Tag: Iraq
The places we’d like to forget
Busy morning: conversations with people who know the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo really well. What’s the common denominator? Ethnic strife, which makes everything so much harder. Each of my interlocutors (that’s people you talk with in diplomatese) has his/her own agenda and views. Here are my conclusions:
1. Iraq:
Not going badly. Much more Sunni ethnic nationalism than in the past, with Sunnis and Kurds getting on better as the Sunnis start thinking about wanting one or more regions of their own. Maaliki managing to maintain the fragmentation and shifting alliances that keep him in power, even as he continues to gain greater control over the army. Arrests of Ba’athists and Exxon contract with the Kurds are not causing giant problems: Iraqiyya is staying in the government and the Exxon move brings pressure on Baghdad to pass the oil law. Both sides reasonably content with the American withdrawal, looking forward to stronger implementation of the Strategic Framework Agreement that will now govern the bilateral relationship. Not clear however whether they see implementation of that agreement in the same way.
2. Afghanistan:
Not going well. Governance is the main issue. This is well-recognized among the Americans, who regard the 2014 presidential succession, strengthening of independent institutions, and improvement of national and provincial planning and budgeting as the governance priorities. But there is not a lot of sign of progress, despite substantial effort. Governance is difficult. President Karzai’s way of governing is not one we can ever much like, as it involves behaviors that we regard as corrupt, but creating an alternative requires a degree of commitment and sophistication that the now declining American presence is not likely to display.
3. Bosnia:
No prospect of forming a “state” government (that’s what they call the central government), ten months after elections. Meanwhile the Federation half (51%) of Bosnia, led by engineer turned Social Democrat Zlatko Lagumdžija, is competing with Republika Srpska (49%), led by social democrat turned ethnic nationalist Milorad Dodik, for both improved governance and political clout. RS is thought to be running out of money and is borrowing at high rates. Federation has recently borrowed at lower rates. RS is trying hard to negotiate pre-accession funding and other matters directly with the European Commission, which is inclined to accommodate. The Federation is intervening to prevent this, in order to preserve the prerogatives of the state government and block RS from weakening it further.
4. Kosovo:
No clear solution has emerged yet to the problems of the north, where Serbia still controls the territory. There is hope NATO and EULEX will resolve the issue of collection of taxes at the border posts, seized by Pristina last summer, but governance in the north is a bigger problem and can only be solved with Belgrade’s cooperation, which has not been forthcoming. It is not clear what the Europeans will insist on as the price for a positive decision on EU candidacy, due December 9, even though Merkel was clear enough on the need to eliminate the Serbian “parallel structures.” Meanwhile Pristina is weighing constitutional amendments, which may provide for popular election of the president (rather than election in parliament). But then they might have to augment the functions of the president as well.
All in all, not such a bad picture, if you consider the very real difficulties of post-war state building, which is a decades-long process. Afghanistan is the greatest of the concerns–it is just very difficult to picture how the situation there comes out well enough for U.S. troops to be able to stay on after 2014, an idea Karzai has been trying to sell to this week’s loya jirga. And even more difficult to picture how we would leave Afghanistan if things do not straighten out.
The game is changing, but to what?
More than a little difficult to sum up today’s Middle East Institute “game changer” conference in a few words, but here’s a try:
1. Enthusiasm for Arab spring, with lots of uncertainty about both transition and how it will come out in the end. It is still the first five minutes. Economic problems loom.
2. Tunisia could be a hopeful bellwether: good electoral process, moderate Islamist victory, clear roadmap.
3. Libya shaky, with militias the big immediate problem but the constitutional framework provides a clear roadmap ahead, if they can stick with it.
4. But Egypt is the big prize. Things there are not going well: security shaky, military holding on, electoral process too complicated, liberals fragmented, Muslim Brotherhood strong, economy weak.
5. Revolution likely to succeed sooner or later in Syria, but possible high cost (civil war) and high payoff (depriving Iran of an important ally). Arab League moves do make a difference.
6. Also like to succeed in Bahrain and Yemen, but cost may also be high there.
7. Little hope to revive the Israel/Palestine peace process before the U.S. presidential elections, though Dan Kurtzer argued strongly for a bold U.S. initiative to define parameters.
8. Iran is gaining in Iraq and Afghanistan, but losing in Syria and the Arab world generally, as Turkey and smaller Arab monarchies gain but Saudis do not.
9. Israel, facing many uncertainties, hopes for preservation of the status quo but navigates when need be.
10. Lots of change, but overall outcome not yet clear.
These are obviously only my impressionistic highlights. I’ll be glad if others chime in.
Context matters, and so does U.S. support
I gave a talk yesterday at West Virginia University’s Law School on U.S. policy towards democracy-seeking rebellions. The star attraction at the conference was Erica Chenoweth, co-author of Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. Some of you will have seen my tweets summarizing her talk, which I won’t try to reproduce here. Suffice it to say that she provides hard statistical evidence that nonviolent civil resistance really does work, even against the most repressive regimes, and she gives a coherent rationale for why. She also notes that foreign monetary assistance does not appear to work well.
I was asked to address the U.S. policy response, in particular to the Arab Spring. Here are my speaking notes, which of course do not represent exactly what I said:
West Virginia University
November 10, 2011
1. While I am an admirer of Dr. Chenoweth’s quantitative methodology, I am going to rely today on the much less impressive techniques of the historian and diplomat: stories, I would call them, rather than “cases.”
2. Arab spring is far from over yet, but I’ll try to focus on the transition phase: that is, the phase after a regime falls and before a new one has yet emerged.
3. I am thoroughly convinced of the efficacy of what Dr. Chenoweth calls civic resistance in the earlier phase.
4. But things get much more complicated when that resistance has to turn into something more constructive.
5. There are three cases already in the transition phase, more or less: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Each is quite different.
6. In Tunisia, the autocrat left the scene quickly and the regime was pushed aside fairly easily. First elections have already been held and there is a clear roadmap ahead. A classic, fairly smooth case, with no sign of counter-revolution on the horizon. Good chance of consolidating a democratic regime.
7. In Egypt, the autocrat also left pretty quickly, but the regime was not pushed aside easily and the protesters called on the army to manage the transition. It is doing so, but in a way that consolidates its control over some aspects of governance (security, foreign policy) and a big piece of the economy. I’d say much less likelihood of success in the transition. Might be rather like Serbia, where a similar deal was made with the security forces and the transition has been slow and halting as a result.
8. In Libya, there was a violent revolution that has the advantage of having swept the old regime away completely, with foreign help. There has been good leadership, decent planning and ample resources. I give the Libyans a decent chance at success in consolidating a democracy, albeit less probability than Tunisia.
9. What of Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, all of which are still in progress?
10. Yemen has turned violent, even if the protesters themselves have stuck with nonviolence. The odds of successful transition to democracy seem to be small, because the opposition to Saleh most likely to take power is the violent one, which is no more inclined to democracy than he is.
11. Syria could be headed in the same direction, though there is still some hope of keeping it on a nonviolent course. That’s vital for success. Violence will lead to sectarian and ethnic breakdown (similar to Iraq) that will be difficult to overcome.
12. Bahrain is an odd case. The protesters have been nonviolent, but the crackdown was effective, unlike Syria and Yemen. A lot depends on the Bassiouni commission report: will it revive nonviolent resistance, or will the regime be able to keep the lid on?
13. What of the other monarchies: Morocco and Jordan? Saudi Arabia and Oman?
14. These four, each in its own way, is attempting to preempt resistance with reform, albeit minimal reform in the case of Riyadh. So far, they are largely succeeding.
15. I do think the monarchies have some advantage in this respect: not because they are somehow nicer, but because their legitimacy is understood not to derive from elections but rather from heredity.
16. It is much harder for a republic to claim that there is no need to change who is in power in order to reform the system.
17. But that does not mean the monarchies will succeed forever. The fact that all Saudi Arabia experts agree that it can’t happen there, that the succession is ensured, is a clear earlier indicator that it may well happen there.
18. If I were advising the Saudis and the other monarchies, I would suggest they get ahead of the curve and stay ahead, by taking truly meaningful steps to redistribute power and ensure that their security services are shifting from protecting the rulers to protecting the ruled.
19. If there is one mistake common to all the Arab Spring successes so far—and also to those places where rebellion is still in progress—it is the use of regime violence against the population.
20. These guys need to learn that legitimacy comes from the people, who will be much more inclined to confer it on those who protect them than on those who attack them.
21. We should also be thinking about how we can encourage security sector reform in advance of rebellion and revolution—it would be far cheaper and more effective than doing it after the fact.
22. America should certainly be supporting those who demonstrate nonviolently for their rights, but I confess to doubts that it should be done through embassies.
23. Robert Ford, our ambassador in Syria who has bravely gone to “observe” demonstrations, is the exception that proves the rule.
24. The rule is that embassies need to stay on good terms with the host government, even if it is an autocracy. They cannot be implicated in support to revolutionaries.
25. Assistance to democracy and human rights advocates should flow not through embassies but through nongovernmental organizations, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute as well as non-American counterparts.
26. The more these can be made distinct from our official representation, the better.
27. America is condemned to spreading democracy. If you really believe that all people are created equal, you have no choice but to sympathize with those who claim their rights. But the specific modalities for when and how to do it depend a great deal on context.
PS: In answer to a question, I said yes it can happen in Iran, but American efforts to support it there are problematic because of our fraught relationship with Tehran, which includes both concern about nuclear weapons and attempts to foment ethnic strife inside Iran. In the end, I think Obama got the reaction to the Green Movement about right in the end: rhetorical support without repainting it red, white and blue.


Best freebie next week
Game Changer: Policy and Politics
For a New Middle East
The Grand Hyatt Hotel
1000 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Thursday, November 17, 2011
8:45am-5:30pm
Conference Schedule
8:45am-9:00am – Opening remarks
Ambassador (ret.) Wendy Chamberlin, Middle East Institute President
9:00am-10:30am – After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy in the Middle East
Steve Clemons, New America Foundation, The Atlantic
Ambassador (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Princeton University
Ambassador (ret.) Ron Schlicher, Former US Department of State
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Deputy Assist. Secretary of State-NEA
10:45am-12:15pm – The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
Esraa Abdel Fattah, Egyptian Democratic Academy
Michele Dunne, Atlantic Council
Larry Diamond, Stanford University
Radwan Masmoudi, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
2:15pm-3:45 pm – Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
Abdelkhaleq Abdalla, UAE University
Jamal Khashoggi, Al-Arab TV
Haim Malka, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mohsen Milani, South Florida University
Paul Salem, Carnegie Middle East Center
4:00pm-5:30pm- Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
Adel Abdellatif, UN Development Programme
Odeh Aburdene, OAI Advisors
Iman Bibars, Ashoka/MENA
Ambassador William B. Taylor, US Department of State
Game changer
Politics and Policy in the New Middle East: that’s what they are calling the Middle East Institute 2011 Annual Conference at the Grand Hyatt, 1000 H Street:
Wednesday, Nov. 16th
6:00pm: Kickoff Banquet: Keynote by Bill Burns, DepSecState; awardees Lakhdar Brahimi and Esraa Abdel Fattah
Thursday, Nov. 17th
Conference
8:45 – 9:00am: Opening Remarks: Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, President MEI
9:00-10:30am: After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy In the Middle East
10:45am-12:15pm: The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
12:30-2:10pm: Keynote Luncheon: Samih al-Abed and Yossi Beilin
2:15-3:45pm: Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
4:00-5:30pm: Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
Arresting developments
Ali Hawar, a friendly Kurdish journalist for Al Rudaw weekly published in Erbil, writes:
A few Days ago Iraqi security forces cracked down on former members of the former ruling Baath party. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki defended the crack down and there are rumors that those who were arrested were planing for military coup….
I answered his questions:
1- Do you think a military coup can happen in Iraq?
DPS: I imagine a military coup could happen in Iraq, but I personally have no reason to believe that one was being planned. If the government has evidence against the people it has arrested, I hope it will be presented soon in public.
2- What does this latest event tell you about the future of Iraq, especially now that the US will defiantly leave at the end of the year?
DPS: It tells me Iraqis had better learn how to sort out their problems by peaceful means without the Americans around. Some of the people who were most critical of the American presence in the past are now hoping the Americans will rescue them from what they claim is abuse of power by the Prime Minister. I might even sympathize with their complaint, but they should have worried a bit more about the American withdrawal they so stridently demanded. The Americans aren’t being defiant–they are doing what the government in Baghdad has asked them to do.
I imagine the Americans will ask a lot of questions about these arrests, and depending on the answers they may register some objections, but they cannot do a whole lot more than that. The problems emerging now have to be settled among Iraqis.
3- Do you believe this is another scenario from Maliki, so he can show his political power toward his rivals?
DPS: I don’t really doubt that Maliki fears a coup attempt. What I don’t know is if he has real reason to fear it.
He has also unquestionably been trying to consolidate his hold on power. It is up to other political forces in the society to use the means provided by the constitution to respond if they think he is going too far. The provision in the constitution for formation of regions is one possible route for those who don’t appreciate Baghdad’s behavior. But the constitutional procedure for a referendum has to be followed.
The main thing is that Iraq stick with the rule of law. I could be arrested in the U.S., too, maybe wrongfully. I would have to hire a lawyer and defend myself. The trouble in Iraq is that the courts are not sufficiently independent to guarantee a fair trial. A bit more focus on problems like that, and less on who holds what position in which council, would be a good idea.