Tag: Iraq
Farewell Iraq, more or less
The Americans are reported to be abandoning plans to leave troops in Iraq after the end of the year, with the exception of the Embassy’s usual (and in this case large, more than 150) complement for “defense cooperation” and occasional training missions.
Why do I not quite believe this? First, because training missions can last a long time. Second because no one is talking about the substantial numbers of contractors who will need to be in Iraq to support military sales (like the F16s). And third because a lot of the counter-terrorism cooperation with Iraq is presumably done by the CIA, which doesn’t put out press releases about it.
Still, it is a major development that Iraq will be without overt foreign fighting forces on its territory for the first time in more than eight years.
Is it a good thing? There are people in Washington concerned that this more or less complete withdrawal will open the door to greater Iranian influence. And there are Iraqis–many in Kurdistan but also some in Anbar, Ninewa and elsewhere–who think it would have been a good thing for the Americans to stay. Kurds, Christians and many Sunnis see the American presence as protection.
But this “decision,” if we can call a failed negotiation a decision, is positive in other ways. It was taken on the Iraqi side under popular pressure–Prime Minister Maliki is reported to have thought he couldn’t get approval to extend an American presence through the parliament. I’d call that kind of decisionmaking democratic, which is not a word many people are using today to describe Maliki’s Iraq. Without American troops, the Iraqis will have to bear the full brunt of the responsibility for keeping the country stable, including by confronting the Iranians if they overstep. No more Uncle Sam will take care of it for you.
Will the Iraqis be up to the challenge? I don’t pretend to know, but they are certainly more capable than at any time in the past eight years. Bad things still happen in Iraq, on a more or less daily basis. But security has improved, oil production is up, services are marginally better and people are worried about corruption, which is one of my personal indicators that the worst of the physical violence is coming to an end.
What is not clear is how long they’ll keep the more or less democratic system of governance we bequeathed them. Maliki shows signs of grabbing for power by appointing army commanders loyal to him personally, ignoring the parliament, pressuring the constitutional court and stiff-arming both his coalition partners and the opposition. His ungenerous reaction to Iraqi protesters calling for better services and more democracy, as well as his support for Bashar al Assad, have raised a lot of eyebrows.
Iraqis should bear the responsibility for ensuring that the democratic system prevails. Keeping it propped up with American troops was helping Maliki consolidate his position, and seemed to provide precious little leverage over his decisions. I find it hard to believe that either Kurds or Sunnis will accept a Shia autocracy, and there are lots of Shia who will object as well. Iran will not find Iraqis any easier to push around than the Americans did. Maybe it is time to take off the training wheels altogether and hope for the best. We’ve got a lot of other things to worry about.
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Rashomon beyond borders
I finished jury duty yesterday, acquitting a guy who was observed by an undercover policeman conducting a drug transaction. The twelve jurors reached agreement in less than an hour.
I went home the night before convinced after hearing the prosecution’s case that we would convict the guy. The policeman said he had seen the accused transfer $25 worth of cocaine and PCP to another person in broad daylight on a Washington, DC street corner.
Yesterday, the defense put the accused on the stand, where he said he was an addict trying to buy, not sell, when he realized the transaction was being observed. He therefore aborted the transaction, asked for and received his money back without receiving the drugs, which were found in a search of the other guy.
None of the jurors was sure this defense account of events was true, and for all I know it is a standard ploy to claim to have been buying when you are accused of “distribution,” which the judge explained requires transfer to another person (not necessarily for payment). But there was no compelling evidence the story was false. Had the policeman seen the tiny packets (“zips”) of drugs transferred? Not really, but he claimed that he saw the second man pick something unidentified out of the accused’s cupped hand.
So here you have two different versions of the same events, with the rules heavily weighted in favor of the defense: the government was obligated to prove the distribution of illegal drugs “beyond a reasonable doubt.” None of us on the jury thought that standard had been met.
It struck me as we proceeded through the careful choreography of a DC courtroom how really very difficult it is to administer justice this way. Jurors randomized, judge impeccable in explaining the law and protecting the integrity of the process but not commenting in any way on the truth or falsity of the allegation, machine to make consultations at the bench inaudible, jurors disciplined about not discussing the case outside the jury room, prosecutor and defense attorney clearly well-educated and experienced.
It is not an exaggeration to say that it is a privilege to have your crimes judged in this fashion, though the drug-addict accused is unlikely to have been grateful. His court-appointed attorney told me after the trial he did not think the guy would take advantage of the big break the jury had given him.
All this for a $25 offense? I still don’t know why the government bothered to prosecute this case, but I imagine they were convinced he was a much bigger fish than he appeared in court.
Which raises the much more important question of how and why Troy Davis was convicted in Georgia when there was no physical evidence and most of the witnesses changed their stories after the conviction, several claiming the police had pressured them to testify as they did. I can’t say Troy Davis was innocent, but was he guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt”?
The world was watching the Troy Davis case. Were I still a U.S. diplomat, I would find it hard to explain the execution of someone about whom there was even a sliver of reasonable doubt. The issue for me is not so much the moral one, which should be more important to those who believe government is an inefficient and ineffective mechanism to do just about anything and therefore inherently untrustworthy. The issue for me is doing something irreversible (and, by the way, frighteningly expensive, as capital cases chew up a lot of resources) when there is no physical evidence. Eye witnesses are notoriously unreliable.
The United States makes a lot of effort these days to promote “rule of law” abroad–it has been a major part of our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ours is such an expensive and difficult system to administer that it gives me pause to ask poorer and less well educated countries to imitate it. But the execution of Troy Davis gives me even greater pause, even if both Iraq and Afghanistan are devotees of capital punishment. Can they really be expected to do any better than we do in eliminating the possibility of executing someone who is innocent? What is the example we are setting?
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The long diplomatic game in Syria
It is past time to take a look at the possibility that the protests in Syria will not bring down Bashar al Assad any time soon. While some of the opposition appears in frustration to be calling for violence on the part of the demonstrators, my inner voice tells me that would be a big mistake. Bashar has the advantage in use of force, and he has demonstrated willingness to use it.
There is no real possibility of external military action in support of a violent Syrian rebellion, which is what made the difference in Libya. The Arab League is far from advocating a UN Security Council resolution authorizing force. The Russians, who enjoy the use of the Syrian port at Latakia, would block it anyway–they haven’t even allowed a resolution condemning regime violence.
If the protesters take up arms, they will elicit a response in kind and drive the violence in Syria in the ethno-sectarian direction, which is precisely what Europe and the United States fear the most. Even Iran will agree: a Sunni-defined uprising against the Allawi regime would be particularly unwelcome in Tehran.
So the question becomes this: how can the protesters sustain their nonviolent efforts over the longer term, defined as months or even a year or two? Only if they are clearly able and willing to do so will Bashar yield. If he thinks he can outlast the demonstrators, why would he give in?
First, the international community needs to warn the protesters that there is no real alternative. There will be no external military action. Not even a “no fly zone,” which has become code for the kind of aggressive air campaign NATO conducted in Libya. Syria is not Libya. Damascus has strong backing from Tehran and Moscow. Ankara has talked tough but has not backed it up with action. Ditto the Arab countries, several of which have withdrawn their ambassadors but done little else.
Second, the international community needs to reward and encourage those among the protesters prepared to keep to nonviolence and maintain unity of purpose. Monday’s formation of the Syrian National Council (SNC), an analogue to the Transitional National Council that has become the post-Qaddafi governing structure in Libya, is a good development. It will need wholehearted moral and financial support from Europe and the United States, though at this stage formal recognition would be premature.
The SNC, led by a diaspora professor, will necessarily be an outside Syria affair for the most part, unless the protesters can somehow carve out some liberated space inside the country. They have tried to liberate particular cities several times, only to see the regime security forces eventually surround and retake them.
An alternative approach is to use cyberspace, as the Libyans also did, to publish their intentions and plans for post-Bashar Syria. This could include a constitutional charter or framework that projects the kind of Syria they would institute, including a roadmap for preparation of a new constitution as well as local and national elections. This would give the international community something to respond to and provide a blue print for future preparations and eventual implementation.
Third, the SNC will need to encourage defections from the military and business communities. This can be done by making it clear, as the Libyans have done, that contracts will be maintained, revenge avoided and continuity valued once Bashar is gone. There is time enough in the aftermath of a revolution to vet and re-vet government officials, military officers and crony businessmen. It need not be done immediately, or used as a threat against the regime. The trick is to get regime elements, especially the security forces, to turn on Bashar, which they will do if they believe it will help protect them after the regime falls.
Fourth, while the SNC figures out how to convey the impression of knowing what to do if Bashar steps down, the international community needs to give him a stronger shove in the right direction. Europe has still not blocked imports of oil and oil products from Syria. Over time, that would deprive the regime of at least some revenue (assuming Damascus sells the oil at a discount elsewhere) and signal to businesspeople that the European Union is serious about getting him to step aside. Secretary of State Clinton needs to spend some quality time beating up the Europeans on this subject when she sees them Thursday at the Libya contact group meeting in Paris.
Getting the Russians on board for a Security Council resolution, even a relatively weak one, would also be useful. At some point, Russia needs to begin worrying about making sure that any new regime is not going to throw its fleet out of Latakia. The SNC might start raising questions about the Russian presence there and suggesting that it could be sustained, but only if Moscow goes along with a resolution taking the regime to task for its treatment of the protesters.
What else can be done? It is better in my view to maintain the U.S. ambassador in Damascus rather than withdraw him. But he needs to continue his visits to demonstrators and do what he can in other ways to provide encouragement and succor. Also on the diplomatic front: we should of course be consulting constantly with Turkey and Lebanon, encouraging these frontline states to confront the regime as best they can. Turkey in particular could wield a bit more clout than has so far been apparent with Syria’s business elite.
Jordan has already spoken up against the Syrian regime, but Iraq Prime Minister Maliki has preferred to toe the Iranian line and suggest that the Arab spring can benefit no one except Israel. Apart from the patent inaccuracy of that allegation, Maliki’s attachment to Bashar, who spent years shipping terrorists into Iraq, is passing strange. Our man in Baghdad has presumably objected appropriately, but we need to do a bit more to ensure that Maliki is not actually helping Bashar, presumably on the theory that the enemy of my enemy (Saudi Arabia detests Maliki) is my friend.
Fifth, more unanimity against Bashar in the Arab League might help a good deal. The Secretary General of that august but ineffectual organization was supposed to visit Damascus earlier this week to plead for an end to violence and more reform, but the Syrians rejected his not too vigorous plan before he even arrived. Not clear to me whether he was able to make the trip. Iraq is not the only problem–Algeria is also Qaddafi-sympathetic and welcomed members of his family yesterday.
The Syrian regime will find it difficult to resist unanimity in the international community, if it can be achieved. When even Iran and Hizbollah are distancing themselves, you know you are in trouble. One of Qaddafi’s serious mistakes was to alienate Arab governments, two of which even joined in the NATO military action against him. But it will not be easy to get everyone aligned in the right direction. The diplomats have a big job to do.
PS: For a pessimistic view of the Syrian opposition, see Kinda Kanbar’s piece at Middle East Progress.
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The rap, good and bad, from Iraq
The several dozen attacks across Iraq today that killed at least 68 people raise many questions: is al Qaeda in Iraq reviving? can the government handle the violence as the Americans withdraw? is the failure of Prime Minister Maliki to name Interior and Defense Ministers a contributing factor? what can be done to prevent future attacks of this sort? should the Americans consider slowing their withdrawal?
It is too early for answers to most of these questions, though personally I doubt there is any reason to slow American withdrawal. Responsibility for preventing this kind of attack clearly lies with the Iraqis. There is no way that slowing the withdrawal will help in preventing them. It is even arguable that doing so would stimulate more, and encourage targeting of the Americans, who were not targeted today.
I am not as exercised about this as those who rail against slowing the withdrawal, largely because I do think that the United States has continuing national security interests in Iraq that need protection. That means we need to keep our commitment to helping Iraq acquire the means to defend itself. The gigantic American investment in Iraq over eight years should not be written off as a total loss. But it is no longer an American responsibility to protect Iraq and its citizens from its internal enemies.
That is Prime Minister Maliki’s responsibility, in particular because he has dragged his feet in naming the Defense and Interior Ministers, in an apparent effort to enhance his own control over the country’s security forces. With that control comes accountability. In a more established parliamentary system, attacks like those that occurred today would lead to the prime minister’s resignation. At the very least, he should recognize that naming new ministers would give him someone to hold responsible when things don’t go well.
The fundamental problem is that Maliki does not trust his own institutions and believes his personal authority is the only trustworthy authority. That’s a bad rap. He underestimates Iraq’s institutions and leans in authoritarian directions. It is time for Maliki to share power more effectively with his coalition partners, enlisting their considerable talents in an effort that requires the broadest possible political consensus.
While you hold your breath for that to happen, here’s a good rap out of Iraq, from before today’s terrible events:
Past the twelfth hour
So Iraq has finally, in the 11th hour (actually the 12th, since it happened after midnight Baghdad time) told the Americans it is willing to talk about a continuing American troop presence past the end of 2011, mainly to train the Iraqi air force and navy. According to the LA Times, Prime Minister Maliki and his archrival (and coalition partner) Iyad Allawi used the occasion to hash out an agreement on how nominees to the still unfilled positions of Defense and Interior Minister will be handled.
The agreement to talk is important, but there are still necessarily a lot of unanswered questions. Will the Americans have any combat or counter-terrorism role? Will they continue to play a role in the confidence building measures (CBMs) between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish peshmerga? Will they be permitted to defend themselves? Will they be held accountable if they kill or injure someone unjustifiably in an Iraqi court or in an American one? Who will pay for this training mission, the hard-strapped United States or the Iraqis, who have been collecting close $100 per barrel for oil?
The Sadrists appear to have objected but not so strongly as to prevent the negotiations from starting. They lack the votes in parliament to stop the move on their own, but they could certainly make life difficult for Prime Minister Maliki. I wonder what he promised in exchange for their quiescence. Or have the Sadrists come to realize that an American presence in Iraq as a counterweight to Iran is not such a bad thing even from their perspective?
If we can presume for the moment that these talks will in fact lead to 10,000 American troops remaining in Iraq, is that a good thing, or not? In my book it is. It will help to ensure a united Iraq that can defend and maintain itself in a rough neighborhood, and give the Americans an opportunity to engage constructively with its armed forces, which are bound to remain a key institution there. A more or less democratic Iraq that aligns itself with the U.S. and Europe on issues like Iran’s nuclear program or democractic transition in Syria would not pay back all the effort we have made and the losses we have suffered there, but it would be a positive mark in a foreign policy ledger that has not accumulated many in recent years.
I know Americans are tired of Iraq, but it remains an important piece of the Middle East jigsaw. As I’ve noted previously, a large military training program is only one dimension of American relations with the new Iraq. Also important is the direction of its oil and gas pipelines, which could literally tie Iraq more closely to Europe by flowing north and east. I can do no better than quote myself on this subject:
In my view, another important contribution to Iraq’s future international alignment could come from its capability to export oil other than by loading it on ships and moving it through the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz. The Gulf export facilities are already a bottleneck, not to mention the risk that conflict there could disrupt Iraq’s exports.
But Iraq is geographically advantaged. It can export oil (and gas) to the north and west, reaching European markets more directly and cheaply than through the Gulf. My understanding is that even Iraq’s southern oil fields can export more economically to the north and west, provided the “strategic pipeline” that once linked them to northern Iraq is repaired and enlarged.
If the Americans really want an Iraq that will see its interests more aligned with the West, oil and gas pipelines to the north and west are likely to be at least as important as F-16′s and American troops in the long run. There is no time like the present to get busy making the long run happen.
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Have we got the Arab Spring right?
The Middle East Institute, which kindly lists me among its “scholars,” asked me to address the question of whether President Obama has established the right policy in his May 19 speech in his May 19 speech for reform and democracy in the Middle East and whether implmentation is adequate. This MEI meeting was part of a broader effort to look at the implications of the Arab Spring. Here are the notes I used yesterday to respond, slightly embellished with hindsight (see especially note 19).
Reform and Democracy
Middle East Institute
July 29, 2011
1. President Obama was clear enough in May: he said, “it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.”
2. And he added: “our support must also extend to nations where transitions have yet to take place.”
3. Nor was there any doubt what “reform” means: “The United States supports a set of universal rights…[including] free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders.”
4. This he made clear is on top of our “core” interests in the region: “countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel’s security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.”
5. So is the Administration living up to its own rhetoric? Is the policy framework right? Is the bureaucratic response adequate?
6. My view is that basically the policy framework is correct. As someone whose foreign service career was spent mainly in Europe, I in fact am a bit surprised that this was not the policy framework all along.
7. Values and interests have always been pursued in tandem in Europe, though not always without conflict and tradeoffs. I served 10 years in Italy, where we often compromised our values in favor of our interest in keeping the Communist Party out of power.
8. Of course there is more conflict between values and interests in the Middle East, especially when it comes to countries that have not yet seen much of the Arab Spring: the GCC countries in particular.
9. I see no sign that we’ve really adjusted our bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates to this policy framework.
10. Nor do I see signs that Saudi Arabia has embraced reform: this week’s Economist reports on efforts there to restrict new media by “inciting divisions between citizens”, “damaging the country’s public affairs”, or insulting senior clerics. The Shura Council is considering a draft anti-terrorism law that would criminalize “endangering national unity” and “harming the interests of the state,” imposing harsh penalties. Our embassy won’t be encouraged to reform by the fact that this proposal originates with Prince Nayef; repression can’t be more of a problem for us than for the Saudis.
11. As for other countries, I would hesitate to make the judgment on my own.
12. In Tunisia, we seem to be doing the right things. But the Project on Middle East Democracy/Boell Foundation report suggests effectiveness is spotty in a lot of other places:
- Aid is restricted by US policy concerns (Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, fifth fleet in Bahrain)
- Host government concerns (Yemen, Egypt)
- US aid is a declining percentage of the whole (Egypt $17B from Gulf)
- Indifference (Morocco)
- Violence (Yemen and Libya)
- Excessive focus on government bodies and not enough on real democratic development
14. I think part of the problem is the bureaucratic structure, which is not only fragmented but also too much under State Department and chief of mission control.
15. If you are going to get serious about supporting reform, especially in coutries where interests militate in the other direction, you are going to have to break the strait jackets diplomats put on you. I am not a fan of interagency mechanisms when it comes to democracy support.
16. We are going to see a whole lot more support for reform the more independent the sources of funding are—ask anyone (except George, who was disappointed in the results) whether Soros was effective in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
17. I would rate NED and its family of organizations as a preferable conduit for democracy assistance (relative to State or USAID), at least until the revolution has actually occurred. And yes, Fulbrights should be regarded as part of our democracy and reform support efforts.
18. In the end, though, the most important instrument for influencing the course of events in some countries will not be our democratization support efforts, but the U.S. military, whose training and assistance were certainly influential in Egypt and could be in places like Bahrain and Iraq.
19. It goes without saying that we can only be effective if there is an indigenous movement for democracy and reform, one that has taken on the responsibility of defining for itself what those words mean. We should not be imposing systems that we invent, but helping others to discover what will suit their needs for accountability, transparency and inclusivity.
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