Tag: Iraq
Stevenson’s army, June 28
US air strikes in Iraq and Syria against Iranian-linked militias. NYT background. Official release.
UN told Russian mercenaries commit war crimes in Africa.
Bruce Riedel remembers the Khobar Towers bombing 25 years ago. He notes how US retaliated against Iran. The incident also led to a civ-mil clash when SecDef Cohen wanted to punish senior officers and USAF Chief of Staff wanted to punish only those immediately responsible. The chief retired early in quiet protest. For me it was a clash between the Navy and Air Force approaches to command responsibility.
Fred Kaplan reviews West Point’s long history of teaching about race.
Tucker Carlson attacks Gen.Milley.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks | June 21-25, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- World refugee day: Stories of resilient women | June 21, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The Atlantic Council hosts a powerful conversation with refugee – and former refugee – women from around the globe as they share their stories of hope and triumph after surviving unforgettable hardship. These are stories of true resilience.
Speakers:
Adrienne Arsht (opening remarks)
Executive Vice Chair, Atlantic Council; Founder, Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Reena Ninan (moderator)
Journalist and International Correspondent
Suzana Vuk
Account Executive, Zoom Video Communications
Priyali Sur
Founder & Managing Director, The Azadi Project
José Felix Rodriguez
Regional Coordinator of Migration, Social Inclusion and Non-Violence (Americas Region), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Lilia
Interviewed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Sedighe
Interviewed by the Azadi Project
Masouma
Interviewed by the Azadi Project
Rebecca Scheurer (closing remarks)
Director, Humanitarian Initiatives, Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, Atlantic Council
2. What Iran’s election results portend | June 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Following the June 18 presidential elections in Iran, a panel of experts discuss the political landscape and the ballot’s regional and international implications. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion of the implications of the election results for US-Iran relations, the 2015 nuclear deal, and Iran’s regional and domestic politics, including the succession to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Speakers:
Borzou Daragahi
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
Director, Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy
Azadeh Zamirirad
Iran Researcher and Deputy Head of the Africa and Middle East Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Sadegh Zibakalam
Author and Professor, University of Tehran
Barbara Slavin (moderator)
Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
3. Prioritizing clean energy investments in emerging and developing economies | June 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Around the world, developing markets are facing a daunting challenge: how to strengthen their economies to improve the lives and livelihoods of citizens while not relying on high-carbon avenues for growth which have been deployed for generations. In many ways, the future of climate action relies on the decisions made in these emerging markets, and additional fiscal pressure brought about by the pandemic has made investing in necessary energy transformations to create sustainable, long-term growth even more difficult. A new report from the International Energy Agency (IEA), in collaboration with the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, outlines a plan for mobilizing and prioritizing clean energy investments in these economies.
The Brookings Initiative on Climate Research and Action will convene an event to discuss the new IEA report, “Financing clean energy transitions in emerging and developing economies” and the obstacles to mobilizing and deploying finance for clean energy transitions.
Speakers:
David G. Victor (introduction)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
Fatih Birol (keynote)
Executive Director, International Energy Agency
Michael Waldron (paper presentation)
Head of the Energy Investment Unit, International Energy Agency
David Dollar
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution
Samantha Gross
Director, Energy Security and Climate Initiative; Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
Rachel Kyte
Dean, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Steven M. Rothstein
Managing Director, Ceres Accelerator for Sustainable Capital Market
4. Terrorist Attacks, Cultural Incidents And The Vote For Radical Parties: Analyzing Text From Twitter | June 22, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Hoover Institution, Stanford University | Register Here
The Hoover Institution announces a new seminar series on Using Text as Data in Policy Analysis. These seminars will feature applications of natural language processing, structured human readings, and machine learning methods to text as data to examine policy issues in economics, history, national security, political science, and other fields. This third session features a conversation with Francesco Giavazzi speaking on Terrorist Attacks, Cultural Incidents and the Vote for Radical Parties: Analyzing Text from Twitter.
Speakers:
Francesco Giavazzi
Professor of Economics, Bocconi University; Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research; Research Associate, NBER
5. Views From the Ground: Perceptions of Domestic Conditions in MENA | June 22, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) holds the third event in a four-part series in cooperation with Arab Barometer, on the occasion of the publication of Arab Barometer’s findings from the sixth wave of its surveys. The third panel will bring together experts from the US and Middle East alongside Abdul-Wahab Kayyali, senior research specialist with the Arab Barometer, to discuss the findings relevant to domestic conditions in the region. What have been the views of governments throughout the pandemic and ongoing crises? How are the economic conditions, and in what ways has the change of global work conditions impacted regional populations? What are the perceptions of civil liberty and freedoms?
Speakers:
Abdul-Wahab Kayyali
Senior Research Specialist, Arab Barometer
Sahar Khamis
Non-Resident Scholar, MEI
Saloua Zerhouni
President, Rabat Institute for Social Science
Ibrahim al-Assil (moderator)
Senior Fellow, MEI
6. Iran’s Pivotal Presidential Election | June 22, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | Wilson Center and United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
The election on June 18 could mark the most important political transition in Iran for more than 30 years since the new president is likely to be in power when the next supreme leader is selected. Most Iranians—and now the majority of voters—were born after the 1979 revolution. One of the looming questions is how many will vote—and what will turnout say about public support for the regime.
The election intersects with critical negotiations between Iran and the world’s six major powers over the future of the JCPOA nuclear deal. Iran’s next president will set policy for years to come on foreign relations, including talks with the outside world on its nuclear and missile programs as well as on domestic affairs and the economy, which have been stifled by economic sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic.
This expert panel will discuss the election results and the implications for Iran, the Middle East, and the United States. How will the new president fare with the Biden administration?
Speakers:
Robin Wright
Distinguished Fellow, USIP-Wilson Center; Author and Columnist, The New York Times
Suzanne Maloney
Interim Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution; Senior Fellow, Brookings Center for Middle East Policy
Ali Vaez
Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
James F. Jeffrey (moderator)
Chair of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center; Former Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, US State Department
7. Re-Seeding Culture: Syrian Artists in Berlin | June 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute’s Arts and Culture Center in collaboration with the Goethe-Institut Washington host a conversation about the development and influence of a thriving Syrian creative community in Berlin over the past decade with a panel of members of this community.
How did Berlin emerge as a new hub of Syrian arts and culture in diaspora? What challenges did Syrian artists face? How did they adapt and engage with this new artistic landscape? And what sort of influence has this exchange of cultures had on Berlin’s artistic community and cultural institutions?
Speakers:
Khaled Barakeh
Contemporary Artist
Kinan Hmeidan
Actor
Diana El-Jeiroudi
Filmmaker & Producer
Malu Halasa (moderator)
Writer
8. Advancing the role of women in Sudan’s transition | May 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Chatham House | Register Here
The contribution of women to Sudan’s transition is crucial to ensuring long-term peace, stability and development. In March 2020, the transitional government adopted its National Action Plan on women, peace and security, in line with UN Resolution 1325 which reaffirms the important role of women in peace and security efforts. Earlier this year, the cabinet also announced its priority to empower women in public affairs yet implementation of these commitments remains slow
At this event, panellists reflect on the role of women in the implementation of peace in Sudan and discuss how to increase the participation of women in political roles and other fields. They also examine outstanding priorities for legal reform, the impact of gender-based discrimination and the need for action to secure the rights and safety of women in the country.
Speakers:
Samia El Hashmi
Co-Founder and Chairwomen, Mutawinat Benevolent Company
Samia Nihar
Head, Gender Unit, Development Studies and Research Center, University of Khartoum
Manara Asad Begira Arbab
International Cooperation and Public Relations Officer, Sudan Youth Organization for Climate Change
Yousra Elbagir (moderator)
Freelance Journalist and Writer
9. A Conversation with Iraq’s Planning and Migration Ministers | June 23, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Join USIP for a discussion with Iraq’s Minister of Planning Khalid Najim and Minister of Migration and Displacement Evan Jabro on the current situation and challenges to stabilization, reconstruction and reform efforts in Iraq. The discussion will also shed light on the status of Iraq’s displaced communities and recent returnees — including ethnic and religious minorities and those at al-Hol camp — as well as the Iraqi government’s plans for the future.
Speakers:
Michael Yaffe (opening remarks)
Vice President, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Minister Khalid Batal Najm
Minister of Planning, Republic of Iraq
Minister Evan Faeq Jabro
Minister of Migration and Displacement, Republic of Iraq
Sarhang Hamasaeed (moderator)
Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace
10. Book Discussion | Transforming Our World: President George H.W. Bush and American Foreign Policy | June 24, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
From the fall of the Soviet Union to the Gulf War, the presidency of George H. W. Bush dealt with foreign policy challenges that would cement the post-Cold War order for a generation. Transforming Our World: President George H.W. Bush and American Foreign Policy offers readers a unique perspective on international events in the Bush administration — in the words of distinguished U.S. foreign policy insiders who helped shape them. They shed new light on and analyze President Bush’s role in world events during this historic period, his style of diplomacy, the organization and functioning of his foreign policy team, the consequences of his decisions, and his leadership skills.
Speakers:
Andrew H. Card Jr.
Author, Transforming Our World; Former White House Chief of Staff; Former Chair, National Endowment for Democracy
Andrew S. Natsios
Author, Transforming Our World; Director, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University
Ambassador Mark Green (moderator)
President, Director, & CEO, Wilson Center
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Stevenson’s army, June 18
-Congress and administration fight over cyber jobs.
-Pentagon considers sending troops back to Somalia.
-Covid locks down Kabul embassy.
-Defense One writers call PDI a slush fund.
-House votes to repeal 2002 Iraq AUMF. [Hello. It’s the 2001 AUMF that has been stretched beyond the breaking point.]
-Ronan Farrow wonders if Blinken can rebuild the State Dept
-WSJ says US & EU are cooperating on emerging technologies.
-Rand analyst says US should understand what defeat in war means.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The pandemic weakened the weakest governments and social groups
The Middle East Institute June 15 hosted a seminar discussing the impact of COVID-19 on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This was in collaboration with the recently released 6th wave of the Arab Barometer, an expansive regional survey. Using the results from this survey and analysis from the Brookings Doha Center, the panel assessed the pandemic’s effects on the region and the perceived efficiency of government responses. As the survey was held in three rounds throughout 2020-2021, the Arab Barometer could also register changes over time. Bottom line: the pandemic exacerbated the region’s existing problems and the hardest hit were the most vulnerable communities (refugees, the poor, and women).
The speakers were:
Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow
Brookings-Doha Center
Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist
Arab Barometer
Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar
MEI
Deputy regional director
Mercy Corps
Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy
MEI
Exacerbating existing problems
Shahla Kli COVID has worsened existing issues, particularly for IDPs and refugees. She highlighted two of these structural weaknesses in particular:
- Lack of institutionalization: This is manifested in weak healthcare systems and social welfare programs. COVIC pushed these to their limits. Furthermore, some countries (such as Syria or Lebanon) lack well-structured recovery and vaccination plans, exacerbating and lengthening the crisis.
- Unemployment/the ‘youth bulge’: Problems in the labor market abound in the MENA region. Many of its youthful populations work in informal, day-to-day jobs. This is particularly true for migrants and refugees. Often these jobs disappeared during lockdowns. Conversely, many poor citizens and migrants had no choice but to continue working despite the pandemic, potentially falling ill themselves.
Public opinion
Salma al-Shami outlined the relevant results of the Arab Barometer on this topic. The Barometer gathered data on seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) due to financial and access constraints. She summarized the findings in five main points:
- Concern for COVID is still high in these countries, but it is significantly higher among women than among men.
- The loss of education for children and increased cost of living were the the number one and two concerns. In Jordan some 140 days of education were lost according to UNESCO, and even more in Iraq.
- Public opinion on government response to COVID varies with the assessment of the healthcare system and inflation control. If these are positively rated, the government’s response also tends to be. This is the case in Morocco and Tunisia for example, while Lebanon and Iraq lack such public confidence. Morocco was also the only country where significant relief packages were deployed. Some 49% of respondents in that country indicated they received some form of aid, where that number didn’t top 20% in any of the other countries.
- Concerning vaccines, there is still some hesitancy. Where trust in government is high, so is the willingness to take a vaccine, as in Morocco which has already seen an exemplary vaccine rollout compared to its neighbors. However, in Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia, only 35-42% indicate they are willing to take a vaccine. Abouzzouhour added that in Jordan conspiracy theories surrounding the vaccines are rampant, and that the government is often not the public’s primary source of information.
- The survey data also indicates that COVID has exacerbated issues of income inequality and unemployment. Few respondents indicated they lost their jobs because of COVID-related lockdowns, although many did experience a temporary job interruption. Women and migrant labor in general suffered greater consequences.
Government responses
Adding to the statistics related to government response to COVID, Abouzzouhour commented that governments overpromised and underdelivered. The first wave saw major lockdowns and task forces with health experts, leading to a comparatively strong performance. However, the initial best cases (Tunisia and Jordan) failed to follow through on their success because they favored opening up for their economies. Additionally, relief packages and strong vaccination drives often faltered, despite government promises. In general, countries that previously underinvested in healthcare (as a percentage of their GDP) suffered high mortality rates.
Two interesting cases emerged from her story. Once again, Morocco was underlined as a strong performer in vaccination compared to its neighbors. Algeria is less clear-cut. It has some of the lowest infection rates in the region. However, its mortality rate is comparatively high, indicating that case numbers are likely underreported more than in other countries. Algeria was also criticized for failing to set up significant relief packages, despite the nation’s hydrocarbon resources.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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Nationalism is rising, but sectarianism won’t fade quickly
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) June 9 organized a discussion on issues of nationalism and sectarianism in the Middle East. The Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianization project (SEPAD) co-organized; its director Simon Mabon joined the panel as an expert on Saudi Arabia. Together with two experts on Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, he assessed the state of sectarianism and nationalist projects in these three countries. Iraq and Lebanon are experiencing grassroots protest movements to overcome sectarianism while Saudi Arabia is seeing a major top-down drive through the Vision 2030 project spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Should these be understood as attempts to let national identity overcome sectarianism in politics? If so, can we expect them to be successful? The panel agreed that these issues are unlikely to be solved quickly or by MbS’s preferred economic means, but a clear shift in political thinking is occurring in the younger generations.
The speakers were:
Geneive Abdo
Visiting Fellow
AGSIW
Simon Mabon
Chair in International Politics
Lancaster University
Director
Richardson Institute
Director
SEPAD
Maha Yahya
Director
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Kristin Smith Diwan (moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar
AGSIW
Two protest movements and one grand vision
As Simon Mabon explained, SEPAD analyzes the events in the modern Middle East and tests the theory that secularist national identities are replacing sectarian political identities. The focus for his talk lay on the three countries Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. As Abdo and Yahya indicated, Lebanon and Iraq are experiencing major protest movements that attack the corruption, lack of accountability, and cronyism in their countries. Both have democratic systems that reserve political positions and parliamentary representation to specific sectarian groups. In practice, as Yahya said, this “turned the relationship between individuals and their state into one that is mediated by sectarian community.” The political system has become a way to divide the cake among power brokers, who in Lebanon are referred to as ‘mafia’.
The protest movements in both of these countries self-identify as secular. As Abdo underlined, Iraqi protesters are overwhelmingly Shia and use Shia religious symbolism (such as references to the martyrdom of Shia Imam Hussein) in their demonstrations. Moreover, the Shia clergy in Iraq openly supports and collaborates with the protest movement. In this younger generation there is a clear division between personal religious identity and political identity. It is in the latter that desectarianization has occurred. Furthermore, the protesters emphasize that their agenda is issue-based.
Maha Yahya noted that Lebanon differs. The current protests go beyond clear-cut issues (such as the Whatsapp-tax that triggered the current protest movement) and aim at a complete overhaul of the sectarian political system. The individual controversies and issues that abound in Lebanese politics are seen as symptoms of a broken regime.
The situation in Saudi Arabia might appear unrelated. The Arab Spring saw some demonstrations in the Shia East of the country, but nothing on the scale of the other two countries discussed here. MBS is seeking to transform and modernize his country under his ambitious ‘Vision 2030’ project. Funded by billions of petrodollars, MBS wants to wean Saudi Arabia off its reliance on oil and modernize its economy. His vision includes relaxation of the strict religious laws for economic and political purposes. MBS hopes to transform Saudi citizenship to a secularist, civic nationalism in which both Sunni Wahhabi and Shia groups participate. According to Mabon, the ambitious pace and huge investments that go along with this show that MBS believes he has a ‘magic switch’ that can achieve this transformation of identities.
Sectarianism won’t go away easily
The panel agreed it would be naïve to think that deep-seated sectarian social and political systems will go away quickly. Vision 2030 aims to remove sectarian divisions by offering everyone a seat at the economic table, and therefore a stake in the state. The systems of marginalization and othering cannot be undone with a ‘magic switch’ and some ‘bread and games’, and centuries of repression cannot so easily be erased. Investing hundreds of millions into shopping malls in Shia areas could be seen as tokenism and introduces new issues of gentrification and marginalization along class lines. Nonetheless, a less cynical view could see these as the first steps towards change according to Mabon.
In Lebanon and Iraq, a major obstacle is the lack of unity within the protest movements. Groups and proto-parties are forming, aiming for Iraqi elections planned for October and Lebanese parliamentary elections to come in 2022. However, the grassroots movements have not yet coalesced into clear protest parties. Yahya and Abdo agreed that in both Lebanon and Iraq the political system discourages new parties, and the existing political establishment is unlikely to disappear in one electoral cycle. Yahya is cautiously optimistic in the medium term about the grassroots developments in Lebanon. Abdo indicated that Iraqi proto-parties are also emerging and receiving donations. However, there is a serious debate on whether the protesters should boycott the elections or try to get as many seats as possible. Iraq’s 2018 elections had an official turnout of 44%, although the real number is estimated to have been as low as 20%, meaning that turnout is already a critical issue for the established elite’s legitimacy. Moderator Diwan pointed out that boycotts in the region (such as in Bahrain or Kuwait) haven’t generally been a successful way to challenge entrenched elites.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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Engagement with armed groups is necessary, “good” or “bad”
The Crisis Response Council and the Brookings Institution’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors June 3 convened a discussion on challenges posed by armed groups to security sector reform (SSR) in the Middle East and beyond. Panelists agreed that SSR too frequently views armed groups from a unidimensional perspective. Militias are not inherent spoilers whose power is limited to the security sector. They are more often politically or socially embedded potential power brokers. State monopolies on violence are an anomaly in post-conflict states. Armed groups can contribute positively to SSR and governance.
The speakers were:
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Brookings Institution
Frederic Wehrey
Senior fellow, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bernadetta Berti
Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
NATO
Yaniv Voller
Senior Lecturer in the Politics of the Middle East
University of Kent; Stanford University
Ranj Alaaldin (moderator)
Visiting Fellow – Brookings Doha Center; Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institution
The present: thriving and misunderstood
Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the Corona pandemic’s effect on armed groups around the world. The associated economic downturn has pushed some states to their limits. 200 million people have been pushed into poverty, and many of those will be forced to engage in criminal activities to scrape together a living. Under these conditions, armed groups thrive. Hundreds of millions of people already live under total, partial, or shared control by armed groups. As state spending on social welfare, but also security provision, shrunk, armed groups moved in to fill the gaps.
Wehrey discussed the case of Libya, where armed groups have thrived in part because they were misunderstood by outsiders. Emerging after the fall of Gadhafi, they were useful security providers, but politicized and prone to state capture and corruption. The Libyan case could have ended more positively if the ‘prizes’ for militias had been placed under better oversight. Oil revenues, ministerial positions, ports, airports were targets for militia competition. Protection of such prizes could have prevented the militia growth that Libya has seen.
Multiple efforts to “train and equip” a Libyan army from scratch have failed. Such an effort takes years and the security vacuum that exists before its completion is sure to be filled up by someone. Furthermore, in Libya new armies have often recruited from specific tribal, communal, or political backgrounds. These are less national armies and more new militias. This is something Wehrey sees happening now with Turkish support for the Tripoli-based armed forces. The current effort to defer security issues while working on political unity is reminiscent of 2012. The outcome might be similar: a relapse into violence.
The panel agreed that armed groups are not anomalies and they will not go away. Ahram suggested states do not necessarily want to be centralized. There are many examples of leaders deliberately fragmenting power. Militia fighters are not unlucky souls whose dream is to join the regular army and leave the militia life behind them. These groups are an embedded part of their communities and not easily fixable aberrations.
What makes an armed group “good” or “bad”?
The exact drivers of armed groups are poorly understood by academia and policy makers. Voller focuses his research on the question of why certain pro-government militias act predatorily, while others do not. Rather than an inherent inclination to violence, he believes that a core determinant is whether an armed group acts in a theater where its constituency is present. The predominantly Shia PMF in Iraq became predatorial when they entered the Sunni northwest in the fight against ISIS, while the Kurdish Peshmerga refrained from doing so as they always operate among their Kurdish communities. Felbab-Brown countered that other factors must also be important, as there are plenty of examples of armed groups acting predatorily among their own communities. She posits that any armed group gets feedback from its community, even if it is only by means of resistance to violence. If a community lacks social cohesion, this feedback can be unclear or weak, allowing greater predatory behavior.
Wehrey warned against an overly economic focus when it comes to controlling militias. Paying off armed groups to steer them, or turning off their incomes to force their hand, only treats part of the reality. These groups are embedded in and motivated by communal identity, religion, and history. Ahram agreed. He added that armed groups are also not merely political, as there are many cases of armed groups engaging in negotiations or elections and still continuing their armed struggles. Normative motivations are also part of the equation, as local norms, national laws, and even international law (and the fear of a Hague tribunal) are all considered by militias. Ahram believes that the onus is on researchers to identify which of these different levers matter under which circumstances, and how they can be used effectively.
Berti joked that she would enjoy this academic exercise, but that the policy maker in her called for a different course of action. She warned that all of these tools are highly context specific. What works best in practice is a willingness to enter a long-term commitment to a peace building effort. An intervening power needs to engage in a dynamic relationship with local power brokers and be willing to deal with new actors and change course when the situation calls for it.
Policy makers’ task: flexibility and pragmatism
The panel agreed that thinking in terms of “good” or “bad” militias is a fruitless exercise. Voller emphasized once more that militias are embedded in their communities. He used the example of Syrian militias that might align with Assad and engage in repression in order to protect their own constituencies. We might not call these actors “good”, but we can understand what motivates them. Felbab-Brown explained that it is better to think in pragmatic terms of available alternatives. An armed group might be odious, yet be the best option in terms of service provision, behavior, and accountability. Local populations as a rule adapt to harsh and illiberal actors if they provide stability and security.
The task that faces policy makers is a daunting one, as current tools and theories are poorly equipped to deal with the realities. The key is to be flexible and to accept militias as an embedded part of society. Berti and Ahram underlined this. We often speak of ‘allowing’ armed groups to exist or participate in a society. In practice, however, we usually have little influence over their existence. Voller emphasized that engaging with a militia directly as the state, rather than condemning and ignoring it, is usually the best way to have a positive influence on its behavior. Using the example of the Lebanese Hezbollah, however, Berti warned us to beware of who’s steering whom in these dynamics.
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