Tag: Iraq
Peace Picks | August 5 – 9
How to Talk About People Disengaging from Violent Extremism – The Power of Strategic Language | August 06, 2019 | 10:00 AM – 12:00 PM | U.S. Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Around the world, many countries face a challenging security question: what to do with citizens who have joined violent extremist groups. While many face criminal trial, thousands who traveled to live with ISIS will have to reintegrate into their communities, meaning rehabilitation must play a central role in any realistic security approach. Based on experience and research, this rehabilitation is possible through a two-way “re-humanization” effort. Yet we currently lack the language in public discourse to talk about those disengaging from violent extremism without reinforcing stigmas that hinder reconciliation.
It is critical for returning persons and community members to again see and treat each other as people with whom they share a basic human nature. Prosocial engagement between returning persons and community members and institutions is key to that effort. However, public discourse insists on using language steeped in fear and anger: the returning persons are “terrorists,” “jihadists,” “ISIS brides,” or “fighters.” The stigma this language produces is a self-fulfilling prophecy—it impedes empathy, erects barriers to prosocial engagement, and perpetuates the isolation and dehumanization that often fuels violent radicalization in the first place.
Speakers:
Dr. Arie Kruglanski, Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland- Shannon Foley Martinez, Consultant for the prevention and disruption of targeted identity violence
Dr. Hollie Nyseth-Brehm, Associate Professor of Sociology, The Ohio State UniversityDr. Paul Thibodeau, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Oberlin College and Conservatory
Moderator:
- Leanne Erdberg, Director, Countering Violent Extremism, U.S. Institute of Peac
Contemporary India: Foreign Policy, Development Strategy, and Regional Priorities for Modi 2.0 | August 06, 2019 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | The Heritage Foundation | Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, DC 20002 | Register Here
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s foreign policy and engagement with the world has acquired new energy and dynamism. Following India’s historic elections this spring, Modi’s second term will continue to focus on creating an enabling environment for India’s growth and development, while pursuing security and growth for all in India’s neighborhood and beyond. To discuss the Modi government’s foreign policy imperatives, and particularly India’s priorities in its regional engagements, India’s Ambassador to the U.S., His Excellency Harsh Vardhan Shringla will join Heritage Foundation South Asia scholar Jeff M. Smith for a wide-ranging conversation.
Speakers:
- H.E. Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Ambassador of India to the United States
- Jeff M. Smith, Research Fellow, South Asia, Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center
A View from Iraq: A Conversation with Iraqi MP Sarkawt Shamsulddin | August 06, 2019 | 12:00 PM | The Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
With a new Kurdistan Regional Government in place, the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative invites you to join us for a conversation with Iraqi Council of Representatives Member Sarkawt Shamsulddin to hear a view from Iraq. In 2018, Shamsulddin became the youngest member of the Iraqi parliament, securing the top position of the New Generation Movement in Sulaymaniyah Province. He is now one of the leaders of The Future parliamentary bloc and a member of the Iraqi-American Friendship Committee.
The discussion topics will include how Iraq views the tensions between the United States and Iran, how the new Kurdistan Regional Government cabinet is re-setting relations with Baghdad, and what can be done to promote reforms, counter corruption, and build bridges between civil society organizations in Baghdad in Erbil.
Speakers:
- Mr. Sarkawt Shamsulddin, Member, Council of Representative of Iraq
Moderator:
Dr. Abbas Kadhim, Senior Fellow and Director, Iraq Initiative, Atlantic Council
The Japanese-South Korean Trade Dispute: Ramifications and the Path Forward | August 07, 2019 | 1:30 PM – 4:30 PM | The Heritage Foundation |
Japan and South Korea have recently imposed rulings that impact each other’s financial interests and risk triggering a strategic trade war. During previous spikes in tensions, bilateral economic and security sectors were not involved and instead served as moderating influences. That changed for the worse last year. Strained bilateral economic relations undermine U.S. allied diplomatic and security coordination to deal with the North Korean threat. What role should Washington play in resolving disputes between two critically important Asian allies?
Speakers:
Panel I – Competing Views and Economic Considerations (1:30 – 3:00 p.m.)
- Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations
- Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program, The Stimson Center
- Riley Walters, Policy Analyst for Asia Economy and Technology, The Heritage Foundation
Panel II – Implications for Economics, Security, and U.S. Strategic Objectives (3:00 – 4:30 p.m.)
- Matthew Goodman, Senior Vice President, Senior Adviser for Asian Economics, and the Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- James Schoff, Senior Fellow, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair, The Hudson Institute
Hosted by:
- Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, The Heritage Foundation
Building Bridges? Development and Infrastructure in U.S.-China Relations | August 08, 2019 | 9:00 AM – 10:30 AM | CSIS Headquarters, 2nd Floor | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Amid escalating U.S.-China tensions, Washington and Beijing are focused on managing their differences on bilateral trade. At the same time, both countries have a major stake in the functioning of the global economic order—the institutions, rules, and norms that shape international economic affairs. Even as they address bilateral issues, it is also important for the two sides to confront strains in the global order.
During this event, U.S. and Chinese experts will discuss an important set of issues in the global economic order: infrastructure and development finance. They will explore where the two sides may be able to cooperate and where they need to manage their differences. The event will roll out a collection of essays written in parallel by U.S. and Chinese scholars on trade, finance, technology, and other key issues in the global economic order. This essay series is the culmination of a multi-year effort to promote U.S.-China dialogue funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Speakers:
- Nancy Lee, Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global Development
- Peter Raymond, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Reconnecting Asia Project and Simon Chair in Political Economy, CSIS; Former Advisory Leader, Capital Projects and Infrastructure, PwC
- Stephanie Segal, Senior Fellow, Simon Chair in Political Economy, CSIS
- Ye Yu, Associate Research Fellow & Assistant Director, Institute for World Economy Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS)
Moderator:
- Matthew P. Goodman, Senior Vice President and Simon Chair in Political Economy, CSIS
Confrontation in the Gulf: Unpacking Recent Escalations and the Prospects of US-Iran Talks | August 08, 2019 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM | Arab Center Washington DC | National Press Club, Holeman Lounge, 529 14th St., NW Washington, DC 20045 | Register Here
Tensions in the Persian Gulf threaten to escalate as regional and international actors look to improve their strategic standing at the expense of their adversaries. The last few weeks witnessed a number of attacks on oil tankers and platforms, seizures of ships operating in the Gulf and traversing the Strait of Hormuz, and the mutual downing of American and Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles. Left unaddressed, these actions ratchet up tensions and could quickly lead to a conflagration that would devastate all states in the region and disrupt the free flow of hydrocarbon supplies to the international economy. Over the last few months, many efforts have been made to find a compromise that could help address the sources of tension and spare the strategic area the outcomes of a confrontation, including calls and statements by regional and international actors as well as by the United States and Iran. Despite attempts at de-escalation, the stalemate persists and talks have not taken place.
Join Arab Center Washington DC to discuss the recent escalation of hostilities in the region, the economic, political, humanitarian, and strategic risks of a potential military conflagration, the possibility for negotiations and the measures needed to advance talks between Iran and the Trump Administration, and the impact of the current stalemate and policy responses from the actors involved.
Speakers:
- Shireen Hunter, University Associate, Georgetown University
- Kenneth Katzman, Middle East Specialist, Congressional Research Service
- Assal Rad, Research Fellow, National Iranian American Council
- Barbara Slavin, Director and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Moderator:
- Daniel Brumberg, Associate Professor and Director, Democracy and Governance Studies, Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC
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A bad barometer reading
On June 26 the Atlantic Council held a panel to discuss the release of opinion poll data collected by the Arab Barometer about the state of the economy, migration, governmental performance, corruption, and other topics in the Middle East. Survey data was collected in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. Presentation of data was followed by a panel discussion that included Mark Tessler, professor of political science at University of Michigan, Kathrin Thomas, Research Associate at the Arab Barometer, Abbas Khadim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, and Faysal Itani, Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council. Vivian Salam, reporter at the Wall Street Journal, moderated.
There is little optimism about the economy improving in the Levant. In Jordan, 70% of respondents cite the economy as a primary concern. In all three countries, (Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon) more than 85% percent of respondents perceived the governments of their respective states to be corrupt.
Survey data also noted a slight upwards trend in desire to emigrate from the Levant region. An uptick in a desire to emigrate can be explained by the “brain drain” phenomenon in which highly educated youths seek to leave their home countries due to lack of high-level employment opportunity. Respondents indicated that “economic reasons”, “political reasons” and “security reasons” were the primary drivers for the choice to emigrate.
The survey catalogued a slight increase in support for women’s rights and prominence in politics and business. 60% of respondents would support a female head of state, with Lebanon the most supportive of the notion at a rate of 77%. Despite this, 66% of respondents in the Levant said that men inherently make better political leaders than women.
Since 2016 there has been a decline in the belief that the Middle East and North Africa would benefit from stronger relations with the United States. Survey data revealed that people in the Levant widely believe that Iraq is a proxy of Iran, despite the fact that the Shia in Iraq have not sided with Iran.
Itani notes that the economic anxiety present in the region, specifically in Lebanon, is a reminder to Western policy makers that issues of chief importance to the West (Hezbollah, etc), do not necessarily take precedence in the region. The expectation of poor economic performance will have implications for future investment and growth. Itani attributes Lebanese decrease in willingness to strengthen ties with Washington to US policy in region, specifically US dealings with Israel and the change in American leadership in 2016.
Khadim spoke more specifically to the Iraqi data. Surveys confirm sentiments Iraqis usually express only through social media or encrypted messengers. There is a divergence of opinions held regarding the United States government and US citizens. Iraqis view American citizens more favorably than the American government, which Khadim says can open avenues in the realm of public diplomacy and good faith action between the two countries. On the Iraq-Iran relationship, he says GCC media have ascribed an affinity between Iraq and Iran that does not necessarily exist. Iran does have influence over certain discrete groups in Iraq, but that influence is not as widespread as many believe.
Tessler and Thomas, the administrators of the data collection, focused on the ways in which the data can be used to determine if there are links between different variables. Specifically, they expect a link between corruption perceptions and education levels as well as support of Iran depending on religion. While they had not yet conducted the analysis on these variables, they expect to confirm Khadim’s assertion that support for Iran in Iraq is contained to certain demographics and is not a widespread sentiment. Tessler further notes that the trend of declining support for strengthening relations with a United States dates to 2006.
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Two can play
President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran is generating a “smart pressure” campaign in return. Tehran can’t limit American ability to export oil and gas or pay for imports, but it can threaten Gulf shipping, move towards enriching uranium to levels required for nuclear weapons, and convince at least some trading partners to pay for Iranian exports in ways that circumvent US sanctions. Both Europe and Iraq are planning to use “special purpose vehicles” to do just that, the latter likely with the implicit approval of the US since it desperately needs Iranian electricity this summer.
Trump is feeling the impact. He has dropped the insistence on talking about missiles and Iran’s regional behavior, but Tehran is still not yielding to his begging to re-open nuclear talks. Nor is it inclined to give Trump the kind of photo-op flattery that North Korea’s Kim Jong-un has learned gets the President to soften his stance. Maximum pressure has unified Iran’s fractious ruling elite behind a policy of defiance and disdain, tempered however with caution. While prepared to endure an American strike, and return the blow by more or less surreptitious means, Tehran knows it cannot sustain a real war against the US.
Trump can’t sustain a long war either. Another lengthy Middle Eastern war would end his chances for re-election, as Fox star Tucker Carlson has advised. Trump has done nothing to prepare popular opinion for it and would face substantial opposition in Congress, where quite a few Republicans as well as most Democrats are prepared to claim he lacks the legislative authority needed to go to war. The existing authorization to use military force (AUMF) covers only Al Qaeda and its affiliates. That has been stretched to cover the Islamic State, which did in fact emerge out of Al Qaeda’s erstwhile Iraqi affiliate. But no one serious reasonable thinks it can cover war with Iran. Trump will have to use an implicit “self-defense” authorization if he decides to strike Iran.
So the shadow-boxing continues, with the unavoidable risk of escalation. But there are serious possibilities for negotiation as well. It should be clear by now to all but the most hawkish in both Tehran and Washington that the alternative is a war from which neither capital can reasonably hope to emerge victorious. Trump may still hope for some spectacular photo-op: a visit to Tehran perhaps? But Supreme Leader Khamenei seems incapable of the kind of political acrobatics that Kim has successfully pursued to get the President of the United States to confirm his otherwise doubtful legitimacy.
A quieter, perhaps clandestine diplomacy is required: talks about talks, perhaps in Oman or Qatar. A few confidence-building measures like release of prisoners. A humanitarian gesture or two. A more or less explicit understanding about the limits of what each side is prepared to tolerate, both in political rhetoric and the use of military force. Iran will try to make it to November 2020 without going farther than that, knowing that if Trump loses a Democratic administration would want to reenter the nuclear agreement of its own free will.
That is what Trump should do as well. But he can’t without Iranian cooperation in hiding the concession under a photo-op or some sort of fig leaf revision of the agreement. So we’re stuck with a pressure campaign, which two can play.
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The time is ripe
When adversaries square off, as the US and Iran have done in recent weeks, they sometimes reach a point at which they think escalating to violence can get them no more than what they hope to get at the negotiating table. If both reach that point within the same time frame, talking becomes a serious alternative to escalating. That is the “ripe” moment at which it is worth considering whether there is a “way out” that will do better for both than resorting to violence.
President Trump has reached his ripe moment. He is saying he is ready to meet with Iran to discuss one subject: nuclear weapons. He has dropped Secretary of State Pompeo’s 12 preconditions, he has forgotten about Iran’s missiles as well as its involvement in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Iraq, and he called off military retaliation against Iran for its shoot-down of an American drone. He even tried to given Tehran an “out” by suggesting the downing of the drone was not properly authorized. The man is begging for negotiations with Iran.
The Iranians are hesitating, for several reasons. They want the US back in the nuclear deal and the associated relief from sanctions before talking to Washington. Tehran knows that Trump is erratic and doesn’t want to be the next victim of his decisionmaking. The Iranians may also believe that they can continue to “bleed” the Americans with little risk of retaliation, because they know neither the US public nor the Congress is prepared to sustain a new war in the Middle East. There will also be some in Tehran, especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, that want to continue expanding the nuclear program, with a view to eviscerating the nuclear agreement even if Iran doesn’t formally withdraw from it.
My sense though is that the time is ripe for at least clandestine talks between Iran and the US, likely focused initially not on the nuclear deal but rather on release of prisoners. That accomplished, with more or less simultaneous but unilateral releases, the adversaries could proceed on to other matters, including some relief from sanctions while talks continue. That will be a requirement for the Iranians. The Europeans would certainly appreciate loosening of sanctions, as would the Chinese, Turks, Iraqis and many others. Getting them to support Washington in any future nuclear negotiation should be a high priority for Trump. They won’t do it while the sanctions continue to make their trade and investment impossible.
The Iranians will fear that any negotiation will have to tighten the nuclear agreement, or extend it. But they have surely seen how incapable of negotiating any serious agreement the Trump administration is. The renegotiation of the South Korea free trade pact generated little. The NAFTA negotiation produced a modest update. The North Korea negotiations have produced nothing. President Obama had as one of his chief negotiators a Nobel-prize winning physicist who was then Secretary of Energy. Trump’s Secretary of Energy wouldn’t know a nuclear reactor from a coal-burning plant.
Tehran should also understand that there are only a very few serious US objections the the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). First is that it didn’t cover missiles or Iran’s regional interventions. Those issues are going to require a long conversation, and President Trump has dropped them from the agenda, at least for now. Even if started tomorrow, talks on missile and regional issues are unlikely to be completed before the next US election, when Tehran certainly hopes to see elected a more reliable, even if no more friendly, president.
Second is that the JCPOA “sunset,” or ended, at various times in the next decade or more. That too is a conversation that could drag on, but there may be some relatively easy pickings in that department. Iran has good reason to make it clear to Israel and Europe, its two most concerned neighbors, that nuclear weapons are not its objective, even in the long term. Israel has first strike capabilities that make a nuclear Iran a dangerous place to live. Europe is an important trade and investment partner with potential to enormously ease Iran’s desperate economic situation.
All that Trump really needs from Iran in the short term is to rename and extend the JCPOA so that he can claim proprietary rights. The technical aspects are likely to remain unrevised. As Evelyn Farkas suggests, the Trump/Iran Nuclear Adjustment (TINA) need be no more than a JCPOA 2.0. US sanctions might stay in place during talks, but their application to third countries would have to be at least suspended. The Iranians are serious people and will understandably hesitate to be sucked in to an agreement with a notoriously unreliable negotiating partner. But when the moment is ripe and the way out is better than war, it is a mistake to pass up the opportunity.
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Escalation as distraction
Whatever doubt there might be about the origin of recent attacks on shipping in and near the Gulf, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has claimed responsibility for yesterday’s shoot-down of a large American Navy drone. The Iranians say it violated their airspace. The Americans say it was shot down over international waters.
Both could be true, but it doesn’t matter. The significance of the Iranian move is to confirm that we are on an escalatory ladder. President Trump has so far declined, at least in public, to retaliate for the attacks on ships. We don’t really know what Washington has done covertly. Tehran is now testing Trump further with the shoot-down of the drone. The Iranians will likely continue to take steps that either they can claim publicly are in self-defense or interfere covertly with shipping oil and oil products by other Gulf countries.
The Iranian actions demand a response, one way or another. Even doing nothing is a response, as it is likely to encourage continued Iranian attacks. Tit for tat is also a possibility: certainly the US could shoot down an Iranian drone, one of which is said to have been responsible for last night’s success. Some argue the escalatory ladder could reach the point of taking out Iran’s shore-based missiles. It might in fact go much further.
The response could also be at least partially diplomatic rather than wholly military. The Iranians are claiming to be guarantors of Gulf security. They should be challenged to prove it. Once it has done, covertly or publicly, its proportional retaliation, the US should consider easing up on sanctions and allowing , Oman, Iraq, or some other relative neutral to convene a multilateral meeting on Gulf maritime security, to include Iran and the US as well as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Even a meeting at which the parties shout at each other could serve to clear the air and begin the process of climbing down from a ladder that all too predictably leads to a catastrophic new war in the Middle East.
The current situation stems inexorably from the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. The aim should be to return to the status quo ante, which was surely better than what we are facing today. Trump will need some sort of face-saving process, but he is certainly capable of 180 degree policy and rhetorical reversal, a trick he successfully performed with North Korea. The US should also establish rapid military-to-military communications with Iran, since that could help to avoid unintentional provocations and support a diplomatic effort.
Congress needs to weigh in decisively at this point. The effort of the Administration to sell the existing Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) as the basis for war with Iran is not just a stretch. It relies on a claim of active Iranian support for Al Qaeda that is as dubious as Iranian claims that the US and its allies actively support Al Qaeda (the Iranians are particularly fond of quoting a dreadful interview with former Trump National Security Adviser Flynn to that effect).
The simple fact is that the US is not ready to go to war with Iran. Doing so would be a blatant effort by the Administration to distract attention from its all too serious domestic challenges. The Iranians might like war for the same reason: their economy is in a shambles, not only due to sanctions but also due to mismanagement. This is a perilous situation. Military strength has a role to play, but the way out is diplomatic.
PS: In case you don’t believe that Flynn bit, here it is:
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Basra protests and the future of Iraq
June 6 the Middle East Institute hosted Akeet Abbas, professor at the American University of Iraq, Basma Alloush, advocacy and communications officer at the Norwegian Refugee Council USA, James “Mac” Skelton, director at the Institute of Regional and International Studies, and Bilal Wahab, fellow at The Washington Institute on Near East Policy for a panel on rising tension and unrest in Iraq in the wake of the 2018 Basra protests. Randa Slim, senior fellow and director of the Program on Conflict Resolution and Track II dialogues at the Middle East Institute moderated the discussion.
Skelton explained that the rhetoric of the Basra protestors was aimed at overturning the entire governance system. Protestors targeted not only government office buildings, but also political party offices. People felt that the traditional patronage system that operates through the party system has failed them because of rampant co-option of abundant resources (i.e. oil) in Basra. This vying for control is cyclical in nature between political parties. For example, currently the Hikma party “owns” the oil fields as well the Basra Oil Company (BOC), but before them it was the Dawa party.
According to Skelton, the resultant dynamic is “government dysfunction at every level.” So many actors capture the state that no project can be completed. Lack of electricity and clean water were among the rallying calls of protesters. Skelton also pointed to a closed network of jobs and opportunities as catalysts for the Basra protests.
Abbas explained that while protests were not a novel occurrence in Iraq, the 2018 protest in Basra was the first time that popular dissent gained traction within the Shia majority. Before Basra, the Shia elite did not take protests seriously, as it was easy to demonize Sunni fringe groups to retain legitimacy. The protests also called into question the effectiveness of the Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi, who was elected because of his promise to root out corruption in Iraq. Abdul-Mahdi’s perceived inability to deliver on his promises sparked a movement in Basra headed by the Sadrists, which other groups soon joined. Abbas predicted that political reform is not possible if the task is left to the current political elite in Iraq. Rather, reform can only come from either or external or internal pressure. Abbas believes that internal pressure in the form of protests is the catalyst for change, given that the United States has all but washed its hands of governance in Iraq.
Alloush focused on the water network in Basra, and the ways that resource shortage contributes to unrest. Water shortage in Iraq is a regional issue—dams built upstream by Syria, Turkey, and Iran limit water flowing into Iraq by 50%. Climate change, drought, and contamination of the Tigris and Euphrates further exacerbate the waster issue. Furthermore, poor water management practices in cities like Basra ensure that contamination increases, and that clean water is not distributed. Alloush also noted that loss of rural livelihoods contributed to a rise in migration of rural youth to urban areas, but they lack the skills to be competitive in an already saturated urban job market, adding to discontent.
Wahab echoed Skeleton’s statements regarding the ineffectiveness of sectarian patronage networks. They are able to provide money, employment, and legitimacy to their supporters, but they were not able to provide governance. Political parties cannot provide resources like water, electricity, and production. Rather, only cohesive government can provide these things. This lack of governance is why protests in Basra targeted all political parties. Abbas complimented this point, mentioning that even the Popular Mobilization Units, credited with the defeat of ISIS, was not spared from citizen dissatisfaction.
Skelton offered some insights about the future. First, he noted that the issues that sparked protests in Basra in 2018 have not been resolved. Second, he notes that the Sadrists who incited the 2018 Basra protests did not expect to garner so much popular support. The unexpected popularity of the protests illustrate how unpredictable social movements in Iraq are. While Skelton is certain future protests will occur, the extent to which they will spread remains to be seen.
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