Tag: ISIS
Dialogue, restricted speech, or infiltration?
A former terrorist and the NYPD officer responsible for his arrest spoke at CSIS Monday about strategies for countering violent extremism in today’s world. The Unmaking of Jihadism: The Current Effort to Combat Violent Extremism featured:
- Jesse Morton: Leader of Parallel Networks, former leader and co-founder of Revolution Muslim
- Mitch Silber: Former Director of Intelligence Analysis for the New York City Police Department
- Seth G. Jones: Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS (Moderator).
Morton and Silber worked on opposite sides of the extremism/CVE divide. Morton said that his traumatic upbringing spawned resentment towards his family and the working class town he grew up in, and that radical Salafi Islam became the outlet through which he expressed this acrimony. The Salafi movement also gave him a community. Morton co-founded Revolution Muslim with his friend Youssef Al-Khattab, a fellow convert to Islam. Abdullah Al-Faisal, a Jamaican cleric who encouraged the killing of Americans, Jews, Hindus, and Christians in his teaching, became Revolution Muslim’s spiritual leader.
Revolution Muslim pioneered the use of Web 2.0 platforms to radicalize individuals without forcing them to travel to terrorist hotbeds around the world. This tactic, which has become a popular recruiting tool for ISIS, involves using social media video lectures to teach large audiences to teach about the militant brand of Salafism. Interested individuals are then contacted by group leaders through end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Telegram. Morton stressed that Revolution Muslim’s success in evading US law enforcement came through its recognition that the Salafi ideology itself was powerful enough to radicalize individuals without Revolution Muslim having to specifically endorse violent extremism. The group thus remained within its First Amendment rights even though 15-20 terrorist plotters around the world traced their roots back to Revolution Muslim.
Silber furthered Morton’s point, emphasizing that the reason why Revolution Muslim survived in the US for four years was Morton’s exquisite knowledge of First Amendment case law. Morton “frequently danced on the First Amendment line” in his public statements, preventing the authorities from arresting him. Further, Revolution Muslim moved away from the top-down hierarchical approach espoused by Al-Qaeda, allowing individuals around the world to plan and execute their own plots. According to Silber, these factors revolutionized recruiting for terrorist groups around the world. Even Al-Qaeda began publishing an English-language magazine in 2010 that included articles such as “How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom.” The Islamic State takes this approach even further. In addition to publishing an English version of Dabiq, ISIS fully embraced Revolution Muslim’s decentralized, web-based strategy, allowing its ideology to continue spreading on the internet even as its territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria has weakened.
It should come as no surprise that ISIS is in the midst of a resurgence in Iraq, despite Prime Minister Al-Abadi’s declaration of victory over the caliphate last December. Morton stressed that the ideologies associated with extremism always outlive the groups that embody them in a particular time period. ISIS technological prowess also allows it to shift from leaderless resistance back to a command/cadre model at any time, enabling the organization to regroup quickly despite frequent military defeats in recent years. According to Silber, ISIS’ fluidity poses a threat particularly for Europe. For instance, 370 Austrians have traveled to Syria and Iraq since ISIS’ establishment, some of whom have returned to Europe. Further, the threat of other terror organizations cannot be discounted, particularly as Al-Qaeda has reemerged as a “moderate” alternative for terrorists turned off by ISIS’ extreme brutality.
For future US counter-terrorism strategy to be effective, Morton believes that more attention must be paid to the internet’s power to sustain extremist ideologies. He does not believe, however, that restricting free speech on social media platforms is the solution. Social media represents a great outlet for people to voice their opinions, and more should be done to encourage dialogue between people with different views to foster the mutual understanding required to bring people from the poles to the center. To this end, Morton stressed that Islamist extremists and the far right need each other, since both ideologies rely on demonization of the other to survive.
Silber disagreed, arguing that updating social media terms of use agreements to restrict certain types of speech would significantly support CVE efforts. Further, Silber highlighted the valuable role human intelligence played in infiltrating Revolution Muslim and documenting its activities. For Silber, training local officers who possess the technical and linguistic ability to penetrate extremists’ digital networks is the model for the future.
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Peace Picks July 23 – 29
1. The Unmaking of Jihadism: The Current Effort to Combat Violent Extremism | Monday, July 23, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm | CSIS | Register Here
Please join Mitch Silber (former Director of Intelligence Analysis for the New York City Police Department), Jesse Morton (the former leader and co-founder of Revolution Muslim for which he served time in prison), and Seth G. Jones (Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS), as they discuss the ongoing effort to counter violent extremism in the United States and abroad. The discussion will surround the issues of returning foreign fighters, counter messaging, post-prison re-integration, and other efforts related to countering violent extremism. Jesse Morton and Mitch Silber now co-direct a Virginia-based nonprofit, named Parallel Networks, that focuses on the rehabilitation of radicalized individuals.
2. Verifying North Korean Denuclearization: Where Do We Go from Here? | Monday, July 23, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 4:45 pm | CSIS | Register Here
More than one month after the Singapore Summit, little headway has been made on denuclearization of North Korea. Many attribute the slow progress to disparate definitions of denuclearization on the part of the United States and North Korea. This conference brings together regional and technical experts to take stock of where we are on the four elements of the Singapore Summit and to examine the following questions: Why do the United States and North Korea have different definitions of denuclearization? Is CVID feasible? What are the appropriate standards for a verification protocol for North Korea’s denuclearization? What should be our goals in a denuclearization agreement? What are we willing to sacrifice in return? What does the road ahead look like?
WELCOMING REMARKS
Mr. H. Andrew Schwartz, Chief Communications Officer, CSIS
OPENING REMARKS
Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
SESSION I: Verification Standards for North Korean Denuclearization
Mr. Stephen Pomper, Program Director, United States, International Crisis Group
Ms. Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS
Mr. Richard Johnson, Senior Director Fuel Cycle and Verification, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Mr. William Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
SESSION II: Taking Stock: Where Do We Go from Here?
Mr. David Nakamura, Staff Writer, The Washington Post
Mr. Christopher Green, Senior Adviser, Korean Peninsula, International Crisis Group
General (Ret.) Walter “Skip” Sharp, Former Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea
Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow, Korea Chair, CSIS
3. What to Expect from Pakistan’s Election? | Tuesday, July 24, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12:30 pm | The Wilson Center | Register Here
On July 25, Pakistan will hold an election that will constitute the country’s second consecutive peaceful transfer of power. The incumbent Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party, hit by corruption charges that have resulted in a 10-year jail sentence for former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, will try to fend off several opponents. They are led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party, headed by cricket star-turned-politician Imran Khan. What might recent Pakistani political developments—including Sharif’s sentencing, dozens of parliamentarians changing their political affiliations, and the emergence of several new religious political parties—portend for the election outcome? What role, if any, might Pakistan’s powerful military be playing in the election? What implications might the election’s possible outcomes have for the United States? This event will address these questions and more.
Speakers:
Mariam Mufti, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo (Canada)
Sahar Khan, Visiting Research Fellow, CATO Institute
Tamanna Salikuddin, Senior Expert, U.S. Institute of Peace, and Former Pakistan and Afghanistan Director, U.S. National Security Council
4. The Military-Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership | Tuesday, July 24, 2018 | 12:15 pm – 2:00 pm | The Stimson Center | Register Here
Please join the Stimson South Asia program for a conversation with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, the former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff in the Indian Ministry of Defence, who will talk about the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership. Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School, and Benjamin Schwartz, Head of the Aerospace and Defense Program at the U.S.-India Business Council, will serve as discussants. Sameer Lalwani of the Stimson Center will moderate.
5. Eighth Annual South China Sea Conference | Thursday, July 26, 2018 | 9:00 am – 4:45 pm | CSIS | Register Here
This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. The event will feature speakers from throughout the region, including claimant countries. Panels will address recent developments, legal and environmental issues, the strategic balance, and U.S. policy.
9:00 am: Morning Keynote
Representative Ted Yoho, Chair, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives
9:45 am: Panel: State of Play in the South China Sea over the Past Year
Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
Chatham House
Colin Willett, Asia Section Research Manager
Congressional Research Service
Sumathy Permal, Fellow and Head of Centre for Straits of Malacca
Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Feng Zhang, Fellow, Department of International Relations
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
Moderator:
Amy Searight, Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
11:15 am: Panel: Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea and Beyond
Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retired), Senior Fellow
Delhi Policy Group
Charles I-hsin Chen, Visiting Senior Fellow
Institute for Taiwan-America Studies
Bec Strating, Lecturer
La Trobe University
Thanh Hai Do, Senior Fellow
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Moderator:
Gregory Poling, Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative; and Fellow, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
12:30 pm: Lunch Served
1:15 pm: Lunch Keynote
The Honorable Randall G. Schriver, Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
United States Department of Defense
2:00 pm: Panel: Environmental Issues in the South China Sea
Vo Si Tuan, Senior Scientist
Institute of Oceanography, Nha Trang
Carmen Ablan Lagman, Professor
De La Salle University
Rashid Sumaila, Director, Fisheries Economics Research Unit
University of British Columbia
Moderator:
Brian Harding, Deputy Director and Fellow, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
3:30 pm: Panel: The Military Balance in the South China Sea
Collin Koh Swee Lean, Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Hideshi Tokuchi, Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Richard Heydarian, Fellow
ADR-Stratbase Institute
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Advisor and Director, China Power Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderator:
Andrew Shearer, Senior Adviser on Asia Pacific Security and Director, Alliances and American Leadership Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies
6. Identifying – and Isolating – Jihadi-Salafists through their Ideology, Practices, and Methodology | Thursday, July 26, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
In order to win the war against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, the United States must understand the enemy. Yet the problem of knowing the enemy has never been more acute, and the lack of consensus around this issue has never been more debilitating, for American foreign policy.
Without a clear vision of who the U.S. is fighting, the government and military will not be able to distinguish ordinary Muslims from the extraordinary extremists, will be incapable of devising effective strategies for military and political efforts, and will not know which allies can be safe partners and which need to be avoided for being too close to the extremists. While there are many reasons for a lack of understanding the enemy, one of the most important is a deep disagreement about the role that Islam plays in motivating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
This event will explore the notion that while a marginal version of Islam is the driver of extremism, it is possible to distinguish the jihadi-salafists from the majority of Muslims. A close examination of the jihadi- salafists’ belief system and methodologies will help the U.S. and allied governments formulate strategies to stop their spread.
Speakers:
Dr. Mary Habeck, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Georgetown University, and American University
Zainab Al-Suwaij, Executive Director, American Islamic Congress
Moderator:
Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
7. Faith and Fragile States: Political Stability and Religious Freedom | Friday, July 27, 2018 | 11:00 am – 2:30 pm | USIP | Register Here
Religion influences both peace and conflict worldwide. Violent extremism is often framed in religious terms, and religious discrimination continues to increase as both a driver and symptom of conflict. But, religion drives peace and coexistence as well and religious actors are essential for advancing religious freedom. Efforts to engage religious actors in countering violent extremism (CVE) and interfaith peacebuilding must take this dichotomy into account. Join the International Republican Institute, Search for Common Ground, and the U.S. Institute of Peace on July 27 for two panel discussions that explore the nexus of international religious freedom, CVE, and interfaith peacebuilding.
Opening Remarks
Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), Former U.S. Representative from Virginia
Tony Garrastazu, Senior Director, Center for Global Impact, International Republican Institute
Panel 1: Religious Engagement in CVE
Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah, President, Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies
Humera Khan, President, Muflehun
Moderator: Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Panel 2: Interfaith Peacebuilding
Cardinal Onaiyekan, Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, Nigeria
Mike Jobbins, Senior Director of Partnerships and Engagements, Search for Common Ground
Susan Hayward, Senior Advisor, Religion and Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
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Stabilizing Iraq and Syria post-ISIS
The National Press Club last Wednesday hosted the Foreign Policy Research Institute‘s launch of the latest issue of their journal, Orbis, entitled “Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent after the Fall of the Caliphate.” The papers aim to analyze the current state of ISIS as well as society in Iraq and Syria, and to assess and recommend possible guidelines and tactics for American action in the region. To accompany the issue’s launch, FPRI invited the following speakers to discuss the topic of stabilization in Syria and Iraq:
Moderator: Samuel Helfont – Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Tally Helfont – Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Barak Mendelsohn – Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam – Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
Mendelsohn asserted that to deal with global jihadi movements like al-Qaeda and ISIS we need to more accurately assess the scope of their threat and capacities. The challenge they pose to local and American security is often overblown. Focusing on jihadi terrorist attacks is counter-productive. A single successful terrorist attack can lead to the impression that the jidadis are “winning,” when the situation is often more complex. Terrorism is an instrument for political, not strategic or military objectives. Jihadi movements consistently fail to achieve their political objectives – for instance, setting up a sustainable ISIS caliphate – through terrorism.
Mendelsohn also emphasized the systemic challenges that constrain the threat posed by transnational jihadi movements. National and subnational identities, which are usually of national or ethnic nature, constrain the appeal of transnational movements based on religious identity. It is not sufficient to practice Islam to find religious political leadership appealing. Political as well as religious or social affiliation is needed. As transnational political movements, cross-border logistical coordination is also an issue for jihadi groups. Finally, they are plagued by infighting, further reducing their capacity to operate effectively.
Moghadam agreed with Mendelsohn on the constraining factors jihadi groups face. He hoped, however, that policy-makers would not confuse “jihadism constrained” with “jihadism declining.” While their threat might often be overblown, jihadi groups will not disappear any time soon. Their ideology continues to appeal to some people. Jihadi movements are by nature highly decentralized. Their lack of a “center of gravity” means they cannot be easily eradicated with a precise military attack.
Decentralization also means that jihadi groups’ constituent parts are adaptable and innovative. Key individuals play an oversized role, making jihadi groups capable of reacting to changing environments. In addition, the conditions that gave rise to jihadi groups such as ISIS are still in place. In Syria especially, regions devastated by ISIS will face governance and resource issues for decades to come, providing fertile ground for radical military groups to thrive.
Moghadam concluded by predicting that we will witness a shift in the global jihadi movement from a “bipolar” structure – centered around the poles of ISIS and al-Qaeda – to a “multipolar,” localized structure, with smaller groups gaining influence in a greater number of locations. This will make it harder to fully eradicate the threat of jihadism. When it comes to counter-terrorism, he advocated for a less reactionary stance. Jihadi groups use terrorism to provoke Western governments into over-reacting, thus alienating Muslim communities and reinforcing the appeal of the groups Western states are trying to combat. He called for better cooperation with Muslim communities in Europe and the US.
Tally Helfont focused on what Gulf states can do to counter the influence of jihadi groups in the Middle East. These states are worried about the appeal of transnational jihadism in the Gulf, but are also seeking to counter Iranian influence and fill the vacuum left by American political withdrawal. Gulf states’ counter-terrorism strategy has focused on stopping “men, money, and ideas.” This means increasingly trying to curb the radical messages and influence of local religious leaders as well as stopping financial flows to terrorists from private citizens in the Gulf.
Countering jihadi ideas is especially important, both in education and in mosques. Helfont asserts that Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE – have begun to see the appeal of critical thinking and want to create new generations of citizens who are capable of thinking for themselves and innovating with the best on the international stage.
Caveat emptor: It was hard to decipher useful lessons from the panelists’ statements. While the jihadi threat is often overblown, it is essential for the American government to portray ISIS as a genuine threat to national security to justify continued involvement in Syria and Iraq. A Muslim terrorism group is also a useful foil in electoral campaigns. Doubts should be raised about the capacity of stabilization to succeed without subsequent peace-building and reconstructing projects afterwards. There’s still a lot to consider before we can get a clear idea of how to durably stabilize the Fertile Crescent.
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Peace Picks July 8 – 15
You can find more events for the upcoming week here
1. A Vision: Ukraine – 2030: Sustainable Development Doctrine | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Ukraine has made significant progress on ambitious economic and financial reforms in recent years. Steps have been taken to intensify the fight against corruption and boost economic growth across a range of sectors. However, much work is still needed for Ukraine’s economic development and improvement of the socio-economic situation. In addition to focus on specific reforms and bolstering investor confidence, strategies for long-term sustainable development must also be considered.
At this event, Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, will present a paper, entitled Ukraine 2030, a vision which lays out a framework for the strategic direction of Ukraine’s long-term development. This will be followed by a discussion on the challenges and opportunities for Ukraine’s sustainable development will be discussed.
Speakers:
Moderator: Ambassador John Herbst, Director – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Dr. Anders Åslund, Senior Fellow – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Independent Member, Supervisory Board, Ukrzaliznytsia
Dr. Vira Nanivska, Policy Research Director, Collegium Anna Yaroslavna: East
Dr. Edi Segura, Chairman of the Board, The Blezyer Foundation; Partner and Chief Economist, SigmaBleyzer
Ms. Michelle Small, Director, Head of the Washington DC Representative Office, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Mr. Morgan Williams, President, US-Ukraine Business Council
2. Elections in Zimbabwe: Autocracy and Stasis, or Democracy and Change? | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | National Endowment for Democracy | Register Here
Since the Movement for Democratic Change’s founding in 1999, Zimbabwe has been going through a protracted struggle for democratization. An entrenched incumbent, fortified by a strong political-military network, has met aspirations for democratic improvement with strong resistance. This network, however, underwent a serious rupture last November when former allies effectively deposed its long-serving leader, Robert Mugabe. The new president, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has scheduled general elections for July 30, 2018. The upcoming polls present new political dynamics and a heightened level of anticipation both within and outside Zimbabwe. In his presentation, Dr. Alex Magaisa will consider the struggle to achieve greater democratic accountability in today’s Zimbabwe. He will assess preparations for the approaching elections and discuss the prospects for democratization, including possible post-election scenarios and the roles of the military and the international community. Comments by Dr.Alexander H. Noyes will follow.
Speakers:
Moderator: Natalie Kay, Program Officer, Southern Africa, National Endowment for Democracy
Alex Magaisa, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy
Alexander H. Noyes, Senior Associate (Non-Resident), Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
3. July 15 Coup Attempt: Two Years Later | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization
Please join the Turkish Heritage Organization and the Global Policy Institute on July 11 for a panel discussion on the second anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt that took place in 2016. Since this critical event in Turkey’s recent history, the country has witnessed profound changes within both its foreign and domestic politics. Our distinguished guests will discuss how the coup attempt shaped present day Turkey and the potential implications regarding U.S.-Turkey relations.
Speakers:
Moderator: Deniz Karatas, Global Policy Institute
Abraham Wagner, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs & Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
4. Future of US-Turkish Relations After Erdogan’s Victory | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Endowment for Middle East Truth | Register Here
Join EMET on Capitol Hill as we host Congressman Gus Bilirakis, FDD scholar and former Turkish parliament member Dr. Aykan Erdemir, the pro-Kurdish opposition US representative of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Giran Ozcan, and EMET’s Director of the Kurdistan Project, Diliman Abdulkader. The panel will be moderated by EMET founder and President Sarah Stern. Our panel will analyze the implications of the June 24th Turkish elections called by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Leading Turkey since 2002 with the Justice and Development Party (AKP), internally Erdogan has tilted state institutions to further solidify his position, he has targeted political opposition groups, academics, journalists, and the Kurdish minority all while labeling those speaking against his rule as “terrorists.” Erdogan has distanced himself from his short-lived “zero problem with neighbors” policy as he has made more foes than friends in the region. He has threatened Greece with military action while continuing to have a foothold in Northern Cyprus. His incursions into Syria targeting US-backed Kurdish forces has created a diminishing of relations with the United States. Under Erdogan, Turkey has pivoted towards Russia by purchasing Russian missiles incompatible with NATO defense systems. The panel will examine the outcome of the elections, what Turkey’s future holds under Erdogan and how this will affect US-Turkish relations.
5. Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00pm – 1:45pm | Foreign Policy Research Institute | Register Here
In 2014, the United States stated its intention to “degrade and destroy” ISIS. Since then, a diverse array of forces has worked tirelessly to liberate key territories in Iraq and Syria from ISIS’s Caliphate. Now, in the summer of 2018, ISIS’s Caliphate largely has been dismantled as a territorial entity. However, the group is far from destroyed, and its ability to maneuver is much improved as it reverts to an insurgency. What’s more, there is very little to prevent yet another non-state armed group from retaking the very same lands that ISIS once held. Accordingly, American diplomacy, military strategy, and intelligence collection likely will focus on Iraq and Syria for many years to come. Thus, the question for policymakers is how the U.S. can prevent non-state armed groups from regaining a territorial foothold, further destabilizing these territories, and ultimately threatening U.S. interests in the region. Relatedly, the question of what to do about the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS even if they do not hold territory remains equally pressing.
“Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate,” a special issue of Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018) and the subject of this panel, seeks to provide a framework for thinking about the threat of terrorism emanating from the Fertile Crescent now that ISIS’s Caliphate is being undone and to provide concrete policy recommendations to establish a tenable politico-economic status quo.
Speakers:
Tally Helfont, Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Samuel Helfont, Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Barak Mendelsohn, Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam, Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
6. Next Steps on North Korea: Denuclearization and Building a New Relationship | Thursday, July 12, 2018 | 9:00am – 10:30 am | Korea Economic Institute of America | Register Here
With the historic first meeting between a sitting U.S. president and the leader of North Korea now complete, the difficult process of negotiating North Korea’s dismantlement and building a new relationship between the United States and North Korea begins. What are the key steps the United States and North Korea need to take to achieve the goals of the Singapore Statement? What is the role of South Korea as the process moves forward? What challenges beyond denuclearization are there for building new U.S.-North Korea relationship?
Please join the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy for a discussion of the key next steps in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program and moving towards the new relationship called for in the Singapore Statement.
Speakers:
Moderator: Jenna Gibson, Korea Economic Institute of America
Patrick Cronin, Center for a New American Security
Katrin Katz, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Kim Seok Hwan, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
Kim Yong Hyun, Dongguk University
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Stabilization again
During the Stabilization Symposium on Tuesday, a panel consisting of Frances Brown (Fellow – Carnegie Institute), Ciara Knudsen (Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary – Department of State), Katherine Donahue (Office of Transition Initiatives – USAID), and Colonel Joe Holland (Chief, Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division, J-5 Global Policy & Partnerships – Department of Defense) discussed avenues for building peace and stability in post-conflict situations, using the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) as a blueprint.
According to Brown, three key obstacles make it complicated to transition from conflict to peace: defining success, measuring progress, and governmental organization. The SAR states that post-conflict stabilization is inherently political, allowing the US to better confront the first challenge. Specifically, it provides the US government with the flexibility to candidly judge whether the legitimate political actor on the ground wants peace and stability, making it possible for interventions to succeed. This mindset would have been crucial in Afghanistan, where large sums were poured into stabilization efforts that derailed because president Karzai’s government was not on board.
Brown argued that the SAR also allows the US to adopt more realistic measures for success in stabilization operations. In Afghanistan, cherry-picked stories were used to evaluate US peace building efforts, causing onlookers in Washington to mistakenly believe that the success of three, US-implemented district councils was indicative of the state of affairs in the country as a whole. Brown expressed confidence that the SAR’s emphasis on a coordinated, cross-government strategy for stabilization will make US implementers more accountable to each other, increasing the likelihood that future interventions will adopt more accurate measures of success.
Knudsen used her experience with the Defeat ISIS Campaign to critique the SAR’s inapplicability to situations where short-term, cosmetic interventions will not work because no legitimate on-site actors exist. ISIS has systematically destroyed entire communities’ physical and social infrastructure by reducing cities to rubble, planting IEDs, assassinating tribal leadership, and leaving sleeper cells behind in liberated areas.
These conditions breed a climate of fear and distrust in target communities, making it nearly impossible to find actors who enjoy the legitimacy to inspire the unity necessary to accomplish stabilization. Thus, stabilizing institutions in destroyed cities like Mosul and Raqqa will require meaningful, long-term engagement. Knudsen argued that the SAR does not recognize that most conflict situations call for more than quick, low-budget interventions to develop lasting peace.
Donahue struck a more positive tone than Knudsen, praising the SAR for being realistic and encouraging swift governmental interventions to stabilize conflict zones. The SAR’s declaration that stabilization is an iterative process falls directly in line with the philosophy OTI uses for its intervention strategy. According to Donahue, this will give the US government the flexibility to behave more like OTI, allowing it to mobilize quickly instead of getting bogged down in crafting grand strategies that often do not apply to the situation on the ground. Instead, the SAR strategy centers around learning on the go, recognizing that moving quickly and being correct at the 80% level is more productive than shooting for 100% effectiveness and failing because of inaction.
During his assignment to Kirkuk in the Iraq War, Holland was responsible for facilitating provincial reconstruction teams in the area. In what was indicative of the broader White House strategy at the time, military officers were under the impression that the Department of Defense was spearheading stabilization efforts in Iraq. Little interagency coordination occurred as a result. This military-centric approach led to planning gaps, causing stabilization attempts to end largely in failure. Iraqis remained employed for a snapshot in time, so communities slid back into conflict following US withdrawal. The SAR’s emphasis on interagency coordination represents a building block for future stabilization success, opening the door for long-term, sustainable development by legitimate regional partners after US troops end the mission.
The Bottom Line: The SAR is promising, but it has limits and presents little more than a framework to guide future US stabilization efforts in conflict regions. While this general blueprint will give US actors on the ground considerable flexibility in crafting case-specific strategies, the SAR’s desire for quick, low-cost interventions ignores that most conflicts are multidimensional and can only be solved by long-term stabilization initiatives. Reluctance to commit significant time and resources to stabilization means that future US peace building efforts will likely fail, or that the US will avoid intervening in these situations altogether.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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