Tag: Iraq
Annan Anon
Today’s news from Syria is bad, really bad for those of us who hope to see a more open and democratic regime there. The usual sources in Baba Amr, the Homs neighborhood that Bashar al Assad has been shelling for a month, have gone silent, apparently because elite Syrian army units are closing in from all sides. Electricity has been cut off. Violent resistance there will be, but sporadic and largely ineffectual. Expect widespread mistreatment of the civilian population, where the regime is trying to re-install the wall of fear that kept people in line for decades.
In the meanwhile, Kofi Annan, the newly appointed joint envoy of the UN and the Arab League, met in New York with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, in the aftermath of still another UN Security Council meeting that failed to reach agreement on his mandate. Annan was modest in his goals:
It is a very difficult assignment. It is a tough challenge and the first thing we need to do as the secretary general has said is to do everything we can stop the violence and the killing to facilit[tate] humanitarian access and to ensure the needy are looked after and work with the Syrians in coming up with a peaceful solution which respects their aspirations and eventually stablizes the country.
My Twitterfeed is disappointed in his failure to mention transition (away from the Assad regime), but Annan is doing what a good diplomat should: lowering expectations and trying to ensure himself at least a first meeting with Bashar. He needs to keep his public remarks in line with the minimalist goals that Russia and China support. UN envoys don’t last long if one of the Perm 5 members of the UNSC object to what they are saying and doing, or a key interlocutor refuses to meet with them.
Kofi Annan knows as well as any of us that stabilization of Syria is not going to be possible with Bashar al Assad still in power. He betrays it with that adverb: “eventually.” Getting Bashar to step aside from power will not be easy. It will require convincing him that he is safer out of power than in it. Several Arab presidents have already chosen that route (Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh). Muammar Qaddafi preferred to fight, with well-known consequences. But Bashar will not like any of those precedents: exile in Saudi Arabia, a trial in his home country, exile in Ethiopia and murder victim are not attractive propositions. Maybe Tehran will be?
He will try to sell himself to Annan as a reformer: like the Bahraini and Moroccan monarchies or Algeria’s President Bouteflika, all of whom are engaged in modest reforms intended to co-opt protesters and maintain their regimes intact. Bashar will attribute his obvious excess use of force to the need to fight terrorism, a favorite excuse for violating human rights in this country as well as in Syria. There is just enough evidence of Al Qaeda in Iraq involvement in a few of the bombings in Syria to put some wind in that sail.
We should not expect Annan to get past Bashar’s defenses easily or quickly. As fallacious as the claims may be, he will have to listen and appear to appreciate them. Then, he needs to try to internationalize the situation as much as possible, by getting Arab League and UN monitors back into Syria to prevent renewed violence once a ceasefire is in place. He also needs to maintain his credibility with the Russians, so that he can talk with them about how their interests in port access and arms sales might be better served by a future, democratically-validated regime than by a declining Assad.
Annan will also need to reach out to the protesters in Syria and assure them that their pleas are heard and that their interests will be best served by returning to nonviolence, with international monitors in place to offer what protection they can, which is admittedly not much. In the meanwhile, the Free Syria Army and other militia groups will be arming, but hopefully not fighting. If the protesters resort to violence, Annan’s position will quickly become untenable as the regime returns to the battlefield.
Why is this not more like the situation in Libya or Kosovo, where the rebellions armed themselves and fought the regime tooth and nail? The answer is that the Syrians can be close to certain that no air force is coming to their rescue. The Americans and Europeans are showing no appetite for it. The Turks and Arabs seem almost as reluctant. If any of them were to change their minds and decide to throw their military weight behind the protesters, the situation would be different. But that is unlikely to happen.
Annan’s chances of success are low. But we should wish him the best in his efforts, which should begin as soon as possible. Delay or failure would mean continuation of a war the regime is bound to win.
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The coming week’s peace picks
Too much this week, and most of it happening Wednesday:
1. Are economic sanctions the key to resolving the nuclear dispute? CSIS, February 27, 6-8 pm.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) is pleased to invite you to a debate on the recent sanctions imposed on Iran. These sanctions target Iran’s banking sector and are widely believed to have had significant effects not just on Iran’s ability to acquire materials for its nuclear program, but also its energy sector and economy as a whole. Although many agree that Iranian development of a nuclear weapon would have serious security implications for the Middle East, questions about whether or not this is truly Iran’s intent and what the United States should do about it remain hotly contested. Does diplomacy still offer a means of resolving this issue and, if so, are the economic sanctions being passed on Iran making a diplomatic solution harder or easier to achieve?
Two highly distinguished scholars will come to CSIS to present opposing views on this issue and debate the policy of sanctioning Iran on its merits. The debate will feature:
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
and
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Maloney will present her argument that sanctioning Iran has become counterproductive and that the U.S. “cannot hope to bargain with a country whose economy it is trying to disrupt and destroy.” Mr. Rubin will take the opposing view that “only overwhelming pain” will convince the Iranian leadership to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
A cocktail reception with appetizers will begin at 6:00pm and the debate will commence at 6:30pm.
RSVP to David Slungaard at dslungaard@csis.org.
Webast: For those that cannot attend, the debate will live streamed. A link to the webcast will posted on this page on the day of the debate.
This event is the 13th installment of PONI’s ongoing Live Debate Series, which is an extension of the PONI Debates the Issues blog. The objective of the series is to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of the arguments on both sides of key nuclear policy issues. Please join us for what promises to be an exciting debate on a crucial issue of concern for the nonproliferation community, international security analysts, and regional specialists focusing on the Middle East.
2. Policing Iraq, USIP, February 29, 9:30-11:30 am
Under Saddam Hussein, a complex web of intelligence and security institutions protected the regime and repressed the Iraqi people. Underfunded and mismanaged, the Iraqi police were least among those institutions and unprepared to secure the streets when Coalition Forces arrived in 2003 and disbanded the rest of the security apparatus. Iraq’s police forces have made important strides, and some 400,000 Iraqi police have been trained and stationed across the country. However, with the U.S. drawdown in Iraq, the future of the Iraqi police and U.S. police assistance is uncertain.
On February 29, the United States Institute of Peace and the Institute for the Study of War will co-host a panel of distinguished experts who will discuss the history of the Iraqi police and the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. This public event will introduce a new USIP Special Report by Robert Perito on “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire.”
Speakers
- General Jim Dubik (U.S. Army, ret.), Panelist
Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of War
Former Commander, Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq - Dr. Austin Long, Panelist
Assistant Professor, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs
- Ginger Cruz, Panelist
Former Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) - Robert Perito, Moderator
Director, Security Sector Governance Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Author, USIP Special Report, “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire” - Tara Sonenshine, Introduction
Executive Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace - Marisa Cochrane Sullivan,Introduction
Deputy Director, Institute for the Study of War
3. Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace in the Horn of Africa: A New Approach? Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th floor auditorium, February 29, 10-11:30 am
The Horn of Africa is one of the world’s most conflicted regions, experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990. In recent months, the region has been afflicted with drought, famine, refugee migrations and military confrontations. All of these dynamics have catapulted the Horn of Africa upwards on the priority list for US policymakers.
In response to this on-going crisis, the Wilson Center’s Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity established a Horn of Africa Steering Committee in 2010 that focused on developing a regional US policy framework for the Horn. A conflict mapping report that analyses the major patterns, cross-cutting issues, and interrelationships in the Horn’s ongoing armed conflicts was subsequently commissioned, as well as a set of recommendations for US policy in the region going forward.
On February 29, 2012, the Leadership Project, in partnership with Alliance for Peacebuilding and Institute for Horn of Africa Studies and Analysis (IHASA) The overall objective of the recommendations publication is to employ a conflict resolution-oriented approach to a US regional framework for the Horn, including the need to promote good governance, increase human security (not just state or regime security), strengthen regional cooperation, and boost economic development and regional economic integration.
This event will be taking place at the Woodrow Wilson Center in the 6th Floor Auditorium on February 29th from 10:00am-11:30am. Please RSVP to leadership@wilsoncenter.org.
Program Agenda
Scene-Setter
Paul Williams, Associate Professor, George Washington University
Discussants
Akwe Amosu, Director, Africa Advocacy, Open Society Institute (Invited)
Chic Dambach, Chief of Staff, Congressman John Garamendi, CA
Raja Jandhyala, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, US Agency for International Development
Ambassador David Shinn, Former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Professor, George Washington University
Location:
Event Information
When
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
10:30 AM to 12:00 PM
Where
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Participants
Panelists
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Natan B. Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Shibley Telhami
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
5. Presidential Elections in Russia – What’s Next?, Carnegie Endowment, February 29, 12:30-2 pm
Dmitri Trenin, James F. Collins
Register to attend
With Russia’s presidential election less than a month away, Vladimir Putin is facing the most serious challenge since the establishment of his “power vertical.” Tens of thousands of people have taken to the streets across Russia, undeterred by plunging winter temperatures. Moscow is also facing challenges abroad—its recent veto of the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian regime has threatened its relations with much of the Arab world, and the U.S.-Russia “reset” appears stuck in neutral.
Dmitri Trenin and Ambassador James F. Collins will discuss how Russia’s presidential elections will influence its policies.
6. China’s International Energy Strategies: Global and Regional Implications, Elliott School (Lindner Family Commons) February 29, 12:30-1:45 pm
Philip Andrews-Speed, Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, the German Marshall Fund of the United States; Associate Fellow, Chatham House
Discussant: Llewelyn Hughes, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, GW
China is now a major player in the international energy arena. Imports of all forms of energy are increasing; national energy companies are investing around the world; and the government is active in different forms of energy diplomacy. These behaviors are driven by a range of interests from within and outside China. The external political consequences are rather greater than the economic ones, and vary around the world. China is a key player, along with Japan, in the progress of energy cooperation in East Asia.
RSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/ASFeb29
Sponsored by Sigur Center for Asian Studies
7. Assessing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities Amidst Economic Challenges: The Foreign Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, 2172 Rayburn, February 29, 1:30 pm
Full Committee
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Full Committee to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
8. To What Extent Is Iran a Threat to Israel? 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW, Suite M100 February 29, 4-6 pm
9. Measuring and Combating Corruption in the 21st Century, SAIS Rome building rm 200, March 2, 12:30-2 pm
Summary: Nathaniel Heller, co-founder and executive director of Global Integrity, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact developmentroundtable@jhu.edu.
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The state of Iraq
Corey Gannon, one of my Johns Hopkins/SAIS master’s students this term, offers the following account of a Carnegie Endowment discussion earlier this week on “The State of Iraq.” Speakers included Ad Melkert, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Marina Ottaway, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lt. Col. Joel Rayburn, Senior Military Fellow at the National Defense University. The focus was on current governance issues in Iraq and on political prospects over the next several years.
Melkert stressed the need to be humble in predicting the political future of Iraq. Open competition for office has not been a feature of Iraqi politics since 1958. The country is still defining its policies and asserting its constitutional sovereignty. There is reason for cautious optimistism, as the current political situation in Iraq is a “fragmented reality” without the cover of unified authoritarianism. The central question is whether the constitution will hold. Despite ongoing Sunni-Shia, intra-Sunni, and intra-Shia tensions, Iraqi politicians still view “sticking to the rules of the game” as advantageous. More people, he said, are invested in the state, financially and otherwise. In the regional context, Turkey is increasingly important and is beginning to feel the tension of being a regional broker. The situation in Syria will provide reduced opportunities for spoilers from that country to disrupt the Iraqi political process.
Marina Ottaway is “cautiously pessimistic.” She thinks Iraq is likely headed toward heightened sectarian violence. The problem is an “unhealthy pluralism.” Democratic institutions are possible partially because people can change their minds, but unchanging ethnic and religious identities dominate Iraqi politics. Despite their claims, all Iraqi political parties are sectarian. It is questionable whether there is time for the rules to develop before the country returns to conflict, including rules regarding the degree of autonomy of parts of Iraq. Top leaders are not known for their democratic tendencies and historically leaders have held power for long periods of time. Syria and other countries in relative disarray in the region are likely to exacerbate the problems in Iraq, in contrast to Melkert’s prediction.
Lt. Col. Rayburn is pessimistic in the short term, but optimistic over the long-term, which he described as roughly fifteen years. He anticipates a “painful” five to seven-year period after which Iraq may achieve a stable political outcome. The Iraqi economy could grow three to four times its current size. In the meanwhile, Maliki is neutralizing checks and balances in government, co-opting the Dawa party and establishing “anti-coup” forces in the police and military. Government posts are filled with family, close associates, former Baathists, and “Dawa orphans” all dependent on Maliki remaining in power. Maliki can seize the state but not the country. In a worst-case scenario, the trend would be an Iraqi society increasingly alienated from the state, partially because the latter fails to provide services, and the eventual use of violence by the Maliki regime to keep the country in line. Despite the views of many in the region, Iraq distrusts Iran. While generally agreeing with Iran on foreign policy, Maliki’s is not a puppet government.
Questions from the audience raised additional points. Melkert mentioned that during the 2014 national elections, Iraqi politicians will have to show what they have done for their constituencies, perhaps for the first time. The UN role is already shifting to monitoring human rights, assisting the central government, and helping to resolve border issues with Kuwait. Ottaway said that “after sectarian identities are out of the bag, it’s difficult to put them back in.” She sees only a small chance for nationalism to transcend sectarian and ethnic identities. Rayburn commented that the public sector still dwarfs the private sector economically. He also mentioned that the US role was different than previously planned. Poor security means US officials will rarely be able to leave the embassy.
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More thunder, no lightning
The UN General Assembly today passed a resolution supporting the Arab League plan for Syria, which would have Bashar al Assad step aside from his presidency and turn over power to his vice president, who would form a broad coalition government and initiate a democratic transition. The vote was 137 to 12, which is pretty lopsided even in the UNGA, where lopsided votes are common.
The opponents were: Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, DPRK, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. This is a crew that needs a name: something like the antidemocrats, but snappier.
So what practical effect will this have? Hard to say, but the legal effect is nil. UNGA resolutions are like preseason football: the games may be well played and show off talent, but they have no direct impact on the standings. Only UN Security Council resolutions have legal effect.
But legal effect isn’t everything and doesn’t guarantee implementation either. The important thing is that the “international community” has made an appropriate noise in response to Bashar al Assad’s military assault on Syria’s citizens. This will weaken Bashar’s position both internationally and within Syria and give inspiration to his opponents, who will also bemoan international community ineffectiveness.
The real question is what should be done now. Some will want to resort to military intervention or arming the Syrian Free Army. This is a serious error in my book. The worst outcome for the U.S. is a prolonged civil war in Syria, which could have a destabilizing impact on Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and more widely. “Safe areas” and “humanitarian corridors” would, in the absence of Syrian government cooperation, require major military intervention.
As Mona Yacoubian, Randa Slim and Aram Nerguizian were at pains to make clear this morning at a Stimson/Middle East Institute Event, there are diplomatic and political courses of action that still need to be played out:
- The U.S. should lead on getting a “Friends of Syria” group up and running;
- The Arab League and Turkey should lead on pressing the Syrian opposition to unify;
- Sanctions implementation needs to be tightened, especially by the Arab League;
- The U.S. and Turkey need to court Russian support, on grounds that their interests require a good relationship with whatever comes after Bashar;
- The Syrian opposition has to work on peeling away Sunni and Christian merchant, as well as military, support for the regime.
As Randa Slim noted, what helps the regime is fear of instability on the one hand and Islamism on the other. These fears would get worse with military intervention, not better. We need more thunder, no lightning.
PS: Somehow this “Dancing and chanting around an independence flag in Qudaysa, Damascus” tweeted by @LeShaque and retweeted by Robert Mackey grabs me this morning. It is a lot more expressive than the important, if dull, session of the UNGA yesterday and reminds us of what the resolution is really about:
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This week’s peace picks: better late than never!
I was ill last night and didn’t get the peace picks up until late today, but here are a few of the best items for the week, heavy on Iraq:
1. Recent Developments in Cyberwarfare
February 13, 2012, 12:00 – 1:30 PM – Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters
Please join Hudson Institute’s Center on Economics of the Internet for an address by Gen. James Cartwright (USMC, ret.), Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies at CSIS.
General Cartwright served as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before being nominated and appointed as the eighth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s second-highest military officer. During his four-year tenure as Vice Chairman, spanning two presidential administrations and overseeing constant military operations against diverse and evolving enemies, Cartwright became widely recognized for his technical acumen, vision of future national security concepts, and keen ability to integrate systems, organizations, and people in ways that encourage creativity and spark innovation in the areas of strategic deterrence, nuclear proliferation, missile defense, cyber security, and adaptive acquisition processes.
Senior Fellow and Director of the Center, Harold Furchtgott-Roth, will moderate the discussion.
2. The PLA Navy ‘Lobby’ and Its Influence Over China’s ‘National Sovereignty’ Policies, February 13, SAIS
08:30 AM – 05:30 PM
American University Washington College of Law, Room 603
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DCThe revolutions throughout the Middle East and North Africa have captured the world’s attention. As a result, many questions have emerged including whether human rights and international laws have been violated, whether the use of force has been appropriate in certain domestic conflicts, and whether it is likely for similar movements to occur in other regions of the world. Through panel discussions with scholars and practitioners in the field, this symposium will facilitate substantive dialogues that address many of these complex legal and quasi-legal questions. Specifically, symposium participants will discuss how to build the rule of law within this region and the role of the international community in internal state disputes. Additionally, participants will dissect the relevant history and causes of the Arab Spring, and explore the future application of international law norms in light of the on-going civil unrest throughout this region.Presented by the International Law Review PROGRAM AGENDA
Ad Melkert, Joel Rayburn, Marina Ottaway Tuesday, February 14, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
12:15 PM – 2:00 PM EST
5. Is Hamas Changing?
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Foundation to Defend Democracy
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POMED DC Events Calendar
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john.simon@pomed.org
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Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation agreement; Hamas leaders are exiting Syria, and Hamas’ funding from Iran may be drying up. Are these events prompting Hamas to consider a change in strategy? To assess this question, FDD is pleased to host a breakfast conversation on Wednesday, February 15 at 9:30 am with Nathan Brown, Hussein Ibish and Jonathan Schanzer. Breakfast and registration will begin at 9:15 am. If you haven’t already, we encourage you to register here. Please RSVP by February 13 to ensure your spot. If you have other colleagues who might be interested in attending, please feel free to share this invitation. For questions, contact Annie at annie@defenddemocracy.org or 202-250-6144.
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6. Post-Occupation Iraq: The Brittleness of Political Institutions
with
Adeed Dawisha
Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center and
Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Miami University, Ohio
The hope during the American occupation of Iraq was to actively encourage the creation of functioning democratic institutions, so that by the time Iraq attained full sovereignty it would be well on the way toward democratic consolidation. While the democratic structure seems to be in place, its performance leaves much to be desired. Political parties are defined more by ethno-sectarianism than ideology; Parliament is weak; the prime minister exhibits a clear propensity for authoritarianism; and the issue of federalism has been turned into a recipe for the division of the country. Still, politics so far is conducted within the corridors of political institutions. And while violence persists, to date it has not replaced dialogue and discussion as the avenues for settling differences and disputes. Dawisha will discuss how long this delicate balance could persist and whether it could withstand major crises.
The Institute for the Study of War presents
Iraq After the U.S. Withdrawal
ISW cordially invites you to an on-the-record panel discussion on the evolving political crisis in Iraq and its implications for Iraqi stability and U.S. national interests. The departure of all American troops from Iraq in mid-December 2011 removed constraints on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s political behavior, increased his fears of survival, and accelerated his efforts to consolidate power. Sectarian politics is becoming the norm in the Iraqi government, and violence is increasing. Immediately following Maliki’s visit to Washington days before the last troops left, Iraqi Security Forces issued a warrant for the arrest of Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, sparking a political crisis that continues today. This panel will analyze the unfolding political crisis, deteriorating security trends, and prospects for renewed insurgency and civil war in Iraq. The panel will also discuss the ramifications of this crisis for U.S. policy towards Iraq and the Middle East.
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Noon to 2 p.m.
Lobby Conference Center
1400 16th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
A light lunch will be provided.
Please RSVP no later than Tuesday, February 14.
For more information, contact Tricia Miller at
tmiller@understandingwar.org or 202-293-5550 ext. 210.
Panelists:
Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, is an expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf.
Dr. Laith Kubba is the senior director for the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Endowment for Democracy. He was born in Baghdad, Iraq, and served as a government spokesman and senior advisor to Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari in 2005.
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan is the deputy director at ISW, where she supervises the Iraq and Afghanistan Projects. Sullivan also conducts research on Iraqi political dynamics and the security environment in central and southern Iraq.
Moderator:
Dr. Kimberly Kagan, the founder and president of ISW, conducted many regular battlefield circulations of Iraq between May 2007 and April 2010. She participated formally on the Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team for MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq in October 2008 and October 2009 and on the Civilian Advisory Team for the CENTCOM strategic review in January 2009.
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At best a rough transition
Reidar Visser has the details, but what it amounts to is just this: Prime Minister Maliki has outmaneuvred Iraqiyya–the political coalition led by Ayad Allawi that once had the most seats in the Iraqi parliament. Its boycott of parliament has lost it a few seats. Its ministers never really implemented its boycott of the government. Maliki has managed to strengthen his hold on the reins of government, which is increasingly a majoritarian one. Power sharing is evaporating.
The question is whether democracy can survive Maliki’s efforts to protect and enlarge his hold on power. Iraq’s institutions are weak. The courts haven’t dared challenge him. The Supreme Court has been particularly submissive. Those provinces that have wanted to hold referenda on becoming regions have so far been blocked from doing so. Iraqiyya, having joined the governing coalition, is getting few of the benefits promised but cannot play a serious opposition role either. Having gained full control of the security forces, Maliki has been cracking down on the press, on protesters and on prominent members of Iraqiyya, including a vice president of the country and a deputy prime minister, who are hiding out in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is even a crackdown on women’s dress in government offices.
I don’t think there is any doubt but that Maliki’s instincts are not entirely democratic. How could they be? He spent a lifetime protecting his Dawa party from Saddam Hussein’s attempts to wipe them out. He sees conspiracies everywhere he looks. Even paranoids have enemies. It would be surprising if Maliki did not. Knowing Saleh Mutlaq, his hyperbolic deputy prime minister, he gave Maliki ample reason to doubt his loyalty, even if there was likely little substance behind the words. Ambassador Jeffrey should stop claiming that Iraq is still the most democratic country in the Middle East–ignoring Israel, you now have Tunisia and even Libya contesting that position.
But Maliki’s self-protective instincts will not necessarily win the day. Even in Baghdad, it is going to be hard to put the genies of free speech, competitive elections and free association back in Aladdin’s lamp. The key to realizing Iraq’s democratic potential lies in its parliament. It is there that Allawi needs to find a way of playing a more serious game by at least occasionally blocking Maliki from marshalling a majority. This will require more effective wheeling and dealing with the Sadrists and the Kurds than Allawi has managed so far. The budget, amnesty, referenda on new regions–there are lots of opportunities to develop coalitions of the willing that can counter Maliki’s worst instincts, which are not so different from those of many American politicians.
What holds autocratic instincts in check in the U.S. are institutions and political competition. Those are things that need strengthening in Iraq. Maliki is clearly tending to the needs of the army, police and other security forces, with lots of help from Washington. The Americans would do well to focus what remains of their civilian assistance on making sure pluralism and the institutions that protect it are strong enough to weather what is going to be at best a rough transition.
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