Tag: Iraq
You won’t find any of this on Amazon
Hanukkah, an apocryphal festival if there ever was one, starts this evening. In my family, we expected gifts each night. Here’s my wish list:
1. Release of those arrested post-election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. A serious civilian government in Egypt ready to restrain the security forces and fulfill the ideals of the revolution.
3. International Criminal Court indictment of President Saleh of Yemen.
4. Turnover of power in Damascus to the Syrian National Council.
5. A transition in North Korea that opens the door to peaceful reform.
6. An end to military action in the Nuba Mountains and resolution of Sudan’s disputes with the South.
7. Quick and peaceful formation of a new government in Baghdad.
8. Success in negotiations with the Taliban that allows accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops.
If you think this is grand, just wait until you see what I ask for the twelve days of Christmas!
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Is Iraq coming apart?
With the last of the American soldiers leaving, Iraq’s politicians are going after each other. Iraqiyya, the coalition that won the most seats in 2010, is boycotting the parliament, where it is nominally part of the majority. Prime Minister Maliki is targeting Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq and Vice President Tariq al Hashemi, mainstays of the relatively moderate Sunni political forces that have sought to participate in the post-Saddam Hussein democratic framework.
Ironically, Vice President Hashemi recently offered an optimistic view of what might happen after American withdrawal:
There is nothing to worry about because there is no security vacuum in the country. In fact, the internal security situation might improve after the US withdrawal. However the Iraqi armed forces’ insufficient training – in particular, the absence of well trained air and naval forces – will mean that Iraq’s borders are undefended in case of any attack from outside the country.
But he added:
The ground forces alone are not sufficient to protect Iraq’s borders because these forces are busy with internal security-related tasks. And [after the US withdrawal] there may also be internal issues that arise because of different Iraqi ethnicities’ claims to different provinces. So we really need to find political solutions to these problems quickly.
Yes, indeed they do, though at the moment the strongest tensions appear to be sectarian, between Sunni and Shia, rather than ethnic (between Arabs and Kurds). An arrest warrant has supposedly been issued for Hashemi, and his bodyguards are under investigation for a carbombing in Baghad’s green zone apparently intended to kill Maliki, who has asked parliament to withdraw confidence from Mutlaq. Hashemi and Mutlaq flew to Kurdistan today, likely looking for support to bring down Maliki’s government. As Maliki has fulfilled few of the promises he made to get the Kurds to join his coalition government, Hashemi and Mutlaq may well find a friendly reception in Kurdistan. But to put together an alternative governing coalition, they will need to entice one or more of the Shia parties to join. That will not be easy.
Juan Cole is right when he says:
If the country’s vice president really is a terrorist, it is a sad commentary on the state of Iraqi politics. If he isn’t, then al-Maliki is deploying ‘war on terror’ accusations to grab complete power for his coalition of Shiite parties.
The important question is not whether Maliki’s government survives but whether the current quarrels are managed peacefully and in accordance with the constitution. I know all the principals in the most recent quarrels: Maliki, Hashemi and Mutlaq. They are tough and wily, but are they murderers or dictators? I’ve learned from experience to reserve judgment until there is clear evidence one way or the other. It is too early to reach any definitive conclusions.
Is Iraq coming apart? We should not mistake the fall of a government for the dissolution of a state. It is not even clear yet that Maliki will fall. Too early to tell what is really going on.
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Let’s not lose Iraq now
No, Iraq has not been “worth it.” Even a majority of its veterans don’t believe that. President Bush launched the war believing that there were weapons of mass destruction. That in any event was the only argument that really held water. Neither Saddam Hussein’s marginal role in supporting international terrorism nor his gross mistreatment of the Iraqi people would have garnered the broad support that the Bush Administration managed to assemble for the invasion.
The Iraqi toll is huge: more than 100,000 killed seems to be the consensus. The American toll, though much smaller, is deeply felt: almost 4500 killed and more than 33,000 wounded, not counting civilians. In a decade of financial collapse the economic costs, projected to reach trillions, cannot be ignored.
That said, the right thing to do now is to make the best of a bad thing. The Bush Administration put in place both the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that expires at the end of this month and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which will now govern the Iraq/U.S. relationship, including the substantial office of security cooperation that will provide training to the Iraqi army and police. While Republicans are complaining that President Obama did not do whatever was necessary to extend the SOFA and enable a small (10,000?) U.S. contingent to remain in Iraq, they certainly would not be patting him on the back if he had caved to Iraqi demands that American forces give up de facto immunity from prosecution, which is what the current SOFA provides. Both Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki decided it was politically more palatable to allow the SOFA to expire and use the SFA for the future defense relationship.
The SFA is more than adequate for that and broader purposes, if it is implemented energetically. It covers not only defense and security but economy and energy, education and culture, health and environment, information and communications technology, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation. I keep hearing of meetings happening and efforts being made, but so far as I can tell no one has prepared a comprehensive review of what has been accomplished and what is planned under the SFA. That makes me suspicious that it is little more than whatever the stovepiped agencies of the U.S. government happen to want to do in Iraq, rather than the strategic effort its label suggests.
What would be strategic in Iraq today? First and foremost in my view is pipelines. Yes, pipelines. Most Iraqi oil, especially of the cheaply produced kind, is in the south, and for decades Iraq has exported it via the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz, where it runs a gauntlet of Iranian guns. Iraqi exports are now reaching the limit of the existing export capacity and there are plans to expand it. More leverage to Iran.
Far better, or more likely in addition, Iraq should be expanding export capacity to the north. This requires repair of its aptly named “strategic” pipeline, a two-direction pipeline that links oil facilities in the south to those farther north. It would also require construction of a major new pipeline to get oil to Turkey, where it can be sold into European markets more economically than through the Gulf route. Tying Iraq to European oil and eventually gas markets would do more to ensure Baghdad’s future political and diplomatic orientation than dozens of persuasive diplomats. Maybe more than 10,000 American troops would have done.
The SFA also invites the United States to “work with and through the democratically elected government of Iraq” to strengthen democratic institutions. This is important, as it opens the door to assistance to the court system, the parliament, provincial and local governments that are vital counterweights executive power. The SFA also welcomes American diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq’s international and particularly regional role. This is something the Iraqis highly value–they haven’t got a lot of other pals to lend a helping hand–and it would help to preserve American influence in Baghdad.
I won’t attempt a comprehensive review of the SFA here, though it is something I hope someone will undertake, but maybe there is room for one more item: educational and cultural cooperation. Getting more Iraqis to the U.S., especially for educational purposes, would help enormously in the long term to ensure a more modern and Western oriented Iraq. Our current visa regime needs some loosening to allow it to happen. But just as important is getting Americans to Iraq without wearing BDUs (Battle Dress Uniforms). Most Iraqis have had contact with few American civilians–it is high time they saw more of America than military might. Apart from the very real security issues, the Iraqi visa regime, at least in Washington DC, is prohibitive–I know the ambassador and haven’t been able to get a visa for more than a year (most of my dozen or so trips into Iraq have been on Pentagon ID, but that presumably will no longer work after the end of this year).
You don’t have to be a Bush voter to recognize that Iraq is an important country in the Middle East: its geographic position, its long border with Iran, and its vast oil resources (on the order of those in Saudi Arabia) give it real weight in how the region will evolve. It is disturbing that the Senate Committe on Foreign Relations hasn’t held a hearing on it (except for confirmation of new ambassadors) in three years.
The Americans need to do something now that doesn’t come naturally: pursue a mutually respectful relationship with Iraq through civilian means even as its troops complete their withdrawal. Nothing about the giant and expensive embassy convinces me that we are doing it effectively and efficiently. Give me a comprehensive report on the implementation of the SFA–I’m wonk enough to look forward to reading it.
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Is Iraq really open for business?
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki spoke today to a warm welcome at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Iraq, he said, is open for business and it welcomes American companies, which risk losing out if they don’t get more aggressive. So far, so good. I can’t agree with Donald Trump, who thought it remarkable we didn’t take the oil with us as we left, but I am surprised how few American companies (other than the Blackwaters of security protection fame) have pursued Iraqi business.
There was something missing in Maliki’s remarks: he made no promises about a level playing field, about accountability or transparency, about doing business cleanly and on the merits. Instead he underlined that he and his Iraqi government colleagues will be glad to help American companies do business, a promise that skeptics like me view as dubious at best and downright illicit at worst. Call me cynical, but if you have to come to the right people in government to help you do business, there is something wrong with the way government has set up business to be done.
I don’t mean to rain on the Iraqis’ parade. It is good for Maliki, as part of the overall noralization of relations, to court U.S. business and to promise assistance. It is also good for American companies to get busy competing. But in an open and competitive system, assistance should only rarely be needed.
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What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
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What is a normal relationship?
Here’s what the Administration would like you to know about Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s visit next week.
Maliki and President Obama will be marking the end of the more than eight-year American military presence in Iraq and the beginning of a new, more normal relationship between Iraq and the United States. That is how senior officials yesterday framed their version of the visit, which will include a Wednesday event at Fort Bragg to thank the military for its sacrifices. My suggestion that the President add a word of thanks to the civilians who have worked in Iraq was welcomed. The “end of mission” ceremony will take place on Thursday, with the drawdown of the last troops occurring sometime thereafter.
By the end of the year, U.S. troops will be out of Iraq, except for the “normal” but large defense cooperation office headquartered in the Embassy. A total uniformed contingent of 250-400 plus supporting contractors will be stationed at 10 Iraqi bases around the country. The continuing security relationship will include substantial sales of U.S. equipment, to the tune of $11 billion (including F16s). The Iraqis are fully capable of handling internal security. The U.S. focus will be on external security, as well as police “train the trainers.” The war is ending “responsibly.”
The normalization of relations with Iraq will be based on the Strategic Framework Agreement, signed during the the Bush Administration. The Iraqis are enthusiastic about implementing it and have repeatedly pressed the U.S. for a stronger effort. There are now eight bilateral committees at work. The Iraqis want U.S. help in improving governance and restoring their regional role. Iraqis want a strong state that transcends ethnic and sectarian divisions. Americans will continue to advise in their ministries.
Maliki is no Iranian stooge–he left Iran during his exile from Iraq because his Dawa party colleagues were being murdered. Even many of the Shia in the south are none too fond of the Iranians, whose influence is generally overstated. We can and will be helpful to the Iraqis in dealing with the Turks, Kuwait, Bahrain and the Arab League. We failed to line up the Iraqis on Syria in recent months. That mistake will be corrected. The U.S. will still have lots of leverage in Iraq: they need and want us for many reasons.
Iraq is a functioning multiethnic state (the echoes of the Bush Administration were noted with irony) that faces a lot of problems, including the territories disputed between Baghdad and Erbil and failure to implement the agreements on which the current coalition government was based. But the issues are being worked out through politics rather than violence. Maliki is frightened of Ba’athist resurgence and does not always behave like a democrat, but there are countervailing forces in the parliament and elsewhere that restrain his actions. He is no worse than Richard Nixon when it comes to rival political parties, or Franklin Delano Roosevelt when it comes to the constitutional court.
Iraq has tremendous economic potential, due largely to its oil and gas resources as well as its strategic geopolitical location. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is hosting the Prime Minister, and a good deal of emphasis will be put on commercial prospects (and also jobs, jobs, jobs, I imagine). The Iraqis will be vastly increasing their oil export capacity, not only through the strait of Hormuz but also to the north.
The State Department is ready to take over the mission in Iraq. It has developed its capacity for deploying expeditionary diplomats and other needed personnel quickly. The administrative and logistical challenge of supporting the big embassy and 13 other posts (10 defense cooperation and 3 consulates) has been significant, but the problems have been solved.
So what did I think of all this?
There is a good deal of wishful thinking involved, especially when it comes to the capacity of the Iraqis and the U.S. embassy to fill the vacuum the military withdrawal will leave behind. The State Department has repeatedly failed on police training; it would be refreshing if it succeeded this time around. It would also be surprising if there were not other hiccups, or worse. Both Maliki and Obama are running risks.
But I don’t think we are making a mistake to withdraw completely: it is what democratic politics and shifting priorities in both Washington and Baghdad demanded. Americans are having trouble with the idea of continuing the effort in Afghanistan. Iraq is long forgotten. I also think it is important to get U.S. troops out of harm’s way before we deal with Iran, a challenge that is now coming on fast. No military option with Iran has much credibility if American troops are vulnerable to Iranian proxies in Iraq. I trust the new configuration, which includes 14 sites at which Americans will be present in numbers, will be far more defensible than the hundreds (even thousands at one time) that used to exist.
I also worry about Iraqi democracy, such as it is (which is admittedly more than in much of the region). The counterweights to Maliki are still weak institutions. The courts and provincial governments are particularly feeble. His paranoia could well evolve in harmful directions. If it does, the Americans will need to be ready to coax him back to a less self-destructive path. Sunnis and Kurds should not be expected to accept a new autocracy.
The problem with the Iranians is not so much their clout in Baghdad. It is their more pervasive influence at the local level, especially in the south but also in Kurdistan. The GCC reluctance to engage seriously with post-war Iraq is allowing this pervasive influence to grow. Despite repeated Administration assertions that the Arabs are beginning to engage with Maliki, there is precious little sign of it. Getting Iraq on side about Syria is crucial, not only because it will discomfort Bashar al Assad but also because it will help heal Maliki’s relationship with Arab League states and put Tehran on its back foot.
Naturally nothing was said in this unclassified briefing about continuing intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation. I assume there is a classified side to this “normal” relationship, one that will give the United States ample access to both information and opportunities, if they arise, to attack Al Qaeda and other terrorists. Normal means different things to different people, but to Maliki it would certainly include our providing information that would help him protect the Iraqi state and his providing opportunities for the United States to do in its enemies if the Iraqis don’t want to do it themselves.
PS: I should have included in this post a word about Arab/Kurdish tensions, which are not so much between Arabs and Kurds as between high officials in Baghdad and Erbil. The Kurdistan Region has good reason to be disappointed with the failure to implement many of the items it thought Maliki had accepted as conditions for forming his government. Baghdad has good reason to be upset that Kurdistan has signed an oil production-sharing agreement with Exxon, one that includes resources that appear to lie in disputed areas. But these very real sources of irritation are not manifesting themselves in military confrontation so far as I can tell. That is a really good thing. But can it last?
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