Tag: ISIS
Indonesia has a plan
On Monday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hosted its annual Fullerton Forum in Singapore. The keynote address was delivered by Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs and a retired general in the anti-terror squad of the Indonesian special forces. Pandjaitan was introduced by both Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia and by Ng Eng Hen, the Defense Minister of Singapore.
Pandjaitan stated that the goal of terror groups is always to destabilize countries and demoralize their populations. ISIS has not succeeded in doing this so far in Indonesia because the Indonesian government is clear that it does not negotiate with terrorists and will respond immediately to any attacks. ISIS recruitment is a global problem; the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS doubled between 2014 and 2015. Brookings estimates there are 46,000 Twitter accounts that support ISIS. In Indonesia, even some middle-class people have joined ISIS, including a policeman who died in Syria.
Indonesia is a huge country with many poorly-educated people; ISIS’s propaganda concerning the caliphate is powerful among lower-class people. Syria and Iraq are included in Islamic “end times” prophecies, and ISIS convinces people to fight the West and all countries that lack Sharia. ISIS wants to see the caliphate expand to Southeast Asia. Its fighters are hard to deal with because they have what Pandjaitan refers to as a “one-way ticket”: they are prepared to die.
In the January 14 attacks in Jakarta, Indonesian security forces responded rapidly, eliminating the terrorists in less than 12 minutes. They killed four terrorists, and using one of their cell phones, were able to track down and arrest others. This sets an example for terrorists. The attackers were previously linked with Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. Even though ISIS and AQ are fighting each other in Syria, their affiliates are capable of cooperation; Indonesia believes the local ISIS and AQ leaders have merged their work.
Terrorists in Indonesia operate in cells to maintain secrecy; cells do not have contact with other cells, making it difficult for the police to crack down on networks. So far, the authorities have had success in mapping terror networks, but Pandjaitan cannot promise that Indonesia is immune from attacks. Terror groups also communicate their final decisions to stage attacks via couriers, which are hard to intercept.
Fighting terror effectively involves three components:
- A soft approach.
- International intelligence cooperation.
- A hard approach.
The soft approach to fighting terror is Indonesia’s strategy of first resort. This includes counter-radicalization and deradicalization campaigns that are holistic in nature and will partially be conducted using the media. They are working with Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to spread the message, including on television, that ISIS is not Islam and Islam is not ISIS. Indonesia has freedom of religion, so people have the freedom to follow sharia law.
The government is also campaigning against religious intolerance. Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world, which makes it difficult to manage. The government is working on categorizing terrorists as ideologues, militants and sympathizers. Ideologues will be imprisoned separately to help stop radicalization in prisons. The government is also cracking down on social media content supporting terror, including videos that provide instructions on how to build bombs.
The ASEAN countries already have a platform for intelligence sharing regarding threats, attacks, and terror financing. Intelligence cooperation in the region is already very good.
The hard approach is a secondary approach, but is one that Indonesia is prepared to use. Indonesia has prepared its special forces to conduct operations anytime and anywhere within the country. If terrorists take hostages, the special forces will free them immediately. The Indonesian government is also altering counterterrorism legislation so that the authorities will be able to detain those suspected of plotting terror attacks for 7-30 days. Those found to have no terror links will be released. New legislation also allows the government to revoke the citizenship of Indonesians who join groups of foreign fighters.
Another key to stopping terror in Indonesia is economic improvement. Economic growth has stopped slowing. The economy grew by about 5.5% this year. Consumer confidence and confidence in the government have increased. The government has been trying to distribute economic growth more evenly between Indonesia’s regions and improve the country’s infrastructure. There has historically been a large gap between the haves and the have-nots. Many terrorists come from poor backgrounds. This year, Indonesia will spend $70 billion or 36% of the national budget on outlying regions. Funding for villages has increased from $2 billion to $4.5 billion in 2016. This will give each village around $100,000 to spend, which will help reduce rural poverty and boost economic growth. Poverty reduction is crucial. Indonesia has 230 million Muslims. If 2% live in extreme poverty and are brainwashed by ISIS, one can imagine how many will become terrorists and stage domestic and regional attacks.
An audience member asked Pandjaitan about links that had been discovered between the terrorists in the recent Jakarta attacks and terrorists from Mindanao in the Philippines. Pandjaitan stated that radicals in Mindanao are supporting radicals in Indonesia, including through the smuggling of weapons and explosives. Indonesian authorities are working to crack down on weapons smuggling.
Another audience member asked about Indonesia’s position regarding China’s actions in the South China Sea. Because of Indonesia’s territory in the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has declared that its Special Economic Zone extends into the South China Sea. There were reports that Indonesia was considering pursuing international arbitration against China. Pandjaitan replied that China acknowledges the Natuna Islands are part of Indonesia, so China and Indonesia are not in conflict regarding this matter. However, Indonesia views the South China Sea as an important area for global shipping. Indonesia does not wish to see power projection in this area and views freedom of navigation as very important.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Hangups: why and who
The Syria peace talks did not begin as projected in Geneva today, though they are likely to convene before the end of this week. Secretary of State Kerry is doing his damndest to make it happen. What are the hang ups? Is he wise to press so hard?
There are two big hangups: why talk and with whom. Or in diplomatese: the agenda and the shape of the table.
Why is the bigger issue. The Syrian opposition, backed by Washington, wants to talk about transition of power away from Bashar al Asad to a “governing body with full executive powers.” That 2012 formula has been repeated ad infinitum since, either explicitly or implicitly (by reference to the June 2012 United Nations communique in which it first appeared). The regime has made it clear it will not negotiate about transition in Geneva. Nor did it last time the UN tried for a political solution, two years ago. Bashar al Asad’s delegation will stick with an anti-terrorist pitch, backed by the Russians and Iranians. The military gains the regime has made against its opponents since Russia’s intervention in the fall mean it is feeling little pressure to yield.
While the Russians never tire of saying that they are not wedded to Bashar al Assad, everything they do suggests the opposite. There is good reason for this. Moscow has no hope of a welcome in Syria by a serious successor to the regime, so the Russians are sticking with what they’ve got.
Iran even more so. Tehran has risked Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias it supports and Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria, certainly losing thousands. Though Syrians in my experience are little inclined to sectarianism, the approximately three-quarters of the population that is at least nominally Sunni is not going to easily forget what Iran and its proxies have done to prop up a dictator. Nor will the Alawites and Shia who have backed the regime want to find out what the majority population is inclined to do in retaliation. So having Iran at the table, entirely justified by its role in the conflict, is no easy formula for a solution.
In addition, there are other “who” problems. The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, often cited as a serious obstacle, is not such a big problem this time around. With Saudi sponsorship, the main opposition forces other than al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State have chosen a High Negotiation Commission (HNC), headed by former regime Prime Minister Hijab, and a negotiating team. The main body of the opposition is, in fact, remarkably unified this time around, at least for the moment.
The problem is that there are forces claiming to be opposition that lie outside the HNC, which does not recognize them as such. They come in two flavors: Kurdish and so-called “internal” opposition, both heavily favored by Moscow.
The Kurds who count are affiliated with the Kurdish PYD militia who are fighting in northern Syria against the Islamic State with US support. Washington doesn’t want them excluded from the talks, even if they are affiliated with the Kurdish militia waging a rebellion inside Turkey. Moscow agrees, not least to give Turkey grief.
Moscow also backs elements of the “internal” opposition who aren’t regarded by the opposition forces represented in the HNC as real opposition. Russia is trying to force internal opposition figures into the HNC delegation, likely in exchange for allowing some of what Moscow regards as extremist groups also to join. From Moscow’s point of view, the more unmanageable and fractious the HNC presence in Geneva, the better. The last thing Moscow wants is for the Syrians to choose their own delegation, which would be heavily anti-Russian.
The HNC seems determined to reject Kurdish participation in its delegation, not least because the Kurds often clash with opposition brigades represented there and collaborate with the regime in territories the Kurds largely control. But of course that may mean separate Kurdish representation, which in some ways is precisely what the mostly Arab HNC should not want to see. Separate Kurdish representation in the talks could well favor Kurdish ambitions for a separate federal unit within Syria, like the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Syrian Kurds are calling theirs “Rojava.”
With all these complications, is Secretary Kerry wise to insist?
Richard Gowan argues that there are reasons to proceed, despite the odds: possible progress on humanitarian issues, keeping a peace process alive because it may eventually lead somewhere, and most of all the need Washington and Moscow are feeling to limit their recent competition and try for some cooperation in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. Even a failure, in this view, has the virtue of trying.
My own inclination is towards skepticism, not least because failure at this point will likely mean another tw0-year hiatus. Secretary Kerry is a far greater risk-taker than most of his predecessors. He tried with Israel and Palestine far beyond the point at which others would have given up. The result is an impasse that may last a long time. He pressed forward with Iran on nuclear issues to good effect. Will his Syria effort look more like the former or the latter? More likely the former, with catastrophic consequences for millions of Syrians.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks January 25-29
Government closing today, but still lots of good events later in the week:
- U.S.-Russia Cooperation in Syria | Wednesday, January 27th | 9:00-10:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After a year that has seen increased turmoil in the Middle East, there is growing attention in the region from outside powers. A distinguished Russian delegation, led by Vitaliy Naumkin, will present their views on the geopolitical challenges in the region. In particular, they will discuss Russia’s role in resolving the Syrian crisis, and outline opportunities for collaboration with the United States. Vitaly Naumkin is the head of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Other speakers include Vassily A. Kuznetsov, head of the Centre for Political Systems and Cultures at Moscow State University, and Irina Zvyagelskaya, professor at Moscow State University.
- Local Responses to Libya’s Instability | Wednesday, January 27th | 2:30-4:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since its 2011 revolts and the overthrow of former ruler Muammar Qaddafi, Libya has experienced a series of weak governments, internal fighting factions, and extremist violence. In the attempts to resolve Libya’s complex political and security challenges, the voices of Libyan citizens often go unheard. Please join the Atlantic Council for a discussion with Jeffrey Vanness and Jakob Wichmann. Wichmann will present his findings from a nationwide survey conducted in Libya in August and September 2015, and Vanness will respond to the survey’s results from a US government perspective. The survey includes representative samples for Tripoli, Misrata, and Benghazi, allowing for a comparison of perceptions and demonstrating differences in attitudes in Libya. The survey, conducted through phone interviews with 2,507 Libyan respondents, was commissioned by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Topics explored include political efficacy and engagement, preferences for the future constitution, gender issues, perceptions of local and national actors, evaluation of public services, perceptions of armed groups, and responses to insecurity. Jeffrey Vanness serves as Democracy and Governance Field Advisor with the Elections and Political Transitions Division of USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance. Jakob Wichmann is a consultant for Social Impact and a partner at JMW Consulting. Karim Mezran focuses on the politics of North Africa at the Atlantic Council, where he is the lead expert on Libya.
- Saudi Arabia’s Regional Role and the Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations | Wednesday, January 27th | 2:30-4:00 | Project on Middle East Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has long been one of the United States’ closest allies in the Middle East, among the largest recipients of U.S. arms sales globally, and perceived as a crucial partner in the war on terrorism. Nonetheless, there have always been serious questions regarding the costs of the U.S.-Saudi military relationship, which have become more pronounced over the past year. The Saudi military intervention in Yemen has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, and recent executions in the Kingdom, including of nonviolent dissidents, have renewed longstanding concerns about the state of human rights in the Kingdom. In addition, concerns remain about Saudi support for extremist networks in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, as well as the impact of Saudi militarism on divisions throughout the region. How has Saudi Arabia’s role in the region changed in recent years, and what has driven these changes? What relationships have various factions in Saudi Arabia had with extremist movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa? What impact does U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia have on the Kingdom’s role in the region, as well as on human rights concerns within the country? How have recent events, such as the ongoing conflict in Yemen, Saudi’s role in the Syrian conflict, and mass executions within Saudi Arabia, affected the U.S.-Saudi relationship? And what might we expect for the future of bilateral relations? The panel includes Nadia Oweidat, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, Andrea Prasow, Deputy Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, and Stephen Seche, Executive Vice President of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
- The Impact of Low Oil Prices on the Middle East | Thursday, January 28th | 9:00-10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center on Thursday, January 28 from 9:00 am – 10:30 am for a panel discussion on the impact of low oil prices in the Middle East. The collapse in crude oil prices since mid-2014 has shaken the foundation of global energy markets, with sweeping economic and political implications for the Middle East. Amidst falling oil revenues, governments from the Gulf to Iraq and beyond face fiscal crises, market upheaval, disruption of traditional ways of doing business, challenges to longstanding fuel subsidy programs, and slumping economic growth. In the midst of this volatile landscape, energy producers in the region face an uncertain future that will have ramifications in the years to come. The discussion will touch on the following questions and more: How are low prices impacting the economic health of and internal political dynamics in Saudi Arabia? What is the future of Saudi Aramco? How are other major producing countries across the GCC, Iraq, Iran, and North Africa adapting and faring in today’s price environment? Are fiscal constraints inducing major changes in government policies and/or driving macroeconomic and energy policy trends across the Middle East? To what degree are low oil prices driving geopolitical calculations in the region? Panelists include Denise Natali, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jean-Francois Seznec, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Global Energy Center, and Jamie Webster, Senior Director of HIS Energy Downstream Research. Annie Megdalia, Deputy Director of the Global Energy Center, will moderate.
- Women and Extremism: A Tale of Two Experiences | Thursday, January 28th | 3:30-4:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Women are often the victims of terrorism and extremism by states and international actors. At times, they are also the perpetuators of violence and terrorism. This discussion will focus on the intersection between women and extremism at a time of increasing volatility in the Middle East and around the world. Join us as we explore how women are recruited and used by terrorist organizations, and how women become trapped in cycles of violence and conflict. Our panel of experts will look at ways to address the problem and how to engage women and girls in conflict prevention and resolution. Speakers include Farah Pandisth, Adjunct Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, Timothy B. Curry, Deputy Director of Counterterrorism for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Co-founder and Executive Director of the International Civil Society Action Network, Fatima Sadiqi, Fellow at the Wilson Center, and Tara Sonenshine, Distinguished Fellow at George Washington University. Join the conversationon Twitter by following @WPSProject.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Ethics matter
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs in New York hosted a talk by Jean-Pierre Filiu, Professor of Middle East Studies, Sciences Po.
Filiu related that he chose this topic months before the Paris Attacks; he knew the ISIS threat was unprecedented.
Thirty years ago, Filiu met the first jihadis while doing humanitarian work in Afghanistan. He was introduced to the disturbing Arab “volunteers” who had already begun to sneak in. He heard about Bin Laden and Zawahiri but never met them. He concluded that they lived on a different planet and wished to annihilate our way of life. Nobody took his warnings seriously.
The jihadists founded Al Qaeda (AQ) in the last month of the Soviet occupation. Al Qaeda means “the base,” which refers to a territorial base and a transnational network.
In 2001, the US and its allies responded appropriately by hitting AQ in its base in Kandahar. It is important to strike such threats at the source, the territorial base, before going after the global network. The decision to rely on local forces in the Northern Alliance was prudent. This action prevented a second wave of planned attacks.
Then the US launched the Global War on Terror and invaded Iraq. France warned against this and was correct, as it opened the Middle East to AQ. It also provided the instability that led to the London and Madrid attacks. French jihadis who had fought in Iraq were the masterminds of last year’s attacks.
ISIS was formed as a continuation of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), established by former Jordanian criminal Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Unlike Bin Laden (a son of a tycoon) and Zawahiri (a doctor), he was not bourgeois. He used his expertise in crime. He was the first to behead a hostage, Nicholas Berg, in 2004.
Bin Laden thought this tactic too gory. But it made Al-Zarqawi a star. The US focused on targeting him, so other jihadis followed him. He was killed in 2006. His successors were killed in 2010 and were succeeded by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who had been detained in Camp Bucca in 2004, but was released for good conduct. Al-Baghdadi was able to maintain order in the camp by making other inmates listen to him; this would have made Filiu suspicious.
When Al-Baghdadi took over, AQI was losing ground because of the surge of US troops. AQI was later able to regain ground with the help of former Baathists alienated by the sectarianism of the Maliki government. AQI also gained ground in Syria thanks to Assad, who preferred to be up against jihadis rather than peaceful protesters for propaganda reasons. The more dictators you have in the Arab world, the more jihadis you will have. Ethics in international relations is not a luxury, but could be a real solution to many problems.
The US lost moral leverage after it did not act on its red line regarding chemical weapons in Syria. ISIS recruitment exploded. ISIS argued that the US and its allies were letting Syrians be gassed and presented its mission as humanitarian. ISIS learned from AQ not to depend on an external force, like the Taliban. ISIS runs its own totalitarian regime in a region more symbolic for Muslims than Khorasan.
The Levant is key to Muslim “end times” narratives. ISIS now incorporates much of this apocalyptic material into its propaganda; they talk about places mentioned in prophecies. In their narrative, the final battle will be in Jerusalem. The Israeli strategy of hoping ISIS and Hezbollah will just fight each other is shortsighted. ISIS is now recruiting inside Israel. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Approaches to fighting ISIS
The Middle East Policy Council hosted The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security: Policy Choices event on Thursday. William F. Wechsler, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, gave an overall assessment on the U.S. position towards handling ISIS. Mark N. Katz, professor at George Mason University, talked about Russia’s position and its thoughts on U.S. foreign policy. Charles Lister, Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute, focused on ISIS within the Syrian context. Audrey Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason University, discussed how the U.S. should approach the ISIS situation. Patrick Theros, former ambassador to Qatar, moderated.
Wechsler believes ISIS poses a significant direct threat to the US. The US priority however has been the fight against the Syrian leader, Bashar al-Asad, and the recent scuffle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He posited that Salafi jihadist groups would turn to external attacks because of their need to prove leadership and look impressive. Conducting successful attacks attracts new members and shows authority. The use of indirect action, in his opinion, is the best option moving forward, but indirect action leads to a much longer time frame for fighting ISIS. Understanding what is happening on the ground—the changing scenarios, the history of the people, religious sects, and the ethnic composition—is critical to success if the US wants to bring real change to the region.
Katz agreed with Wechsler that ISIS has not been the top US priority. He began his discussion with Russia, its relationship with the US, and how that plays into the Syrian conflict by examining Putin’s September speech. Putin recognized Asad as the vital component in fighting ISIS. Russia’s priority in Syria is to ensure Asad remains in power, not to defeat ISIS. The US and Russia strongly disagree on who should lead Syria, though there is the commonality of keeping ISIS from gaining power. Russia thinks that the US only wants Russia involved in Syria so the US does not have to become directly involved in the conflict. The US wants to defeat Asad, ISIS, and install a pro-Western regime, yet wants to dedicate hardly any resources in doing so. Katz stated that as long as each side thinks it is superior, cooperation would not go very far. But Katz thinks Russia ultimately can be pragmatic and compromise. Russia did not support the Arab Spring but had good relations with President Morsi of Egypt. Moscow can compromise if it is in Russia’s best interests.
Lister has personally dealt with over 100 Syrian armed opposition groups on the ground. ISIS feels the pressure from opposition groups, Russia, and the US, but that does not necessarily mean ISIS is losing. Indirect action has not been implemented to the highest degree. The partnership with Kurdish forces has been successful. Lister believes other Syrian armed groups could be just as successful if given the same resources the Kurds have received. Giving support only to the Kurds shows US lack of understanding of what is really happening on the ground and of how the Kurds are perceived by their Arab neighbors. For example, the education system implemented by the Kurdish territory contains socialist elements, which makes the Arab tribes surrounding them unhappy.
Other people within Syria may not see Kurds as legitimate. Lister wants the US to team up with local Syrian allies, attack ISIS momentum, and stop ISIS from fighting on multiple fronts. He also urges that the US not forget about Al Qaeda in Syria, which has allied itself with the anti-Asad revolutionaries. He believes Al Qaeda will be in Syria after ISIS is gone because they have operated so quietly and have deep roots in communities.
Cronin said that so far, the US has attempted to use the same strategies to fight ISIS as it did Al Qaeda. This is problematic, as Al Qaeda and ISIS are not affiliated and have different traits and origins. Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization, generally does not hold territory, and relies on outside funding. ISIS is a conventional army with infrastructure, holds territory, and funds itself by utilizing resources within its territory. Taking down ISIS leaders through drone strikes will not work because leaders mainly hide in urban areas, use civilians as cover, and the pseudo-state can go on without particular leaders. ISIS kills journalists publicly because their core message is all about power and revenge. Public killings suppress dissent. When the US focuses on these brutal killings, it helps ISIS become more powerful and respected to the people it wants to attract. ISIS does not care if it is popular, but that it is powerful.
Cronin suggested that best way to combat this sort of group is by offensive containment, which would entail a major diplomatic effort and indirect military effort. Cronin, along with the rest of the panelists, agreed that fighting ISIS is a long-term problem and instant solutions are not in the cards.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks January 18-22
- Assessing the outcomes and implications of Taiwan’s January 2016 elections | Tuesday, January 19th | 10:30-12:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With Tsai Ing-wen, leader and presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), ahead in the polls against the Kuomintang (KMT) party candidate Eric Chu and People First Party (PFP) candidate James Soong, it appears Taiwan voters will elect a new ruling party on January 16. The Legislative Yuan elections are still up for grabs, and will dictate the degree of initiative a Tsai administration will have. Across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing has expressed its concerns, most notably through the November 2015 meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou, on how it feels a DPP-led government should approach cross-Strait relations. The four-month transition period leading up to the May 20 inauguration will be a critical time for the new government to lay out its policy agenda and work to establish a platform for cross-Strait relations. On January 19, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP) at Brookings and the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) will host Joseph Wu, Secretary General of the Democratic Progressive Party, for a keynote address on Taiwan’s election outcomes and implications going forward. Richard Bush, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies and director of CEAP at Brookings, will provide an introduction, and Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser and director of the China Power Project at CSIS, will moderate a discussion after the address. Following the discussion, Wu will take audience questions. To register for this event, please email ChinaPower@csis.org.
- Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships | Wednesday, January 20th | 9:00-11:00 | Center for Strategic & International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Center for Strategic and International Studies was tasked by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 with conducting an independent assessment of the Asia-Pacific rebalance first announced by President Obama in 2011. Four years into the rebalance the Department of Defense should receive high marks for sustained attention to the Asia-Pacific, but challenges in the region are increasing. The United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional relationships, posture, operational concepts, and capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the rebalance. Please join us as we present the findings of this important report and host a discussion of the importance of this vital region to U.S. national security in particular and global peace and prosperity more broadly. This panel discussion features Mark F. Cancian, Senior Adviser of the International Security Program at CSIS, Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks, Director of the CSIS International Security Program, and Andrew Shearer, former Australian National Security Adviser. Dr. John J. Hamre, CSIS CEO, will make the introductory remarks. Zack Cooper, Fellow and Japan Chair at CSIS, and John Schaus, CSIS Fellow, will present their report findings.
- North Africa in Transition: The Struggle for Democracies and Institutions | Wednesday, January 20th | 2:00-3:00 | International Institute for Strategic Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The 2011 Arab uprisings began in North Africa and toppled the leaders of Tunisia and Libya, but the forces that wreaked this profound change also touched their fellow Maghreb states of Algeria and Morocco. North Africa in Transition, the latest IISS Adelphi book, examines how the politics, security and economies – which were largely stable for decades prior to 2011 – have changed in the four states. It asks why the popular revolutions in Tunisia and Libya did not spread to Algeria and Morocco; how the revolutionary states have fared since 2011; why Libya descended into a deadly civil war while the others did not; and whether the sitting governments in Algeria and Morocco have applied sustainable strategies to address the new political climate.Please join the IISS-US for a policy discussion and Q&A session about North Africa and its importance to Western interests, chaired by Executive Director Mark Fitzpatrick. This event is on the record and will be webcast live on the IISS website. Copies of the book are available for sale on our website or after the event. Speakers include the following: Ben Fishman served for four years on the US National Security Council, including as Director for North Africa and Jordan from 2012 to 2013. Haim Malka is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at CSIS, where he oversees the program’s work on the Maghreb. John Desrocher is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Egypt and Maghreb Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State. Mark Fitzpatrick is the Executive Director of the IISS-US and the Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme.
- Congressman Hun Many: The Future of U.S.-Cambodia Relations | Wednesday, January 20th | 2:30-4:00 | U.S.-Korea Institute and John Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The U.S.-Korea Institute and the Southeast Asia Studies program at Johns Hopkins SAIS present a discussion with Cambodian Congressman Hun Many. The youngest parliamentarian in the National Assembly of Cambodia, and son of Prime Minister Hun Sen, Congressman Hun Many will be sharing his insights on Cambodia’s foreign policies and relations with the U.S., Korea, China and other regional players. Karl Jackson, professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS, will moderate the discussion.
- Top Priorities for Africa in 2016 | Wednesday, January 20th | 3:00-4:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | 2016 will be a crucial year for African countries as they seek to respond to shifting dynamics in the global economy. Mitigating the adverse effects of China’s economic slowdown, tumbling commodity prices, and the U.S. interest rate rise in 2015 on the region will demand serious policy reform and investment in African economies—so will maintaining the continent’s trade competitiveness, given the rise of mega-regional trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Domestic issues including stagnating industrialization and job creation, rapid urbanization, and governance and security threats could undermine the continent’s upward-trending development trajectory; however, if managed prudently with timely action from African policymakers in 2016, the continent could equally recover from external and internal shocks, accelerate regional growth, and further expand the benefits of growth to the more than one billion people living throughout Africa. On January 20, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings will host a panel of leading Africa experts on the most pressing challenges facing the continent in 2016. The panel will be moderated by Mark Goldberg, editor of U.N. Dispatch, and will include Ambassador Hassana Alidou of Niger, as well as Brookings experts Joshua Meltzer, Witney Schneidman, Eyerusalem Siba, and Amadou Sy who will offer their expertise on these important issues and provide recommendations to national governments, regional organizations, multilateral institutions and civil society on how to contend with these priorities in the year ahead. The event follows the release of the new Foresight Africa report, a collection of issue briefs, viewpoints, and infographics on the major issues for Africa in 2016. Join the conversation on Twitter using #ForesightAfrica.
- The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security: Policy Choices | Thursday, January 21st | 9:00-11:30 | Middle East Policy Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 83rd Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:00am Thursday, January 21st and conclude at 11:30. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Speakers include William F. Wechsler, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Mark Katz, professor at George Mason University, Charles Lister, Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute, and Audrey Kurth Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason University. Richard Schmierer, former ambassador to Oman, will moderate the discussion.
- Turkey in 2016: Domestic Politics, EU Relations and Beyond | Thursday, January 21st | 3:00-4:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since the November 2015 elections in Turkey, questions have arisen surrounding the future of domestic politics and the country’s relationships with the West. The government has had difficulties managing burgeoning and increasingly more complex political, security and economic challenges. This panel will look at the year ahead and discuss these issues with a wider perspective on domestic politics, foreign policy and relations with the European Union. How will a new AK Party government confront its domestic and foreign policy problems – ranging from the Kurdish question to Syria and Russia – and pursue relations with the EU and the West in general? What is the current EU perspective on relations with Turkey? What other major issues are at stake? Henri Barkey, Director of the Wilson will moderate this talk. Bulent Aras, Senior Fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center, Michelle Egan, professor at American University, Fuat Keyman, Director of the Istanbul Policy Center, and Amberin Zaman, columnist at Al Monitor are the speakers for this event.
RSS - Posts
