Tag: ISIS
The toughest nut in the Middle East
The Middle East Institute held their 7th annual conference on Turkey last week, gathering regional experts to discuss Turkey’s turbulent domestic politics and regional role. This post focuses on the regional issues discussed.
Haim Malka of the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused on Turkey-Israel relations. The reconciliation agreement following Israel’s 2010 raid on a Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza is being implemented. This is a mutually-beneficial, low-cost measure. Strategic cooperation is likely to remain limited.
Syria will test the renewed relationship as it is an arena where both Turkey and Israel’s interests intersect. Israel’s policy on Syria has to date been confused and vague, perhaps intentionally so, but ultimately the Israelis want to see a Syria with minimal Iranian influence. The fall of Iran’s ally Assad may be assumed beneficial to Israel, but the Israelis seem to have followed a ‘better the devil you know’ approach so far and do not appear to be supporting alternative political actors in Syria.
Bill Park of King’s College, London discussed Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which saw marked improvement in 2009 and 2010 due to trade and energy connections, shared mistrust of Maliki’s Baghdad government, and President Barzani’s role as a potential partner in the peace process with Turkey’s own Kurds (the PKK). While these foundations for positive relations remain, Turkey’s refusal to support Syrian Kurds in the fight against IS, Turkey’s re-establishing a relationship with Baghdad following the replacement of Maliki by Abadi, and a change in perception of Barzani’s leadership record have undermined the rapprochement.
Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Karim Sadjadpour discussed Turkey-Iran relations. There are notable commonalities between the two states as they suffer both a superiority and inferiority complex – both do not see their current status in world affairs as reflecting their histories as great empires. There is also a strong shared cultural history. The Iran-Turkey border has proven stable in an otherwise turbulent region for centuries. Also important is their economic partnership, with shared gas projects and common concern with Kurdish independence.
Having suffered from terrorist attacks, Turkey is disappointed in Iran following Assad’s lead, especially in ignoring the radical Islamist threat in Syria. Upcoming events could exacerbate frictions between Turkey and Iran. These include the upcoming US presidential election, the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran, and whether the nuclear deal lasts ten years.
Presenting the complex relationship of Turkey, the US and Kurds was Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow with the Wilson Center. She believes the US has an opportunity to use its leverage with the Syrian Kurds (the PYD) and Turkey to revive the Turkey-Kurdish peace process. This will require the US to abandon the fiction that the PYD and PKK are separate groups. The PYD is not seeking an independent state but rather a subnational federal unit within Syria, which the Kurds term “Rojava.”
While Turkey is unable to determine a military outcome, Ankara holds considerable soft power, especially in assisting the moderate opposition.
It was agreed among all the panelists that the US must articulate its policy for the region, and Syria in particular, as Turkey and its neighbors are looking for US leadership and unwilling to pursue their own policies without clarification from Washington. That is proving the toughest nut to crack in the Middle East.
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Liz Sly is wrong
She is also one of the very best journalists covering Syria, so I’d better explain why I think her “No sign of Obama’s predicted ‘quagmire’ as Russia’s engagement in Syria escalates” in the Washington Post this morning is wrong.
The Russians are stuck in a quagmire because the Assad regime can no longer survive without them. If the war continues, Moscow will have to continue or even escalate its engagement further, in order to compensate for the deterioration of the Syrian armed forces. If the regime some day wins, or at least comes to dominate “useful Syria,” Moscow and Tehran will be responsible for reconstruction, the costs for which amount to hundreds of billions. Sure, the $10-11 billion or so per year that the war is costing Moscow is sustainable this year and next, but at some point it becomes a serious burden. And that is nothing compared to what will be required once the war is over.
Moscow (and Tehran) are heading for strategic defeat in Syria. What they have done to a large portion of the civilian population will not be forgotten. It is now difficult to picture any successor regime to Assad that would be friendly to Russian and Iranian interests. Sustaining Assad or one of his coterie in place will mean continuation of the war with extremists, whose recruitment is directly related to his abusive rule.
In the meanwhile, Syrians suffer from the excesses of the regime, the Russians, the Iranians, and the extremists. Pro-regime forces are using anti-personnel and incendiary weapons in civilian areas, where they target in particular rescue workers, an aid convoy, and hospitals. Moscow denies all this, but those denials are no more believable than its denial that one of its missiles shot down Malaysia Air flight 17 over a rebel area of Ukraine.
Quagmire is apparent only in the rear-view mirror. The Americans denied they were in a quagmire in Vietnam, until they withdrew. The Soviets did likewise in Afghanistan. Assad, or a successor who will continue the regime, cannot be kept in place without massive assistance. That’s a quagmire, even if the effort is successful. Until the withdrawal, when things come apart sooner or later.
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Clinton won on the merits
How can anyone who watched last night’s presidential debate conclude that Trump did well? Clinton beat him on knowledge, amiability, respect, and record. Trump nervously sniffed, grunted, interrupted, and grimaced through the 90 minutes, scattering lies throughout. By the end, he was reduced to incoherence in responding to a question about America’s doctrine on first use of nuclear weapons and platitudes about how important they are.
But on NPR this morning, a self-described “alpha male” said Trump showed the kind of command authority required to be president. For him, that was the key: Trump attracts those who believe in male supremacy. His discourteous and dismissive behavior towards Clinton, not to mention his long record of derogatory remarks about women, is an asset, not a liability, with some voters.
He also attracts those who believe in white supremacy and maintenance of white privilege. His description of black neighborhoods as ridden with crime and violence is not calculated to attract black votes. It is the “dog whistle,” inaudible to many, intended to attract white racist votes by signaling that he understands their distaste for black people. Ditto his not denying that he discriminated against black people in renting apartments. Why deny something that your supporters like?
Trump, in short, represents the revenge of misogyny and racism. Can that win?
Unlikely, but not impossible. FiveThirtyEight has him at 45%, more or less, this morning. My guess is that his odds will go down over the next few days as his poor performance in the debate sinks in with the electorate. Hillary Clinton looked and behaved like a president last night: self-controlled, clear, and articulate. But even at 40/60, Trump would still have a shot a month our from the November 8 election.
On foreign policy issues, the debate was minimalist. Clinton ably defended the nuclear deal with Iran, which Trump attacked without promising to renege on it. Trump went after Clinton on trade agreements–not only the Trans-Pacific Partnership but also the North American Free Trade Agreement. Most commentators seemed to think that was his best moment. Syria did not come up, nor I think did Ukraine, Israel, or Afghanistan (except for Clinton’s mention of the NATO allies joining us there after 9/11). Clinton criticized the Russians for cyber attacks. Trump tried to parry by suggesting someone like the Chinese might have been responsible. He also criticized China for competitively weakening its currency, which hasn’t happened in years.
ISIS came up, but neither offered anything really new on how to counter it. Clinton got a point or two for mocking Trump’s “secret” plan. She also scored in emphasizing that the agreement for withdrawal from Iraq, which Trump criticized, was done during George W. Bush’s presidency, including the date by which the withdrawal had to be completed. Trump again denied supporting the Iraq invasion, which by now everyone should know is untrue. He also denied denying global warming and deleted an old tweet in which denied it.
In short, this was a clear win for Hillary Clinton on the merits even if she did not score any knockout blows. Those are more likely to come in the next debates, scheduled for October 9 and 19 (the vice presidential debate will be October 4).
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Peace picks September 26-30
- The Role of Law in the Fight Against International Terrorism |Monday, September 26 | 8:30am – 4:30pm | George Washington Law | Click HERE to register
Join GW Law’s International and Comparative Law Program, American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (AFHU), Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Faculty of Law (HU Law), and Minerva Center for Human Rights (HU Minerva) as they examine issues arising from the changing nature of terrorist acts. Alberto Mora, former General Counsel of the US Navy and the recipient of the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award, will present the opening address. The luncheon address will be presented by Michael Chertoff, former US Secretary of Homeland Security. - After Mosul: Rethinking Iraq | Monday, September 26 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Woodrow Wilson Center | Click HERE to Register
ISIS has occupied Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, since the early days of June 2014. The victory in Mosul was both symbolically and materially very significant for ISIS. The group not only obtained large caches of military equipment from a defeated Iraqi army, but occupying such a large city made it a visible contender for power in the region. Now the Iraqi army, with the help of the United States and others including the Kurdish peshmerga, is getting ready to recapture the city. This panel will explore the impact of ISIS’s occupation of the city on its inhabitants, what the recapture of the city will mean for Iraq, and the city’s future relations with the rest of Iraq. Featuring Amatzia Baram, Professor emeritus for Middle East history and director of the Center for Iraq Studies, University of Haifa, and former public policy scholar, Wilson Center, Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, and President, Institute of Shia Studies, and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Middle East Analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, Judith Yaphe, Adjunct professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. - When Should the U.S. Use Force Abroad? | Monday, September 26 | 11:45am – 2:00pm | American Foreign Policy Council | Click HERE to Register
Debate Panel I: What lessons should we learn from America’s use of force in Iraq and how should those lessons inform future decisions on future military missions abroad? Speakers: Phil Giraldi, PhD., former CIA Case Officer and Army Intelligence Officer, and current Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, Michael Doran, PhD. previously senior director in the National Security Council under President George W. Bush, and currently a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Debate Panel II: This panel will review the major uses of force since Viet Nam. Panelists will discuss a) when military force is justified and the arguments against its use ; b) multilateralism; c) the views of the American public, and d) the War Powers Resolution and the role of Congress in authorizing the use of military force. Speakers: Jeffrey Bergner, PhD. former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs (2005-2008) and former staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sen. Lugar R-IN), Gerry Warburg, former House and Senate Democratic leadership aide on defense, intelligence and foreign policy, and current professor at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. - A Vision for the Future of Syria | Tuesday, September 27 | 11:15am – 12:30pm | Atlantic Council | Click HERE to Register
Prime Minister Riad al-Hijab and the Syrian High Negotiations Commission (HNC), an umbrella organization for the Syrian opposition, released its vision for the future of Syria in London on September 7, 2016. This framework detailed three phases consistent with the 2012 Geneva Communiqué: negotiations initiated with a nationwide ceasefire and release of prisoners, a transitional period for rebuilding institutions, and a third phase welcomed by free elections for a new president.
Weeks after this announcement, Syria is experiencing an incomplete, fragile, and faltering reduction of violence facilitated by Washington and Moscow. Nonetheless, a path toward negotiations and other key components of the HNC vision remain elusive, and the future of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains in question.
Please join us on September 27 for a discussion with Prime Minister Riad al-Hijab to discuss these and other issues. Dr. Hijab will detail the HNC framework for transition in Syria, after which Hariri Center Director Ambassador will moderate a discussion on the vision’s receptivity and the challenges to its implementation. - Civil Society in Eastern Europe and Eurasia: Thriving or Just Surviving? | Tuesday, September 27 | 9:30am -11:00am | Woodrow Wilson Center | Click Here to Register
Is the trend to restrict civil society, visible in Russia and neighboring countries, getting worse? In some of the countries of the former communist world, it has become more difficult for civil society to operate freely, while in others, civil society plays a strong role promoting reform and responding to regional challenges. These are just some of the divergent trends identified in USAID’s 2015 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index(CSOSI), which assesses the health of the civil society sector against key indicators in 24 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
Practitioners and scholars will discuss these trends, what it means for civil society leaders and activists in these countries, and what can be done to put civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia on a more secure and sustainable path. - 7th Annual Turkey Conference | Friday, September 30 | 9:00am – 4:00pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to RegisterThe Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute is pleased to present the 7th Annual Conference on Turkey on Friday, September 30, 2016. The conference will assemble three expert panels to discuss the impact of the recent coup attempt on Turkey’s internal political-military dynamics as well as the country’s relations with its Western allies and regional partners. Register now to attend three expert panel discussions on these and other issues facing Ankara. Registration is free and open to the public. Additional panelists and moderators to be announced.
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The epitome of resolve
AP has published the Syria cease-fire deal that the US government refused to make public. It is instructive, even though the cessation of hostilities is in tatters as Russian and Syrian government forces have launched major attacks focused on Aleppo.
The deal was more or less as anticipated and described in the press: it entailed an effort to stabilize at least parts of Syria by ending attacks on non-extremist forces, thus permitting them to receive humanitarian assistance. Had this happened as agreed for a week, the US and Russia would have jointly targeted extremist forces (ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra and others) while the Syrian air force would have stood down from attacks in designated areas.
Special provisions would have allowed relief to arrive from Turkey to Aleppo in sealed trucks. Checkpoints on the Castello Road north of Aleppo were to be monitored initially by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and later by the UN. The area near the road was to be demilitarized, with both government and opposition forces pulling back. Syrians were supposed to be allowed to leave Aleppo, including fighters with weapons. At least one other route was to be opened into Aleppo.
The joint Russian/American military action against extremists depended on the delineation of areas controlled by Nusra and opposition groups, starting right away but more “comprehensively” once the joint implementation center responsible for coordinating attacks on extremists was established. The Russians have been claiming that the Americans failed to fulfill their commitment to delineation, which also requires separation of more moderate forces from the extremists.
Why hasn’t it worked?
Some blame the failure on a lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. To be sure, this is a complicated agreement with many moving parts that might have been marginally more successful had there been some sort of third-party monitoring.
But fundamentally it hasn’t worked because the parties haven’t really wanted it to or don’t have the leverage required. The Syrian government has the military advantage around Aleppo and wants to finish off the opposition that has controlled parts of the city for years. The Russians, having doubled down on their support for Bashar al Assad, are in no position to undermine their surrogate. The Americans have not provided sufficient support to the opposition to wean it from the extremists, who provide a good deal of the tooth in fighting against the regime.
Secretary of State Kerry is still trying to revive the cessation of hostilities. Foreign Policy has classified this as the textbook definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over expecting a different result. But Kerry isn’t nuts. His problem is President Obama, who thinks there is nothing he can do that will improve the situation.
My Republican colleagues see this as a failure of resolve. I don’t. All American presidents since the fall of the Berlin Wall have resisted interventions. All eventually undertook one or more, against their better judgment at the outset. What distinguishes Obama is that he is more resolved, not less. But he is resolved to avoid the slippery slope to “owning” Syria, whereas his critiques wish he would start down it. This is the epitome of resolve, not its failure. Remember: this is a man with two teenage daughters who has spent almost eight years in the White House without a whiff of scandal.
I believe there are still things the President can consider doing about Syria: expanded sanctions, stand-off attacks on helicopters that drop barrel bombs or Syrian aircraft that violate the cessation of hostilities, an ultimatum to get Hizbollah and other Iranian surrogates out of Syria, non-declared attacks on Syrian government command and control. Without these alternatives, Secretary Kerry will not be able to deliver the negotiated political solution that is his avowed goal.
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Peace picks September 19-23
- Central Asian Fighters in Syria: Classification, Factors, Scale Assessment | Monday, September 19th | 9am – 10.30am | Elliot School of International Affairs | click HERE to register
The war in Syria, like a magnet, pulled radicals from around the world, including Central Asian fighters. There are different figures on the number of Central Asian militants in Syria. Separate research was conducted in Kazakhstan under the leadership of Dr. Yerlan Karin to estimate and organize all the data, as well as determine the main factors of radicalization attracting young people from Central Asia to Syria. The research is comprised of several surveys of former combatants and is the first such study in the region. Yerlan Karin is Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan. Yerlan Karin is a leading expert in Kazakhstan on security and terrorism and is the author of more than 100 publications in Kazakhstan and abroad on issues of terrorism, national and regional security, and history of Kazakhstan.
- Winning the War Against Islamist Terror: A Conversation with Chairman Michael McCaul | Tuesday, September 20th | 4pm – 5pm| American Enterprise Institute | click HERE to register |
Fifteen years ago on September 11, Americans experienced firsthand the grave consequences of Islamist terrorism flourishing abroad. Following recent terror attacks in Paris, San Bernardino, Brussels, Orlando, Nice, Istanbul, and beyond, it has never been more apparent that the US and its allies are in a generational, ideological struggle against a determined enemy and that we are not winning. How can we thwart lone wolf attacks and stop radicalization at home? How can America and its partners prevent power vacuums from turning into terrorist safe havens? Join AEI for a conversation with House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul as he releases a new national counterterrorism strategy outlining how the US can protect the American homeland, take the fight to Islamist extremists abroad, and prevail in this long war. Discussion between Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security (R-TX) and Danielle Pletka, AEI.
- Arrested Development: Rethinking Politics in Putin’s Russia | Wednesday, September 21st | 10am – 12pm | The National Press Club | click HERE to register |
The Center on Global Interests is pleased to invite you to a discussion on Russia’s political development with members of the Russia Political Insight Project, an international research collaboration that seeks to deepen the understanding of Russia’s current domestic political landscape. Panelists will present the results of their forthcoming book, Arrested Development: Rethinking Politics in Putin’s Russia, scheduled for release in 2017. The book explores the role of the Russian security forces, media, regional elites, public opinion, and other politically relevant actors in the making of domestic policy. Confirmed speakers include Andrei Soldatov, Maria Lipman, Nikolay Petrov, Kirill Rogov, and Daniel Treisman. Maria Lipman is an Editor-in-Chief of Counterpoint journal, published by the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University. Nikolay Petrov is a professor and head of the Laboratory of Methodology of Regional Development Evaluation at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow. He also heads the Center for Political-Geographic Research, and is a columnist for the information agency RBC (RosBusinessConsulting). Kirill Rogov is a well-known Russian journalist, a regular columnist for the publications Vedomosti, Forbes-Russia, and Novaya Gazeta. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and a member of the supervisory board of the Liberal Mission Foundation (Moscow). Andrei Soldatov is an investigative journalist and editor of Agentura.ru, an information hub on intelligence agencies. Daniel Treisman is a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Islam and Politics in the Age of ISIS: A Smarter Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism | Wednesday, September 21st | 12pm – 1.30pm | Atlantic Council |click HERE to register |
In recent decades, Muslims have been debating political and social aspects of their religious teachings in new ways. The religious debates are connected to and sometimes stem in considerable part from underlying political and social trends – demographic shifts, rising education, unaccountable and authoritarian governance, stuttering economic and governmental performance, and corruption. They cannot, however, be wholly reduced to those trends. Religion is not an isolated field, but neither is it simply a mask for other struggles; the terms and outcomes of religious debates matter in their own right. Please join us for a conversation with the authors of the newly published Middle East Strategy Task Force (MEST) Working Group on Religion, Identity, and Countering Violent Extremism report to discuss these issues and more. Geneive Abdo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. Nathan J. Brown is a professor of political science and international affairs and the director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University as well as a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Frederic C. Hof is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.
- Russia and the Middle East | Wednesday, September 21st | 6pm – 7.15pm |Elliot School of International Affairs | click HERE to register
Ambassador Thomas Pickering joins MEPF to discuss Russia and the Middle East. Drawing on his past experiences as the Ambassador to the Russian Federation and his diplomatic career in the Middle East, Ambassador Pickering discusses Russia’s political interests in the turbulent conflicts of the region. What is the historical context for Russia’s current role in the Middle East? How has Russia’s increased involvement affected its relationships with Middle East power players? Will Russia be a hindrance or a help in achieving lasting solutions to current conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and beyond?
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