Tag: Iraq
Peace Picks | March 21 – March 25, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Defense Project Series: Ending the War in Afghanistan- a discussion with counter-terror expert David Kilcullen | March 22, 2021 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Dave Kilcullen: Lieutenant Colonel, Australian Army Reserves
Dave Kilcullen, strategist/scholar/author, discusses the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban and ISIS, and how the United States and its allies might help Afghanistan forge a future of hope and promise vice a return to the dark days of the 1990s. With the agreed deadline for American withdrawal from Afghanistan looming on 1 May and Taliban attacks ramping up, President Biden is faced with a difficult policy decision to stay in the war or leave. Join Bill Rapp as he moderates this important discussion with the famed counter-terror expert.
2. Iraqi diaspora mobilization and the future development of Iraq | March 22, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Center | Register Here
Speakers
Amb. Feisal Al-Istrabadi: Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East
Dr. Abbas Kadhim: Director, Iraq Initiative, Atlantic Council
Dr. Oula Kadhum: Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Birmingham
Dr. Marsin Alshamary (moderator): Postdoctoral Research Fellow, The Brookings Institute
The Atlantic Council hosts a discussion surrounding the upcoming report, Iraqi Diaspora Mobilization and the Future Development of Iraq. Authored by Dr. Oula Kadhum, postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Birmingham, the paper explores Iraqi diaspora mobilization before and after the 2003 invasion and fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, looking at ways in which members of the diaspora have sought to help in the rebuilding of their country of origin, at both the elite and grassroots levels, as well as investigating changes over time. The discussion will touch on the paper’s key recommendations, considering the obstacles that have hindered diaspora mobilization, beyond the ethno-sectarian system.
3. The Politics of Mass Violence in the Middle East | March 22, 2021 | 4:00 PM – 5:00 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Laura Robson: Professor of History, Penn State University
Laila Parsons: McGill University
Ussama Makdisi: Rice University
Christian F. Ostermann (moderator): Director, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center
Eric Arnesen (moderator): Professor of History, The George Washington University
4. In a Consequential Year for Iraq, What’s Next? | March 23, 2021 | 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Lise Grande: President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
Ambassador Matthew Tueller: Ambassador of the United States to Iraq
Ambassador Fareed Yasseen: Ambassador of Iraq to the United States
Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman: Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the United States
Sarhang Hamasaeed (moderator): Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace
As Iraq marks the 18th anniversary of the 2003 U.S.-led war that set in motion consequential changes, the country is eyeing what a Biden administration might bring while the country prepares for national elections in October. Meanwhile, His Holiness Pope Francis made a historic visit to Iraq earlier this month and injected much needed messages of hope, coexistence, and peace into an environment dominated by frustrations with the pandemic and its financial consequences, public grievances with governance, continued U.S.-Iran tensions and attacks on coalition forces, and the ongoing threat of ISIS. Join USIP for a discussion of key developments in Iraq and the outlook for U.S.-Iraq relations under the Biden administration. The panel will share their insights on the Pope’s first-ever visit to Iraq, examine the country’s current challenges, and explore areas where policymakers and the international community can support Iraq.
5. Women’s gains in Afghanistan: Leadership and peace | March 23, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Minister Hasina Safi: Acting Minister for Women’s Affairs, Government of Afghanistan
Fatima Gailani: Member, Afghan Negotiating Team
Lt. Colonel Natalie Trogus: Former Advisor, Afghan Ministry of Defense
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky (moderator): Vice Chair, Scowcroft Center for Strategy & Security, Atlantic Council
For Afghanistan to rebuild and for peace to be sustainable, the country will require a diversity of ideas, experiences, leadership, and action — from all of its people — to move forward. Such progress is impossible without the dedicated, long-term involvement of women, which allows for shifts in both long-held beliefs and practices, including those of the Taliban. This will ultimately allow peace to be not only enduring, but create a shared vision of Afghanistan’s future that puts Afghan women at the center. Join the Atlantic Council for a conversation on how Afghan women and their US partners have worked to improve women’s leadership opportunities in Afghanistan, what these improvements mean for Afghan women, and the critical role women play in Afghanistan’s aspirations for long-term peace.
6. Africa’s Global Reset: Foreign Relations in a Post-Pandemic Era | March 23, 2021 | 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
Speakers
Andrew Alli: Partner and Group CEO, SouthBridge; former CEO of Africa Finance Corporation
Akunna Cook: Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Bogolo Kenewendo: Former Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry of Botswana; Non-Resident Fellow, Center for Global Development
Ambassador Koji Yonetani: Assistant Minister for African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Judd Devermont (moderator): Director, Africa Program
The Covid-19 pandemic is dramatically changing relationships between African governments and external partners, creating opportunities for a reset in relations and a recommitment to strategic issues. Longstanding grievances stemming from African countries’ status in international affairs, racism against their citizens abroad, and the zero-sum premise of global power competition have reached a boiling point. The pandemic is prompting regional governments to demand more equitable vaccine distribution, debt relief, and targeted investment in key economic sectors. It’s time to pause and identify the trends reshaping the region as well as implications for African governments and their foreign partners. Join the CSIS Africa Program on March 23, 2021, for a virtual livestream event examining the state of Africa’s foreign ties and key strategic issues to watch for, including Covid-19 recovery, debt relief, anti-discrimination, democratization, and climate change.
7. Anti-Coercion Instrument: How can Europe best protect itself from economic coercion? | March 23, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:00 AM | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Colin Brown: Head of Unit, Legal Affairs/Dispute settlement (trade, sustainable development and investment), European Commission
Sven Simon: MEP; Member of International Trade Committee, European Parliament
Marie-Pierre Vedrenne: MEP; Vice-Chair of International Trade Committee, European Parliament
Jonathan Hackenbroich (moderator): Head of Task Force for Strengthening Europe against Economic Coercion, ECFR
The European Council on Foreign Relations is delighted to invite you to our webinar on how Europe can strengthen itself against economic coercion. Powerful countries revert to economic blackmail to change European foreign, economic, or financial policy. China has threatened Germany and Sweden with dire economic consequences over excluding Huawei from their 5G networks. Russia is looking into expanding its sanction toolkit. Turkey’s President Recep Erdogan called for boycotting French products over a speech by Emmanuel Macron. Under Donald Trump, the US used various measures of economic coercion, even directly against allies. Now, Europe needs to rebuild strong transatlantic relations especially around economic statecraft.
8. Unmasking Influence Operators: What Are Best Practices for Attribution? | March 25, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Marianna Spring: Disinformation and social media reporter, BBC
Elise Thomas: OSINT analyst, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue
Emerson T. Brooking: Resident senior fellow, Digital Forensic Lab, Atlantic Council
Olgo Belogolova: Policy manager for influence operations, Facebook
A growing community of researchers are investigating influence operations, but research standards for conducting investigations are not widely shared. This event will explore one of the thorniest investigative challenges – identifying who is behind an influence operation.
9. Defending democracy against its adversaries | March 26, 2021 | 11:00 AM – 1:00 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya: Leader of Democratic Belarus
Bob Dean: Senior research fellow, Clingendael Institute
Kara McDonald: Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State
Gerard Steeghs: Director, Multilateral Organizations and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands
Thomas Wright: Director, Center on the US and Europe, Brookings Institution
Constanze Stellenmüller (moderator): Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution
Liberal democracy — representation, the rule of law, and human rights — is the foundation of the trans-Atlantic alliance and a rules-based international order. The Biden administration has placed democracy at the heart of its policy agenda; in the words of its March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, “Democracy is essential to meeting all the challenges of our changing world.” Yet democracy is under threat worldwide from populists and rising authoritarian powers. Still, civil societies continue to fight for their rights. In Belarus, a pro-democracy movement led by teacher-turned-presidential-candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is bravely protesting the fraudulent August 2020 election, despite violent repression by the government of Alexander Lukashenko. Brookings will host Tsikhanouskaya for a keynote address that examines democracy and human rights in Belarus.
10. ‘The Last Shah’: A book event with Ray Takeyh | March 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Ray Takeyh: Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Eric Edelman: Counselor, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Kenneth M. Pollack: Resident Scholar, AEI
Colin Dueck (moderator): Visiting Scholar, AEI
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The future of the Islamic State
The Atlantic Council March 4 hosted an event to discuss the group’s current activities and prospects of an ISIS resurgence, including the Caliphate’s impact and demise (2014-17), as well as current and future ISIS activities not only within Syria and Iraq but throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abu Rumman
Expert, Politics and Society Institute; Former Jordanian Minister of Youth and Culture
Borzou Daragahi
Journalist and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Andrew Peek
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq
Mara Revkin
National Security Law Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center
Banan Malkawi (Moderator)
Jordanian-American Researcher and Lecturer
Resurgence Unlikely:
Moderator Banan Malkawi described the ISIS insurgency as a watershed moment for violent extremism. We need to ask “What are the key expectations for the future of the Islamic State as an organization?” The consensus was that an ISIS resurgence is unlikely, though all the speakers acknowledged the threat that the group still poses within the remote pockets where they continue to operate.
Revkin discussed her experiences doing fieldwork in Iraq, noting that conversations she has had with Iraqis suggest there is no easy way to accurately assess the threat ISIS poses to Iraqi society. Just counting weapons and people involved in ISIS activity will not work without examining the socioeconomic and political environment that the group is operating in today. There are multiple drivers of instability in Iraq, only few of which are directly attributed to ISIS. An ISIS resurgence to their 2014 capacity is nearly impossible because of the violence they committed against Sunni communities. They just don’t have the necessary levels of public support.
Sectarian Divisions and Deal Making:
Peek agreed. The viability of a ISIS resurgence is limited, because Sunni politics is marked by pragmatism and deal making. An ISIS resurgence is more likely to happen in Syria than in Iraq, but the chances of either are still limited as long as the Syrian Democratic Forces (and their partnership with the United States) remains strong. “It is a dark time for Sunnis in the Levant,” he said.
Daragahi explained the structure of ISIS and noted the group thrives in ungoverned areas. Its social media and internet strategy has shifted into darker, more secure corners of the internet. ISIS has had to redirect its thinking and recruitment tactics in order to continue to survive. It exploits failed states, whether in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa or other pockets of the world. Thriving on grievances is how the group has managed to stay alive, albeit in a lowered capacity.
The rise of Salafi jihadism and sectarianism have been the keys to ISIS survival, according to Mohammed Abu Rumman. Some of the theories that have emerged in recent months regarding the group and their external support from partners and governments were shot down by both Daragahi and Rumman. ISIS will continue to operate in ways that ensure its survival, but the group will likely remain self-funded.
The international community and governments that have been working to delegitimize ISIS should continue, as countries such as Iraq and Syria still face threats from the group and feel the residual impact from its time in power.
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Reviving refugee resettlement in the US: ethics, policy, and implementation
Here are the remarks I made at today’s Johns Hopkins webinar on “Reviving Refugee Resettlement: Moral, Policy, and Implementation Issues,” in which colleagues and I presented and discussed our published paper on the subject.
- I collected the data on which our assessment of moral, policy and implementation issues was largely based.
- It’s one of the few times in my mostly internationally focused career that I’ve exploited my diplomatic skills to hear American views.
- The people I interviewed were all familiar with resettlement issues: as government officials, as think tankers following the issues, as NGO or international officials with relevant responsibilities.
- The range of political views was wide and included people working in the Trump Administration, but not Steven Miller or others in his inner circle.
- They either did not answer multiple requests for interviews or bluntly refused to talk with me.
- I did however talk with people inside government as well as outside generally sympathetic with the Administration’s views, especially on immigration.
- Ethical issues were not foremost in the minds of most of these people but on questioning all agreed on the moral imperative of helping resettle at least some refugees.
- All believed, for example, that the US should resettle Afghans, Iraqis, and others whose lives were in danger due to assistance they had afforded Americans during invasions.
- There was no dissent from “the duty to repair” in those circumstances.
- There was also general agreement on thinking about refugee resettlement as a human rights and humanitarian issue, albeit one that had to be limited by practical and financial considerations.
- But priority to the needy and non-discrimination, in particular based on religion were universally accepted. This was after the Trump Administration had prohibited visas for people from some Muslim countries.
- There was less agreement on the broad humanitarian imperative—partly because in its boldest form it rejects practical and financial considerations. Some also thought keeping people close to their original homes was more likely to enable returns, which they regarded as preferable in principle to resettlement and far less costly, enabling more people to be assisted.
- Personally, I think that trade-off is a serious issue: resettlement vs. aid in place, because of cost considerations.
- There was also less agreement on the contribution refugee resettlement makes to foreign policy and the legitimacy of the state system. Some insisted on this point unhesitatingly. Those closer to the Trump Administration rejected it as an exaggeration, but mainly I think because they were unconcerned with what others term the “rules-based order.”
- There was concern from some about implementation issues, including possible fraud or other malfeasance in the selection process, the capacity of the US government and non-governmental organizations to handle refugee resettlement (especially when the Obama Administration bumped up the numbers in its final year), and admission of people whose attitudes on gender and other issues might make their adaptation to American mores and law difficult.
- Some issues commonly discussed in the public sphere at the time were not very important in discussions with these experts, on the left or right. None thought there was more than a proportional and therefore small security risk from resettled refugees. Most thought they represented a far lesser threat than immigrants of other sorts and native-born Americans.
- My overall conclusion is that there is more room for consensus across the political spectrum on resettlement than on immigration more broadly. So long as due diligence is faithfully conducted and the numbers can be capably handled by the resettlement agencies and welcomed by local communities, few saw a big problem with the numbers, so long as they do not go up or down precipitously. The limits are more practical than ethical, even if the imperative is ethical.
- But reaching and maintaining this consensus across the political spectrum would likely depend on keeping the issue of refugee resettlement separate from the general issue of immigration, especially at the southern border. I’m not sure that can be done, or that everyone would want to keep the two issues separate. But doing so would be best from a refugee perspective.
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Foreign policy is also made by omission
Secretary of State Blinken outlined Biden Administration foreign policy yesterday. Here is the short version:
- End the pandemic
- Rebuild the economy
- Protect democracy
- Treat immigrants humanely but reduce incentives for migration
- Revitalize relations with friends
- Slow climate change
- Lead in hi tech
- Manage the rise of China
All of this is to be done with two things in mind: benefiting Americans and mobilizing other countries to carry part of the burden.
Tony is also at pains to underline that all these foreign policy issues have important domestic dimensions and that diplomacy will come before military action. The former is not new and underlay Trump’s “America First” slogan, especially on trade issues. The latter isn’t new either, but it is diametrically the opposite of what Trump was inclined to do. He thought cruise missiles and drones could get the US out of Syria without any need for talking with anyone. He tried talks with the Taliban, but did not wait for them to succeed before withdrawing half the troops.
It’s hard for me to quarrel with much of what Tony said. But there are things missing, as Tony acknowledges. Often in international affairs, as in domestic politics, what is not said is as significant as what is said.
Apart from the mention of China and some other geopolitical threats (Russia, Iran North Korea), there is no mention at all of specific regions and little of specific countries. My friends in the Middle East and the Balkans should take note. You are not going to get all the attention you crave. This is a major change from the traditional diplomatic “tour d’horizon” and suggests a shift from the State Department’s traditional emphasis on bilateral relations, as represented in its “geographic” bureaus and accentuated in the transactional Trump Administration, to “transnational” issues represented in State’s “functional” bureaus.
Among the “transnational” issues, one important one is omitted: nuclear non-proliferation. This may reflect a realistic recognition that with respect at least to North Korea and perhaps even Iran the cat is out of the bag: we are not going to be able to convince them to give up their nuclear ambitions entirely. It may also reflect a desire to leave room for some of our friends and allies to respond in kind. We’ve long exercised a tacit double standard with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons. We might be willing to do so for other countries like Japan or South Korea whose neighbors threaten them with nukes. Trump famously uttered this heresy out loud, but his departure doesn’t make the issue evaporate. Confidence in the American nuclear umbrella fades as Pyongyang acquires the capacity to nuke Los Angeles.
Of course the urgent in foreign policy often comes before the merely important. Tony knows he won’t be able to ignore Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Palestinians, democratic backsliding in the Balkans, the coup in Burma, or the agreed withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the Administration needs to either confirm or postpone. This Administration’s minds and hearts are in the right place. But that does not guarantee success. They face a challenging global environment, not least from all the omissions.
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Stevenson’s army, February 26
– Biden administration strikes Iranian-backed militias in Syria.
– Biden talks to Saudi king
– Axios says administration in no rush to change Western Sahara policy..
– Pew reports public opinion on Biden foreign policy challenges.
– David Ignatius comments on Egypt policy.
– Josh Rogin urges action on North Korea policy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Beyond success and failure lies attractive possibility
Michael Picard, a first-year Conflict Management student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:
The Wilson Center February 24 hosted a panel discussion on “Revisiting the Arab Uprisings at 10: Beyond Success and Failure.” that weighed the societal impacts of the Arab uprisings 10 years after they broke out. The term “Arab Spring” is a misnomer as the revolts did not result in democratic reform – the term Arab uprisings was used instead.
The key question was whether the Arab uprisings werea failure that is now over or are they the beginning of a longer process of societal transformation?
Panelists
Liz Sly (moderator): Beirut Bureau Chief, Washington Post
Amy Austin Holmes: International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Asher Orkaby: Fellow, Transregional Institute, Princeton University
Anas El Gomati: Founder and Director, Sadeq Institute
Focusing specifically on the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, the panelists presented and weighed the legacy of each country’s uprising 10 years on. Despite initial popular hope, there was never a serious expectation among observers that these states would transition to democracy overnight. What we have witnessed so far is the beginning of a long-term transformation of the MENA region. The memories of pre-uprising realities are still pertinent, and the youthful composition of Arab societies highlights the need for political and economic reforms.
Several panelists noted the US must examine how its policies and signals have impeded demoratic transitions. Regarding the 2013 coup that deposed Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected leader, the African Union immediately expelled Egypt in response to this setback. The US did not react until the Rabaa massacre, which killed hundreds of pro-Morsi demonstrators. This reflects a broader theme: that the US must consider its democracy promotion goals and what its precise role ought to be in realizing these goals.
The panel also discussed the role of the Gulf monarchies in the Arab uprisings, noting that they saw such movements – both those originating domestically and in nearby states – as existential threats. Ottaway offered an anecdote about a Saudi official who anticipated expatriate students would demand greater civil liberties. This compelled the Gulf states to act – near unanimously – to crush domestic uprisings and take an active international role in promoting counterrevolutions. This has caused immense destruction throughout the region, derailing local conflict management efforts and restraining Gulf proxies from negotiating settlements.
Ottaway observed that perhaps the most pessimistic lesson of the Arab uprisings was that removal of large, unitary, Arab regimes that dominated political life has revealed that the building blocks of democracy were absent, with the narrow exception of Tunisia. Tunisia was able to avoid fates similar to Libya and Yemen because it is a) socially homogenous with relatively few ethnic and sectarian minorities, and b) politically pluralistic. Historically salient political organizations already existed and held society together, albeit in uneasy, unstable balances.
The panelists spoke to new dynamics and outcomes that continue to emerge. Several elaborated on “second generation” protest movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan. In these contexts, protestors demonstrated greater understanding of how their movements could be more inclusive, better organized, and better at extracting meaningful government concessions. This has helped them avoid the high-stakes losses of the “first generation” protest movements.
The panelists noted unanimously that the Arab uprisings have had positive implications for women and some minorities. In several countries, women initiated the initial protest movements, focused on detention of their kin. In war-torn states, women have taken on a more active role in daily economic and social life. The panelists hope that these gains will be locked in with female participation quotas in emergent governance institutions. In Egypt, the Nubian minority gained recognition in the constitution and procured the right to return to ancestral lands from which they were forcibly displaced.
Conclusion
The panel agreed that the Arab uprisings were not failures that are now over but the beginning of a longer transitional process and state-building experiment. Orkaby noted these uprisings sparked the creation of local civil society organizations or strengthened existing ones. El Gomati noted the renewal of social protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan, indicating civilians are still willing to take to the streets. Austin Holmes emphasized that much will depend on how the Biden administration postures itself toward the region, especially with regard to countries that have retained despotic features.
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