Tag: Iraq
How bad could Syria get?
It is hard to be optimistic about Syria. The question is, how bad could it get? The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:
- the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
- the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.
These two factors yield four scenarios:
- Divided sovereignty: Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others. Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas. A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
- The regime wins: Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail. The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
- Protesters win: international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not. The regime loses control of the country and has to yield. Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
- Civil war: Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection. Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines. Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.
1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.
2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid. Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government. The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.
2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns. We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent. But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.
The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4. Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help. If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.
Let there be no doubt: “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities. Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better: “protesters win.” For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Arab world: positive balance, still teetering
I need a scorecard to keep track of political change in the Arab world, so here it is:
- Egypt: New Egyptian parliament led by Muslim Brotherhood met for the first time yesterday. It needs to choose a commission to write the new constitution and call elections for president in June. Other powers are uncertain. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces still running things and holding on to perks and power.
- Yemen: President Saleh has left for the U.S. for medical treatment. I still find it incredible he would come here given the risks of a court deciding to hold him accountable for crimes for which he has immunity in Yemen. A single-candidate “election” February 22 is scheduled to elevate his vice president to the presidency. It is unclear to me what good this will do. Protests continue, his relatives cling to power and dissident parts of the armed forces control parts of the capital.
- Libya: Demonstrators in Benghazi Sunday attacked National Transitional Council offices in a protest over lack of transparency in deciding the electoral law to be used in May elections and in disbursing money. That’s the good news. Occasional strife among the armed militias is the bad news.
- Syria: The Arab League, much criticized because its human rights observers have failed to stop the violence, proposed a serious transition plan, which the Syrian National Council accepted and the Assad regime rejected. The Russians are saying that their patience has run out. A strong UN Security Council resolution would be a fine way to show that they mean what they say.
- Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom is cracking down hard on demonstrations in the majority Shia, oil-producing east.
- Bahrain: Despite the Bassiouni report‘s frankness about human rights abuses during last year’s repression of protests, the monarchy shows no sign of letting up and the Americans, anxious to keep the Fifth Fleet there, aren’t complaining too loudly.
- Morocco, Algeria, Jordan: All attempting various degrees of reform to forestall revolution. Largely succeeding so far. In forestalling that is. Reforms are modest.
So what once looked like a wave of Arab spring protest has now broken into rivulets moving in many different directions as they hit harder and softer obstacles. A few regimes are gone, but most are still holding on, in some cases just barely. Tunisia is the great success story, so far.
There are quite a few shoes that haven’t dropped yet, but likely will: Egypt’s economy is devastated, shoulder launched antiaircraft missiles are circulating in and beyond Libya, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may well expand further in Yemen, sectarian war threatens in Syria. The new regimes, especially in Egypt, look likely to be tougher-minded towards Israel, even if domestic issues predominate in the short term. 2012 is likely to be even more challenging than 2011.
Still: the overall direction is clear enough. There will likely be more freedom of speech and expression in much of the Arab world once this tide goes out. There will also be more Islamists in power and fewer supposedly secular and pro-Western autocrats. There will likely be more political competition, though how long it will be permitted to last is uncertain. It is also unclear how much governance will improve, in particular whether accountability and transparency will triumph over cronyism and corruption, and whether human rights–especially minority rights–will be respected. The balance for the year is positive, but there are still a lot of things to sort out.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The limits of R2P
The Arab League, meeting today in Cairo, got it right: it is not their human rights monitors who have failed, it is the Syrian government that has failed to fully implement its commitments to withdraw from cities, stop the violence and release prisoners. More monitors are needed. Their withdrawal would allow the regime to intensify its crackdown.
Unfortunately the League failed to ask the UN Security Council to weigh in, a potentially important step towards a resolution condemning the regime’s repression of the demonstrations. It will be far more difficult for Russia to block such a resolution if the Arab League calls for it.
Is military intervention in the cards? I don’t think so, and I think it is a mistake for anyone to encourage the demonstrators to think so. One of their signs reportedly called for an alien invasion. Syrians are desperate and don’t understand why there is so much international hesitation.
This is why:
- Russian opposition to anything that might lead to a U.S. or NATO military strike against the Assad regime, which provides Moscow with an important naval base at Latakia.
- Chinese opposition, which likely has more to do with not wanting a precedent for a military strike on Iran, a major oil supplier.
- American interest in cutting back military commitments and nervousness about precipitating a civil war in Syria, where the opposition to the regime is still not strong and united.
- European concerns of the same varieties, especially at a moment of great concern about budget deficits and the stability of the euro.
- Anxiety in the region and elsewhere that military action could have unintended, negative consequences for Turkey, Israel, Iraq and Lebanon.
So, yes, of course we need a Security Council resolution that denounces the violence and calls on the regime to implement fully the Arab League agreement. It would be good if it also called for deployment of UN human rights monitors, either alongside or within the Arab League contingent. But it won’t be backed up with the threat of force.
Some will complain that responsibility to protect (R2P), the UN doctrine under which the NATO led the intervention in Libya, requires military action against the Assad regime. But responsibility to protect is a principle that applies in the first instance to the authorities of the state in which rights are being abused. How quickly, even whether, it leads to outside international intervention depends on the particular circumstances, which are not favorable in the Syrian case.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Righting the civilian/military balance
Someone might imagine that I would be unhappy with the President’s strategic guidance for the Defense Department, released last week. It reiterates many of the U.S. military’s more traditional roles: counter-terrorism and irregular warfare, deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power, countering weapons of mass destruction, maintaining nuclear deterrence. It also re-emphasizes some relatively new areas: outer space and cyber space as well as support to homeland defense. Its implications in many of these areas are unclear, maybe even still undetermined. Certainly who watch the Defense budget more than I do aren’t sure yet.
But it includes a clear and unequivocal step back from stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan (and before in Bosnia and Kosovo), the design and implementation of which preoccupied me for at least 15 years. This is the President’s guidance on stability and counterinsurgency operations:
In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless
be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required,operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
In another section of the document, the guidance also suggests that U.S. forces will be:
...able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a
transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing
forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.
Surprise: I find all of this eminently reasonable, provided the civilian and reserve capacities are built up in a serious way. It is a mistake to use active duty fighting forces in roles that might be carried out at least as effectively by civilians, whether government officials or contractors. Our non-military means are however still lacking. Despite Hillary Clinton’s well-intended Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we are still far from having in the State Department and USAID the capabilities required.
This matters. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability and governance in Afghanistan that allowed the Taliban to regroup and regenerate. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability in Iraq that turned a quick victory into an eight-year nightmare. If ever we need to deal with a post-war or post-revolution Iran or Pakistan (whether the war involves the U.S. as a belligerent or not), or even post-Assad Syria, we will clearly lack adequate civilian capacity, and the military’s reservists won’t suffice either.
So yes, let’s get the military out of the peacebuilding/statebuilding/nationbuilding/postconflict stabilization/reconstruction business as much as possible. Let’s use reservists when possible, as we have for years in Kosovo and Bosnia. As civilians in uniform, they have talents and experience that active duty forces often lack. But let’s not forget that we might still have to do these things, despite the best intention of the Administration to avoid it. If even 10 per cent of what the military saves in following the President’s strategic guidance were to be spent on civilian capacity, it might be enough. But there is no sign of anything like that happening yet.
So yes, I am happy with the strategic guidance, but it has to be backed up with budgetary allocations to the civilian side of our foreign policy apparatus to make it practical. Righting the balance requires not just words but money and people.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Libya on track, but delay may be wise
Geoffrey Curfman reports, from the Carnegie Endowment yesterday:
Ali Tarhouni, former finance and oil minister in the National Transitional Council (NTC) and briefly prime minister, gave an upbeat rendering of current and prospective circumstances in Libya at the Carnegie Endowment yesterday. He was optimistic that widespread turmoil seen in other parts of the Arab world would not afflict Libya, but concerned about whether transition to a democratic regime could be accomplished within the established timeframe.
Though remarkably stable for a grassroots movement lacking fundamental sources of cohesion other than ousting an autocrat, Libya’s revolution still faces challenges. Armed militias are hesitant to relinquish their weapons. Most want to disarm, but are worried others will renege. Foggy prospects for integration into a national army and the benefits that would accrue therefrom only increase their reluctance.
Political prospects are also uncertain. Tarhouni hopes a coalition embracing centrist principles will form. Otherwise, the country could splinter or fall to the Muslim Brotherhood, by Tarhouni’s reckoning the only organized political entity in Libya today. To level the playing field, the NTC has considered allocating funds to emerging civic organizations and political parties. But the question of who receives limited financial resources, a point of contention even in a thriving democracy, is especially controversial given the absence of a legitimate legislature in Libya.
Tarhouni is nevertheless optimistic. Fragmentation along tribal lines is a figment of Western imaginations. Tribal divisions exist, but inter-tribal marriages have blurred many of the lines that may have prevailed in the past. Sectarianism is far less evident in Libya than, say, Iraq or Saudi Arabia. A Sunni by birth, Tarhouni points out that his own name, Ali, is one of the most popular in Libya and is traditionally Shi’a. Islam plays a more moderate role than elsewhere in the Arab world. Individual relations with God are emphasized above interactions between the state and religion. For these reasons, a precipitous decline into civil war, which may occur in Syria, Iraq and even in Egypt, is less likely in Libya.
Libya is a wealthy country. Unlike Egypt, which has been forced to borrow heavily from domestic banks and foreign markets, Libya’s oil revenues can finance the bulk of government services rendered to its small population. Wealth, however, does not guarantee societal prosperity. Resources are still somewhat frozen given the inertia of transitional politics. State domination of the economy under Qaddafi all but eliminated a once vibrant private sector. What remains survived on corruption, now woven into Libya’s cultural fiber.
The NTC has worked to lay the foundation for transparency, which Tarhouni sees as an important prerequisite of free markets in Libya. Laws protecting property rights and requiring the publication of all oil contracts will be crucial. Just as corruption became a cultural phenomenon over time, so too will transparency emerge gradually.
Forming an inclusive coalition is a priority, but who is included and how disparate actors might be brought together is still an open question. This much is clear: in five months, 200 representatives will be elected to draft a constitution, which will then be revised based on recommendations from the NTC. Once the NTC approves a draft supported by an up-or-down vote taken in the drafting body, the constitution will be put to a referendum before being ratified, thereafter providing the framework for future political activity. It is important for this process to occur in a timely manner, since only then can the economic activity required to restore normality in Libya ensue.
But more important than the speed of state formation are the underlying politics. Whether Libya’s new government is sustainable will depend on its legitimacy in the eyes of the people, which itself will be a product of the extent to which society is involved in the formation of the new state. State formation cannot be an exercise restricted to elites and intellectuals, even if they play a strong leadership role. This is especially true given the success Qaddafi enjoyed in driving many elites out of the country during his reign, thereby removing them from day-to-day life in Libya. Elites must interact with society and account for its various preferences, which will take time to develop.
For a country that has been systematically de-politicized over the last forty years, the current timeframe might be too hasty. The unavailability of public funding to stimulate civil society reinforces the need to allow time for an organic process to develop. A democratic government can invite the activities characteristic of democratic politics, such as the formation of civic organizations, special interest groups, and political parties. But this only occurs if societal groups buy into the governmental arrangement in the first place. If not, they’ll work outside the system and undermine it.
What happens in the interim is more important than the amount of time elapsed. In Tunisia, the elected assembly is now drafting a “mini-constitution,” which includes legislation governing institutional procedures that will apply until a permanent constitution is ratified. This “low stakes” effort allows different actors to enter the political fray and influence negotiations without immediately cementing a permanent order.
Political unraveling in Iraq is providing a stark example of the dangers attached to premature political settlements. Libya would be wise not to repeat these mistakes.
RSS - Posts
