of drones and missiles it could use in a second attack.

The next round will be Israel’s choice. It could choose to write off yesterday’s attack as ineffective and unworthy of response. Or it could decide to reassert deterrence with a direct attack on Iran or on Iranian assets in the region. I suspect the decision will be based primarily on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s domestic political calculations. He faces growing demands for his resignation. Any pause in the fighting could provide the time to bring him down. He is still hoping for enough of a victory in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran to enable him to remain in power.

That seems unlikely in Gaza. Israel has done significant harm to Hamas there but is still far from the total defeat Netanyahu has set as its war goal. Israel has been hitting Hizbollah in Lebanon without much reaction. That could be a likelier prospect. He may think a devastating blow against Iran would enable him to avoid the inevitable for a while longer. Why anyone in his war cabinet would go along with that is unclear to me, but so far they have generally supported his wartime decisions.

Can diplomacy work?

The still wider and more deadly war in prospect is not in the US interest. Nor do the Europeans want it. Karim Sadjadpour on MSNBC last night pointed out that the Chinese would likewise prefer stability in the Middle East to lower and steady oil prices. The Russians by contrast benefit from de-stabilization and the consequent distraction from the Ukraine war as well as the bump up in oil prices. But even acting together it is unclear that the Americans, Europeans, and Chinese could exert sufficient influence on Israel or Iran to de-escalate.

Both countries have leaders whose political mandates won’t last much longer. Iran’s Supreme Leader is almost 85 years old and ill. Netanyahu is suffering a catastrophic decline in popularity as well as serious corruption charges. Both are claiming not to want to escalate. But neither sees an enticing option other than escalation. Both want victory over the other as a political legacy. The wider war has arrived, but until there is decisively new leadership in both Tehran and Jerusalem peace is unlikely.

I

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Stevenson’s army, February 8

– From Netanyahu

– From Senate GOP

– From House GOP

– From Cong. McCaul on Derek Chollet

Ukraine worries, says NYT

– WaPo sees troop shortage in Ukraine

– Politico tells where money would go

Iraq worries

– CBO says deficit is shrinking

– NYT updates us on Ecuador

– Ian Bremmer says Chancellor Scholz is “toast”

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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