Tag: ISIS
US strategy in the Middle East
The Center for American Progress held a discussion earlier today about the challenges, trends and setbacks of US strategy in the Middle East. The event began with US army commander for CENTCOM, General Joseph Votel, and broke out into a panel featuring Derek Chollet, a Counselor and Senior Advisor for Security and Defense Policy for The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brian Katulis, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Linda Robinson, a Senior International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, and Michael Singh, the Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
General Votel listed three major areas of focus for the US strategy in the Middle East:
- Listen to what our partners in the region have to say.
- Reinforce and cultivate relationships with our regional allies.
- Maintain excellent communication with our partners.
With Iranian behavior becoming increasingly aggressive and destabilizing, we must reassure our allies that we will not abandon them. This, however, does not mean that we should cut off communication with Iran. In fact, communication with Iran should be maintained so we can better control our interactions with them.
In terms of fighting ISIS, particularly in light of the ongoing operation in Mosul, General Votel recommends that we maintain momentum and pressure on the group on all fronts. Elimination of ISIS is the ultimate goal for the US military right now. Fortunately, our military coalition campaigns have largely been successful. However, these campaigns need to go hand-in-hand with humanitarian and political solutions. They will be difficult to achieve, but they are absolutely necessary for lasting stability.
The panelists were invited to provide their insight on US strategy in the Middle East. They focused primarily on a report recently published by the CAP Middle East team. Katulis said the Middle East is still incredibly vital to the US, but our goals there cannot be accomplished alone. The new administration needs to increase trust with our traditional partners such as Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and others. However, this should not be an unquestioning embrace of friendship, but rather it should be a friendship of increased communication and goal-sharing.
Robinson echoed this sentiment, but she also brought up that the US needs to bring its attention to non-state partners as well, such as the Syrian Kurds. She emphasized the importance of not relying too heavily on military solutions, but also integrating political and social solutions into the larger operational framework. Most importantly, the US needs to devise a reliable system of local policing for recently liberated areas. A lack of reliable policing is an “Achilles heel.” Perhaps the US and its allies need to formulate an international police force to provide interim policing services.
Chollet noted the US is perpetually in crisis management mode in the Middle East, which might not be in our best interests. The US and its partners do not necessarily share the same goals, so our cooperation with these actors needs to be examined closely. The next president should to step away from defining her/himself by what he/she accomplishes in the Middle East and concentrate on other issues.
Singh highlighted that the US strategy in the Middle East has often been solution-oriented when perhaps it should not be. Our goals should not be focused on solving conflicts or creating governments, but rather providing support when needed. The US shouldn’t “fix” the Middle East, rather it should simply ensure that things don’t get worse and that our allies have back up if they need it. The region, he argued, has a lot of potential if provided with the right support. If we work carefully and patiently with our regional friends, the Middle East could begin to thrive.
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He’s finished
There were a lot of things Trump said in this third presidential debate that I disagreed with and lots more that undermined his claim to have the temperament and judgment to be president. But the coup de grâce for his campaign was his refusal say he would accept the outcome of the election. Here is the suicidal candidate, making a mockery of American democracy the day after the debate:
It has long been apparent that Trump lacks liberal democratic values. Witness his claim that an American-born judge is biased because of his Mexican heritage. Witness his pledge to put Clinton in jail if he wins. Witness his willingness to accept the support of white supremacists and anti-Semites. Trump’s world is one in which white and male privilege is a good thing, taxes are for others to pay, and illegal immigrants are manual labor to be exploited and deported. He is a self-declared law and order candidate with no respect for equal rights.
None of his anti-liberal stances have much affected Trump’s attractiveness to something close to 40% of the electorate. He will get most of those votes, apparently no matter what. The Republican party, sadly, will be reduced not to its core principles of less intrusive government and more private initiative, but rather to arbitrary government power and no respect for individual rights. How they are going to get out of that trap I don’t know.
To win Trump would need more. That’s where he failed last night. And that’s where his refusal to make it clear he will accept the election outcome hurts him the most. He has no chance of extending his reach to independents without respect for the electoral process he is participating in. Failing that respect, he will also lose a lot of Republican voters who know that the election is organized at the state level, where Republican governors and legislatures have if anything been over-vigilant in their effort to prevent almost non-existent voting fraud.
On foreign policy questions, especially Syria, Trump was mostly incoherent last night. He continues to wish for a good relationship with Vladimir Putin, which is ironically an attitude Hillary Clinton initially took as Secretary of State, only to find that her “reset” was unsuccessful. Trump also continues to refuse to acknowledge that Russia is responsible for hacking American emails, something he has urged Moscow to do. Neither candidate had much to say about China, though Trump emphasized its unfair trade practices (against which Obama has been retaliating) and seemed to think the US could somehow approach its claimed growth rate of 7% (actually 6.7%, and no one seems to believe that figure).
Trump even promised 5-6% growth in the US, achieved by lowering taxes on the rich and vastly expanding government spending for infrastructure.
Lots of foreign policy issues went unmentioned: vast areas like Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, current crisis areas like Ukraine and Libya (though Trump mentioned the latter in connection with ISIS, which has been largely defeated there), North Korea, the pending trade pacts in Pacific and with Europe (TTP and TTIP to the cognescenti), Egypt and Israel…. I hardly need to mention that my readers’ favorite part of the world, the Balkans, did not make the cut.
ISIS was a big deal in this debate. Trump blames its existence on Clinton, which is clearly nonsense. Even if you think the American withdrawal from Iraq opened space for it and choose to ignore Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s contribution and the impact of the war in Syria, the agreement to withdraw and the timing were decided in the George W. Bush administration, not by President Obama or Hillary Clinton. Neither Trump nor Clinton offered much idea what they would do about ISIS other than what is already being done. Clinton said she would not put US troops on the ground to stabilize Mosul. Trump did not make that commitment but instead insisted that the attack on Mosul should have been a sneak attack.
He hasn’t got a clue. You can’t move tens of thousands of troops into place, carpet the civilian population with leaflets urging them to shelter in place or rise against ISIS, begin to soften up the defenses with air attacks and artillery, and prepare for the inevitable displacement of people by constructing shelters for them to live in without alerting the enemy that something is up. Trump’s knowledge of how war is fought seems grounded in playing Risk with his kids.
I’m not willing to see him play Risk with the United States. Nor it seems are most of the American people. It’s a shame the election isn’t today, but millions have already voted early and many more will do so in coming days. The only good thing that can come of Trump’s candidacy is a resounding defeat.
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Jordan in the middle
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is often ignored when discussing the conflicts throughout the Middle East. However, given its central position (and its shared borders with Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian West Bank) it inevitably plays a pivotal geo-strategic role. Its close relationship with the United States only heightens its regional significance.
To address Jordan’s role in the region and beyond, a knowledgeable Jordanian spoke last week at a roundtable discussion in Washington DC, specifically about his country’s stake in the regional conflicts—namely, the civil war in Syria and the rise of ISIS.
Chaos and displacement of populations throughout the Middle East affects Jordan directly, since many refugees often seek resettlement in Jordan. The Jordanian government faces tremendous pressure to take in more and more refugees from neighboring countries. However, the Jordanian government and public are concerned with the security risk that these refugees pose, especially those migrating from areas formerly held by ISIS. Refugees admitted into Jordan go through a rigorous vetting process and are closely monitored. Amman is wary of the spread of radicalism domestically, and is concerned that refugees will encourage native Jordanians to join Islamist groups.
The refugee population has become a serious economic burden. Prior to the Arab Spring, Jordan had its economy in order—it had surfaced from the crippling debt of the 1990s and had a steadily growing GDP. The influx of refugees has forced the government to scramble to create institutions to care for these people (such as schools, hospitals, etc.). In addition to this pressure from refugees, Jordan’s tourism, transportation, and private sector haven’t been able to weather these economic blows and have been suffering recently. While they were guaranteed financial assistance from the UK and the US at the London Conference earlier this year, this assistance has not yet arrived. The official did, however, note that the US has been providing Jordan with $1.3 billion annually, which has been incredibly helpful in keeping the Jordanian economy in balance.
On Jordan’s ability to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the response was that Jordan would probably not be able to fill this role. Jordan does have a friendly relationship with Saudi Arabia—the Saudis and the Emiratis give Jordan $5 billion a year for project support, and there is talk of letting Jordan into the GCC. However, Jordan’s relationship with Iran is not strong and therefore Amman cannot serve as mediator.
Jordan has been pivotal in establishing a Free Syrian Army (FSA) “safe haven” in Southern Syria. Amman sees the southern faction of the FSA as relatively benign and capable of securing the south as a buffer zone against regime or extremist aggression.
On the US presidential election, the perception in Jordan is that Hillary Clinton has a clear and practical plan for the Middle East whereas Donald Trump is just bluffing.
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Syria’s future
It would be foolish to have much hope well into the sixth year of the Syria’s wars that Saturday’s meeting of the US, Russian, Iranian, Saudi, Turkish and Qatari foreign ministers will lead to a way out of the current impasse. But it is reasonable to ask what would make the meeting more than just one more boon to Lausanne’s luxury hotels.
The current situation is not propitious. Syria’s government is feeling confident as it rides a ferocious wave of mostly Russian and Iranian attacks on the opposition-held neighborhoods of eastern Aleppo, which it is “cleaning.” It figures the fall of Aleppo will be a tipping point leading to government victory in much of more populated Syria. The government has already negotiated an end to sieges of several areas near Damascus, transporting their populations in an effort to adjust their demography. President Assad has no intention of welcoming back the more than 7 million Syrians who have fled the country. He wants, and thinks he can get, a Syria over which he can restore his autocratic rule by violent means.
At this point, the only thing that would increase the likelihood of a negotiated diplomatic solution is a change in the military balance that threatens Assad. There are ways that might be accomplished without directly engaging Russian forces, which the Americans don’t want to do: stand-off attacks on the Syrian air force or on Hizbollah ground forces or giving more and better weapons to non-extremist opposition forces, to cite two examples. The Americans are hesitant to move in that direction for fear of hitting commingled Russians or enabling an extremist takeover. They have spent the last week or two pondering options.
Washington isn’t likely to do anything before Saturday, but if Secretary of State Kerry can go to the Lausanne meeting with an option to re-balance the military equation in his pocket he might be able to make some diplomatic progress. He needs a credible threat, one Moscow and Tehran feel they need to forestall, to get a serious cessation of hostilities. The beginning of serious talks on transition is likely a bridge too far. Iran and Russia have doubled and quadrupled down on their bets favoring Assad. They are unlikely to risk losing him, since any successor regime that is even remotely democratic would throw them out.
What happens if/when Aleppo falls? Assad will force the opposition adherents out, either leaving eastern Aleppo destroyed and deserted or repopulating it with loyalists. Will the government and its allies then turn its attention to Idlib, where there really are extremists (and infighting among them)? Or will they try to drive farther north to the Turkish border, risking clashes with Turkish and Turkish-backed groups advancing there?
Or will they be content to rest on their laurels? That seems unlikely. Many of us, including me, have underestimated Assad’s sticking power and his determination to retake territory. Now that he is on a roll, he won’t want to stop. Nor will the extremist and non-extremist forces leave him alone. I’m afraid more war rather than less is still in Syria’s future.
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Russian views on Syria
On Tuesday the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies hosted a discussion with Ambassador Sergey I. Kislyak, Russian Federation Ambassador to the US.
Ambassador Kislyak acknowledged that things are not developing in the best fashion for Russian or US interests. The US has been taking unfriendly steps towards Russia, including the imposition of sanctions and calls to isolate and pressure Russia. He warned that these approaches do not work with Moscow. Russia, he said, has tried hard to work with the US and sees many opportunities for cooperation. These are being missed, but it is not Russia that started or is fuelling the current situation.
Regarding Syria, Kislyak believes that the US and Russia have a common enemy in terrorism. Russia is even more vulnerable to the risks of revived terrorist groups due to its regional proximity and an estimated 4000 Russian speakers fighting in Syria. Syria must continue to preserve the state as the alternative is total failure, which would be a greater problem for everyone. Russia came to Syria on the invitation of its government to assist in the fight against terrorism, no more and no less. Russia’s presence is consistent with international law, as opposed to the presence of other states that have not received the permission or invitation of the sovereign Syrian state.
Commenting on the current situation in Aleppo, Kislyak said that East Aleppo is controlled by Al Qaeda and other “so called” opposition forces who are holding the population hostage. He offered examples of Al Qaeda executions of civilians attempting to leave. He denied that hospitals have been bombed in Aleppo and stated that the Russians never attack civilians. If hospitals had been bombed it was because they had not been identified as such. The Russians are only targeting Al Qaeda. When they request that the US provide information of who is Al Qaeda and who is opposition they never receive a helpful response to deal with the issue in a precise manner. According to Kislyak, the US has been promising since February that the opposition would be separated from Al Qaeda but this has not happened.
Russia is still open to cooperation with the US on Syria. Priorities going forward are to stop the fighting, delineate between opposition forces and Al Qaeda, and start building the environment to start negotiations.
There are clearly areas of common interest for cooperation between the US and Russia on Syria. Both agree that Jabhat al-Nusra is an Al Qaeda force which must be dealt with. A totally failed state will be fertile ground for such groups. There is a disagreement however on the nature of the groups fighting Assad, with Kislyak denouncing ‘opposition forces’ as an American term. If Russia was invited by Assad to combat terrorists, and follows Assad’s definition of all opposition groups as terrorists, there is a fundamental gap in understanding that must be filled before progress in negotiations can be successful. There remains however the issue of separating moderate opposition forces from the complex network of militant groups operating in Syria, which the Russians see as one Washington must take on.
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Plan B options
The Administration is considering plan B for Syria. In order to be effective, it has to somehow rebalance the military situation to enable the non-extremist Syrian opposition to resist effectively the Russian/Iranian/Syrian government/Shia militia onslaught and to fight the Islamic State.
I take as a given two limits: 1) Washington does not want to directly engage Russian forces and 2) it does not want to put significant numbers of troops on the ground in Syria. Nor do I think it will be possible for the President to gain Congressional approval for an expanded Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF).
Here is a summary of options, all of which I think I have previously discussed on peacefare.net:
1. Encourage Congress to pass and sign the pending sanctions bill. This would have broad political significance, but mainly affect helicopter and airplane parts, if we are prepared to enforce third party prohibitions (i.e. threaten suspension of business with US companies if foreign companies ship parts to Syria).
2. End the impunity of the Syrian air force by destroying helicopters that drop barrel bombs on civilian targets. This can be done with stand-off weapons and does not require US aircraft over Syrian territory. It would likely have to be done as covert action in order to get around the AUMF, which covers only Al Qaeda (and via a stretch Al Qaeda-descended organizations like the Islamic State).
3. Tell the Russians and Iranians we are no longer going to turn a blind eye to Hizbollah engagement in Syria. If they don’t leave, we would need to target them (again as covert action with standoff weapons).
4. Create safe areas inside Syria we are prepared to protect from the air. The opposition, or Turkey, would have to provide ground forces in order to govern there without fear of regime and Islamic State violence. This option would also entail financial and technical assistance to the civilian opposition on a scale not yet attempted.
5. Provide (or allow others to provide) anti-aircraft and other more advanced weapons to vetted opposition groups. Possible use of these weapons against civilian aircraft either in Syria or in the region is the obvious downside. Remember Malaysia Air flight 17.
None of these ideas is a slam dunk. All could generate unintended consequences, in particular Russian and Iranian escalation. It is not clear that Washington would be willing to meet and exceed their responses. Nor is it guaranteed that the non-extremist opposition would be able to take advantage of the opportunities Washington generates.
But without something that changes the military equation, Aleppo is lost and the Syrian/Russian/Iranian alliance will continue its depredations against civilians in Idlib and other opposition strongholds. This would strengthen extremist recruitment and postpone the prospect of any political settlement.
I don’t envy this president, or the next one, in facing the choice among these options, or doing nothing.
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