Tag: ISIS
Russia loses
I spoke this morning at a session on the Middle East of the SAIS conference on Russian Foreign Policy: New Spheres of Influence? Here are my speaking notes.
1. As a conflict management person, I look to distinguish between stated positions and underlying interests. That distinction is fundamental to understanding and resolving conflict.
2. Russia’s stated position on Syria, if you listened to NPR this morning, is clear: Moscow says it is not wedded to Bashar al Assad and is fighting terrorism in Syria.
3. While I am ready to be convinced that Moscow was at one time not wedded to Bashar al Assad, it is hard to argue that since September, when Putin doubled down on Russia’s support for him by initiating its air campaign.
4. Russia’s underlying interests are discernible from what it is doing, not what it is saying: Russia’s main bombing targets are Bashar al Assad’s strongest opponents, which include relative moderates as well as extremists. It is doing little to attack the Islamic State.
5. A well-informed Russian told me in December that the targets are in fact selected mainly by the Syrian army, so the targeting is not a surprise.
6. It is now hard to picture any successor to Assad, except a member of his family or inner circle, who would be as friendly to Russia’s interests in Syria as Assad.
7. Rather than gaining a sphere of influence in Syria, Moscow has lost any hope preserving its influence there in the longer run.
8. A transition to a democratically elected leadership, as foreseen in both the Geneva 1 and Vienna 2 statements, will likely end Moscow’s port access and other privileges in Syria, or raise significantly the price Russia pays for them.
9. It is foolish of the Americans to convince themselves that Russia in the current situation, which is militarily advantageous to Assad, will sign on seriously to any plan that ends the Assad regime.
10. In the meanwhile, Russia is causing massive destruction in Syria
11. Moscow’s strategy is essentially a Chechnya strategy—destroy and conquer—without the possibility of post-war reconstruction under a hand-picked autocrat that has worked reasonably well in Grozny.
12. While the US has contributed upwards of $4 billion to international relief efforts distributed both regime-controlled, and when possible, opposition-controlled areas, Russia has done virtually nothing to feed, shelter or care for upwards of 4 million refugees and 7 million displaced people.
13. Those who know the relief business know how useless the recent airdrops of food are.
14. So long as the Assad regime stays in power, I see no way the United States or even the Europeans would pay for reconstruction, the price tag for which is in the hundreds of billions.
15. Syria may become for a while a Russian satellite, but the longer-term future is one in which Russia loses influence not only in Syria but throughout the Sunni world.
16. What can Washington do to hasten that day?
17. The most immediate priority is to save the relatively moderate opposition in northern Syria from obliteration.
18. John Kerry is trying to do that by negotiating a cessation of hostilities.
19. I admire the determination, but he is unlikely to succeed without a clearer American commitment to protecting a specific area in northern Syria from Russian, Iranian and Syrian attacks.
20. That would require a military commitment that President Obama, fearful of the slippery slope, is unwilling to make in a country where he perceives no vital American national security interest.
21. Bottom line: the horror is likely to continue, with the very real possibility that the winners will be extremists and the losers will be Russians.
22. It will be up to a future American president to determine how Washington feels about that.
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The proverbial fly on the wall
Here is what a fly on the wall heard yesterday in a well-informed, but not attributable, discussion of Iraq.
The defeat of Daesh at Ramadi has strengthened the Iraqi government politically and refocussed Baghdad attention to what will happen after Daesh is defeated, in particular to the (mostly Shia) Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs). Once seen as not only national heroes but also a permanent fixture in Iraqi politics, some Shia as well as Sunni politicians are now hoping they can be neutralized as a political force.
How to do that is still under discussion. It is not clear that incorporation of the PMUs into National Guard forces organized at the provincial level, which is what the international community until now has advocated, is the best approach. That could result in making them permanent. It might be better to transfer them, either as units or individuals, to the regular security forces, both army and police.
Even as the Baghdad government has strengthened politically, it has weakened economically. It faces a massive economic and budgetary crisis, due to declining low oil prices. The situation is even worse in Kurdistan, which also faces a humanitarian crisis due to the influx of people displaced by the war against the Islamic State (ISIS).
There is however good news, especially in Tikrit. Sunnis are returning there and joining in the continuing fight against Daesh. The liberation of Mosul it is agreed will require cooperation between Sunni forces and the Kurdish peshmerga. Shia PMUs will be involved only peripherally. The preparations for the Mosul operation, which may not occur before the end of this year despite what the government is claiming, are having a positive political impact overall, though they are causing some competition among Sunni politicians.
The overall Sunni mood is not good. Returns to Sunni areas require local reconciliation as well as law and order. Both are too often lacking. Ramadi is still laced with improvised explosive devices, so returns are minimal. International community capability to support stabilization and reconstruction is limited. The government has few resources to devote to reconstruction in the liberated territories. National Sunni politicians are disconnected from the Sunni population and unrealistic in their expectations.
Serious long-term problems remain. The territories disputed between Erbil and Iraq are likely future battlefields. Tehran still controls some of the PMUs. Iraq’s unity is imperiled, but the Germans and others are making it clear to the Kurds that they oppose an independence referendum. The two traditional Kurdish parties–the PDK and the PUK–are in intensive political consultations on KRG reform and on the issue of President Barzani’s remaining in power. There is some hope for Kurdistan to postpone its ambitions for self-determination.
Everything in Iraq would be easier if Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia could come to an agreement on Syria.
Prime Minister Abadi is not in a strong position. But he maneuvers well and is muddling through. He is looking now to install a more technocratic cabinet that will pursue reform more aggressively. This will not be easy, but the effort merits international community support.
PS: Those interested in the Prime Minister’s own view of the situation can get it here.
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Will the hostilities cease?
The only real question about the cessation of hostilities supposedly agreed in Munich last week is when it will collapse. It may never go into effect or it may last a week or two, but it will be surprising if it lasts much longer than that. The Russians have made it clear enough the cessation of hostilities doesn’t apply to its efforts against ISIS, which have never really targeted ISIS but are instead directed mainly against any forces opposing the Assad regime. Assad has likewise indicated that his forces will not cease fighting whoever opposes them.
The US and its Coalition allies, who are focusing for now on ISIS forces in eastern Syria, also intend to continue their air attacks. Turkey is shelling Kurdish and allied Arab forces trying to take control of the relatively small part Syria’s northern border that they don’t yet own. Saudi Arabia is talking about deploying ground forces to Syria, but only as part of a US-led Coalition effort that has not real possibility of materializing.
If Damascus allows humanitarian aid convoys into some of the areas it is besieging, that will only be for fear of the consequences if they don’t. If no relief reaches the besieged areas, Secretary of State Kerry will want to make another run at President Obama to urge stronger military action, at the very least provision of antiaircraft weapons to the opposition forces the US has trained. Preventing this eventuality could be a good enough reason for Assad to allow the aid shipments to move forward for a while. Assad’s air force is already decimated, but loss of its remaining helicopters would constrain its ability to terrorize civilian areas with indiscriminate barrel bombs.
President Obama still shows no appetite for getting more deeply involved in Syria. He remains exclusively focused on the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). None of his putative allies in the region share that single mindedness, though the Kurds are making a good show of it. Their real objective is to carve out part of Syria that they can claim to govern, and from which they can support Kurdish insurgents inside Turkey. The Turks are trying to prevent that. The moderate opposition, supported by the Gulf, is targeting Assad. Coalition warfare, which for the US is more the rule than the exception, is always difficult, but this Coalition is proving particularly unruly.
Russian air attacks have already devastated a large part of the area around Aleppo, where several hundred thousand people are at risk of being besieged. Idlib could be next. The costs of future reconstruction in Syria are already astronomical, with no sign of anyone willing or able to pay. The Russians and Iranians haven’t contributed even to the humanitarian relief effort. The Americans and the Gulf won’t be interested in reconstructing anything if Assad remains in power. The Europeans may want to provide some aid, if only to relieve the refugee pressure that is bearing down on them. The Syrian government is broke and will remain so–even if it regains control of its oil fields, they are now depleted and damaged.
So the war will continue sooner or later, despite the human and economic costs. And the post-war period will be no less challenging. Woe to Syria.
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Republicans and Democrats like Jordan
On Thursday, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa hosted a hearing on “Jordan: A Key US Partner.” Opening statements were delivered by the following members of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa: Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairwoman, Representative Ted Deutch, Ranking Member, Representative David Cicilline and Representative Lois Frankel. Witnesses included Gerald Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Paige Alexander, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the Middle East, USAID, and Fatema Sumar, Regional Deputy Vice President, Europe, Asia, the Pacific and Latin America, Department of Compact Operations, Millennium Challenge Corporation.
Ros-Lehtinen affirmed Jordan’s importance as an ally and King Abdullah’s status as reliable partner. Last year, the US signed an MoU with Jordan that recognized its key role in fighting ISIS and in welcoming refugees. Refugees are straining Jordan’s already limited resources. It is vital that we help Jordan shore up these resources, especially water and energy. Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, we have already invested $275 million in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) wastewater projects that are nearing completion. She and Deutch visited the Al-Samra wastewater treatment plant last year. There are other projects such as the Red-Dead Sea Conduit that could shore-up Jordan’s water resources and strengthen Jordanian-Israeli cooperation.
Another area for possible Israeli-Jordanian cooperation would be an agreement for Jordan to import Israeli gas. Jordan and Israel have shared interests and should work together. We must also support USAID and IRI in their efforts to strengthen civil society and governance. Jordan’s stability is essential for the region. She and Deutch recently introduced the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act, which passed Congress and is on its way to Obama. It will expedite weapons sales to Jordan to help it fight ISIS and strengthen its borders.
Deutch thanked his colleagues for supporting the bipartisan legislation and explained that last year’s MoU increased annual US aid to Jordan from $600 million to $1 billion. This reflects our commitment and Jordan’s willingness to partner with us against ISIS. Jordan has taken in 635,000 registered refugees, but Jordanian officials believe the actual figure is much higher. Jordanian communities have welcomed them but they have strained water and energy resources. USAID programs have brought fresh water and sanitation services to 1/3 of Jordan. The expansion of the Al-Samra wastewater treatment plant will increase access to water for over 3 million Jordanians.
Schooling is key to prevent a lost generation of Syrian refugee children. Secretary of State Kerry recently announced $267 million in education spending for Jordan. More refugees will seek safety in Jordan as the conflict in Southern Syria worsens; they will be difficult to vet at the border but Deutch hopes Jordan will let those who don’t pose a threat in.
King Abdullah understands the need to both defeat ISIS and find a political solution to the conflict. As long as Assad remains in power, we won’t be able to stem the flow of refugees or defeat ISIS. Helpful actions that Jordan can take include improving refugees’ ability to work and cooperating with Israel on the Red-Dead project. Deutch thanked Jordan for its efforts to calm tensions on the Temple Mount last fall, but was alarmed by news that some Jordanian MPs had threatened to topple the government if the deal to import Israeli gas goes through.
Cicilline also expressed appreciation for Jordan’s counter-ISIS efforts and noted that he had visited the Za’atari Refugee Camp last month. Frankel noted that she had visited Jordan last month on a personal trip and had admired the beauty of the country and its people. She thanked Jordan for welcoming refugees but noted that refugees whom she met with expressed how difficult it was for them that they were unable to work and supplement their meager allowances. She wanted to know if anything was being done about this and what the US was doing to boost Jordan’s economy, including by supporting tourism. She also questioned whether our aid programs in Syria were still
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The Russians win this round
John Kerry went to Munich this week looking for a ceasefire and humanitarian access. He got a “cessation of hostilities,” which implies less legal status and less permanence, and a promise of immediate humanitarian access. This was entirely predictable and predicted: the cessation of hostilities freezes the recent Russian/Iranian/Syrian government gains in place on the ground around Aleppo. Humanitarian access will shift the burden of feeding and sheltering hundreds of thousands of besieged Syrians from their own government to the international community.
Just as predictable as this agreement is its breakdown. There is no neutral party to monitor implementation. Even if the moderate forces represented in the High Negotiation Commission, which gave a nod to the deal, restrain their cadres, there are lots of other fighters all over Syria, including extremists associated with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda who are uninterested in stopping the hostilities. The Russian-backed offensive never made any distinction between extremists and relative moderates, whom it slew with abandon. Some of the relative moderates will continue their efforts to flee northwards. Others who remain will swell the ranks of the extremists.
It would be surprising if an agreement built on such shifting sands were to last more than a couple of weeks. The Russians, Iranians, Hizbollah and Syrian forces will suffer many potshots and will at some point decide to take to opportunity to go at it again. The opposition will be trying to regain its footing, but that will be difficult as civilians flee and extremists recruit. The Americans have given no indication of any willingness to beef up arms to the opposition or to allow the Saudis and Gulf monarchies to deliver anti-aircraft and other higher quality weapons. The logistical advantage lies with the regime and its allies, who are not besieged and will more easily rearm and resupply.
So the next round, whenever it occurs, is likely to find the opposition at an even greater military disadvantage. Russia may want to help the Syrian Kurds take control of the entire northern border of Syria with Turkey, thereby boxing in the remaining opposition forces in the north. That could trigger a Turkish intervention, widening the war and weakening America’s best allies, the Kurds, in fighting the Islamic State. The Russians will also want to clear out the opposition forces near Damascus and in the south, where Russian air strikes had intensified in recent days. It is hard to say that the regime may “win” this war, because much of the country will be destroyed, but Assad could end up remaining in the presidential palace and presiding but not ruling over a fragmented and desperate country.
Without a political agreement that leads to his certain departure, it is hard for me to picture the Americans, Europeans and Gulf states supporting any significant reconstruction. Washington has already spent upwards of $5 billion on humanitarian aid and will presumably spend billions more. The Russians and Iranians, so far as I know, haven’t spent a dime on humanitarian aid yet. With oil prices around $30/barrel, both Moscow and Tehran will be hard strapped. Even at $80/barrel they wouldn’t have much to spare. They won’t be willing to spend any significant amount on reconstruction in Syria.
So an Assad “win” will make Syria a ward of poor step-parents with their own offspring to nurture. Some days I think the opposition should just stop fighting and allow the regime to confront the challenges of governing post-war Syria, with its ruined infrastructure, its decimated security forces, its limited oil production, its drought-ridden agriculture, and its dwindling water resources. How long would Assad last? Many Syrians have already been governing themselves through local councils for the better part of five years. It is going to be hard to take the legitimacy and authority they have built up back and stockpile it again in Damascus. Assad may win the military fight, but he has lost his country.
The Russians and Iranians are also likely losers in the long term. They have doubled down on supporting Assad. Their efforts will drive more Syrians to support extremists and guarantee that no successor regime will be friendly to their interests.
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The ceasefire/humanitarian trap
Secretary of State Kerry is in Munich at the annual security conference reportedly talking with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov about a ceasefire and humanitarian access in Syria, focused on Aleppo and the north. That’s where Russian air attacks have decimated both the Syrian opposition fighters and their civilian supporters in recent days.
Let’s leave aside the question of whether Kerry should ever speak with Lavrov again after his mendacity of the past several months, when he led the admittedly gullible Secretary of State to believe that Moscow might make common cause with Washington against the Islamic State (ISIL). Instead, Moscow’s main military targets in Syria have been relative moderates. But we all have to talk with people who have treated us shabbily. The question is whether there is any hope of a ceasefire and humanitarian access.
Surprise: the answer is yes.*
At some point the Russians, the Iranians and Bashar al Assad are going to conclude that they have reached their main objectives. Going further will result in diminishing returns. Having displaced well over 100,000 people and besieged several hundred thousand more, the triumvirate will not want to feed and shelter them, much less provide medical care and sanitary facilities.
Particularly if the Kurdish forces in northern Syria, who are friendly with the Russians and the Syrian government, are able to seize the stretch of the border with Turkey that they don’t already control, Moscow will want to halt its offensive and consolidate its gains. In addition to dumping the humanitarian burden on the UN (which gets its resources from the US, the Europeans and the Gulf), from Moscow’s perspective agreeing to a ceasefire would reduce the (already small) risk that Turkey will enter the fray to block Kurdish advances.
Should the Americans, Europeans and Gulf states fall into the ceasefire/humanitarian trap?
They don’t have much choice. There appears to be no real possibility of a military response to the Russian-backed offensive. Syrian suffering is monumental. The Europeans will want to use humanitarian assistance to stem the tide of refugees. The Gulf states will feel obligated, not least because they too don’t want the refugees. The Americans have never stinted on humanitarian relief.
There is something wrong with this picture. Moscow and Tehran have created the current humanitarian crisis in northern Syria. They, not the Americans/Europeans/Gulf, should be paying to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of their military advances. So far as I am aware, neither Moscow nor Tehran has anted up a ruble or a rial. All the assistance they provide to the government in Damascus goes to the regime and areas the regime controls.
It is high time for the Americans to tell Lavrov that we expect Russia to do its part. Putin wants Russia to be counted among the great powers. He should start spending like one. I’d start the bidding at $2 billion from the Russians for UN humanitarian relief efforts and settle for $1 billion.
I’d also make it clear that Moscow’s indiscriminate bombing entails responsibility for post-war reconstruction. The Russian approach in Syria resembles what Putin did in Chechnya: level and rule. Post-war Chechnya cost Moscow a bundle. The bill for Syria will be many times that. Assad’s international opponents may feel obligated to provide humanitarian assistance to his Syrian opponents as they are chased from their homes, but they should not provide any assistance to rebuild a Syria still ruled by Assad or his regime. That is a Russian and Iranian responsibility.
Washington has already provided over $5 billion in humanitarian assistance to Syrians inside and outside the country. American aid is distributed inside Syria both in regime and opposition controlled areas. But if Assad wins this war, we’ll have to take a much harder-nosed attitude when it comes to funding reconstruction.
*For the record: I wrote this before the Russians proposed a March 1 date, and well before the proposed cessation of hostilities.
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