Tag: ISIS
Precious little Thanksgiving
Thanksgiving is when Americans, who constitute only about half peacefare’s readers, join with family and friends to acknowledge their many blessings. This year that means relative prosperity across much of the country, a parade of giant balloons in New York City, and a lot of good food and cheer–plus a bit of intra-family political controversy–at the single serious meal most of us indulge in today.
But the world is not in good shape and we all know it. Civil war rages in Syria, Libya and Yemen, three former dictatorships that failed to make the transition to democracy after political upheavals in 2011. Islamic State and Al Qaeda-linked terrorists have attacked in Beirut, Sinai, Bamako, Paris and elsewhere. Syrians, Afghans and Africans from many sub-Saharan countries are flowing into Europe, driving politics to the nationalist/nativist right and raising difficult security questions, with echoes in the US.
The Turkish downing of a Russian warplane has upped the ante. I don’t doubt that the Russians violated Turkish airspace or that the Turks warned the Russian pilots. It would be impossible to bomb along that portion of the Syrian/Turkish border without crossing into Turkish territory. But those are not the only reasons Turkey acted. The Russians were bombing Turkmen rebels fighting Bashar al Assad’s forces. Erdogan was making Obama’s rhetorical point with bombs: Russia is welcome to fight the Islamic State, but not to fight relatively moderate rebels opposing the dictatorship.
The escalation is nevertheless dangerous. The Syrian civil war is already a proxy war between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab Gulf states plus Turkey. The Turkish move risks engaging NATO and the US, which are understandably loathe to come to blows directly with Russia. I’d anticipate increasing pressure to produce results at peace talks to be convened early in January. But impending peace talks will also provide an incentive for the warring parties inside Syria to grab as much territory as possible, before a ceasefire freezes them in place.
The situation in Libya, Yemen and Iraq is no more promising. The Islamic State is using the impasse in Libya to deepen and expand its footprint, especially in and around Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte. In Yemen the fighting continues, with Houthi rebels only slowly yielding ground to Saudi- and UAE-supported ground forces (reportedly including Colombian mercenaries) while Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula deepens and expands its footprint in more desolate parts of the country. Iraqi forces are making gradual but agonizingly slow progress against the Islamic State in Anbar, but Mosul and much of western Iraq remain out of Baghdad’s control.
Little of these Middle Eastern dramas are reflected directly in the United States. The numbers of refugees President Obama wants to take in are small even compared to what the Europeans are accepting, who in turn are less than 25% of the total who have already left Syria. The West is unwilling to throw its doors open to desperate Syrians, especially the Muslim ones, fearing that there may be terrorists hiding among them and neglecting to notice how refusal to admit refugees will help Islamic State and other extremist recruitment efforts. John Oliver captured the irony well with this:
There was only one time in American history when the fear of refugees wiping everyone out did actually come true, and we’ll all be sitting around a table celebrating it on Thursday.
I hope Americans will remember this bit of irony and try to spare some sympathy not only for the natives we displaced but also for the Middle Easterners who have so little to celebrate this year.
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Peace picks Nov 23-27
- The “Pitiless” War: A Strategy After the Paris Attacks | Monday November 23rd | 10:00 – 11:15 | German Marshall Fund | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the aftermath of the November 13 terrorist attacks in Paris committed by the self-proclaimed Islamic State group (ISIS), French President François Hollande declared that “….we are going to lead a war which will be pitiless.” What is the proper military, intelligence, and diplomatic response to counter to these recent brutal attacks against Western targets? What role will the United States play going forward? What does Europe need to do differently to meet this threat? What should the transatlantic alliance do about Syria and Iraq? With Hollande scheduled to meet U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington on November 24, and with these questions in mind, The German Marshall Fund of the Unites States (GMF) is pleased to invite you to an on-the-record discussion. Speakers include: Ambassador James Franklin Jeffrey, Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Matthew G. Olsen, Former Director, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); Derek Chollet, Counselor and Senior Advisor for Security and Defense Policy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
- The Deteriorating State of Human Rights in China | Monday, November 23rd | 12:00 – 1:30 | CATO Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since assuming the presidency of China in 2013, Xi Jinping has become the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, centralizing his authority over the Communist Party, the military, and the government. Eminent scholars and civil rights activists from China will describe the deterioration of human rights under Xi’s rule, citing the rise of arbitrary arrests and detentions; a crackdown on academic freedom; the persecution of some ethnic groups; and increasing restrictions on journalists, the internet, religious organizations, and other groups in civil society. The speakers will discuss those developments within the context of other policies, including a new national security law, an anti-corruption campaign, and economic measures in the face of a significant growth slowdown. Speakers include: Chen Guangcheng, Visiting Fellow, Catholic University; Teng Biao, Associate, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; and Wei Jingsheng, Chairman, Wei Jingsheng Foundation; with comments by Xia Yeliang, Visiting Fellow, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute; moderated by Ian Vasquez, Director, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute.
- Understanding ISIS: Paris, Beirut, and U.S. Policy Webinar | Monday, November 23rd |4:00 – 5:00| Institute for Policy Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Terrorism survives wars, people don’t. Last week’s attacks in Paris left over 100 people dead. In Beirut, car bombs killed 43 people. Shortly before these attacks, President Obama defended his “war on terror” and said that ISIS was contained. As the civilian death toll rises and the refugee crisis grows, the U.S. global war on terror continues — and continues to fail, ultimately because you can’t bomb terrorism out of existence. In this 1-hour webinar, IPS Middle East expert Phyllis Bennis will discuss the new developments in Paris and Beirut, in the refugee crisis in Europe and the U.S., and discuss solutions that promote true diplomacy over military action.
- A New Cold War? The West and Russia | Monday, November 23rd | 5:30pm | Foreign Policy Research Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the prospect of protracted confrontation between Russia and the West has so far met with an uncertain response on the part of the West. Has a new Cold War begun, and how should America and its allies respond? Nikolas Gvosdev, a frequent commentator on Russian and Eurasian affairs will explore these issues. He was the Editor of The National Interest magazine and a Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center in Washington, D.C. He received his doctorate from St Antony’s College, Oxford University, where he studied on a Rhodes Scholarship. His work has appeared in such outlets as Foreign Affairs, The Financial Times, The Los Angeles Times, and Orbis, and he has appeared as a commentator on CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, National Public Radio, and BBC.
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Is there a best option for Syria?
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted ‘A look at the policy options in war-torn Syria’, a panel discussion featuring Daniel Byman, Senior Fellow and Research Director at Brookings’ Center for Middle East Policy; Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at Brookings; Will McCants, Senior Fellow and Director of Brookings’ U.S. Relations with the Islamic World project; and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director at Brookings’ CMEP. Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Research Director for Foreign Policy at Brookings, moderated as well as contributing his own views.
Each of the panellists proposed a policy for Syria. As the discussion wound up, Pollack acknowledged that though each argued that their policy was the best for future action, and could present numerous pieces of evidence to support their argument, ‘best’ in the case of the Syrian crisis is a relative term. The only real locus of disagreement between the panellists is how they evaluate risk, possibility of implementation, and potential for success, rather than over the meat of what must politically and militarily be accomplished for the country. No one wants to see the conflict endure, nor does anyone wish to see ISIS given the space to breathe or the humanitarian crisis to wear on.
Some of the policies proposed differ pretty significantly.
O’Hanlon has opted for a confederal model, or an ink-spot approach. Taking some inspiration from the Bosnian case, he envisions autonomous zones of governance with their own security forces, in order to combat Assad and ISIS both. He believes these zones will allow for bridges to be built with both Turkey and Russia, as they can prioritize relations with the zones closest to them politically, e.g. the Russians with an Alawite sector in the northwest, where Assad potentially could stay in power as well. This model would require moderate numbers of NATO boots on the ground.
Pollack, meanwhile, operates within the assumption of a unified Syria. Having analysed third-party resolutions to other civil wars, he proposed building an alternative army: large, conventional, trained outside Syria, and only good enough to face off the so-so forces of ISIS and Assad. This falls within a three-step program. First, with this army we need to create a military stalemate; then a power-sharing agreement needs to be forged, reflecting the relative power of all parties. Finally, long-term guarantees need to be established, including protection of minorities’ rights. The key is not to withdraw once military success is achieved, and to ensure the maintenance of those guarantees.
Byman, concerned with implementing policies only half-way in such an unstable environment, opts for a less intensive one: containment of local instability. This includes the more conventional border security, counterterrorism assistance, and weakening ISIS through limited air support for local ground troops. It also means better management of refugee camps, policing them with an eye to extremist threats, and providing for refugees, aiming for their integration into society in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. He acknowledges this only ‘staunches the bleeding’ rather than ends the conflict, but this at least is lower in cost than other policies.
McCants provides the ISIS view, noting that since the Syrian crisis began, the fledgling state has deployed the same tactic several times to gain control of cities and regions. It infiltrates, assassinates or imprisons those who oppose it, and proceeds to impose its rule through brutally violent tactics. These are laid out in a terror theorist’s manual, The Management of Savagery. ISIS has been able to take advantage of regional governments collapsing, as in Iraq after the US withdrawal. Previously it had been driven underground by the US army and nearly destroyed. It is able to exploit power vacuums. McCants added that a weakness of the confederal model is that it increases the enclaves’ vulnerability to ISIS tactics, especially if regional allies (e.g. Jordan, Turkey) are not sufficiently committed.
Wittes reviewed Obama’s foreign policy, noting that all his strategies have ‘foundered on the realities of a disordered region’. There has long been a gap in understanding between Washington and local actors: for instance, the Obama administration has always discounted Syria, while in local view, it is of utmost strategic and political importance. Wittes traces the current regional crisis to two underlying problems, of order and of authority. ISIS also springs from these underlying problems, which are reflected in the conflict over the role of Islam in politics. She proposes convening a regional security dialogue. The Vienna talks focus on external actors’ interests, sacrificing an accounting problems within the region.
There was indeed broad agreement across the panel on the need to incorporate local actors and local political realities into the solution, whether that meant Sunni Arab tribes, the opposition forces (including moderate Islamists), or regional governments. It is important as well that these policies include long-term political reconciliation and guarantees, whether through federated autonomy or power-sharing. Though generally unified on the need to combat ISIS militarily, the panelists also recognized that the underlying problem in Syria is Assad, his brutal war, and the power vacuum to which he has contributed.
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Better, but Assad’s fate is still unclear
Friday’s Vienna meeting of what is now being called the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took a step or two in the right direction by defining more clearly ceasefire and transitional governing arrangements in Syria. The transitional arrangements are based on the June 2012 UN communique, which was not clear last time this group met. But it is still unclear what is to happen with Bashar al Assad and his regime, or when. So the main point of divergence between the Americans and the Syrian opposition, on the one hand, and the Iranians, Russians and the regime on the other hand, remains unresolved, even if progress has in theory been made.
The first step is to be a nationwide ceasefire, endorsed by the UN Security Council, and deployment of monitors in those parts of the country where they would not be subject to terrorist attacks. Where that might be is unclear, so I wouldn’t hold my breath for arrival of the observers. You would have to be nuts to put them in most of Syria at this point. The ceasefire does not apply to offensive or defensive operations against the Islamic State, Jabhat al Nusra or other (undefined) groups the ISSG designates. Humanitarian access is supposed to happen regardless, and the use of indiscriminate weapons (read especially barrel bombs) is supposed to cease.
In parallel, there is to be a political process under UN auspices that convenes the Syrian government and opposition representatives by a target date of January 1. Syrians are to somehow choose their own representatives, in an undefined process under UN envoy De Mistura’s aegis.
The big step forward is this outline of the transition process:
The ISSG members reaffirmed their support for the transition process contained in the 2012 Geneva Communique. In this respect they affirmed their support for a ceasefire as described above and for a Syrian-led process that will, within a target of six months, establish credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and set a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution. Free and fair elections would be held pursuant to the new constitution within 18 months. These elections must be administered under UN supervision to the satisfaction of the governance and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including the diaspora, eligible to participate.
So negotiations should start January 1, a new government is formed within six months, a new constitution is written and elections held under UN supervision within 18 months. That is a far clearer timetable for the transition process than previously agreed. It corresponds more or less to what the Iranians have been pushing for some time.
But there is a missing link: what happens to Bashar al Assad and his security apparatus. Implicitly, they remain in place for the six months of negotiations and formation of a new government, which presumably is empowered with full executive authority (the key provision of the June 2012 communique that this one mentions repeatedly). I might imagine that would mean the Assad regime leaves power once the new government is formed, but nowhere is that specified. I suspect the Russians and especially the Iranians have not agreed on that point.
Much of this timetable will prove difficult if not impossible to implement. Are the Russians going to stop the more than 80% of their bombing that is directed against what the Americans regard as moderate opposition forces? Will the regime stop its incessant barrel bombing of civilian areas? Will the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, its Shia militia allies (the National Defense Forces) and Hizbollah stop their efforts to clear the opposition from the Damascus/Latakia axis so vital to the regime? Will the Americans and Saudis throttle back on the supply of anti-tank and other weapons that the moderate opposition are using to blunt the regime/Russian/Iranian offensive?
As for the political process, who among the serious opposition would be prepared to go to a Damascus still controlled by Assad to negotiate or take positions in a transitional government? Is Assad ready to delegate “full executive authority” to a government he does not control? If he remains nominally in office as chief of state, who protects him and how? Secretary of State Kerry in a speech at the US Institute of Peace Thursday was more insistent than in the past that Assad had to go, because even the moderate opposition would continue fighting if he didn’t. But precisely when and how he goes is still not agreed.
So there are still lots of unanswered questions, and little likelihood that the timetable outlined in this communique will be observed. But it is better than what we’ve had until this point.
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Remember Paris
The pundit world will spend the next week debating what went wrong to allow the Paris attacks to happen and how similar attacks there and elsewhere might be prevented. The culprits will include Edward Snowden (for inhibiting eavesdropping), Barack Obama (for not doing enough in Syria), George W. Bush (for invading Iraq), the Quran (for inspiring violence), Arab autocrats (for repressing their populations), France (for not integrating its Muslim population), multinational corporations (for globalization that has lowered wages and impoverished people worldwide), Russia (for intervening in Syria), the internet (for enabling recruitment of extremists) and at least a dozen other contributing forces and factors.
None of this will enlighten us much. The sad fact is that you and I can do precious little to protect ourselves from violence of this sort: weapons and explosives are readily available to those who want them in many countries, including the US. Nor can our governments do much more than they are already doing. Killing sprees that target random individuals can always get past the limited security defenses at a rock concert or the non-existent defenses at an outdoor cafe. The Paris attacks might have killed and wounded many more people. Once perpetrators open fire, only brave souls willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others–like the three Americans on a French train a couple of months ago–can stop the carnage before security forces arrive.
The American equivalent of the Paris attacks would be on the order of 600 people killed. That is fewer than 9/11, but getting up to the same order of magnitude. The effects in France and beyond will be dramatic: lowered tourism, tightened security measures, hindered travel, lower economic growth, strengthened nativist political movements, military retaliation, and likely more attempts to up the ante. We’ll return to the rhetoric of the “war on terror,” forgetting how misguided that idea was 14 years ago and the mistakes it led us to make.
Political violence is a technique, not an enemy.
Our enemy should be political extremism. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks, as well as the downing of a Russian airliner over Sinai. If those claims are confirmed (I fully expect they will be), the enemy should be called by the name he uses: Muslim political extremism. The Islamic State is a self-declared mass murderer that targets civilians and aims to terrorize those it regards as its enemies into submission to its will, in particular by withdrawing from Muslim countries and leaving them to be welded into a caliphate ruled in accordance with a distorted interpretation of the Quran.
The irony is that Islamic State activities are discouraging Western withdrawal from the Middle East, not encouraging it. Most Americans (among them the President) would gladly leave Libya, Syria and Yemen to pursue their own civil wars, if they thought no harm would cross the Atlantic or the Mediterranean as a result. There really isn’t much in any of those benighted countries to attract American interest other than al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which may be able to kill random Americans at home and abroad but present no existential risk to the United States.
We have to remember Paris, in particular the victims. The French authorities need to prosecute the perpetrators, who surely go beyond the narrow circle of the already dead shooters. The American-led coalition should press the fight against the Islamic State’s military forces in Iraq and Syria. But we need to be careful not to do things that will make things worse: prejudice against Muslims as a group, denial of their equal and inalienable rights, and indiscriminate military or police attacks. Doing too much of the wrong things can be just as harmful as doing too little of the right things.
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Syrian civil society in wartime
On Friday, the Atlantic Council hosted Syrian civil society activist Raed Fares to discuss ‘Fighting ISIS and al-Qaeda through Syrian Civil Society’. Fares is the founder and president of the Union of Revolutionary Bureaus (URB) in Kafranbel and neighboring towns in Idlib province. The URB employs over 400 people, providing services to civilians and operating local media outlets. It has also established women’s and children’s centers. Fares talked with the Atlantic Council’s Faysal Itani and was introduced by Frederic Hof.
Fares gave an overview of the start of the revolution through peaceful protests in 2011, describing civil society as caught between two different types of terrorism. On the one hand, Assad and his regime have been oppressing civil society for the past five years (as well as muting it before). On the other hand, civil society finds itself set upon by ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Syria), and others such as the newer jihadi group, Jund al-Aqsa.
Despite these challenges, Fares remains defiant and confident. He and his group have managed to accomplish much since the URB was founded in January 2013. Despite abduction and assassination attempts, as well as intimidation, Fares is confident that public support for civil society leaders and groups like his is more powerful than ISIS and al-Qaeda. While last year ISIS had more influence around Kafranbel, in Idlib, their influence has retracted, in part because of the strength of civil society there. The URB provides essential services, is secular and independent (they refused an offer of protection from Ahrar al-Sham), and knits the community together.
Over three years and with only $2 million, the URB has been able to accomplish more than the international coalition has in a year with far greater resources. URB is also more effective than the Syrian National Coalition and the Interim Government in Gaziantep, with whom they do not have a strong relationship. It would be ideal for them if donors came straight to them rather than operating through either of those bodies.
Fares also highlighted the innovative solutions Syrian civilians invent in order to get around the complications arising from shortages of communications infrastructure and other resources as well as the daily realities of aerial bombardment. Russian airstrikes, which are more devastating than regime airstrikes, have worsened conditions. Both the regime and the Russians target civilians and civil society in general.
The URB also cooperates with the Free Syrian Army and other moderate groups. Fares insists that average Syrians now hate the Assad regime and everything to do with it, but also Islamic extremists and jihadists, and they hate violence and bloodshed. Syrians want to return to a reality with ‘love stories and flowers’.
They therefore ask for American help to stop Russian airstrikes and Assad’s bombing: a no-fly zone, even a small one, is essential. Fares also remarked that, in the medium term, Syrians will not stand for a solution that includes Assad. He must go.
The URB and civil society organizations in other Syrian cities, such as Aleppo, have persevered in providing services and maintaining institutions. Increasing support to such organizations ensures civilians have options other than the regime and extremist groups, or fleeing continually. The endurance of Fares and the URB is testament to that.
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