Tag: Iraq
Stabilization again
During the Stabilization Symposium on Tuesday, a panel consisting of Frances Brown (Fellow – Carnegie Institute), Ciara Knudsen (Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary – Department of State), Katherine Donahue (Office of Transition Initiatives – USAID), and Colonel Joe Holland (Chief, Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division, J-5 Global Policy & Partnerships – Department of Defense) discussed avenues for building peace and stability in post-conflict situations, using the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) as a blueprint.
According to Brown, three key obstacles make it complicated to transition from conflict to peace: defining success, measuring progress, and governmental organization. The SAR states that post-conflict stabilization is inherently political, allowing the US to better confront the first challenge. Specifically, it provides the US government with the flexibility to candidly judge whether the legitimate political actor on the ground wants peace and stability, making it possible for interventions to succeed. This mindset would have been crucial in Afghanistan, where large sums were poured into stabilization efforts that derailed because president Karzai’s government was not on board.
Brown argued that the SAR also allows the US to adopt more realistic measures for success in stabilization operations. In Afghanistan, cherry-picked stories were used to evaluate US peace building efforts, causing onlookers in Washington to mistakenly believe that the success of three, US-implemented district councils was indicative of the state of affairs in the country as a whole. Brown expressed confidence that the SAR’s emphasis on a coordinated, cross-government strategy for stabilization will make US implementers more accountable to each other, increasing the likelihood that future interventions will adopt more accurate measures of success.
Knudsen used her experience with the Defeat ISIS Campaign to critique the SAR’s inapplicability to situations where short-term, cosmetic interventions will not work because no legitimate on-site actors exist. ISIS has systematically destroyed entire communities’ physical and social infrastructure by reducing cities to rubble, planting IEDs, assassinating tribal leadership, and leaving sleeper cells behind in liberated areas.
These conditions breed a climate of fear and distrust in target communities, making it nearly impossible to find actors who enjoy the legitimacy to inspire the unity necessary to accomplish stabilization. Thus, stabilizing institutions in destroyed cities like Mosul and Raqqa will require meaningful, long-term engagement. Knudsen argued that the SAR does not recognize that most conflict situations call for more than quick, low-budget interventions to develop lasting peace.
Donahue struck a more positive tone than Knudsen, praising the SAR for being realistic and encouraging swift governmental interventions to stabilize conflict zones. The SAR’s declaration that stabilization is an iterative process falls directly in line with the philosophy OTI uses for its intervention strategy. According to Donahue, this will give the US government the flexibility to behave more like OTI, allowing it to mobilize quickly instead of getting bogged down in crafting grand strategies that often do not apply to the situation on the ground. Instead, the SAR strategy centers around learning on the go, recognizing that moving quickly and being correct at the 80% level is more productive than shooting for 100% effectiveness and failing because of inaction.
During his assignment to Kirkuk in the Iraq War, Holland was responsible for facilitating provincial reconstruction teams in the area. In what was indicative of the broader White House strategy at the time, military officers were under the impression that the Department of Defense was spearheading stabilization efforts in Iraq. Little interagency coordination occurred as a result. This military-centric approach led to planning gaps, causing stabilization attempts to end largely in failure. Iraqis remained employed for a snapshot in time, so communities slid back into conflict following US withdrawal. The SAR’s emphasis on interagency coordination represents a building block for future stabilization success, opening the door for long-term, sustainable development by legitimate regional partners after US troops end the mission.
The Bottom Line: The SAR is promising, but it has limits and presents little more than a framework to guide future US stabilization efforts in conflict regions. While this general blueprint will give US actors on the ground considerable flexibility in crafting case-specific strategies, the SAR’s desire for quick, low-cost interventions ignores that most conflicts are multidimensional and can only be solved by long-term stabilization initiatives. Reluctance to commit significant time and resources to stabilization means that future US peace building efforts will likely fail, or that the US will avoid intervening in these situations altogether.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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Winners should stabilize, like it or not
Throughout the two-day Stabilization Symposium – held at the Elliott School of International Affairs on June 26-27, 2018 – panels were held to provide “Perspectives from the Frontlines,” sharing witness accounts from a conflict, or recently deconflicted areas, in which a stabilization framework is most likely to be implemented. The Symposium thus hosted a panel entitled “Perspectives from the Frontlines: Syria and Iraq.” Moderated by Moises Venancio, UNDP Regional Advisor for Iraq and Syria, the panel included:
Linda Robinson – Senior Policy Researcher, RAND
Katherine Krueger – Senior Advisor, Stabilization and Development, Creative Associates International
Aya Aljamili – Al Jazeera
Robinson emphasized how important effective coordination is for the success of stabilization on the ground. Different operating partners in Raqqa, Syria – probably different branches of the US government and NGO partners of the government organizations – have differing conceptions of what stabilization meant. This apparently delayed effective implementation. Robinson also stressed the need for government actors to bring non-government actors to the planning table early on if effective stabilization is to happen. Stabilization in Raqqa had been more successful than in some other cases thanks to better communication between partners; but more could be done to improve the process.
Asked how best to go about implementing stabilization, Robinson highlighted the importance of detailed community research. We need to look at the perceptions and priorities of every demographic group, not just local leaders, when determining what is best for a deconflicted region. Gathering such information is difficult when local populations are traumatized and hostile to foreign powers, as is often the case. This is why community outreach to build relationships and trust are important facets of a successful stabilization process.
Krueger pointed out the biggest obstacle to implementing stabilization in Syria: as an inherently political process, successful stabilization requires clearly defined political objectives. The American government has failed to provide such clear political objectives, leading to what Krueger called “stabilization lite.” Implementation is further complicated by the US struggle to find a satisfactory stabilizing intermediary on the ground, with American support for Kurdish troops proving particularly controversial with local Arab populations. She also pointed out how important continued American presence is to deterring radical groups such as ISIS.
In the same vein, Krueger reminded the audience not to forget about reconstructing Mosul and dealing with the huge number of internally-displaced people in Iraq. While the Iraqi elections were reassuring in their focus on corruption and the reduced role of sectarianism, international actors still have a lot to do to ensure that ISIS does not resurge in Iraq.
According to Aljamili, stabilization can only succeed in eastern Syria if a government is formed that not only provides basic services, but also unites disparate local communities under a common banner. According to the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), stabilization should function through cooperation with legitimate local actors. Unless the US succeeds in fostering a local government that satisfies the needs of both the Kurds and Arabs, stabilization efforts will flounder.
Because of this, Aljamili emphasized the need to take the time to work within communities, to ascertain what the population wants, before undertaking a stabilization process and “elite bargaining” that may run counter to popular desire. It is also essential to remember that Iraq and Syria are not one entity; even within each state, regions differ substantially, meaning that stabilization processes must be highly tailored to the region in which they are to be implemented.
During the Q&A portion of the panel, I asked whether – seeing the Turkish government’s apparent opposition to the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in the north-east of Syria – stabilization in eastern Syria could function without American political support for the Kurds. To this, Aljamili answered that Turkey will at some point have to face the reality of a strong Kurdish political presence in northern Syria, whether that is as part of a negotiated settlement with Assad’s government or as an autonomous enclave for the foreseeable future.
Krueger said that two possible solutions exist for northern Syria. Maybe multi-sectarian local community rebuilding could occur with the consent of Assad and Turkey. Now that President Erdoğan has won a decisive victory at home, he may reopen negotiations with the PKK from a stronger negotiating position. The other solution would be an official deal between the PYD and the US, with Russia and the US then putting pressure on Turkey to accept the facts on the ground and some form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria, as Assad may be open to such autonomy in majority-Kurdish regions.
The bottom line: it is awkward to talk about an American-support stabilization process in Syria when President Trump has been advocating full American withdrawal. All three panelists emphasized the importance of the American presence in eastern Syria and in Iraq to not just stabilizing, but also rebuilding communities in these regions once the conflict with ISIS is over. Stabilization and peace-building are vital in the aftermath of the fight with ISIS, but the Americans may abandon the effort.
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Peace Picks – June 25-July 1
1. An Alternative Vision for Israel | Monday, June 25, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Brookings Institution | Register Here
On June 25, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Member of Knesset Yair Lapid for an Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders Forum. M.K. Lapid will join for a public conversation on his vision for Israel’s future. M.K. Lapid, the former finance minister of the State of Israel, will discuss a wide-ranging set of issues confronting Israel today, from its position in the Golan Heights, its strategy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to the state U.S.-Israel alliance and bipartisan support for Israel in the United States.
A former journalist, television presenter, and author, Lapid founded the centrist Yesh Atid Party in 2012. The party garnered a surprising 19 seats in its first elections, and was the second largest party in the Knesset. Yesh Atid today polls as the main opposition challenger to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party.
Introductory Remarks: John R. Allen, President, The Brookings Institution
Moderator: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
Featured Speaker: Yair Lapid, Chairman – Yesh Atid Party
2. More Than Burden Sharing: Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 8:15 am – 9:45 am | Center for New American Security | Register Here
In early-July, NATO will host the first full-length summit at its new headquarters in Brussels. It will also be the first NATO summit for President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy team. President Trump will arrive in Brussels with only one thing on his mind: burden sharing. This is hardly a new concern for an American president, or indeed for many European leaders. Although continuing to push allies to take on a bigger share of the burden is important, the United States should not allow this single issue to eclipse the entire summit agenda. This summit needs to be about more than burden sharing. It is with this in mind that the Center for a New American Security’s Transatlantic Security Program has published its latest report, “More Than Burden Sharing: Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit.”
We cordially invite you to the formal release of this report on Tuesday, June 26 at 8:15 AM at the CNAS office (1152 15th Street NW, Suite 950) as we examine the additional issues that NATO allies should tackle at the Summit including the Black Sea, counter-terrorism, emerging domains of warfare, NATO-EU defense planning, and readiness. This public, on-the-record event will feature opening remarks by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide. A panel discussion with CNAS experts Julianne Smith and Jim Townsend, along with Ian Brzezinski of the Atlantic Council will follow. The event will be moderated by Professor Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University.
3. Mapping the Role of Religion in Fragile States – Insights from Libya, South Sudan and Iraq | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
From Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s influence in the Iraqi elections to the involvement of religious actors in South Sudan’s peace process, the role of religion in conflict zones continues to dominate headlines. Please join field researchers and U.S. Institute of Peace experts on June 26, as they present an approach for mapping the role of religious actors and institutions to better understand their legitimacy and influence in contributing to peace and conflict, exploring findings from three recent mappings from Libya, South Sudan, and Iraq based on work from the field.
The religious landscape of any conflict zone is undergoing constant change, making it difficult for stakeholders to engage and partner with religious actors. This event presents a methodology that relies on local researchers to understand the influence and legitimacy of religious actors and institutions, taking a unique approach to identifying key informants to facilitate trust and accuracy. Researchers who participated in the project in South Sudan and Iraq will be present to answer questions about challenges faced and how they were overcome.
Speakers:
Welcoming remarks: Col. Paul Hughes, Acting Vice President, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace
Introductory remarks: Rev. Susan Hayward, Senior Advisor, Religion & Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
Moderator: Rosarie Tucci, Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
Palwasha Kakar, Senior Program Officer, Libya Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Jacqueline Wilson, Lead Researcher and South Sudan Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Ann Wainscott, Lead Researcher and Iraq Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Zainab Qassim, Networks Manager, Sanad for Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace
Monica Pio, South Sudan Researcher, Forcier Consulting
4. Is There Reason to Hope? – Turkey after the 2018 Elections | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Project on Middle East Democracy | Register Here
On June 24, Turkish voters will go to the polls to select the first president and parliament to be elected under the constitutional reforms of 2016. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan poised to assume even greater powers if he wins, these elections have been described as Turkey’s last off-ramp before dictatorship. While some observers remain optimistic about the possibility of a surprise opposition victory, others fear that a contested or stolen vote could end in protests and violence.
With the stakes higher than ever, please join us for an expert panel on Tuesday, June 26, that will discuss the results of Turkey’s elections as well as their implications for the future of Turkish democracy and for the U.S.-Turkish relationship.
Please join the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) for a panel discussion featuring:
Moderator: Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research, POMED
Henri Barkey Cohen, Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University; Senior Fellow, Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Nicholas Danforth, Senior Analyst, Bipartisan Policy Center
Howard Eissenstat, Associate Professor, St. Lawrence University; POMED Nonresident Senior Fellow
Lisel Hintz, Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Gönül Tol, Founding Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Middle East Institute; Adjunct Professor, George Washington University
5. Impact of Turkish Election Results on Turkish-American Relations | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | National Press Club, First Amendment Lounge, 529 14th St NW Washington, DC 20045 | Turkish Heritage Organization | Register Here
Turkey’s snap Presidential and Parliamentary elections take place on June 24, and the outcome will shape the future of Turkey for years to come. How will these elections impact Turkey’s foreign policy toward the United States?
Please join THO on June 26 for a timely discussion on the results of the Turkish Elections. Our distinguished experts will provide insight on how the election will impact U.S.-Turkey relations. ***A light lunch will be provided for all guests***
Speakers:
Moderator: Melike Ayan, Bloomberg TV
Peter Van Praagh, President, Halifax International Security Forum
Defne Sadiklar-Arslan, Executive Director, Atlantic Council Turkey ( via Skype from Istanbul)
Luke Coffey, Director of Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation
Paul McCarthy, Deputy Director of Europe, International Republican Institute
6. Who won Turkey? Implications from Erdoğan’s Snap Elections | Wednesday, June 27, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called snap presidential and parliamentary elections for June 24. Following the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the constitutional referendum in April 2017 that approved a more powerful executive presidency, and recent economic turbulence, Turkish politics have become increasingly volatile. Recent polls suggest it is likely that Erdoğan will win the presidency in a run-off, but his Justice and Development Party (AKP) will lose its majority in parliament. What would be the domestic, economic, and foreign policy implications of such a mixed result? And what would a renewed mandate for Erdoğan mean for Turkey’s democracy, economy, and relations with the United States and Europe?
To address the outcome of the elections and its wide-ranging implications, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will convene an expert panel on Wednesday, June 27. The panel will feature Ali Çarkoğlu, professor in political science at Koç University; Charles Johnston, BIAC executive board vice chair and managing director of international government affairs at Citi; Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch senior fellow at Brookings; and Kemal Kirişci, TÜSİAD senior fellow and director of the Turkey Project at Brookings. The discussion will be moderated by Karen DeYoung, associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Washington Post.
7. Russia in the Middle East: A View from Israel | Wednesday, June 27, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here
Since Russia entered the Syrian conflict in September 2015, it has positioned itself as a major player in the region. Israel in particular has had to contend with Russia’s presence right across its border. How does Israel perceive Russia’s influence in the region? How does it impact on Israel’s ability to maintain its security interests? The speakers will address these questions and related issues.
Speakers:
Moderator: Matthew Rojansky, Director, Kennan Institute
Major General (Res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya
Dr. Col. (Res.) Shaul Shay, Director of Research of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzilya
Dr. Dmitry Adamsky, Professor, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzilya
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The Levant: from bad to worse
The Wilson Center hosted a panel yesterday entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation in the Middle East and the U.S. government’s reaction to this situation. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Syrian Conflict. A previous post focused on the Iran/Saudi Arabia dimension.
As the conversation shifted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Miller painted a bleak picture of future prospects for a two-state solution. At a time when Syria, Iraq, and Egypt – traditional, vocal allies of the Palestinian cause – are projecting less power across the region because of unrest at home, the US-Israel relationship has reached unprecedented strength. This realignment is a central premise of Jared Kushner’s peace plan strategy. Kushner hopes that aligning fully with Israel on previous roadblocks, such as the governance of Jerusalem, will take these issues off the table while heaping pressure on Netanyahu to accept concessions made to the Palestinians. At the same time, Palestinian demoralization with the current state of affairs will push them back to the negotiating table if any unexpected compromises are made. Miller argued that Kushner’s moves will have the opposite effect; Palestinian trust in America to be an honest broker has evaporated over the last six months, leaving them less inclined than ever even to engage with the United States to find a viable two-state solution.
Miller and Yacoubian also highlighted the diminishing US leadership as power vacuums emerge across the region due to the dysfunction of many Arab states. As Trump continues the Obama administration’s hands-off approach to the region, these voids are being filled by Russia, Turkey, Israel, and non-state actors. US aversion to conflict has also allowed Iran to dramatically increase its influence in Syria, leading to direct military engagement between Israel and the Islamic Republic. Yacoubian argued that a possible Israeli airstrike on Iranian positions close to the Syria-Iraq border could mean that more escalation is on the horizon. Paradoxically, continued hostilities could drag the United States into a proxy war between Israel and Iran fought in Syria and Iraq.
On the southern front, the Syrian Arab Army’s ongoing siege of Dera’a and Al-Quneitra provinces could force even more refugees to flee to Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom is already reeling from the political blowback to tax hikes designed to combat the country’s ailing economy, and another refugee influx would further inflame internal tensions. Yacoubian argued that recent US inaction in Syria suggests that the State Department’s promise for “firm and appropriate measures” in response to cease fire violations in Southern Syria is also bluster, so Jordan is on its own. Yacoubian also revealed that efforts to convince the Kurds to leave Manbij and move east of the Euphrates in northern Syria could easily derail, leading to more violence, while Trump’s desire to quickly withdraw US. troops could leave a power vacuum that ISIS would exploit.
The Bottom Lines: The political situation in the Levant has gone from bad to worse over the last six months. Increased US support of Israel at the expense of Palestinian goodwill appears to have driven them away from the negotiating table completely, at least for now. In Syria, immediate US withdrawal will only lead to further destabilization. While the train has left the station for Trump to intervene in the south to limit further economic and political strain on Jordan, maintaining a presence in the east could prevent a resurgence of ISIS in this sparsely populated, US-controlled region.
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Chemical weapons: how and who
The deployment of chemical weapons in Homs, Syria by the Assad regime in late 2012 ended a 20-year freeze on state employment of chemical weapons. Since then, the use of these weapons of mass destruction has exploded, with over 200 attacks reported in Syria alone, in addition to incidents in Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom.
One week before the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW) meets to discuss multilateral methods to enforce accountability for users of chemical weapons, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a group of chemical weapons experts to share their ideas for enforcing accountability for users of chemical weapons. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the OCPW, gave the keynote address before a panel moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, discussed the issue of chemical weapons proliferation. The panel included:
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Samantha Job, Counsellor for Foreign and Security Policy, British Embassy Washington
Nicolas Roche, Director of Strategic, Security and Disarmament Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Üzümcü detailed the successes of his tenure as OPCW Director-General, which included the elimination of 96 percent of declared chemical weapons stockpiles worldwide. He also delved into the challenges the OPCW faces in the coming years, emphasizing that increased chemical weapon attacks in Syria and elsewhere call for heightened international coordination to reinforce nonproliferation. However, Russia’s enabling attitude towards Syria’s chemical weapons use has actually eroded this norm. In recent years, Russia has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions to condemn Assad’s actions. Putin has also led a defamation campaign against the OPCW’s investigation methods. In the face of this challenge to the OPCW and its mission, the Director-General advocated for member states to give the organization the power to conduct investigations to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks.
Roche focused on France’s desire to combat chemical weapons use by strengthening multilateral institutions. He stressed the importance of international partnerships for information gathering and sharing, as well as the need for a stronger OPCW with the power to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons violence. In what could be seen as a slight to both the US and Russian behavior vis-a-vis international institutions over the last year, Roche emphasized that a multilateral regime for addressing the attribution gap in chemical weapons investigations is a greater good. France will move forward with multilateralism in combating the chemical weapons threat, regardless of who is on board.
Poblete agreed that multilateralism should be at the forefront of the fight against chemical weapons proliferation, but argued that bilateral negotiations between states should also play a role. International approaches fail when compromise becomes the enemy of the good. Poblete defended president Trump’s bilateral strategy with North Korea, repeating multiple times that the administration was well-informed going into the Kim summit. Trump’s failure to mention Kim’s chemical weapons program in the buildup or the aftermath of the meeting in no way indicated that dismantling North Korean stockpiles was off the table.
Job took the point about the need for multilateralism a step further, focusing on the critical role OPCW plays in strengthening the international norm against chemical weapons proliferation. Job emphasized the need to combat Russia’s attacks on the legitimacy of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s regulatory body, arguing that member countries should appoint permanent representatives to the OPCW to accomplish this goal. OPCW also needs increased funding to face the threat of chemical weapons attacks by non-state actors. Like Roche, Job also explicitly endorsed giving the OPCW the power to fill the attribution gap that currently exists in the prosecution of chemical weapons crimes.
Bottom Line: The international community is currently at a crossroads when it comes to dealing with the rejuvenated threat of chemical weapons attacks. Our European allies have already decided on the way forward: multilateralism. The United States is still welcome at the international negotiation table, but like with the JCPOA, France and other European powers will not capitulate to the US preference for bilateralism. The United States must present a united front with its allies on the chemical weapons issue, both for the sake of nonproliferation and for prevention of further erosion of American credibility in the current international framework.
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