Tag: ISIS
Countering Daesh in cyberspace
In his speech following the deadliest shooting in American history and the nation’s worst terror attack since 9/11, President Obama asserted that the gunman had been radicalized over the internet. Many Daesh (aka ISIS) fighters, sympathizers, or “lone-wolf” attackers are like Omar Mateen. They have been radicalized online or have been exposed to violent extremism via social media, such as Twitter, YouTube, or other platforms. Radicalization is not new, but the internet has made it easier and faster. Social media platforms have become central for disseminating terrorist propaganda, allowing recruiters to reach a far larger and more global audience.
What the US government in partnership with NGOs and the private sector can do to successfully counter violent extremist narratives online, and what they are already doing, were the main topics at the “Fighting ISIS in the Information Space: Government and Civil Society Perspectives” panel, hosted by New America on last Thursday. The panel consisted of Meagen LaGraffe, Chief of Staff at the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and Tara Maller, Spokesperson and Senior Policy Advisor for the Counter Extremism Project. It was moderated by Peter Bergen, Director of New America’s International Security program and CNN’s national security analyst.
Recognizing that Daesh, and violent extremism in general, cannot be defeated solely by military force, in March 2016 President Obama signed Executive Order 13721, establishing the GEC as an interagency entity based at the Department of State. LaGraffe explained that the GEC plays a critical role in the Obama Administration’s revamped strategy to undermine Daesh’s media messaging and erode its appeal.
The Executive Order states that the Center “shall lead the coordination, integration, and synchronization” of US counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences. According to LaGraffe, observers had rightly criticized prior government efforts focused on producing video or other materials in English. Even though the government has a good message to tell, it is not the best messenger to to its target audiences. The Center therefore refrains from messages with a government stamp on them.
The new strategy is defined by identifying local partners and more credible messengers on the ground, and working with them to produce more localized anti-terrorism messages. For LaGraffe, “it takes a network to defeat a network.” Among other parties, this network includes ISIS defectors and foreign fighters’ family members, whose messages seem to be particularly effective for counter-radicalization and counter-recruitment.
In addition to fostering and empowering a global network of local messengers, the fight against Daesh also requires cooperation with nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and especially social media companies. Maller applauded Twitter shutting down 125,000 Daesh-linked accounts, but asserted that a lot more can be done. She explained that every picture and video has a unique DNA. Companies don’t have to review manually extremist content, but instead can use technology like Microsoft’s PhotoDNA to detect ISIS photos or videos as they’re being uploaded. This allows for immediate removal of the content and of the user’s account. The same image matching technology is already used to stop the online spread of child sexual abuse content.
Daesh does not rely on its own media platforms, but primarily uses platforms owned by private companies in America, which have the power to shut its messages down. Maller observed that like the US government, NGOs and the private sector still haven’t caught up with the significant change in terrorist radicalization techniques and recruitment strategy. Countering violent extremist narratives and defeating Daesh requires that they all step up their game.
As acknowledged by LaGraffe, the GEC is solely concerned with changing behavior, and not necessarily with changing beliefs and perceptions. While an entity that does this work is undeniably necessary, a successful long-term approach to countering terrorism requires deeper contemplation about the root causes of terrorism and commitment to address them. The internet accelerates, but it rarely if ever creates.
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Peace picks July 11 – July 15
1) HEARING: Human rights under siege worldwide | Tuesday, July 12th | 10:00 AM | 2172 Rayburn House Office Building | Chairman Royce on the hearing: “Human rights violations are on the rise around the world. In Iran, the courts carry out public amputations and floggings. In Putin’s Russia, journalists are jailed for exposing government corruption and reporting the facts. In failed states like Syria, we’ve seen abhorrent treatment of civilians, including genocide. We’ve even seen backsliding in respect for human rights among established democracies. These are disturbing trends, and this hearing will seek answers on how the U.S. should respond.” Witnesses include: The Honorable Mark P. Lagon, President of Freedom House. Thomas Farr, Ph.D., President of the Religious Freedom Institute. Ms. Amanda Schnetzer, Director of the Human Freedom Initiativeat the George W. Bush Institute. Mr. Mark Bromley, Chair at the Council for Global Equality
2) Economic and Labor Reform in Bahrain | Wednesday, July 13th | 12:00 PM | Brookings | Click HERE to register | No country in the Gulf region and perhaps in the broader Arab world has thought about and experimented with reform more than the Kingdom of Bahrain. Indeed, Manama was setting up economic visions of the future long before the trend became popular. However, the country’s reform process faces various challenges, posed by an ongoing political crisis at home and an increasingly turbulent regional environment. Ausamah Abdulla Al Absi, Chief Executive Officer of the Kingdom of Bahrain’s Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), will join the Atlantic Council to discuss Bahrain’s reform accomplishments and shortcomings and lay out the country’s path toward sustainable development. In his capacity as head of the LMRA, Mr. Al Absi is responsible for realizing Bahrain’s economic reform plan. Since its inception in 2006, the LMRA has played a crucial role in HRH Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s economic reform program. Additionally, the large and vastly important institution oversees the implementation of Bahrain Vision 2030. Speakers include:
Ausamah Abdulla Al Absi, CEO of the Labour Market Regulatory Authority, Kingdom of Bahrain Introduced by: Barry Pavel, Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Moderated by: Bilal Y. Saab, Director, Middle East Peace and Security Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council.
3) Blasphemy Laws and Censorship by States and Non-State Actors: Examining Global Threats to Freedom of Expression | Thursday, July 14th | 2:00 PM | 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, click HERE for event details | The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission | The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission will hold a hearing that will examine blasphemy laws, state censorship, actions by non-state actors, and other threats to freedom of expression around the world. This hearing will examine these issues, while seeking to provide concrete recommendations for how U.S. policy makers can most effectively encourage the protection of freedom of expression around the globe. This hearing will be open to members of Congress, congressional staff, the interested public and the media. The event will be hosted by Joseph R. Pitts, M.C. and Co-Chairman, TLHRC. James P. McGovern, M.C. and Co-Chairman, TLHRC.
Panel I:
David N. Saperstein, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State
Panel II:
Rev. Thomas J. Reese, S.J., Chairman, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
Panel III:
Ms. Vanessa Tucker, Vice President for Analysis, Freedom House
Ms. Nina Shae, Director, Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom
Dr. Karin Karlekar, Director of Free Expression Programs, PEN America
Dr. Courtney C. Radsch, Advocacy Director, Committee to Protect Journalists
Mr. Wael Aleji, Spokesperson, Syrian Network for Human Rights
4) After Fallujah: Security, Governance, and the Next Battle Against ISIS | Friday, July 15th | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM | Middle East Institute hosted at the Johns Hopkins Kennedy Auditorium | Click here to register | Iraqi forces have expelled the Islamic State (ISIS) from Fallujah, but difficult work lies ahead to retake the territory still under ISIS control, provide security, and rebuild. Restoring government and the rule of law, returning the displaced, and rebuilding homes and infrastructure will be crucial for sustaining the victory. Who will have the power and legitimacy to manage local resources and services? What will it take for civilians to return? Can the Popular Mobilization Forces that played an important role in the liberation of Fallujah be demobilized or absorbed into the army, or will they remain independent power centers? The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host Robert S. Ford (MEI), Charles Lister (MEI), Jessica Lewis McFate (Institute for the Study of War), and Douglas Ollivant (New America) for a discussion of these and other questions regarding the aftermath of Fallujah, how ISIS may react in defeat, and the challenges ahead facing the liberation of Mosul.
5) How to Defeat Terrorism in Iraq | Wednesday, July 20th | 10:30-12:00| The Institute for World Politics | Click here to RSVP | Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari will share his vision for his country: a political re-crafting of the existing government structure away from sectarianism and towards a new constitution based on Iraqi national citizenship and inclusive of participation from all sectarian communities. HE Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari is the Chairman of the Iraq National Project and President of Peace Ambassadors for Iraq (PAFI). One of the leaders of the al-Zoba tribe in Iraq, he is the nephew of the late Islamic scholar and religious leader. Sheikh Harith al-Dhari Jamal was born in the Abu Ghraib district of Iraq on July 16, 1965. He grew up within the al-Zoba tribe and in the 1970s he attended the Hafsa School. In the 1980s, Jamal was conscripted into the Iraqi Army to fight in the Iran- Iraq War. During his time on the frontline, he fought alongside both Sunni and Shia officers and friends, in the Iraqi Republican Guard. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by coalition forces, Jamal was a strong proponent of Iraqi nationalism and self-rule. In 2005, he and his family fought against al-Qaeda’s occupation of Iraqi territory and, as a consequence, Jamal lost 70 members of his family in the struggle. In 2014, Jamal helped to establish the nonprofit think tank Peace Ambassadors for Iraq, whose purpose is to advocate for a renewed system of government in Iraq, to determine the best policies to fully eliminate ISIS/Daesh and other terrorist forces from Iraq, and to build international support for an all-inclusive Iraq. Presently, Jamal is working for a renewal in Iraq by forging a non-sectarian and inclusive settlement for all Iraqis.
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America is already great
On Wednesday, June 29, the Atlantic Council hosted the first public presentation of Pew Research Center’s 2016 annual report on America’s global image, followed by a discussion on international views of America’s role in the world. The discussion was facilitated by Molly O’Toole, Senior Reporter at the Foreign Policy Magazine, and featured David Rennie, Washington Bureau Chief and Lexington Columnist at The Economist, and Richard Wike, Director of Global Attitudes Research at the Pew Research Center.
Wike presented the key findings, which aim to gauge America’s international image. Contrary to claims of increased anti-American sentiment, America’s image remains strong and largely favorable in the countries surveyed, which however exclude Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. More than 50% in every country surveyed (10 European, 4 Asia-Pacific countries, and Canada) expressed a favorable opinion of the US. The exception was Greece, where only 38% embrace this sentiment. Other recent Pew studies suggest the US enjoys a positive image around the globe, including 56% of Indians and 50% of Chinese, with young people much more likely to have a positive opinion, though Wike noted that “young people around the world are more positive towards the US, more positive towards China, more positive towards the UN — they are just more positive, more internationalist.”
In 15 out of 16 countries (Greece again being the exception), the majority expressed support for US-led military intervention against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This support is remarkably high in most Western European countries, including France (84%), Sweden (81%), the UK (71%), and Germany (71%). This response is different from reactions to all previous US-led interventions in the Middle East. According to Rennie, the refugee crisis, coupled with the increase in the number and magnitude of terrorist attacks, have rendered ISIS the highest security threat in Europe. The fight against ISIS is not seen in Europe as a quarrel in a far away country, but rather as an issue that directly affects European citizens.
The Pew survey also indicates that while America was able to regain perceived primacy as the global economic power — which for the past few years most people attributed to China — perception of US respect for personal freedoms at home remains relatively weak. Only 53% of Western Europeans think the US respects the human rights of its inhabitants. This is lower than 2008, the final year of the Bush presidency. Edward Snowden’s revelations about the NSA’s surveillance programs, increased awareness of unauthorized interrogation techniques used in the post-9/11 era, as well as the controversies regarding police treatment of African-Americans and other minorities likely contributed to the decline. Rennie observed that America’s reputation for upholding individual liberty constitutes an important source of soft power and gives a degree of credibility to US interventions. Government officials should work on improving America’s international perception regarding respect for human rights and liberties.
The panelists all agreed that America’s global image is highly personified in the President: who is in the White House has a tremendous impact on how people around the world see the US. After the start of the Iraq War in 2003, President Bush suffered negative ratings in most parts of the world and Pew observed a significant rise in anti-Americanism in most regions. The image of the United States has improved immensely in most regions after Obama was elected as a President in 2008, a shift that was particularly pronounced in Western Europe.
O’Toole suggested that the 2016 Presidential elections will have a tremendous effect on how people globally view the US. Wike substantiated this claim with hard data. The newest Pew study finds a remarkably negative assessment of Trump, with 85% of Europeans lacking confidence in him, and a median of only 9% confident in his ability to handle international affairs. While not as enthusiastic as for Obama, most Europeans still look at Hillary Clinton favorably. A median of 59% express confidence in her. As Rennie observed,
the caricature of Bush is fairly close to what Trump tells his supporters he will be….Everything that Europe thought they disliked about George W. Bush, Donald Trump is currently telling his supporters is what he will deliver.
As O’Toole noted, both Pew surveys and other evidence invalidate the almost trite claim that today the US is neither respected by its allies nor feared by its adversaries. However, this might in fact change with the 2016 elections. If America’s global image really is personified in the President — as the panelists contended — then we need to envisage Donald Trump, with his 9% favorability rate in Western Europe, personifying America. Recognizing the complexity of the current state of international affairs, and the serious challenges that plague the world, more fear everywhere is nearly guaranteed, while allies’ respect practically inconceivable.
For now, however, America’s global image remains strong and largely favorable.
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No end in sight
How can Daesh (that’s the Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL to the uninitiated) be defeated and what will happen thereafter? If you want the more upbeat official story, read Brett McGurk’s testimony. Here are some thoughts that have crossed my screen lately.
Everyone should expect a generational fight. Though Daesh is losing territory rapidly in Iraq (47% of its maximum) and Syria (20%), it is good at what it does, resilient and adaptable. It has recruited at least 40,000 foreign fighters from 120 other countries. It has overt affiliates in more than half a dozen countries as well as a covert worldwide network devoted to smuggling, finance and terror, as illustrated all too clearly in this week’s Istanbul airport bombing. Even after it has lost all its territory, Daesh will go to ground and continue terrorist attacks of that sort.
The Coalition arrayed against Daesh is large (nominally 66 countries) and organized but still clumsy and far from fully integrated. It will hold a July 20 “summit” in Washington focused on its five “lines of effort”: political/military coordination, blocking foreign fighters, Daesh finance, stabilization of areas retaken from Daesh and counter-messaging. This is in addition to the nine US “lines of effort.”
There are contrasting narratives that avowed opponents of Daesh espouse, leading them to opposing conclusions.
The Russians view Daesh as the product of destabilization of Syrian government institutions, whose maintenance is vital to stem the extremist tide. In order to ensure the survival of state institutions, they support Assad and want reconciliation between him and at least some portion of the opposition. They also think their military intervention has gone pretty well, delivering some Western respect and easing Western pressure on Ukraine. But they are concerned, based on the Chechen precedent, about the enormous cost and difficulties of an Assad victory in Syria. They have flatly refused to pay for any reconstruction when approached by a government-linked expert.
The Saudis have an almost diametrically opposed narrative. They believe Daesh is the product of Iranian-sponsored sectarianism in both Iraq and Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki helped the Islamic State to revive in Iraq after the American withdrawal by governing in a blatantly sectarian way dictated by Iran. ISIS’s ability to gain ground in Syria is attributable to the regime, which released extremist prisoners, has bought oil from Daesh, and focused its military attacks against moderates, all with backing by Iran. The Saudis take the threat of Daesh seriously and believe the fate of Iran’s effort to establish itself as the Middle East hegemon will be determined in Syria. The Kingdom recognizes that its own Wahhabi ideology has contributed to Daesh‘s appeal and is committed to reforms that will change that in the decades to come.
Iraqis are fighting and dying to take turf from Daesh, but the aftermath of victory is a big and unsolved problem. Inclusive governance is what the country needs but seldom gets, in particular in Baghdad. Shia militias were too active in Tikrit in the wake of victory there over Daesh, rendering the town unsafe for Sunni returnees initially. Only once local leaders and reconciliation mechanisms were put in place was the stabilization effort more successful. At Ramadi, the governor has been doing well but there is much more damage and a lot of demining to be done. At Fallujah, there is less destruction but a serious humanitarian crisis, with 85,000 civilians fleeing from the city and living in unacceptable conditions in the desert. UNDP resources are grossly inadequate to the stabilization effort it has been tasked with.
Little planning has been done for stabilization in Syria. What is needed there is a political settlement. Sunni alienation and grievance are the the problem, enormously aggravated by the presence of Hezbollah. Ignoring it gives the impression that the West will support “ABS”: anyone but Sunnis. Post-Daesh, governance needs to be far more inclusive.
The Kurds in both Iraq and Syria are getting a lot of Western support because they are willing to fight Daesh. The support should be more conditional. The US should insist that Iraqi Kurdistan reach a pact with Baghdad and that the Syrian Kurds help with peace talks between Turkey and the PKK, which is closely tied to the Syrian Kurds.
Looking ahead, there is a real risk that with Russian and Iranian support the Syrian regime will manage to capture Aleppo as well as Raqqa, form some sort of “national unity” government with elements of the loyal opposition and rewrite parts of the constitution. The US might then declare victory and abandon the field entirely, leaving reconstruction inadequately resourced. This would not really solve anything and would allow grievances to worsen, ungoverned spaces to grow and the conflict to spread, possibly to Lebanon and Jordan.
There is a glimmer of hope for Iraq, but even that is limited. Splits in both the Sunni and Shia communities are opening the possibility of cross-sectarian mobilization in Baghdad. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are often viewed as under Tehran’s control, but some of them are not and might join with Sunnis who have also fought against Daesh. The Kurdish issue would still be unresolved, however, which will create problems for the liberation of Mosul. Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani is entirely dedicated to consolidating his own power, both vis-a-vis other Kurdish political forces and vis-a-vis Baghdad. Without clearer definition of the political end-state, defeat of Daesh could lead to a follow-on civil war pitting Kurds against Arabs.
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Hard questions, difficult answers
Murdered yesterday, Jo Cox gave this last speech in Parliament on Syria (via @ThomasPierret):
Would that we could all lead lives that guarantee we leave behind such eloquent, upstanding memorials!
I can’t match that, but my readers do ask hard questions about the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Here are a few, with answers:
Q: Why do the Russians back Assad?
A: Lots of people more knowledgeable than I am about Russia have tried to answer this one. Most take seriously Moscow’s frequent statements that they are not wedded to Assad personally but want an orderly and legitimate transition in Damascus, not abrupt regime change.
Certainly they don’t want regime change, but I’ve seen no evidence the rest of that summary is true. Now that they have doubled down on Assad by joining the fight last fall, the Russians have in fact welded, if not wedded, themselves to Assad or some proxy for him. There is no conceivable successor regime that would be even half as friendly to Russian interests.
Moscow’s tactical gains through its air attacks have guaranteed it eventual strategic defeat in Syria, where the overwhelming majority of the more than 60% of the pre-war population that was Sunni will be forever hostile to Russia.
Q: How about the Iranians?
A: Iran has been 100% committed to Assad from the get-go. They need Syria to maintain their pipeline of arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon, who are Iran’s front-line troops in the confrontation with Israel. Tehran cannot rely on access to Beirut’s airport, and Syria provides strategic depth to Hezbollah.
Iranian strategic defeat is even more certain than the Russian loss of Syria. I would be the first to stand up against retaliation by Sunnis against Shia and Alawites, but the odds of its happening eventually are high.
Q: Why don’t we just go in there any finish off the Islamic State?
A: In some alternate universe where George W. Bush is still president, I suppose we might do that. But the risks of deploying US ground troops to the front lines to fight ISIS are significant. Are we prepared to see 100 American soldiers captured and shot in the back of the head or burned alive? How about 500? Or a thousand? ISIS is significantly more virulent and brutal than even its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq during the 2000s.
There is also the “day after” problem. The key question once ISIS is defeated is how the territory it once controlled will be stabilized and governed. Without a solution to that, we can expect ISIS (or something worse) to return. The US didn’t do well as an occupier in Iraq in 2003. How well would we do in Syria or Iraq in 2016? Are we prepared to deploy several hundred thousand troops for years to try to make sure things come out right? And pay perhaps another 500 billion or a trillion dollars for reconstruction?
Q: What’s the solution?
A: I don’t know. The last five years of war have made everything more difficult than it might have been in those first six months of peaceful demonstrations, but the clock can’t be turned back.
There are two propositions I find somewhat appealing now.
One is for the US to extend its war on terrorists in Syria, which in practice now targets only the Sunni variety, to Hezbollah, which is a Shia non-state actor. The first step would be telling the Iranians that Hezbollah must leave Syria. We’d have to be prepared to back that up with air strikes. Getting rid of Hezbollah would significantly affect the military balance in Syria, raise the risks to Russia and Iran, and increase the odds of a negotiated outcome.
The second somewhat appealing idea is creation of safe areas for the non-extremist Syrian opposition to govern, one in the north and one in the south. This would give the mostly Arab opposition an opportunity to prove itself a serious competitor to the regime in dealing with the requirements of Syria’s citizens, as the Kurds have begun to do along the northern border with Turkey. Doing this would entail both protecting the safe areas from the air and providing the opposition with the means to protect themselves on the ground, as we already do with the Kurds.
Neither of these propositions is a slam dunk. The first would likely lead to Hezbollah retaliation against American or allies assets somewhere in the region. The second, safe areas, is an inherently difficult operation that provides the regime, the Russians and the Iranians with target-rich environments they would no doubt attack. Safe areas have more often failed (Bosnia) than succeeded (Iraqi Kurdistan).
Q: What do you think of the State Department dissent message urging air attacks on Syrian government forces?
A: I might agree with its overall thrust, as it appears based on the notion that the Russians won’t help and we have to do something to rebalance the military equation. But I’ll need to see a full text before commenting.
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Peace picks June 13 – June 17
- Authoritarian Resilience and Revision after the Arab Uprisings. Monday, June 13. 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Register to attend. Five years after the 2011 uprisings, authoritarianism remains a deeply embedded feature of the Arab state system. Countries in the region are caught between the competing impulses of fragmentation and two equally unsustainable authoritarian visions—that of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, or classic autocratic regimes. Robert Worth and Joseph Sassoon will discuss these dynamics, sharing from their recent books. Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey will moderate. Following the discussion, copies of the book will be available for sale with signing by the authors. Joseph Sassoon is an associate professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and is the author of Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics. Robert Worth writes for the New York Times Magazine and is the author of A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil from Tahrir Square to ISIS. Frederic Wehrey is a senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Cascading Conflicts: U.S. Policy on Turkey, Syria, and the Kurds. Tuesday, June 14. 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM. Bipartisan Policy Center. Register to attend. In the fight against ISIS, U.S. policymakers have been increasingly confounded by the fact that two crucial allies, Turkey and the Kurds, are locked in a violent conflict on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border. While Washington’s plans for defeating ISIS rely on airbases in Turkey and Kurdish troops in Syria, the Turkish government continues to insist that Washington’s Syrian Kurdish partners are no different from the Kurdish terrorists against which it is fighting at home. In the absence of a more effective U.S. plan for addressing the situation, Turkey’s domestic conflict now threatens to not only undermine the war against ISIS but also destabilize Turkey, damage U.S.-Turkish relations, and prolong the Syrian conflict. Join the Bipartisan Policy Center for an expert panel discussion that will address the evolving relationship among Turkey, Syria and the Kurds, with a focus on the implications for U.S.-Turkish relations and U.S. policy in Syria. As an already complicated situation risks causing a major crisis between Washington and its allies, understanding the dynamics has become more important than ever. Panelists: Eric Edelman, Co-Chair, BPC’s Turkey Initiative, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. Aliza Marcus, Author, Blood and Belief. Ceng Sagnic, Junior Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow, Wilson Institute. Moderated by:Ishaan Tharoor, Reporter, The Washington Post.
- Youth, Peace and Security: New Global Perspectives. Tuesday, June 14. 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM. U.S. Institute of Peace. Register to attend. Today’s generation of youth, at 1.8 billion, is the largest the world has ever known. Many of these youth are living in countries plagued by violent conflict and extremism, such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria. The goal of SCR 2250 is to recognize youth as partners for peace rather than solely viewing young people as perpetrators of violence—a shift in mindset that responds to the call to action of 11,000 young peacebuilders in the Amman Youth Declaration. The resolution, sponsored by the Government of Jordan, is a direct follow-up to the Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security held in August 2015, as well as the Security Council’s Open Debate on the Role of Youth in Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Peace held in April 2015. Join USIP and the Interagency Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding for a discussion on SCR 2250 with the U.N. Secretary-General’s Envoy for Youth H.E. Ahmad Alhendawi of Jordan, young leaders from countries affected by violent extremism and armed conflict, and other experts. Speakers Include: Manal Omar, Associate Vice President, Center for Middle East and Africa , U.S. Institute of Peace; H.E. Dina Kawar, Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations; H.E. Ahmad Alhendawi, United Nations Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth; Saji Prelis, Co-chair of the Inter-agency Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding, Search for Common Ground; Soukaina Hamia, Youth Peacebuilder, Deputy Director of Sidi Moumen Cultural Center of Casablanca, Morocco; Saba Ismail, Youth Peacebuilder, Executive Director of Aware Girls, Representative of the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOYP); Victoria Ibiwoye, Youth Peacebuilder, Founder of One African Child of Lagos, Nigeria; and Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support.
- The Economic Decline of Egypt after the 2011 Uprising. Wednesday, June 15. 1:00 PM. The Atlantic Council. Register to attend. Five years after the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s economy is floundering and remains far from recovery. Successive Egyptian governments since 2011 have struggled to develop a vision for a new economic model for Egypt, while simultaneously implementing populist policies to appease the immediate demand of the public. This lecture is also the launch of the Rafik Hariri Center’s Mohsin Khan and Elissa Miller’s new report, “The Economic Decline of Egypt after the 2011 Uprising,” and a discussion on the trajectory of Egypt’s economy since 2011 and what the current Egyptian government should do to arrest the economy’s downward slide. A discussion with: Prime Minister Hazem Beblawi, Former Prime Minister, Arab Republic of Egypt; Executive Director, International Monetary Fund; Caroline Freund, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Mohsin Khan, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council; and Mirette F. Mabrouk, Deputy Director & Director of Research and Programs, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council. Introduction by: The Hon. Frederic C. Hof, Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council.
- Desert Storm after 25 years: Confronting the exposures of modern warfare. Wednesday, June 16. 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM. SEIU Building. Register to attend. By most metrics, the 1991 Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert Storm, was a huge and rapid success for the United States and its allies. The mission of defeating Iraq’s army, which invaded Kuwait the year prior, was done swiftly and decisively. However, the war’s impact on soldiers who fought in it was lasting. Over 650,000 American men and women served in the conflict, and many came home with symptoms including insomnia, respiratory disorders, memory issues and others attributed to a variety of exposures – “Gulf War Illness.” On June 16, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings and Georgetown University Medical Center will co-host a discussion on Desert Storm, its veterans, and how they are faring today. Representative Mike Coffman (R-Col.), the only member of Congress to serve in both Gulf wars, will deliver an opening address before joining Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings, for a moderated discussion. Joel Kupersmith, former head of the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Veterans Affairs, will convene a follow-on panel with Carolyn Clancy, deputy under secretary for health for organizational excellence at the Department of Veterans Affairs; Adrian Atizado, deputy national legislative director at Disabled American Veterans; and James Baraniuk, professor of medicine at Georgetown University Medical Center. Following discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
- Can the US Work with Iran: Challenges and Opportunities. Thursday, June 16. 9:00 AM. The Atlantic Council. Register to attend. Nearly a year after the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany signed a landmark nuclear deal with Iran and nearly six months after the agreement was implemented, the nuclear aspects of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) appear to working smoothly. But other challenges potentially imperil the agreement. There are questions about whether the JCPOA can serve as a template for additional regional and international cooperation or whether domestic politics in the US and Iran and Iran’s continuing difficulties re-entering the global financial system will put those opportunities out of reach for the foreseeable future. To discuss these vital issues, the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative and the Iran Project invite you to a half-day symposium.
9:00 a.m. – The progress and problems of sanctions relief
Featuring: Christopher Backemeyer, principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the Department of State, Teresa Archer Pratas, deputy head of the sanctions divisions at the European External Action Service, andGeorge Kleinfeld, a sanctions expert at the law firm Clifford Chance, and moderated by Elizabeth Rosenberg, director of the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
10:15 a.m. – The JCPOA’s effects on US-Iran relations
Featuring: Suzanne DiMaggio, director of the US-Iran Initiative at New America, Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow in the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy and Energy Security and Climate Initiative, and Negar Mortazavi, an Iranian-American journalist and analyst, and moderated by William Luers, director of the Iran Project.
11:30 a.m. – The impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s role in regional conflicts
Featuring: Ellen Laipson, a senior fellow and president emeritus of the Stimson Center and former deputy chair of the National Intelligence Council, J. Matthew McInnis, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former senior analyst in the US Department of Defense and Intelligence Community, and Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution and a former senior director for the Near East and South Asia on the National Security Council. Barbara Slavin, acting director of the Future of Iran Initiative, will moderate.
12:30 p.m.– Keynote by Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, on the legacy of the JCPOA. Stephen Heintz , president of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, will introduce and moderate.
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