Tag: ISIS
Hezbollah in Syria
The Washington Post piece I published July 28 on forcing Hezbollah out of the fight in Syria either diplomatically or, if that fails, militarily has gotten mixed reactions, at best. Here are some criticisms I care to reply to:
- Many retweeted the false allegation that I had advocated bombing Lebanon (even that I had advocated bombing civilians in Lebanon). The op/ed was clearly directed at Hezbollah’s presence inside Syria and advocated getting its forces to withdraw to Lebanon. At no time did I advocate bombing civilians either in Lebanon or in Syria. This false allegation was clearly intended to obscure the main point I had made: that Hezbollah is itself a terrorist group that should not be in Syria, even if you think it has an appropriate role in Lebanon.
- Quite a few interpreted my piece as pro-Israel, some explicitly referring to my being Jewish. This of course ignores the fact that Israelis might not appreciate the Hezbollah retaliation I mentioned as likely. It also helps anti-Semites to put people in predetermined boxes, making further thinking or discussion unnecessary. The fact is Hezbollah would represent more of a threat to Israel if it were not fighting against Syrians. It will emerge from Syria significantly diminished in manpower and political traction in Lebanon, though with enhanced military experience.
- Some thought my proposition would be not be consistent with international law. This is a more worthy critique. International law does permit self-defense, but it has been some time since Hezbollah killed Americans, so far as I know. There is, however, no international statute of limitations, in particular on mass murder. Is the US not entitled to respond to the murder of 241 Marines because more than 30 years have passed? The US killed Osama bin Laden more than 9 years after 9/11. How many more years before we forget about mass murder? Hezbollah has sworn enmity to the US. Are we not permitted to take them seriously and try to prevent further harm to our citizens?
- Others alleged that my proposal would spread the Syrian war. This too is worthy of consideration, but I fail to see how my proposal would necessarily make things worse. If Assad and his allies continue to make progress and in particular if opposition-held neighborhoods in Aleppo were to fall, more Syrians would flee to neighboring countries, not fewer. It is certainly arguable that some significant portion of the 7 million and more Syrians who have already become refugees are attributable to Hezbollah. How many more will Hezbollah cause to flee if it is not prevented from assaulting civilians?
- Some asked whether we shouldn’t be happy Hezbollah is fighting the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. While Hezbollah does fight jihadis associated with both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, its presence in Syria is also an important recruiting tool for Sunni extremists, who are delighted to have the civilian population Hezbollah attacks mobilized to take up arms in self-defense. Killing civilians and calling them terrorists is not a viable strategy to counter violent extremism.
Assad helped to create the Islamic State in Iraq after the 2003 American invasion, when he funneled jihadi fighters into Iraq to resist the Americans. Early in the 2011 revolution, he also released extremists from Syrian prisons, in an effort to ensure that the only choice Syrians and the international community would have was between him and the terrorists. He is close to fulfilling that prophecy. The longer the war goes on, the less space there is for non-extremists. Allowing Hezbollah to continue to fight in Syria helps not only Assad but also the most extreme elements opposing him. It also postpones any political settlement, which is what is really needed.
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Stronger Erdogan, weaker Turkey
The July 15 Turkish coup attempt was swiftly quashed. Just as swiftly came President Erdogan’s fulfillment of his promise that those responsible “will pay a heavy price for their treason to Turkey.” Why the coup failed, who was behind it, and what is the future of US-Turkey relations were the main questions explored at the Atlantic Council event last Tuesday “Ten Days after Quelling the Coup: Where is Turkey Headed?” Moderated by Aaron Stein, Senior Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the event featued Elmira Bayrasli, Visiting Fellow at New America, and Steven Cook, ENI Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Cook offered four reasons for the coup failure. The first and most important was the divided Turkish military. The coup was a factious scheme, not a unified undertaking. Second, the plotters underestimated Erdogan’s hold on power, which he has held since 2003. Third, the Turkish military is not as strong as it seemed. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Fethullah Gulen — whom Erdogan regards as the main culprit of the coup attempt — used to be partners and worked in parallel to weaken and subordinate the military. Lastly, Turkish society appears no longer willing to accept military rule.
Bayrasli clarified that Fethullah Gulen is a US-based cleric who founded the Hizmet movement. Rooted in moderate Islam, Hizmet has attracted millions of followers and has funded hundreds of schools, think tanks, and media outlets around the world. Erdogan accuses Gulen of orchestrating the coup and has urged the US to extradite him. It is possible he was behind the coup, but it is also true that Gulen has become Erdogan’s “default scapegoat.” Until Turkey provides solid evidence, the US cannot extradite Gulen, but the claim of his involvement advances Erdogan’s effort to concentrate power.
Bayrasli noted that the AKP came to power with technocrats who delivered. Turkey has seen enormous economic growth since Erdogan came to power. But economic prosperity hasn’t been matched with political and social advancement.
Cook and Bayrasli believe that Washington and the EU are positioned as mere spectators, with little leverage over Turkey’s internal affairs. The implicit Turkish threat to send a large number of refugees in the direction of Europe means that the EU will remain mute over Erdogan’s purge. According to Cook, “Turkey has the EU over a barrel.” Turkey’s paramount importance in the fight against ISIS will silence Washington too.
With its military in chaos, with police and the ministry of interior decimated by purges, Turkey may not remain an effective partner in the fight against ISIS, either in controlling its borders with Syria or working with the US at Incirlik. Who is going to substitute thousands of judges and teachers, and tens of thousands of policemen and army personnel? The purges are weakening Turkey and are undermining its capacity for effective governance. Turkey might have the EU over a barrel, but at least Washington should not be a mere spectator.
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The story will not end with Mosul’s liberation
A former Middle East Institute research assistant still working on Iraq offers this:
The dust is settling in Fallujah, where the Iraqi army is digging in. The center of gravity in the fight against Da’esh (ISIS) is now moving north. Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and a Da’esh stronghold since June 2014, will now become a battleground again. D-Day remains unclear, though on Sunday Nineveh’s former governor predicted a mid-September start date for the Mosul offensive.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad – alongside international partners – have held months of discussions and planning sessions to prepare for what is to come. At times the discussions have been less than amicable, but it is generally understood that Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army will work together closely to liberate the city.
The humanitarian situation arising from that liberation will be bleak. Contingency planners in Iraq and Kurdistan believe there are around 1.2 million civilians trapped inside of the city, with another 800,000 in the surrounding districts and villages in Nineveh province. This population will be directly exposed to the fighting.
This will present an unprecedented challenge for authorities. KRG reports predict that the number of new IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) will reach around 420,000 individuals (72,000 families). The vast bulk of these IDPs will flee north and east, into the Iraqi Kurdistan.
This could spell disaster for the KRG. The region is already suffering from the effects of years of fighting, a severe economic downturn, and a bitter ongoing dispute with the federal government in Baghdad over its share of the nationwide budget. Despite all this, Kurdistan has become a comparatively safe haven for those displaced by regional turmoil (and for economic migrants from the south). As a result the KRG now hosts close to 1.3 million IDPs, plus 245,000 Syrian refugees – around a quarter of the region’s total population.
Moreover, the 420,000 IDP figure does not represent the worst-case prediction. One briefing document produced by a KRG department presents three possible scenarios for the Mosul offensive’s IDP fallout. In the first, best-case scenario, the operation lasts only a few weeks. In this case, the number of IDPs will remain comparatively low, as Da’esh bans freedom of movement, and Mosuli civilians attempt to weather the conflict at home.
The second, middle-case, scenario gives the 420,000 IDP contingency figure. It assumes an offensive lasting more than several weeks, in which shelling and airstrikes become more intense, and the battle descends into block-by-block street fighting.
In the third, worst case scenario the offensive lasts several months. Bitter street fighting, increasing shortages of food and supplies, and inner-city chaos ensue as Da’esh slowly loses control. In this scenario, the number of people fleeing the fighting may rise to more than a million.
This third case scenario warrants being taken seriously. The operation to retake Fallujah lasted a month. The Mosul offensive could well last much longer. Mosul city is considerably larger than Fallujah, at approximately 250 square miles to Fallujah’s four square miles. Mosul’s still-resident population is also vastly larger than Fallujah’s, making it harder and more time-consuming for attacking forces to avoid collateral damage (it can be assumed that the defenders will have no such qualms). Further, Da’esh has had more than two years to entrench. The loss of Mosul, the jewel in its crown, will be a more symbolic defeat than any previous loss. Da’esh is likely to put up a determined defense.
Any of the three scenarios will put an incredible financial and logistical burden on already struggling Kurdistan. Five new IDP camps are planned, but the KRG already struggles to care for the numerous IDPs already in-region. Meanwhile, the stagnant economy has forced the domestic population to undergo painful belt-tightening.
While Iraqi Kurdistan remains relatively stable for now, tensions and resentments bubble barely below the surface. Civil service salaries have been slashed and frequently have not been paid at all. President Masoud Barzani has clung to power, even as his presidential term (and the extension he gave himself) has expired. The Kurdish parliament has ground to a halt as party relations between former coalition partners, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Gorran, have deteriorated to non-speaking terms. Politics between the major parties has become increasingly violent.
Conversations with Kurdish citizens in the region suggest that the failures of their leaders have not gone unobserved, but rather are currently being tolerated for the greater good. Popular grievances will resurface once the common enemy is defeated. Kurds will expect speedy redress from the government in return for their patience these past two years, starting the moment Da’esh is beaten.
Mosul’s fall may be seen as that moment. The domestic and international press will see it as the moment the international coalition broke the back of Da’esh in Iraq. Even as it falls, Erbil will be facing a vast influx of IDPs. It is doubtful the KRG will have the capacity or resources to process and provide for this new population, while also caring for its own.
But even if the liberation of Mosul goes smoothly, other risks will follow: ISIS fighters are likely to escape and pose as IDPs, Arabs fleeing to Kurdistan may therefore be distrusted and even mistreated. Disputes between the KRG and Baghdad will intensify, especially if the Kurds try to keep the eastern bank of the Tigris in Mosul as well as the Nineveh plain, which has a mixed Yazidi, Assyrian Christian, Kurdish, Shabak, Arab population of about 400,000.
This story will not end with the liberation of Mosul.
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Weaponizing humanitarian corridors
Yesterday, Moscow and Damascus proposed to open humanitarian corridors into Aleppo. But their corridors aren’t intended to let humanitarian aid in. What they want to do is let Aleppans leave the besieged city.
Why would they want to do that?
There are two good reasons:
- The Syrian army and its militia allies are stretched thin. A block-to-block fight in the opposition-controlled eastern part of the city will take a big toll. Reducing number of opposition fighters will reduce the hit Assad’s forces take.
- The 300,000 or so people left in the east after more than five years of fighting are diehard opposition supporters. President Assad doesn’t want them staying, as they will no doubt continue to oppose his rule.
So what we’ve got here from the Russians and Syrians is a proposal to cleanse Aleppo of its opposition population, who are mostly Sunni. No doubt Assad intends to replace them with loyalists, in due course. He has caused so much destruction, and has so little money with which to rebuild, the eastern part of the city is likely to remain deserted for some time to come, or be populated by only the most desperate of the down and out.
What we are seeing is a purposeful effort to re-engineer the demography of Syria, now divided among areas controlled by the regime, the opposition, the Kurds, the Islamic State and other extremists, to simplify things a bit. Assad has no intention of welcoming home the more than four million people who have fled the country. Nor does he want another seven million who are internally displaced to go automatically back to where they came from. What he wants is to determine who goes where, consolidating those who support his rule in what he terms “useful Syria” (the Damascus/Aleppo axis and the west) and dispersing to other less attractive areas those who don’t.
The US has characterized the Russian/Syrian proposal as a “demand for surrender.” The UN has said it doesn’t respond to humanitarian needs, which are for pauses in the fighting and free access for UN aid going in and for people who want to leave, via any route they choose.
I see the Russian/Syrian proposition as an effort to weaponize the concept of humanitarian corridors, using them to achieve objectives that would otherwise require the application of military force. I can’t however rule out that the US will fall for the idea, in one form or another. Washington has shown no interest in the dire situation in Aleppo. It is entirely focused on fighting the Islamic State.
That is a mistake. Allowing Assad to conquer Aleppo and cleanse it of his opponents will help extremist recruitment and extend the growing international insurgency they are indulging in. He has made it absolutely clear he has no intention of governing in a way that would be sufficiently inclusive to counter the extremists.
Some of my friends are wondering whether allowing Assad to stay in place might calm things enough to allow for a transition to take place in due course. I’d have to see the details of such a proposition before commenting, but what indication is there that Assad will ever give up power unless he is forced to do so? The cynicism of weaponizing the idea of humanitarian corridors should remind us all that we are dealing, in both Russia and Syria, with people determined to have their way by any means, foul or fair.
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Why get Hezbollah out of Syria
I’ve got a piece in the Washington Post this morning: The right target for the U.S. in Syria: Hezbollah. It starts like this:
The military situation in Syria has turned against the U.S.-supported opposition over the past year, due mainly to Russian intervention. Now, the failed coup in Turkey and subsequent crackdown there stand to reduce the capabilities of a key U.S. ally. Without some rebalancing now in favor of the opposition to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, the prospects for a satisfactory negotiated political transition are dim.
In a dissenting internal memo last month, 51 State Department diplomats advocated attacks on Syrian government forces to end their aggression against the country’s civilian population, alter the military balance and bring about a negotiated political solution. President Obama has focused instead on fighting terrorism in Syria, but U.S. targets are limited to Sunni extremists such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates.
There is also a Shiite terrorist organization in Syria: Lebanon-based Hezbollah. It should not be immune.
That’s all I can reproduce without getting into trouble with the guardians of intellectual property. Go to the link above for the rest.
I don’t advocate an ultimatum backed with the threat of force lightly. But I also don’t see how allowing the Syrian wars to continue can be justified. Doing nothing is also doing something. It has consequences.
The US proposal to cooperate with Russia in attacking Jabhat al Nusra as well as the Islamic State makes the Hizbollah question even more urgent. If implemented, the US/Russia agreement will further weaken the opposition to Bashar al Assad, which relies–like it or not–heavily on Jabhat al Nusra capabilities. While the Americans are proposing as part of the agreement that the Syrian air force be grounded, no restraint on its ground forces (or those of Hezbollah) is proposed. Nor would it be possible to enforce.
So Faysal Itani is correct when he suggests that implementation of the agreement will make things even worse for the Syrian opposition than they’ve been to date, which is pretty bad for the past year. Aleppo is under siege and will likely fall, sooner or later. Idlib is at risk. Barack Obama, who doesn’t think US national security interests are at risk in the fight against Assad, could leave office presiding over mass atrocities the US has pledged to prevent and further undermining prospects for the negotiated settlement the US says it wants.
I am however sympathetic to the Administration’s aversion to taking up the cudgels against Russia, Iran and even the Syrian regime, as it lacks Congressional authorization for that kind of state-on-state fight. But I doubt any Congressional authorization is needed for the fight against a non-state actor like Hezbollah that has killed many Americans. The existing Authorization to Use Military Force, passed to bless the war against Al Qaeda, has already been stretched to cover the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra, both Sunni extremist organizations. Why won’t it stretch to cover Shia Hezbollah as well?
The main purpose of an ultimatum to Hezbollah would not be to widen the Syrian war. It would be intended to get Hezbollah to withdraw to Lebanon and end its participation in the Russian/Iranian coalition supporting Bashar al Assad, thereby encouraging him to get serious about the UN-sponsored peace talks. Washington would of course continue to have a problem with Hezbollah even in Lebanon, where for decades it has weakened the Lebanese state, distorted Lebanese politics and planned the murder of innocent civilians in half a dozen countries.
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We should still support democracy
I signed on to this letter to President Obama written and published today by the fine Project on Middle East Democracy.
As you consider the legacy of your presidency, we urge you to make an official visit to Tunisia, to demonstrate concretely the commitment you made during President Essebsi’s visit in May 2015 that “the United States believes in Tunisia, is invested in its success, and will work as a steady partner for years to come.” Your visit to Tunisia would energize and reassure Tunisia’s citizens and political leaders, sending a powerful signal of American support as the country struggles with the enormous challenges of building accountable institutions and a democratic society.
In 2009 in Cairo, you inspired citizens across the Middle East and North Africa by declaring a commitment to “common principles — principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.” In the Arab world today, Tunisia stands alone as the one country where those principles of justice, progress, and tolerance have prevailed against all odds over the past five years.
Your Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes said in January that you would seek to consolidate your foreign policy legacy this year by traveling widely and by working with allies to combat extremism and foster the rise of emerging democracies. There is no more important example of an emerging democracy in the world today than Tunisia, which has achieved historic progress through compromise and consensus-building. It is impossible to overstate the value that a successful transition to democracy in Tunisia could have for the entire region.
In addition, Tunisia is both the newest major non-NATO U.S. ally and an important partner in the counter-ISIL coalition that, with U.S. support, is demonstrating increasing effectiveness at fighting extremism at home and across its borders. A visit to Tunisia would allow you to highlight a rare example of progress in countering extremism in a region too often defined by rising extremism and violent conflict.
Finally, Tunisia presents a unique opportunity in a difficult election-year climate here at home, as a positive story that enjoys bipartisan support in Congress and as a North African country where both the government and the people want greater U.S. engagement. We strongly urge you to travel to Tunisia to demonstrate the depth of U.S. support for its historic democratic transition and to underscore your administration’s commitment to its success as a model in the Arab world.
The letter has a lot of more distinguished names than mine attached to it (121 in all), so I suppose someone in the White House will read it.
I am less than sanguine about a presidential visit materializing. First there is the practical point: the schedule for the rest of the year should already be in the can. Squeezing in a stop in Tunis might be doable: it is on the way to almost anyplace in the Middle East or Central Asia and an easy hop from more or less anywhere in Europe.
More important is the equivocal character of what has happened in Tunisia. It is the only one of the Arab uprising countries to maintain a clear path towards democracy, rather than falling back into autocracy or civil war. But it has also generated an unusually high number of recruits to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as several horrendous terrorist incidents. President Obama is unlikely to risk an appearance in Tunis to say nice things about its government before the American election.
The two months or less (considering the holidays) remaining on his mandate after November 8 might accommodate a stop in Tunis. But there will be a big clamor for his attention in many countries towards the end of the year, when he plans to attend an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Peru. I won’t be surprised if he decides on visits to American troops in Iraq, Turkey or elsewhere around the holidays.
Another possibility is a Biden visit to Tunisia. That would not have the same visibility worldwide, but I’m pretty sure the Tunisians would appreciate it. The Vice President met with Tunisian President Essebsi in Washington in May.
There are lots of other ways Washington could try to signal support for Tunisia and its continuation on the path towards democracy and reform: visits from John Kerry, Susan Rice or Samantha Power, a high-level “Codel” (Congressional delegation), close consultations on Libya. The point is to somehow make it clear that the US continues to support democratic ambitions in those Middle Eastern countries where they survive. Is that too much to ask?
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