Tag: ISIS
Happy birthday Blic!
1. As the talk about Chinese growth intensifies, its military is getting stronger, and while Beijing is defying even USA in the South Chinese sea dispute…what is your prediction for the decades that are coming: Could China become a world’s number one superpower?
A: No. China is a rising power, but it also still very poor and undeveloped. It faces enormous internal challenges: environmental conditions are deplorable, economic growth is slowing, social tensions have few political outlets, global warming will have a big impact on its infrastructure. China will be an important regional power, and it is already economically active in Africa and Latin America. But it will be a long time before it can play the kind of varied and multi-valent security, political and economic leadership role that the US plays globally.
2. It seems that Russia is getting support from some political factors in the EU countries. Is it possible that some of them will abolish the sanctions and open a wider cooperation with Moscow, especially now when the EU has a lot of its problems?
A: Russia is also getting support from “some political factors” in the US, but our sanctions will remain in place.
The EU will need to review again its sanctions against Russia, but there aren’t any positive developments in Ukraine to justify loosening them.
None of the EU’s problems would be ameliorated by dropping sanctions. The Russian economy is in a deep recession from which it is unlikely to recover without a big increase in oil prices. That isn’t happening.
3. Right-wing movement is getting stronger in Europe, and it seems it could reshape the EU as we know it today. Is that comeback of national states good or bad for Europe?
A: I’ll let Europeans decide. I can see positive developments emerging from the current euroskepticism, but I also see big risks to the single market.
4. Angela Merkel’s popularity has never been lower. If she decides not to run for fourth term, or if she loses, who do you see as her successor? Do you think that Germany will stop with the open door policy, with or without Merkel, because it is obvious that there is no solidarity between the member states?
A: I wouldn’t count Merkel out yet. She is at a low point in her personal popularity, but her political party is still polling very well. Europe is already controlling the inflow of migrants better than it had done. I expect that tighter control to continue.
5. Migrant crisis is shaking the EU for a while, but despite that, it seems that Brussels is avoiding to fulfill the promises given to Turkey, the main dam which is stopping the refugees to come in even bigger number to Europe. For how long could that take, especially now when Erdogan has grown warmer relations with Russia and Putin?
A: Brussels is in a bind. Turkey is taking an autocratic turn. It will be very hard to continue on the path to closer relations with Brussels if Ankara moves in a non-democratic direction. Erdogan has got some solace from Putin, who of course has no problems with autocrats, but Russia really has little to offer Turkey compared to the EU.
6. ISIS has become the world’s number one boogie-man. It seems that the strong actions in Syria has hurt this terrorist organization, but they didn’t destroy it, like something is missing. In your opinion, what is necessary to finally end “ISIS era”?
A: ISIS won’t “end.” It will be defeated in Raqqa and Mosul, then peter out. There never was an ISIS era. There was only an ISIS moment. ISIS has now lost lots of important territory in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It will survive at least for a while as a terrorist group causing real harm to real people, but it is not, and never was, an existential threat to the West.
7. Hillary or Trump? What would the USA look like if Trump wins?
A: I am a supporter of Hillary Clinton for President. A Trump win would be bad for the US, bad for Europe, bad for the Balkans and good for Russia.
8. What is the best path for Serbia? Our ruling political elite is eager to bring Serbia in the EU, majority of people thinks the same, but that same majority wants good relations with Russia. Is it possible to sit on two chairs like that, or not? Also, do you think that some members of the EU will demand from Serbia to recognize Kosovo independence as a condition of joining the EU?
A: Lots of countries in Europe want good relations with Russia. Washington would also like good relations with Russia. It has become difficult to “sit on two chairs” only because of Russia’s renewed aggressiveness, especially in neighboring areas it regards as part of its “near abroad.” Russia’s behavior in Ukraine in particular is unacceptable and has aroused a strong–but peaceful–NATO response. It has also pushed several non-member countries to tighten relations with NATO. This is precisely the opposite of what Putin should want.
There is not now, nor has there ever been, any possibility of Serbian membership in the EU without Belgrade’s acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo, which is already de facto acknowledged in the Brussels political agreement. Belgrade has a choice of methods by which it can act to accept Kosovo’s de jure sovereignty and territorial integrity. It can recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations. Or it can allow Kosovo to enter the UN General Assembly. There may be other clever solutions that I haven’t thought of. But the EU states that have already recognized Kosovo will not allow Serbia’s accession if this issue is still outstanding. Remember: this is not only a question for European presidents and prime ministers but also for their parliaments, which have to ratify accession.
Everyone in Belgrade knows that. But the current authorities don’t want to pay the price, and some like to think they can get a better deal on this issue at the end of the EU accession process than now. I think they are wrong about that. At the end of the process, Belgrade will be under enormous pressure from internal public opinion to remove any obstacles to EU accession, including Kosovo recognition. Serbia today could hope that Kosovo would accommodate some of its needs in return for recognition. I’ll leave it to Serbs and Albanians to cut that deal.
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In the box can be good too
I enjoyed 90 minutes today with SAIS’s Mike Lampton and CSIS’s Michael Green commenting on Amitai Etzioni’s Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box, a recent Chatham House publication. Here are my speaking notes, though I should note much of the event focused on China, which was not within my remit:
- First let me say it has been a privilege to be required to read this book. It is a model of precision and intelligibility. Professor Ezioni says what he means clearly and concisely, marshaling the evidence with skill and erudition.
- My doubts have to do mainly with the title: it advertises thinking outside the box, but much of the book is devoted to ideas I would regard as well inside the box, even if some of them might be labeled “new normal.”
- Take, for example, the chapter on “defining down sovereignty.” A good deal of it is spent pooh-poohing the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and arguing in favor of a more contemporary alternative: sovereignty as entailing rights as well as responsibilities.
- This leads naturally to Responsibility to Protect, which is well within the box these days, and another, new to me notion, “responsibility to counter terrorism.” If states fail or refuse to do this, intervention might be justified, Professor Etzioni says.
- It’s an interesting idea that even explains some current behavior, in particular the anti-ISIL intervention in Syria, which the host government has not unauthorized.
- The downsides are all too clear: the slippery slope that leads to an unjustified excuse for invasion or other intervention, as in George W.
- The chapter on spheres of influence is not so much outside the box as it is outside the realm of academic discussion, as Professor Etzioni himself documents. Spheres of influence are a well-established practice in international affairs, even if the concept has not attracted much scholarly attention.
- Professor Etzioni sees spheres of influence, Russia’s “near-abroad” for example or Iran’s influence in Iraq, as providing space for rising regional powers and buffer zones that bolster a feeling of security.
- The trouble with that notion is that it discounts the will of those who live in these buffer states. The limits of his approach are all to evident in Ukraine, where Etzioni admits Russia used force to try to prevent the Ukrainians from choosing their alignment with Europe.
- People just aren’t always content to serve the purposes of other powers.
- When it comes to self-determination, I would quibble with Amitai’s characterization of Kurdistan as more democratic than the rest of Iraq, but more importantly he ignores the negative regional and internal political contexts for any independence move by the Iraqi Kurds. I doubt it will happen, or that it will be democratizing if it does.
- I would agree however with Amitai’s main conclusion: decentralization rather than secession is far more likely to produce positive outcomes in democratic societies like Spain, where unfortunately the central government has been unwilling to concede even that. That however is a conclusion well inside the box, not outside it.
- One concluding thought: Professor Etzioni repeatedly doubts the applicability of liberal democratic notions outside the family of liberal democratic states.
- As an American, I feel condemned to believe in universal rights, as our founding documents are all too clear on this subject.
- But I would also say that I’ve virtually never met someone outside the liberal democratic world who didn’t aspire to those rights.
- We don’t need to export the notion that all people are created equal. We only need to help people find ways of institutionalizing equal rights in ways that are appropriate to their particular contexts.
- All in all, a good and interesting read, even if the novelty is overblown.
I made two points in the discussion period worth recalling:
- Liberal democracy is not congruent with secularism, since we have liberal democratic states (where rights are in principle equal) like Italy and the UK with established churches (not to mention the penetration of religion into government in the US).
- Russia’s behavior in Ukraine cannot properly be attributed to NATO expansion. Putin has made it clear that he is trying to re-establish Moscow’s hegemony in what he considers Russia’s near-abroad. That is not a reaction to NATO expansion but rather an aggressive program vital to his view of Russia’s historic and cultural role, as well as to his domestic political standing.
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Syria and the next president
Secretary of State Kerry asked the key question about the Syria ceasefire on NPR this morning: “What’s The Alternative?” He had none, because President Obama is sticking with his determination that vital US interests are not at risk there, apart from the terrorist threat. So the President is doing whatever is necessary–even military cooperation with the Russians that Defense Secretary Carter thinks unwise–to attack the Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), now Jaish al Fateh al Sham (JFS). Everything else–in particular support for the Syrian opposition–is at best half-hearted.
The US media often picture Obama as hesitant in Syria, citing this half-hearted attitude and his decision not to bomb in response to chemical attacks and instead seek removal of Assad’s chemical weapons by diplomatic means. That is incorrect. He has been remarkably decisive and resolute in sticking with his initial decision on what matters and what doesn’t in Syria. All American presidents since 1989 have resisted big interventions abroad. He is the only one who has stuck to his guns (or pin stripes, if you prefer). There is every indication that in doing so he is in tune with majority American sentiment: the electorate wants to go after the extremists but not worry about how Syria is governed.
The result is that Secretary Kerry had no leverage in dealing with Moscow. Leverage comes from having a better alternative to a negotiated agreement. You know this from bargaining with car salesmen. If you are willing to walk out, you are going to get a better deal. Kerry couldn’t walk out because doing so would have left the situation entirely in the hands of the Russians and Iranians, who were doing serious harm to civilians and helping the extremists to recruit. He also was unable to threaten action against the Syrian government or the many Shia armed groups Iran has put onto the battlefield in defense of Assad. Obama won’t go there.
For the moment, the ceasefire seems to be holding, with some exceptions. Humanitarian aid so far as I can tell has not started flowing into besieged opposition areas. That is supposed to happen consistently before the military cooperation with the Russians to target the ISIS and JAN/JFS starts on Monday. I’d bet on limited humanitarian aid deliveries, if only because Assad does not want to risk displeasing the Russians too much. But it will be surprising if this unsupervised, unobserved, unmonitored ceasefire lasts more than a few weeks.
All sides in the Syrian conflict will want to use the ceasefire–however long it lasts–to rest, regroup, and rearm. It would be a mistake, in the absence of a firmer and longer-term political solution, for them not to do so. No political solution appears on the horizon. The High Negotiation Commission of the Syrian opposition has published its concept for a transition to a democratic society, but Bashar al Assad is showing no interest. The Iranians and Russians, having doubled down on their support for him, can see no alternative that would be even half as friendly to their interests as Bashar. They can no longer back up without losing their privileges in Syria sooner rather than later.
Later it may be, but strategically Moscow and Tehran have lost. They have linked the fate of their interests in Syria to a dictator who has slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people and destroyed the country. The day will come when Syrians will throw out Bashar and his allies. But there is no guarantee the successor government that does that will be a democratic one. It could just as well be a new, Sunni Islamist one, led by the likes of JAN/JFS or some version of ISIS. President Obama has studiously avoided worrying about how Syria is governed, but his successor will have to.
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After Mosul: military victory won’t suffice
As the Iraqi military and its allies prepare for a campaign to take back Mosul from ISIS, it is important to examine the strategic importance of the city and how the dynamics in Iraq might change once it is back in the state’s possession. This was the topic of a September 9 panel at the Hudson Institute After Mosul: The Imperative of Bolstering US Allies.
The panel was moderated by Eric Brown, a fellow at Hudson, who explained that much of the conversation surrounding Mosul is concentrated on a military defeat of ISIS and overlooks the potentially chaotic aftermath. Iraq, the US and their allies have no plan for keeping the peace after Mosul is taken back. The power vacuum that ISIS will leave behind will give other extremist groups the opportunity to throw their weight around to the detriment of citizens of Mosul.
Michael Pregent, also a scholar at the Hudson Institute, agreed. The current US strategy of punishing ISIS-held towns essentially recreates the situation that made ISIS strong in the first place. The disproportionate US focus on military victory leaves potential Iraqi allies without the support they need to establish sustainable democratic institutions. Pregent suggests that we focus on taking out high ranking ISIS individuals in Iraq and concentrate the majority of our resources on empowering Iraqi communities. By doing so, ISIS will begin to fade and Iraqi civil society will grow stronger and more sustainable.
In regards to Mosul specifically, Dylan O’Driscoll, a research fellow at the Middle East Research Institute in Erbil, explained that Mosul is too fractured to survive any sort of power vacuum. While the liberation of Mosul would be an excellent political boon for both Baghdad and Washington, the Iraqi army isn’t militarily prepared to undertake the task. Without a strong political agreement, Mosul will not stay liberated for long, as it will likely be torn apart by factional violence, leaving room for a neo-ISIS group to take control.
Dlawer Ala’aldeen, the president of the Middle East Research Institute, echoed the sentiments of the previous two panelists. He predicts that once Mosul is liberated, the US will shift its focus to Syria and will totally disengage from Iraq, leaving ISIS and its descendants to flourish. He emphasized the importance of intelligent decision making in Iraq. If the US does not learn from the mistakes of its previous forays into Iraq, it and its allies will be paying for it for decades to come.
The final panelist, Bilal Wahab, the Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agreed with the other panelists and offered insight specifically on Iraqi Kurdistan. While Kurdistan has largely been a safe haven for stability and freedom, the Kurdish moment for independence is slipping away as a result of internal fissures within the KRG. There is no force to unite the Kurds. Disunity makes it difficult for the US or Baghdad to work with them. Their lack of unity in combination with their rising debt, stalled income as a result of low oil prices, and lack of sustainable infrastructure makes the KRG a less-than-ideal ally.
During the Q&A, Ala’aldeen suggested that the US use its leverage over the KRG and Baghdad to encourage democratic institution building, humanitarian aid and reduction of corruption. Both governments financially depend on the US and will respond positively to American pressure. He concluded by saying that the only long term solution to terror is good governance. In Iraq, good governance requires Western pressure.
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Faute de mieux
I’ve been hesitating to comment on the Russian/American agreement on Syria. So far as I know no text is available publicly. As the devil is in the details, it is important to read the whole thing. It is also important to see how implementation goes. But herein a few preliminary remarks.
The basic outline is clear enough from press reports and the leak of an earlier draft. Humanitarian corridors are to opened to besieged areas like Aleppo. Starting this evening, which happens to mark the beginning of Eid al Adha, the Russians and Americans will try to restore the cessation of hostilities, after a weekend of ferocious attacks on opposition forces. Provided humanitarian deliveries go well, seven days later Moscow and Washington will begin jointly to target Fateh al Sham, the successor organization to Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra, which has been largely embedded until now with non-extremist fighters. The idea is to give the non-extremists time and incentive to separate and to prevent the Russian/Syrian government/Iranian coalition from targeting the non-extremists. The war against the Islamic State, which keeps itself separate from the opposition, will also continue.
Secretary of State Kerry describes the agreement as a step in the direction of a political transition. I don’t hear Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov saying that. This agreement in no way threatens the regime, which gets a respite from the fighting during which it will no doubt try to resupply and consolidate its fragmented forces. It is unclear what, if any, restraints on its air and ground attacks are included in the agreement, though it is presumably expected to participate in the ceasefire by not attacking opposition forces that observe it. If there is to be a political transition in accordance with the June 2012 UN communique, it won’t start until the military balance changes significantly from its current tilt in favor of the Syrian government.
The Syrian opposition people I’ve talked to welcome the agreement, more out of resignation than enthusiasm. They doubt the regime will abide by it and know that Fateh al Sham makes important contributions to the resistance to Bashar al Assad. But they also know that the non-extremist opposition is exhausted and needs a break, even if only a temporary one, from a year of indiscriminate but successful Russian/Syrian government/Iranian assault. The US and its Gulf allies could turn off the opposition’s spigot of money and supplies. Better, the opposition figures, to go along with a pause in the fighting and make the best of it. Maybe something like a relatively stable patchwork of opposition-controlled safe areas will emerge.
But the cessation of hostilities isn’t likely to last. Without third party observers, the same frictions that wrecked the last cessation of hostilities are likely to wreck this one as well. The Americans of course know that but hope to do enough damage to Fateh al Sham in the meanwhile to prevent it from being able to launch attacks against Americans, which the Administration is convinced is the extremists’ intention. They do not believe the formal separation of Fateh al Sham from Al Qaeda has made the jihadis any less dangerous to Americans.
Whatever they say about not being wedded to him, the Russians and Iranians have demonstrated unequivocally that they care more to keep Bashar al Assad in power than the Americans care to see him removed. I hope Secretary Kerry at least told them that success in that endeavor means they are responsible for rebuilding Syria, the bill for which will be several hundred billion dollars.
From my point of view, the agreement is a second best and likely temporary solution. President Obama is simply not willing to do more to help the Syrian opposition prevail in forcing a political transition. Secretary Kerry was left with no Plan B. He had no alternative to a negotiated agreement, which means he was over a barrel. The non-extremist opposition is in the same unfortunate state. Faute de mieux, they will go along to get along, hoping that it leads to where they would like to go.
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Dear Mr. President,
Secretary Kerry last week failed to reach agreement with Moscow on coordinating attacks on extremists in Syria. Even his effort to reinstate the cessation of hostilities and ensure humanitarian access has proven a bridge too far for the Russians.
Syria is now in the sixth year of a war that has killed half a million people, displaced more than half the population, threatens the stability of friends throughout the Middle East, and has damaging repercussions among our European allies. Your remaining months in office provide an opportunity to steer this horrendous conflict towards a peaceful settlement. If you refuse to do more than you have done so far, it will discredit your efforts to reduce and reshape US commitments in the Middle East and haunt your legacy.
Your policy has been a judicious one. You have tried hard to keep the US focus on the most serious threats to our national security: the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. You have avoided military clashes with the pro-Assad coalition, including the Russian air force, the Syrian armed forces, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as its surrogates. You have provided military assistance to non-extremists prepared to fight the Islamic State as well as billions in humanitarian and other assistance to civilians.
The results in the past year have been good when measured narrowly against your objective: to block the main threats to the US. The Islamic State is losing territory, especially along the northern border with Turkey. The successful operation with Turkish support took Jarablus and blocked an unwarranted move there by the Kurds. This will cut off ISIS’s vital supply lines and reduce its revenue. An attack on ISIS’s capital Raqqa next year is a real possibility. The Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria has disowned its loyalty to Al Qaeda central, though it maintains goals that are anathema to US interests. We are currently talking with the Russians about jointly targeting what is now call Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS).
Your judicious approach has however had unintended consequences. Fully backed by Russia and Iran, Assad is gaining ground. Attacks on JFS, should the talks with Moscow eventually prove successful, will give him an opportunity to gain more. Over a million civilians are besieged. Few new refugees are escaping. Talks on a 48-hour humanitarian truce for Aleppo have bogged down. The stalwart rebels of Daraya have surrendered, after a four-year siege. It is clear the Syrian regime is again using chemical weapons. The Assad forces and their allies are killing the non-extremists America supports, driving others to make common cause with extremists. There is declining hope for a political transition to a non-Islamist, democratic regime that will preserve Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The US should not abandon that goal. Here are three things you can do in the next few months that will demonstrate American will and reignite diplomatic efforts in favor of a negotiated political solution to the Syria conflict that meets US requirements:
- Support legislation in Congress that imposes sanctions on those responsible for harm to civilians.
The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2016 would levy financial, trade, travel and arms sanctions on those who are responsible for human rights abuses and those who facilitate them. While its practical impact might be limited, because few of the perpetrators are likely to come within US jurisdiction, it would send an important signal and could raise doubts in the Syrian security forces about carrying out illegal orders to harm civilians. We should invite the EU to join us in imposing sanctions.
2. Ground the Syrian air force, both fixed wing and helicopters.
John Kerry is still trying to get the Russians to do this, as the quid pro quo for cooperation with the US in attacking the former Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. If he fails, you should tell the Russians and Syrians that any Syrian aircraft responsible for bombing civilians will be subject to attack by the US. Few Syrian pilots will be prepared to take the risk. If they do, even shooting down one or two such aircraft, or striking them on land, would likely ground the entire fleet.
3. Get Hizbollah out of Syria.
Lebanese Hizbollah has provided vital ground forces to Assad, especially in the fighting around Aleppo and along the Lebanese border. This Shia militia also contributes to Islamic State and Al Qaeda recruitment of Sunnis, as its activities illustrate all too clearly that the fight in Syria now has a sectarian dimension. Hizbollah is a terrorist organization that has killed Americans and will likely do so again in the future. If the US is fighting terrorism in Syria, it should not be immune. We should tell the Russians and Iranians that we want Hizbollah out of Syria or it will be subject to US attacks, like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
You could also consider a no-fly zone over parts of Syria, to protect opposition-held enclaves in the north and south for example. But that would create target-rich areas that have to be continuously defended, both on the ground and in the air. The options above are less burdensome and would signal more unequivocally US determination to protect Syrian civilians wherever they live.
These moves would also improve the odds for a diplomatic solution. Once Assad is deprived of the air and ground assets that have enabled him to survive and even given him an edge in the fighting, the conditions will ripen for a negotiated outcome early in Hillary Clinton’s presidency. That would be a worthy legacy.
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