Tag: Iraq
Strategic failure has consequences
9/11 produces lots of reflections. Here are mine.
Tactical success, strategic failure
The Al Qaeda attacks using commercial aircraft were largely successful. Three of four hit their intended targets and killed lots of people. But that tactical success did not lead to strategic victory. The Americans and others have hunted Al Qaeda for 20 years, killing not only its two leaders and many foot soldiers but destroying much of its organizational capacity.
But that tactical success has also not led to strategic victory. Al Qaeda has splintered and metastasized, spinning off the Islamic State and other extremist jihadi insurgents fighting in many more countries than two decades ago. This includes not only the imploded Middle Eastern states of Syria and Yemen, but also the African states of Libya, Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia.
Thus the prospect of tactical success tempts those with the capacity for violence into enterprises that end in strategic failure. This happened to the US in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We invaded because we could. Tactical success however saddled us with burdens we did not want. It took 10 years to extract most US forces from Iraq, and 20 from Afghanistan. The failure of state-building in Afghanistan has vitiated most gains from the initial military success. In Iraq, the failure is not complete, but the costs have been high.
It’s Russia’s turn
The Russians are now facing their own consequences of strategic failure. Their initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely successful. They annexed Crimea and occupied most of Luhansk and Donetsk using proxies. But President Putin wanted more. This year he tried to take Kyiv, complete the conquest of Donbas, and expand Russian control in the south. The Ukrainians fought off the attack on their capital and are now pushing the Russians back rapidly in Kharkiv province as well as more slowly around Kherson.
The ultimate military outcome is still uncertain. The Ukrainians could over-extend themselves. The Russians could succeed in regrouping and stop the Ukrainian advances or even return to territory they have lost in the past week.
But the strategic failure is already apparent. The Russian army, air force, and navy are in tatters. A reinvigorated NATO is expanding to Finland and Sweden as well as the troop presence on Russia’s borders. Sanctions are sapping the Russian economy. Europe is weaning itself rapidly from Russian oil and gas. States on Russia’s periphery are looking for opportunities to expand ties with the West. Nationalists in Russia who advocated the Ukraine war are turning on Putin. The war is solidifying Ukrainian national identity, increasing support for President Zelensky and the Ukrainian state even among Russian speakers.
The lesson
What should we learn from these strategic defeats of great powers? Confident of their military superiority, they go to war for reasons they think worthy. But war is a political as well as a military enterprise. Tactical military superiority makes it difficult to consider the consequences of strategic failure. Strategic failure is however always a possibility even if you win a war, as the Americans did in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Russians did in 2014 in Ukraine. This failure to take into account the real possibility of strategic failure is a major source of the blunders that lead to war.
Apply it to Iran
A quick footnote on applying this lesson to Iran. Israeli and American military superiority is overwhelming. But Iran is a big country, more or less the size and population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. No one should be thinking about an invasion. Even hawkish thinking is limited to attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure. Tactical success in that enterprise is not certain, as the Iranians have put a lot of their enrichment facilities deep under ground.
But strategic failure is almost certain. An Iran that has suffered an attack on its nuclear facilities will surely redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons, as that would make repeat of the attack unthinkable. Sure, the attack could be repeated ad infinitum, “mowing the grass” as the Israelis say. But sooner or later Tehran would succeed in getting nuclear weapons. What then? Tactical success guarantees nothing. Strategic failure has consequences.
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Stevenson’s army, September 1
– SAIS Prof Mark Cancian analyzes US aid to Ukraine.
– SAIS Prof Tom Mahnken discusses US-China tech competition.
– At Vox, Jonathan Guyer sees a possible Iraq civil war.
– Former SecDef Esper sees danger in extreme partisanship.
– Political scientists see more GOP use of unreliable information than Democrats.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 31
– Guardian says Taiwan for first time is shooting back at Chinese drones.
– WSJ says drones hitting US forces in Syria come from Iraqi territory.
– Defense News reports delays in shipments of arms bought by Taiwan.
– DefenseOne says DHS can’t recruit top cyber talent.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Goodies but mostly oldies
President Biden’s first trip to the Middle East took him to Israel and the occupied territories of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as Jeddah and Riyadh. So what difference will this much-anticipated trip make?
Israeli security first
In Jerusalem, Biden reaffirmed, for the umpteenth time, US commitment to Israeli security. He promised, again for the umpteenth time, that the US would use all necessary elements of national power to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. He also reiterated support for the Abrahamic accords and for an (eventual) two-state solution for the Israel/Palestine conflict. The Israelis did not join that commitment. Both Lapid and Biden favored improvement of the Palestinian economy and quality of life. They opposed anti-Semitism and BDS (the peaceful boycott, divest, sanctions movement against Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory).
The only novelty was a new dialogue on technology. That is a natural extension of the decades-long, fruitful cooperation on air defense. Also new to me was reference to India/Israel/UAE/US (I2U2) cooperation of a vague sort.
Notably missing was any reference to Israeli repression in the occupied territories. Biden ignored the killing in May by Israeli security forces of Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.
Palestine not even a close second
President Biden’s visit to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Bethlehem was low key. Biden made it clear the two-state solution is not for now. But he announced hundreds of millions in assistance to hospitals in the occupied territories (without of course calling them that).
The only novelty was a visit, without an Israeli escort, to a Palestinian hospital in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians hope it will some day house the capital of their state. But that sop did not do anything to reduce Palestinian disillusion with American policy. The Americans support the Palestinian Authority’s repressive security apparatus but fail to press Israel for meaningful concessions on Jewish settlements in the West Bank
Riyadh reconnected
Biden’s objective in Saudi Arabia was to get past a years-long rough patch in US/Saudi relations. Despite Trump’s sword-dancing with the Saudis at the beginning of his term, his Administration was a disappointment to the Saudis. They thought it did not do enough to respond to Houthi attacks on the Kingdom’s oil infrastructure. Biden as a candidate labelled Saudi Arabia a pariah, because of the murder of Washington Post journalist and Saudi citizen Jamal Khashoggi in the Kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul. But oil prices are peaking as a result of the Ukraine war and Israel is anxious to extend the normalization process to Saudi Arabia. Washington decided continuing friction was not advisable.
So with a fist bump and a private complaint to Mohammed bin Salman about the murder, Biden sought to reset relations. Their immediate reciprocal gesture was minimal. The Saudis will allow Israeli civilian aircraft to fly over the Kingdom, as Biden’s did from Tel Aviv. There was no public commitment on oil production. The Saudi Foreign Minister made it clear the opening of airspace was not a gesture only to Israel and that the Saudis will continue to insist on a peace settlement with the Palestinians before diplomatic recognition of Israel. Riyadh and Washington agreed however on a long agenda for US/Saudi cooperation.
Normalization is a process. It appears to be proceeding in internal security and air defense, even if the Israelis exaggerate that cooperation in public. Three years ago I was sitting in the business class lounge in Riyadh hearing nothing but Hebrew around me, spoken by mostly men carrying the kind of cases that contain electronic equipment. When I asked why the somewhat cold-eyed response was clear enough: if I told you, I’d have to kill you.
Notable, but little noted
Notable, but not much noted, is that the US will withdraw its multinational observer force from the strategically important island of Tiran. It sits just outside the Bab al Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea. Egypt has agreed to transfer sovereignty over Tiran and another small island to the Kingdom. US withdrawal wouldn’t be happening without Israeli concurrence, as the observers were put there in fulfillment of the 1979 Egypt/Israel peace treaty.
Horror vacui
Biden met in Jeddah Saturday with leaders of the six GCC states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait) as well as Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. This was a first for an American president. He also held bilateral meetings with Egyptian President Sisi, Iraqi Prime Minister Kadhimi, and United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Zayed. The Americans were keen to underline that they do not want to leave a vacuum in the Middle East that China and Russia can occupy.
Even if they don’t, Moscow and Beijing will be more present in the region than in recent decades. Russia is OPEC’s partner in maintaining oil prices, a protector of the Syrian regime, and increasingly an arms supplier in the region. Moscow is seeking drones from Iran to use in Ukraine. Beijing is the major consumer of regional oil and gas and supplier of manufactured goods.
Bottom lines
Only time will tell how the geopolitical rivalry in the Middle East will work out. So far, the perception of reduced American commitment has led to a process of rapprochement in several directions. Saudi Arabia has been busy improving relations not only with Russia and China but also with Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. Normalization with Israel may not be in the cards anytime soon, but Israel’s technology is welcome because it comes with few strings attached. The Americans are not going to find it easy to press the case for democracy, which Biden vowed to do, while their proxy befriends the autocrats.
Here is the event on the trip I did with Gulf International Forum and a great lineup of speakers on Monday, after the trip:
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The time to remember has come
My esteemed Middle East Institute colleagues Paul Salem and Brian Katulis have set a low bar for President Biden’s trip to the Middle East this week. They want him to send a signal of renewed diplomatic commitment to the region.
There’s a hitch
It’s an important objective, but there is a hitch. It is the signs of reduced US commitment that have incentivized many improvements in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This is clear in Yemen. The current ceasefire came about in part because of US reluctance to continue supporting Saudi efforts to counter the Houthis. Iraq’s current role mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia would be inconceivable if the Americans hadn’t withdrawn most of their forces. The wars in Syria are calming partly because the Americans have mostly withdrawn. The remainder are limiting action exclusively to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
Israel’s newfound ambition to help guard Arab Gulf security is also a consequence of reduced American commitment. The Ibrahim/Abraham accords that President Trump initiated essentially trade Arab recognition for Israeli security assistance. The Arab Gulf monarchies regard that as better than American help. The Israelis don’t demand respect for human rights. Spyware and air defense have proven attractive propositions. Diplomatic recognition hasn’t proven costly to the Arab states that have done it so far (UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco), but the Saudis have hesitated.
And a fly in the Saudi ointment
That’s because of the fly in the ointment. Israel is refusing not only to make peace with the Palestinians but even to accept two states as the basis for a future peace. Israel’s current ambitions are clear: to keep the Golan Heights and all of Jerusalem as well as many of the settlements on the West Bank. The Palestinians would then get only a “state-minus.” That would lack not only an army but sovereign control over its very limited territory. Israel’s attitude is unlikely to change, even after its next election. Prime Minister Netanyahu is gone, but not his singular accomplishment: killing the spirit of Oslo.
Plus an elephant in the room
The elephant in the room is Iran. Negotiations for re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are faltering. If they fail, Iran will have the option within a year of producing enough enriched uranium to make several atomic bombs. Attacks on its nuclear facilities and personnel would only delay the inevitable, perhaps by years but more likely by months. They would also give Tehran reason to attack the Gulf states, either directly or through proxies.
The situation will improve only marginally if the JCPOA is revived. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will then use sanctions relief to reinvigorate their proxy military interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. That is precisely what the Gulf states don’t want.
Diplomacy>military
Paul and Brian rightly underline the good things American diplomacy could try to do: improve governance, encourage regional de-escalation and integration, and build civilian ties to the United States, both with citizens and institutions. But Washington has proven inept so far at beefing up diplomatic efforts once the troops are gone. Witness Iraq, where a mostly civilian-focused strategic framework agreement has languished after the military withdrawal. As Chas Freeman pointed out years ago, our diplomats have forgotten diplomacy without force. The time to remember has come.
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No sword dancing on treacherous terrain
President Biden’s op/ed in the Washington Post previews his visit next week to the Middle East. He will stop in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Jeddah (for a regional Arab meeting), and Riyadh. The piece has two audiences: the domestic one and the international one, especially in the Middle East but also in Europe and the Far East.
What the Americans want
There are four salient issues for Biden’s domestic audience: the Iran nuclear deal, support for Israel, oil prices, and human rights. America is split on the Iran nuclear deal. Half support Biden’s desire to re-enter it. The other half want to continue the so far unsuccessful effort to sanction Iran into submission, with the possibility of military action if that fails. On support for Israel’s security, there is overwhelming support. But Americans increasingly want accountability for Israeli abuses against Palestinians. Biden avoids that subject in the op/ed.
Most Americans want lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to increase production, partly in retaliation for Biden’s criticism of human rights practices in the Kingdom, particularly the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. That is not a dinnertime conversation topic in the US. But there are many informed voices calling for accountability beyond the minimum the Saudis have so far done.
What the world wants: nuclear deal and Iran’s regional power projection
The rest of the world has a somewhat different set of priorities: not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its regional power projection as well as oil prices. Beyond the US, there is little concern for Israel’s security or human rights, apart from the plight of the Palestinians.
Most of the world would like to see the Iran nuclear deal operating once again. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not, despite the risks to them of war if Israel or the US seeks to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. Biden should be aiming to understand their perspective better. My guess is they would be fine with re-entry into nuclear deal provided the US pushes back harder on Iran’s regional power projection.
That could mean doing more to weaken the Houthis in Yemen. It could also mean reducing Iran’s presence in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies are major players. Strengthening the nascent regional air defense system (see video above) or even Saudi entry into the Ibrahimic accords are other possibilities.
What the world wants: oil prices and Palestinians
On oil prices, the Saudis may seek some assurances on the downside while the Americans push for increased production. Europe and the Far East will wish the Americans success. Russia, Iran, Iraq, and other major producers will want prices to remain above $100 per barrel. That is what they all need to balance their budgets. No American president can promise sustained high oil prices. But the US is now a net oil and gas exporter. A nod to stability in the oil market is not out of the question.
While Biden will visit the West Bank, he has so far done little more than restore aid to the Palestinians President Trump had zeroed out. The op/ed fails to mention the two-state solution or Israeli responsibility for human rights abuses against Palestinians. It doesn’t even mention the rumored intention to re-open the US consulate in Jerusalem. That had acted for decades before Trump as a de facto embassy to Palestine. We can only hope Biden will be more forthcoming on those issues during his trip.
Treacherous terrain
The Middle East is treacherous terrain for any American president. Trump blundered by sword dancing with the Saudis, both literally and figuratively. He also wrote the Israelis a blank check (including for their territorial ambitions) and ended support for the Palestinians. Biden won’t commit those mistakes. He will try to build on the Ibrahimic accords that Trump initiated, strengthen and unify Arab defenses against Iran, and reach some sort of accommodation on oil production and prices. Odds are the trip will not be a brilliant success, but the ambitions are at least more realistic than his predecessor’s.
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