Tag: Iraq
The missing piece
President Trump’s sudden decision to withdraw ground troops from Syria has prompted widespread condemnation as well as the resignations of Defense Secretary Mattis and top anti-ISIS coordinator McGurk. Jim Jeffrey, Syria envoy, can’t be far behind. Certainly the manner of the decision merits dismay. Challenged by Turkish President Erdogan to get out of the way of a Turkish operation against Syrian Kurds whom the US has armed and used against ISIS, Trump pulled the plug on the several thousand US special forces in eastern Syria without any serious consultation with his national security advisers or America’s allies and against their collective wisdom. The message to American allies and adversaries alike is that Washington is unreliable and weak. Tehran and Moscow are gleeful. ISIS has already launched a major attack against the Kurds.
In evaluating this decision, we need to distinguish its manner from its substance. The way Trump did this is not just reprehensible but irresponsible. But whether it was better for US interests to stay in Syria or leave is far less clear.
The US gained control of one-third of Syria, along with its Kurdish and Arab allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces, as a consequence of its operations against ISIS, in particular in Raqqa. The result was a devastated city. Staying would have meant stabilizing and eventually reconstructing it and other population centers. That process had begun, but hadn’t gotten very far, before the President’s announcement on Saturday. The Administration had gotten the Saudis and others to ante up several hundred million dollars for the purpose, but more than that was eventually going to be needed. Withdrawal avoids that responsibility.
Jim Jeffrey’s strategy, as I understood it, was to try to make Raqqa and the surrounding area livable and even attractive relative to the regime’s autocratic control of most of the rest of Syria. That would have given the US continued opportunities to do damage to ISIS as well as leverage over the political process, enabling Washington to trade withdrawal for commitments from the regime, Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Jim was aiming for complete Iranian withdrawal and beginning of a political transition, but likely would have had to settle for less. A longer stay in Syria would also have given the US time to make arrangements with Turkey and the Kurds to avoid their clash in the aftermath of withdrawal and continued commitment to the fight against ISIS.
This was a pretty good strategy, even if the US were to be forced to settle for much less than its stated goals. We might at least have gotten something on release of prisoners, accounting for the disappeared, protection of civilians, withdrawal of non-Arab Shia militias, and maybe something on revising the constitution to reduce the powers of the Syrian security agencies and holding internationally supervised elections.
President Trump preferred an abrupt withdrawal. In this he is not unlike his predecessor. President Obama did not want to go into Syria and tried to limit the numbers of American troops there. He withdrew from Iraq before it had been adequately stabilized. American presidents do not like what they pejoratively call “nationbuilding.” It is admittedly a difficult, expensive, and time-consuming process. Witness Afghanistan, from which Trump is said to have decided to withdraw much of the American troops presence. The war there started 17 years ago. No one would pretend that Kabul is yet capable of containing the Taliban and extremist presence there.
Avoiding long-term commitments of this sort is understandable, especially if the maneuver is done with adequate preparation, without undermining friends and allies, and without emboldening enemies. The way to achieve those prerequisites is through diplomacy. That’s what’s missing here.
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The Middle East wants reform
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Iraqi trends
The Washington Institute on Near East Policy hosted a panel on emerging political trends in Iraq’s post-election period on November 27th. The panel featured Munqith Dagher, CEO of Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Ahmed Ali, program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy, and David Pollock, Berinstein Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of its Fikra Forum.
While many Americans are tired of Iraq, Pollock reminded that it is still of strategic importance to American interests, which include preventing the country from incubating terrorism and tipping the region in a hostile, pro-Iran direction. It is also a potential demographic, economic, and religious powerhouse in the region. Iraqi oil exports are half those of the Saudis. Because of the 2003 invasion, the success of Iraq reflects on America’s political clout in the region, with many people seeing Iraq as a US responsibility.
Pollock pointed out the importance of public opinion polling in Iraq, a powerful but underutilized tool. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and the divisions arising from Kurdistan’s 2017 independence referendum were in line with Dagher’s polling at the time. To avoid being taken by surprise in the post-election space, public opinion-informed policy is crucial.
Dagher stated that we are at a crossroads in Iraqi attitudes, with three transformative shifts in public opinion.
1. A shift in inter-sectarian dynamics
For the first time since 2003, Sunnis are overall happier than Shi’a and Kurds. More specifically, they have more trust in the central Iraqi government than their Shi’a counterparts, an increase from 20% in 2016 to 50% today. Sunni Arabs have been reluctant to participate in the political process since Saddam’s ousting, and Dagher emphasized that this moment should be capitalized on to get them involved in the political process.
2. From inter to intra-sectarian conflicts
Iraq has a long history of sectarian politics. We are finally seeing a shift towards interest-based politics. Sectarian identity as the most important source of identity has dropped to below 10% for all three groups. It was as high as 61% in 2013 among Kurds. Iraqi citizenship as the most important source of identity has increased significantly among Shi’a. While it is still very low for Kurds at 6%, there are so signs of further decrease. Across various polling questions, namely if Iraq is heading in the wrong direction, geography is playing a more important role than ever. For example, Sunni Arabs in Mosul are significantly more likely to believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction (69%) than Sunni Arabs in general (55%), as are the Shi’a Arabs of Basra than Shi’a at large.
3. Less international polarization
The ability of regional actors to take advantage of Iraq’s traditional sectarian divisions has also diminished. Iran’s popularity, when asked if it is a reliable partner, has dropped from 75% to 44% among Shi’a Arabs in the last two years alone. The most significant drop was between 2017 (70%) and today (44%), which Dagher attributed to the protests in Basra as well as the visible interference of both the US and Iran in the recent election. Access to information has increased as a result of growing internet use among Iraqis. It jas increased from 40% in 2014 to 80% today. Ninety per cent of Iraqi youth have at least one social media account. Among Sunni Arabs, favorable views of Saudi Arabia have decreased from 90% in 2012 to 61% today.
These trends are overshadowed by more alarming shifts under the surface. The population thinks the country is heading in the wrong direction more than ever, with 80% of respondents agreeing compared to 50% in April 2012. The most recent election has been marred by the fact that less than 1 in 5 respondents thought it free and fair. Dagher warned that lack of trust in the democratic political system might explain why 66% prefer a “strong leader who doesn’t care about Parliament nor elections,” accompanied by dramatic decreases in voter turnout. Ali attributed this legitimacy crisis to the gulf between politicians’ and the public’s views. He cited the Basra anti-corruption protests, which were predictable, and the lack of serious response from the Iraqi government.
For Ali, the big area for policy makers is post-ISIS reconstruction. Addressing grievances in post-ISIS regions and reunifying the country requires institutional governance reforms. Most importantly, the electoral process needs to be transparent and accountable to improve public trust, as demonstrated by post-election fraud allegations. The new Iraqi government has its work cut out for it.
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Trump is right
Donald Trump said earlier this week about the Middle East:
Now, are we going to stay in that part of the world? One reason is Israel. Oil is becoming less and less of a reason because we’re producing more oil now than we’ve ever produced. So, you know, all of a sudden it gets to a point where you don’t have to stay there.
This is more sensible than 99% of what the man says, even if I think Israel can more than take care of itself. But the main reason for US military deployments in the Middle East is oil, which is far less important than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. That is what prompted President Carter’s 1980 pledge to defend the flow of oil from the Gulf:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
President Carter’s Doctrine was a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he feared presaged a thrust towards the Gulf. The Soviet Union is gone, Afghanistan is a mess, and the US economy is now far less dependent on oil imports and energy of all sorts than it was in 1980. The Gulf oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia, are far more dependent on oil exports, which they send predominantly to Asia, especially China, Japan, India, and South Korea.
The US nevertheless spends about 12% of the Pentagon budget on protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf and holds a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of well over 100 days of imports, thus protecting our principal economic competitors from the effects of an oil supply disruption while they free ride on our preparations. It is true of course that an oil supply disruption would also affect the US economy, since oil prices are set in a global market and US consumers would feel the price hike in imports of goods of all sorts. But changed circumstances should affect burden-sharing: we need to do less and other oil consumers need to do more.
There are other ways in which the Middle East merits lower priority for American foreign policy. Middle East terrorism now has little impact on Americans both at home, where right-wing attackers are far more common than Islamic ones, and abroad, where relatively few Americans have suffered harm, most of them either by sheer accident or by travel into known danger zones. Nuclear proliferation is still an issue, but mainly a self-inflicted one due to American withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, which is far from the giant threat the Administration is portraying it as. Even if that were not true, American deployments in the Gulf are far too close to Iran for war-fighting purposes. We would need to move them farther away in order to use them in an attack.
The problem is that withdrawal from the Middle East is as problematic as intervention there. That is what President Obama demonstrated. His restraint in Libya, Syria, and Yemen left vacuums filled by jihadis, Iranians, and Gulfies. The results have been catastrophic for each of the states in question. Intervention by middling powers without multilateral authorization and on one side or the other in a civil war is known to have little chance of success and to prolong conflicts. Where the US re-committed its forces in Iraq, whose state was in far better shape than those in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, the results were far more salutary, even if not completely satisfactory.
Part of the problem for the US is lack of diplomatic capacity. American diplomacy has become far too dependent, both physically and strategically, on military presence. Military withdrawal requires a diplomatic posture that can be sustained without the troops. Many other countries by necessity have learned the trick of hitting above their military weight with diplomatic capacity. Witness an extreme example like Norway, or a less dramatic one like Germany. These are countries that lead with their diplomatic and economic clout, not with their troops, ships and planes.
There has been to my knowledge no serious discussion of the difficulties of withdrawal and how they can be met. Part of solution lies in beefing up the political, economic, and cultural capacities of American diplomacy. But withdrawal will remain perilous anyplace a legitimate, inclusive, well-functioning state does not exist. Statebuilding has gotten a really bad name from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it remains a vital component of any effort to reduce US commitments abroad. About that, both Trump and Obama have been wrong.
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Iran’s offensive defense
The International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a panel of experts on Iran’s Regional Posture October 11. The panel consisted of Dina Esfandiary, fellow at the Century Foundation, Ambassador Barbara A. Leaf, former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, and Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director of the International Crisis Group.
Panelists revisited the nature and role of Iran today, dissecting Iran’s motivations, threats, and constraints, beyond traditional perspectives that privilege analyses based on American interests. With ethno-sectarian conflicts raging in Syria and Yemen as well as a tense political transition in Iraq, the Saudi-led Gulf states and Iran, the region’s major actors, have been embroiled in a competition of political and strategic influence.
But is it that simple? Esfandiary sought to move beyond polarity. She pointed out that Iran is not simply vying for power, but seeks to preserve its territorial integrity against Western and Gulf nations it views as aggressive. As a main center of Shi’a Islam, Iran sees itself as entitled to regional influence. Esfandiary elaborated that while religion was a foreign policy driver for the post-Revolution state’s early years, the Iranian government now leans towards nationalism as a better way to unify the nation’s people and frame its foreign policy endeavors. Elaborating on this point, Leaf said that Iran’s posture should be understood as an offensive defense, a response to the US presence and support of both the Israelis and the Saudis, which it sees as a threats to its territorial integrity and legitimate involvement in Arab affairs.
Iraq, Esfandiary said, is Iran’s highest regional priority. Tehran seeks a central government in Baghdad aligned with its interests. However, with the election of Barham Salih as Iraq’s new President, and his selection of Adel Abdul Mahdi as Prime Minister, many analysts have signaled a turn in Iraq away from the rigid ethno-sectarian politics that have dominated the post-invasion landscape. With many Iraqis disillusioned by dysfunctional governance resulting from proxy politics, Iran’s ability to sway the new government’s formation and the future of the nation’s politics are limited. Esfandiary further identified the Syrian civil conflict as Iran’s second priority, and the conflict in Yemen as its last priority, questioning whether Iran has a long-term strategic goal in Yemen at all. Leaf agreed, with Iraq as Iran’s greatest concern given the election year.
Invoking Iran’s Hezbollah model, Leaf listed the three major instruments in Iran’s toolbox:
- Creating and directing splintered proxy groups, preferably local actors, to shape civil conflicts as Tehran sees fit. In particular, supporting and directing Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
- Increasing its defense and intelligence architecture in Syria, part of its corridor to Israel and the Mediterranean.
- Exploiting disordered Arab states with sizeable Shi’a minorities.
Vaez added Iran’s nuclear program as another instrument of the state’s offensive defense strategy in the region: a deterrent to nuclear Israel and the aggressive Gulf states, all supported by the US.
Underscoring the constraints of current containment policies, Vaez underlined that Trump was misguided in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. While the goal is to deprive Iran of resources through sanctions, Iran’s regional proxy operations are not strongly correlated to sanctions, citing 2011 as a year in which Iran was able to expand its proxy operations while under increased pressure from multilateral sanctions.
With another round of harsher sanctions going into effect on November 4, Vaez fears that in the unlikely scenario of effective sanctions, Iran’s political system and elite will welcome a crisis, whipping up nationalist sentiment and acting in a less risk-averse manner throughout the region. Leaf, who submitted testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcomittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade in support of sanctions, brought up this fear in encouraging the committee to avoid mistiming sanctions, lest they strengthen Iranian nationalism.
For Esfandiary, the Gulf Arab states’ insistence that Iran pull out as a precondition for negotiations is one of the biggest constraints in reducing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. She argued that Yemen could have been ideal for negotiations with Iran, which has made it clear it is willing to negotiate. Leaf echoed this sentiment, stating that while the fractured Gulf states have tried to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table via Oman, only Tehran can succeed. Iran has been reckless in supporting the Houthis, rapidly transferring military training and technology to them. But the Houthis are independent, often operating against Iranian wishes as in their capture of both Sa’ana and Aden. Their relationship to Iran is very different from that of Hezbollah or other proxies. Further recklessness on the part of the Houthis, such as attacks on commercial ships, could be problematic for Iran.
All three panelists agreed that Iran’s image in the international sphere has improved significantly, regardless of its proxy activities. Esfandiary
and Vaez both pointed to the European Union’s effort to bypass US sanctions as well as the ICJ ruling in favor of Iran as indicators of a recovering international image. Despite the negative domestic impact of the war in Syria and Iraqi resistance to Iranian meddling, Iran appears uninterested in negotiating with the US in any capacity. Tehran instead is emphasizing its relationships with the EU, China, and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are especially important and have a higher level of familiarity with the Iranian economy than their Western counterparts.
Ultimately, Vaez warned of the need for a more inclusive security and intelligence architecture in the Middle East. The region needs a long-term strategy to escape the asymmetry and escalating armament in the region.
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Awry
President Trump’s first tweet of September 11 was this:
“We have found nothing to show collusion between President Trump & Russia, absolutely zero, but every day we get more documentation showing collusion between the FBI & DOJ, the Hillary campaign, foreign spies & Russians, incredible.”
@SaraCarterDC@LouDobbs
An hour later he tried to mend the mistake, retweeting a picture of himself signing a “Patriot Day” declaration with this profound insight about the occasion:
Then there was this from his arrival at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, for a 9/11 ceremony there:
The President cares not a hoot about 9/11 and its meaning for Americans.
That meaning has become grossly distorted in the 17 years since the Al Qaeda attacks. President Bush got it at least partly right in the immediate aftermath: Americans needed to unify and respond to the attacks but not go to war against Islam. He chose instead to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan, seeking to punish the Al Qaeda leadership holed up there.
But things then went awry. Osama bin Ladin and most of the Al Qaeda leadership escaped the American invasion. Bush turned his attention to Iraq, which had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda scattered to Yemen, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere, even as more extreme competitors, including the Islamic State, emerged there and elsewhere. The US has tried to kill as many of these extremists as possible, but there are now demonstrably more of them in more countries than in 2001. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost about 7000 American lives and several trillion dollars, but failed to reduce the numbers, the appeal, and the ferocity of Islamist extremism.
President Trump is determined to make things worse. He has barred immigration, including refugees (by definition people escaping a well-founded fear of persecution), from some Islamic countries. He has loosened restraints on the use of drones, raising the number of civilians killed, especially in Yemen. He is squeezing Palestinians mercilessly, denying them vital humanitarian assistance as well as political representation. He supports autocrats in the Muslim world and ignores human rights. He denounces Muslim extremists but not white Christian ones, who have killed many more Americans in terrorist acts since 9/11 than Muslims have. He even managed to hold an Iftar dinner to break the Ramadan fast with no American Muslims, only friendly Muslim diplomats. In both symbols and substance, this Administration is anti-Muslim.
No good can come of continuing in this direction. We need new ways forward that do not mistakenly declare war on a means, “terror,” rather than an enemy, which should be violent extremism. We need to recognize that Americans are not on most days in most places at risk. We need to stop doing things that multiply the numbers of extremists and the places where they find safe haven. We need to ensure that Muslims see the United States as friendly to their religion, even if hostile to extremism conducted in its name.
This president won’t be able or willing to change course. The only question is how much worse he will make things before a leadership change saves us from the tragic direction in which we are heading: towards still more extremists in more countries determined to attack America. 9/11 should not be an occasion for vaunting empty patriotism, but for assessing our situation soberly and looking for more effective means to ensure our national security.
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