Tag: ISIS
Hagel uncontrollable and unpredictable
On Wednesday, the Atlantic Council hosted a conversation with former Secretary of Defense Hagel. He detailed the policy issues and challenges that arose during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, discussed his relationship with the Obama Administration, and provided advice to US policymakers going forward. Fred Kempe, President and CEO, Atlantic Council, interviewed the Secretary and moderated the discussion.
Kempe began with some background about Hagel’s tenure as Secretary of Defense. He was the first Secretary of Defense in decades to face shrinking budgets at a time of increased demand for US military force. Sequester began on his third day in office. He also faced the Russian invasion of Crimea, the fight against ISIS, a difficult US-Egypt relationship, and the Iran negotiations.
Kempe asked Secretary Hagel to provide his thoughts on Iran’s capture and subsequent release of US sailors this week. Secretary Hagel said he doesn’t have the intelligence information he once had, but that the US is pleased with the sailors’ release. There will be an investigation of what happened and why. He strongly supported the nuclear negotiations with Iran. This incident put the deal in jeopardy, especially since the removal of sanctions commences this weekend. If the Iranians hadn’t released the sailors, they would have put sanctions relief in jeopardy.
Hagel described what he saw as a new world order developing now. We are witnessing the greatest diffusion of economic power in history combined with rapid demographic changes. The world order that the US and its allies built post-Word War II has done well; there has been no World War III or nuclear exchange. These alliances will become even more important in this century. As the world has progressed, more people have greater expectations regarding what their rights are.
The world is unpredictable. Leaders need to build margins into their planning. While the US is the most powerful nation on earth, we shouldn’t dictate or impose. Most Americans were born after World War II and expect an America that dominates in every way. But we’ve made big mistakes stemming from not paying attention to other cultures. American leadership is indispensable, but Americans must be humble about this. We can’t fix every problem, but countries do rely on American leadership to bring them together.
American leadership is essential for global stability. We should remain engaged, but not be afraid of other countries becoming successful. We need to adapt to the world’s shifting demographics without abandoning our values. We shouldn’t impose our specific brand of Western democracy on all countries. As Kissinger has said, we need to help countries develop their own democracies for their own contexts. The common threads of all democracies are dignity for all, freedom of initiative, and incentives for hard work and responsibility.
Kempe wanted Hagel to review his recent article in Foreign Policy in which he criticized the way he was treated by the Obama Administration. Hagel did not want to rehash everything he said in the article, but stated that all administrations try to dominate their cabinets. In this sense, the Obama Administration is no different from previous administrations, but each successive administration in recent years has tried to dominate more.
This is unhealthy because it undercuts governing. Governing is not the same as domination. Every institution requires the support of good people and those in charge need to trust these people and rely on them to govern with them. The two most important jobs in every administration are the National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff because all decision making flows through them. The Secretary of Defense doesn’t make policy but is the implementer and operator of the policies that the President wants. When the President dominates those whom he/she is supposed to rely on it impedes his/her ability to govern. In addition, there were too many meetings with too many people in the room; this creates chaos because everyone wants to talk and show how smart they are. Every President faces challenges, uncontrollables, and unknowables.
Every President also has his/her own style. But it’s hard to bring in the best people if they think they will be overloaded with meetings, micromanaged and second-guessed.
Given the fact that sequester began on day three of Hagel’s tenure, Kempe wanted to know how much time he spent on budgets and if the military has enough funding to ensure American security. Hagel reminded the audience that sequester remains in effect, though cuts to military spending have been adjusted. The Pentagon requires the certainty of long-term budgets on the order of 20 years to plan the purchase of weapons systems. Sequester meant an immediate $50 billion of budget cuts, so Secretary Hagel commissioned a review to understand what was most important in the budget, both from Pentagon officials as well as from field commanders. Secretary Hagel originally though he would have to furlough his employees for 21 days, but managed to cut this down to 3-5 days. He had to halt maintenance and training for a few months.
That was followed by a 16-day government shutdown, which was irresponsible on the part of politicians. Hagel refused to comply with the shutdown, though some employees were absent for 16 days. It is terrible to damage the security of the US to make a political point. It hurt the Department of Defense. The employees ultimately got paid anyway by virtue of the unions.
Budgets took up a lot of his time. We are perilously close to not having enough funds to defend our national security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have to testify in front of Congress to give their opinion on whether the current budget is sufficient to guarantee American national security interests; they are getting close to having to say no. We can do with fewer submarines, for instance, but that will come with a long-term price. Once we have two presidential candidates, they must be clear about what they think the US role in the world is and what our national security interests are. Read more
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What to do about Syria?
On January 5, CFR hosted a panel discussion entitled “What to do About Syria” which also aired on HBO. The discussion was designed to resemble a National Security Council meeting. Panelists included Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, CFR, Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, the Hudson Institute. Richard Haass, President, CFR, moderated the discussion.
Paul Pillar stated that none of the multiple sides in the Syrian conflict appears poised to win in the near future. The Russian military intervention that began in September has shored up the regime. The regime still controls roughly 1/4 of the country in a North-South strip. There are non-ISIS opposition areas, largely in the northwest but also near the Golan, as well as large areas of ISIS control in the east and Kurdish control in the north. There are hundreds of opposition groups and many coalitions. Over the past year, ISIS has had neither a net loss or a net gain of territory in Syria, but has lost territory on balance when Iraq is included.
Pillar explained that on the diplomatic front, the Vienna process led to the International Syria Support Group, whose members agree on the need for a ceasefire and political settlement. The Saudis held a meeting in Riyadh in December and agreed that Assad did not have to leave until after negotiations are held. The US adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire. The recent suspension of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran shouldn’t have a huge impact beyond the enmity we already knew existed.
Philip Gordon described the current situation as a dynamic stalemate. The attrition of regime forces is unlikely to cause the regime’s collapse because of outside support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The main battle in Syria doesn’t involve ISIS; it’s between the regime and the non-ISIS opposition. The Vienna Process is a positive step. However, the diplomatic gaps between the Saudis and the Iranians remain large.
Michael Doran believes that the US has essentially dropped its demand that Assad leave by pushing his departure so far into the future that it will not happen on Obama’s clock. This frees up the Obama administration to discuss deconfliction with Russia and Iran, a shift the Saudis dislike.
Gordon summarized US policy in Syria as such: since 2011, when Obama declared that Assad must go, US policy has been to strengthen the moderate opposition, in order to pressure the regime to negotiate. So far that hasn’t worked, but it remains US policy. Doran is right that the
definition of what a political transition would look like has evolved. As it became clearer that Russia and Iran would prop up Assad, diplomats examined other types of transitions that might be more feasible. There has been an effort to unify the opposition but it remains fragmented because our partners support different groups. We have tried to build the capacity of the opposition groups, but it has not been enough; they are fighting a professional military backed by Russia and Iran. The president has authorized force against ISIS, using the legal basis that ISIS threatens the Iraqi government; Obama lacks a legal basis to target the regime.
Doran spoke of the limits of our support for the non-ISIS opposition. Iran and Russia have backed the regime and there has not been comparable activity from our side. The train and equip program failed because we found few recruits willing to fight ISIS exclusively. We also work with the Kurds who are aligned with the PKK. We have alienated our Sunni allies. Our position on Assad is critical to mobilizing Sunni support against ISIS. The US would also need ground forces, perhaps in a 1:5 ratio with our allies.
Gordon clarified that the US does support the opposition militarily and politically. We just don’t provide specifics.
Pillar stated that even though the US is a superpower, it may not be able to satisfactorily solve Syria. It’s not in the US’s interest to take sides in the Sunni-Shia conflict. We should place more emphasis on the diplomatic track because tamping down the war is most important.
Gordon outlined two policy options going forward. First, the US could take out Assad militarily, but this could generate more refugees and cause a power vacuum. The better option is to prioritize a ceasefire to stop the war; this is more important than a political transition. Gordon clarified that he is not proposing an alliance with Russia and Iran, but ending the conflict roughly along the lines of the current reality on the ground. Local areas would gain autonomy, but this would stop short of a partition, so as not to set a precedent of carving out new states in the region.
Doran questioned Gordon’s attachment to the integrity of Syria, but largely agreed with his vision for an end state. However, he reiterated that such an arrangement wouldn’t be possible without ground forces. Haass proposed that the US think seriously about supporting an independent Kurdistan as part of a deal, since the Kurds are the most effective fighting force against ISIS.
Pillar highlighted potential positive effects of the Russian military intervention. Russia will draw the ire of radical Sunnis, and Russia will gain more leverage over Assad. Russia also has an interest in tamping down the conflict; it doesn’t want to prop up a beleaguered Assad forever.
An audience member asked how we might prevent revenge attacks once the conflict ends. Pillar pointed out that under Gordon’s autonomous regions proposal, groups would have a diminished ability on the ground to carry out revenge attacks. Haass contended that, contrary to Western notions of pluralism, a future map of Syria must reflect more homogeneity than heterogeneity.
Gordon addressed an audience question about why the US sees fighting ISIS as in its national interest versus fighting the regime. The US has identified ISIS as a threat because it kidnaps Americans and seeks to destabilize regional partners. We have identified discrete steps we can take to degrade and destroy ISIS. Taking out Assad would require an effort like the invasion of Iraq; we should not minimize the cost and consequences of such an effort. The notion that taking out Assad would yield a positive outcome requires a larger suspension of disbelief than the notion that the Iranians and Russians might agree to a ceasefire if the US drops its demand that they abandon Assad.
Another audience member asked whether we need the Saudis to agree that ISIS is a fundamental threat to their existence. Pillar contended that it would be ideal if the Saudis would follow their own interests more intelligently. In the past, the Saudis have faced the threat posed by Al Qaeda; persistent diplomacy and tough love talks will be required to get them to do the same with ISIS. Gordon noted that it is difficult to explain to countries what we think their interests should be. Saudi Arabia is more concerned about Iran than ISIS and Turkey is more concerned about the Kurds. Doran contended that the Saudis and the Turks have defined their interests correctly; we are wrong about what their interests are.
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Gulf style
Saudi Arabia’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Iran raises the question of how much worse things can get. It depends of course on Riyadh’s and Tehran’s objectives and what they are willing to risk to gain them.
Marc Lynch at Monkey Cage today suggests the Saudi motives for escalating its conflict with Iran by executing Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr are three: to isolate and contain Iran even as the nuclear deal proceeds, to distract from foreign policy failures and to rally regional Sunni support. He regards domestic repression as a relatively unimportant factor, which I find hard to credit. Only four of those executed last weekend are known to be Shia. The other 43 were presumably Sunni, many of them extremists responsible for attacks that occurred a decade or more ago. Someone is surely trying to send a strong signal to Sunni extremists about the consequences of targeting the Kingdom.
But let’s examine the international factors and their consequences.
Executing a nonviolent Shia cleric isn’t a likely way to isolate or contain Iran. But Tehran helped the Saudi cause when it allowed Riyadh’s embassy to be sacked. That’s a surefire way of getting negative diplomatic attention, especially from the US and UK. Score one own goal for Riyadh. The Supreme Leader also threatened Saudi Arabia with God’s wrath. That puts him in good company with some right-wing American politicians who are likewise convinced that God acts on their behalf (and maybe even at their behest).
Riyadh is getting some regional support. Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have downgraded their relations with Tehran. That doesn’t count for much more than an improved field position in my book. Nor are the executions likely to distract much from foreign policy failures, and then only temporarily. The wars in Syria and Yemen are not going well from the Kingdom’s perspective. Riyadh is going to have to throw even more money and hardware into them, while encouraging others to do likewise, if it wants to have a serious impact.
The US failed to condemn the Saudi executions, though it regretted their contribution to increasing sectarian tensions in the region. Friends don’t condemn friends, I guess. It certainly would not have helped Washington’s relations with Riyadh, which are already tense because the Saudis are feeling sold out in the Iran nuclear deal. The question is how much longer friendship will trump honesty. The Americans are in no position to object to executions per se, but no one in Washington thinks much of the Saudi justice system. At least from what is readily available in public, it is hard to picture how anything al Nimr said would justify the death penalty.
The blowup between Iran and Saudi Arabia puts at risk the UN-sponsored Syria peace talks, which are scheduled to being January 25 in Geneva. But it also makes them all the more important. You wouldn’t know it from the headlines, but the Saudis and Iranians have a common enemy in the Islamic State. If only they could agree on how to fight it.
On BBC Five Live last night I was asked whether the current downward spiral could lead to war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It’s hard to rule that out, as breaking diplomatic relations can be a prelude to war and feelings are certainly running high. But both countries seem much keener to fight on third-country turf than on their own. Iran has Revolutionary Guard forces commanding and training in Syria, but most of the actual fighting is done by Hizbollah on Tehran’s behalf. The Saudis are bombing Houthi forces in Yemen, but they seem to have kept their ground forces mostly out of the fight. Some naval dueling in the Gulf, possibly involving tankers, might be in the offing, but proxy war through intermediaries is more the Gulf style.
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A bad way to start the new year
2015 was a disastrous year for the Middle East. Uncivil war in Syria raged on, with Russia pitching in on behalf of the Assad regime. Yemen also descended into full-fledged war, with Saudi Arabia pitching in on behalf of President (or former President, depending whose side you are on) Hadi. Libya’s UN-brokered peace agreement seems far from implementation, with two parliaments, two governments and many militias, as well as a growing Islamic State presence. The Islamic State lost territory in Syria (to Kurds) and in Iraq (to Kurds Yezidis, Shia militias and Iraqi government forces), but it would be hard to claim the tide of war has changed direction. Egypt continues to crack down on not only the Muslim Brotherhood and more extremist Islamist threats but also on moderate secularists. Israel and the Palestinians are at an impasse, one in which deadly violence on both sides is escalating.
Can it get worse?
The weekend’s events answer that question: yes. Friday Saudi Arabia, current chair of the UN Human Rights Council, executed 47 people, one of whom was a Shia cleric whose commitment to nonviolence seems uncontested, even if he was no friend of the (Sunni) monarchy. Yesterday Iranians responded by sacking part of the Saudi Embassy, a move that will remind the world of how little the Islamic Republic can be relied upon to protect diplomatic facilities. Today the Saudis claimed that Iran executed hundreds last year with little legal basis. The Iranians are promising that God will punish the Saudi monarchy.
We are clearly in the midst of a downward spiral that could well end in more sectarian bloodletting. Iran can pump more weapons and fighters (both Hizbollah and its own Revolutionary Guards) into Syria. Saudi Arabia can beef up support for insurgents there and escalate its attacks on the Houthis in Yemen. The more regional conflict and chaos, the stronger the Islamic State and Al Qaeda grow in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Afghanistan, even if they are losing territory in Iraq and northern Syria. Instability breeds instability.
President Obama wants to keep the United States out of the fray, except to attack those who directly threaten the homeland. That means the Islamic State as well as Al Qaeda and its affiliates. His astoundingly disciplined refusal to engage otherwise leaves a vacuum that militants expand to fill. Those who think the President indecisive or irresolute have misunderstood. He is determined not to get drawn back in to the Middle East. Watching the Iranians and Saudis go at it should be enough to make many Americans sympathize.
But not doing things is just as much a policy as doing them. It has consequences. The downward spiral is unlikely to stop of its own accord. The Middle East is a high wire act without a net. There is no regional security framework or even a loose association like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help de-escalate. The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation is far too weak a reed. The Gulf Cooperation Council is an adversary of Iran, not a neutral. Neither Europe nor the U.S. has had much success in getting the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom to temper their conflict.
It is difficult to see how this ends well. It may well be we are heading for a conflagration with much more catastrophic consequences than we have seen so far. Only when the Saudis and Iranians see that happening are they likely to stop. And then it may be too late.
We haven’t seen much yet of 2016. Just enough to know it is a bad way to start a new year.
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The end is nigh, once again
Two years ago I published a post with this title. Remarkably little has changed since then in many conflicts:
- South Sudan is suffering even more bloodletting.
- The Central African Republic is still imploding.
- North Korea is no longer risking internal strife but continues its belligerence on the international stage.
- China is still challenging its neighbors in the East and South China Seas.
- Syria is even more chaotic, with catastrophic consequences for its population and strains for its neighbors.
- Egypt continues its repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular human rights advocates.
- Israel and Palestine are no closer to agreement on a two-state solution.
- Afghanistan has a new president but the Taliban are stronger in the countryside and the Islamic State is gaining adherents; money and people are still expatriating.
- Al Qaeda is less potent in many places, but that is little comfort since the Islamic State has risen to take the leading role in Salafist jihadism.
- Ukraine has lost control of Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, and risks losing control of much of the southeastern Donbas region.
The only issue I listed then that is palpably improved is the Iranian nuclear question, which is now the subject of a deal that should postpone Tehran’s access to the nuclear materials required to build a bomb for 10 to 15 years.
Danielle Pletka of AEI topped off the gloom this year with a piece suggesting there are reasons to fear Putin’s recklessness could trigger World War III.
Without going that far, it is easy to add to the doom and gloom list:
- Europe is suffering a bout of right-wing xenophobia (the US has a milder case), triggered by migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.
- Mali and Nigeria are suffering serious extremist challenges.
- The Houthi takeover in Yemen, and intervention there by a Saudi-led coalition, is causing vast suffering in one of the world’s poorest countries and allowing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand its operations.
- Civil war in Libya is far from resolution, despite some signatures on a UN-sponsored agreement to end it.
- Turkey has re-initiated a war against Kurdish forces that had been in abeyance.
- Even Brazil, once a rising power, is suffering scandals that may bring down its president, even as its economy tanks.
I’m still not ready to throw in the towel. Some successes of two years ago continue and others have begun: Colombia‘s civil war is nearing its end, Burma/Myanmar continues its transition in a more open direction (even though it has failed to settle conflicts with several important minorities), Kenya is still improving, ditto Liberia, which along with Sierra Leone and maybe Guinea seems to have beaten the Ebola epidemic, and much of the Balkans, even if Kosovo and Bosnia are going through rough patches.
I still think, as I said two years ago:
If there is a continuous thread running through the challenges we face it is this: getting other people to govern themselves in ways that meet the needs of their own populations (including minorities) and don’t threaten others. That was what we did in Europe with the Marshall Plan. It is also what we contributed to in East Asia, as democracy established itself in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and elsewhere. We have also had considerable success in recent decades in Latin America and Africa, where democracy and economic development have grown roots in Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, South Africa, and other important countries. I may not like the people South Africans have elected, but I find it hard to complain about the way they have organized themselves to do it.
This is what we have failed to do in the Middle East: American military support for autocracies there has stunted democratic evolution, even as our emphasis on economic reform has encouraged crony capitalism that generates resentment and support for Islamist alternatives. Mubarak, Asad, Saleh, Qaddafi, and Ben Ali were not the most oppressive dictators the world has ever known, even though they murdered and imprisoned thousands, then raised those numbers by an order of magnitude as they tried to meet the challenge of revolution with brute force. But their departures have left the countries they led with little means of governing themselves. The states they claim to have built have proven a mirage in the desert.
If there is reason for doom and gloom, it is our failure to meet this governance challenge cleverly and effectively. We continue to favor our military instruments, even though they are inappropriate to dealing with most of the problems we face (the important exceptions being Iran and China). We have allowed our civilian instruments of foreign policy to atrophy, even as we ask them to meet enormous challenges. What I wish for the new year is recognition–in the Congress, in the Administration and in the country–that we need still to help enable others to govern themselves. Investment in the capacity to do it will return dividends for many decades into the future.
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The UN leans forward
The UN last week leaned forward on two important conflicts. The Secretariat went ahead with a Libyan peace deal, despite the refusal of the chairs of the country’s two competing parliaments and some armed groups to sign. A couple of days later, the UN Security Council passed a Syria resolution endorsing the so-called Vienna 2 road map for a ceasefire, negotiations, a new constitution, transition and elections. Neither move ends either war. Optimists hope they are first steps in the right direction.
The roads ahead will be difficult. In Libya, many armed groups seem unready to end their struggle, which is more about control of oil, the country’s substantial sovereign wealth funds and patronage than it is about religion or identity. But that is little comfort. It is not clear whether the Tobruk-based parliament, recognized under the agreement as a powerful lower house, will be able to move to Tripoli. Nor is it clear that the Tripoli-based parliament, which is to become a kind of advisory upper house, accepts its reduced role. Without a substantial deployment of peacekeepers, there is little the international community can do beyond the threat of sanctions against individuals to change their minds. In the meanwhile, the Islamic State is expanding its presence and aiming to control Libya’s vital oil facilities. Maybe that will get the attention of the warring factions.
Syria is no less difficult. The United States and Russia may nominally agree that it should remain united and become a state in which its citizens decide how it is governed, but they differ on whether and when Bashar al Assad should go, who is a terrorist and what should be done to fight the Islamic State. Washington thinks Assad has to leave in order to enable a serious fight against terrorists. Russia thinks he is fighting terrorists but might eventually leave, if and when the Syrian people decide. Russia is mostly bombing people the Americans thinks are moderates vital to Syria’s future, not the Islamic State. Washington is beefing up moderate forces, but refuses to give them the means to end barrel bombing and Russian strikes. Even a ceasefire in Syria will be difficult. The Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra (an Al Qaeda affiliate) won’t participate. Who will monitor the ceasefire, reporting on violations and who commits them?
None of this means the UN is wrong to try. What it means is that our expectations should be tempered.
A serious ceasefire in all of Syria isn’t likely. Some parts of the country may calm, but the international community will need to settle for “fight and talk,” a time-honored tradition. Agreement on transition isn’t likely either. The day Bashar al Assad agrees that at some future date he will be leaving power will be the day he leaves power. The notion that he will preside over a credible democratic transition is bozotic. He intends to remain in power and will likely be able to do so as long as the Russians and Iranians back him.
In Libya, it is unlikely that the UN-sponsored accord will be implemented without some sort of international peacekeeping presence, to secure at least Tripoli so that the united government the agreement foresees can safely meet and deliberate. That may be neccessary, but not sufficient, since the Islamic State threat is not in Tripoli (yet), but rather in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, and civilians in Benghazi need protection even more than those in Tripoli. Washington isn’t going to bother with Libya, except when it targets an Islamic State militant or two (or two dozen). If Libya is to be stabilized, the Europeans will need to step up to the task, or convince Arab countries to do it. Italy is attached by umbilical pipelines to Libyan gas production. France also enjoys Libyan oil and gas. Europeans with interests need to stop talking and start acting if they want their investments and energy supplies saved.
The UN is also leaning forward in Yemen, where the more or less Shia Houthis allied with forces loyal to former President Saleh are fighting the Saudi- and Emirati-backed effort to restore President Hadi to power in Sanaa. The effort to get a ceasefire and political settlement there is just beginning, without much initial success. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is expanding and enjoying relative immunity in Yemen’s vast hinterlands. The Islamic State can’t be far behind.
The seemingly shy and hesitant Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is proving to be a bold risktaker. The UN is doing the right things. If it didn’t exist, we would have to invent it. American politicians should be more appreciative.
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