Tag: ISIS
Libya questions and answers
After yesterday’s talk, Daniel Serwer answered questions:
Q: Could the international community have taken any different action after the 2011 revolution that would have led to less conflict in the past few years?
A: Yes. For a year and a half or so, the situation in Libya was looking stable and positive. The militias were not called on to disarm and for a period played a role in maintaining security. However, eventually these militias began to align themselves with political forces, embroiling armed groups in political contests. We should have been prepared to provide assistance to disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the militias.
The Europeans in particular should take responsibility, because of migration flows and because of oil and natural gas interests.
Q: What lessons could be learned from other conflicts – such as Iraq and Syria, but also the Balkans?
A: First and foremost we need to pay attention to local circumstances. Libya does not have the same sort of political and civil society infrastructure as the Balkans did, nor the same sectarian or tribal politics as Iraq, and so the lessons that may be drawn from either are few.
The Balkans had something the Middle East lacks entirely: a sense of direction, because the European Union has made it clear that all the Balkans countries can become members once they qualify. In the Middle East, people are fed up with secular dictatorships, but they have little idea what they want in their place. Islamists are filling that gap.
In Libya as in the Balkans (and Iraq and Afghanistan), decentralization of governing authority is likely to be an important part of the solution. Devolution of power enlarges the pie and helps to empower the population with authority over important aspects of their lives.
Q: Is a central government in Libya feasible, or does power have to be devolved to regions, or should we even contemplate breakup of the country?
A: Libya is the classic case of a country cobbled together by colonialists just before independence. But division of the country into two or more parts does not make much political or strategic sense at this juncture. Firstly, Libyans by and large view themselves as Libyans – it is one of the central components of professed identity, along with ‘Muslim’. There is no Libyan consensus that the country ought to be divided, even though there are competing, regionally-based political camps as well as a relatively small fringe that advocates independence for Cyrenaica in the east. Nor is there consensus on lines of division. The oil and gas reserves would be a major bone of contention in any attempt to divide the country – they are not evenly distributed. Libya could not be equitably or peacefully divided so long as participants disagreed as to allocation of hydrocarbon reserves and territorial claims.
Re-concentration of power in a central government in a former autocracy nevertheless will be no easy task. At this point Libyans are wary of recentralization and what it may entail. What most don’t want is a character like Khalifa Haftar to gain power and become another Qaddafi-esque strongman. The only scenario in which break-up would be feasible is if the majority of Libyans vote for it in a free and fair referendum, along pre-determined lines.
Q: How serious is the ISIS threat and what should we do about it?
A: Libya is an important beachhead for ISIS, ranked only after Syria and Iraq. Libya may be where ISIS retreats to if they lose ground in the Caliphate. The hinterlands and the south could be ideal ungoverned spaces for them. We know very little from open source material about their operations in Libya, but militarily they are still relatively weak. It is unclear why they have managed to take Sirte, Qaddafi’s home town. There has been a foiled rebellion there. Their rule seems to be similar to what they do in Syria and Iraq.
It will be important for the US to be involved in training Libyan counterterrorism units, building up a confident and unified military force under a respected and professional leadership.
The EU is thinking about a peacekeeping force of 5000, which doesn’t amount to much once you figure in a 24 hour day and tooth to tail ratio. That number would be able to do not much more than guard the government and foreign embassies. How do we expect the Libyans to feel about international peacekeepers who do no more than that? Ideally, Libya needs at least 15,000 peacekeepers to help maintain order in Tripoli and Benghazi, with logistical, intelligence and air support from NATO (especially the US).
Q: What about migration from Libya? Can we expect another big flow of refugees, similar to that from Syria?
A: The humanitarian crisis is of course urgent, but it is not the root of the problem. Refugees are a symptom of years of the political turmoil and conflict. Treating the symptoms won’t solve the problem. Libya and Syria both need political solutions.
Libya is not one of the more prominent sources for refugees – it is more of a conduit for sub-Saharan and East African nationals. Libyans, who are far fewer than Syrians in any event, are also better off, having enjoyed social payments from the state for many years as well as subsidized food commodities. Some Libyans have simply been able to drive to Tunisia and take a plane to Europe. Many have also gone to Cairo. Libya is not among the top 10 countries sending people to Europe. The predominant refugee and migrant concern remains Syrians, who mainly take Eastern Mediterranean routes, usually through Turkey.
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Libya needs all the help it can get
I had an opportunity today to talk with Hill people about Libya. Here is more or less what I said:
1. It’s a pleasure to be here to talk about Libya, which is today a country in big trouble but with some hope of finding its way out.
2. I confess to a lot of sympathy with the revolution that started in February 2011. I visited Benghazi and Tripoli that September and again in July 2012, to observe Libya’s first national elections in almost 50 years.
3. I found Libya the friendliest Arab country I have ever visited. Libyans knew who saved Benghazi and appreciated it. They ran good elections in 2012 and were looking forward to a free and democratic future.
4. But the revolution began crashing in the fall of 2012. Three years later, Benghazi is chaotic, tribal tensions are causing sporadic violence in the south and only recently has the west begun to stabilize, due to exhaustion of the Misratan and Zintani militias.
5. The country has two parliaments and two governments. The internationally recognized one is based in Tobruk and Bayda, with support from militias gathered together in a coalition called Dignity. The other is based in Tripoli, with support from militias in the Dawn coalition.
6. The big change since I wrote “Libya’s Escalating Civil War” in May is the heightened prospect of a UN-brokered political agreement, hopefully to be signed before the end of this month.
7. The agreement would create a Government of National Accord (GNA) with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) elected in June 2014 as its legislature and an advisory State Council drawn mainly from Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC).
8. This would be a power-sharing arrangement that attempts to merge Libya’s two governments into one. That is a classic way for diplomats to try to resolve civil wars.
9. But it is not entirely symmetrical. The Tripoli-based GNC would become advisory.
10. That’s the main sticking point. The proposed GNC amendments to the draft agreement would make it a second house of a bicameral parliament, with virtually equal powers to the HoR.
11. That may be a deal breaker, but there is another way out of the current impasse. The GNC may be able to make up some of what it loses institutionally in the now ongoing bargaining over deciding who sits where: the positions of prime minister, deputy prime ministers and the two ministers who will be part of the Presidency Council are particularly important.
12. That the bargaining has gotten to this stage—the musical chairs phase of ending a war (who will get a good seat and who will be left standing)—is a good sign, though no guarantee of success.
13. But even success will be no more than what the State Department people are referring to as a “70% solution.”
14. Khalifa Haftar, who commands what he calls the Libyan National Army on behalf of the “Dignity” coalition, is not likely to sign on. Nor will some hardliners associated with the “Dawn” coalition.
15. A 70% solution without international peacekeepers is a dicey proposition. Thirty per cent is a lot of potential spoilers.
16. The key issue for success will be security arrangements, especially in Tripoli. Those arrangements have not yet been made, though I understand some of the militias have begun talking informally about them.
17. Even in the best of all possible worlds, that will take time, as building the confidence of HoR members required to get them to move to Tripoli will not be easy.
18. What about international peacekeepers, at least to secure Tripoli? The Italians have indicated a willingness to lead such an effort, but it will be vital that the initiative come from a legitimate Libyan government only after Tripoli is stabilized and the HoR has moved there.
19. Arab participation, which won’t be easy or quick to arrange, is vital.
20. That will leave a perilous transition period. The Islamic State affiliate in Libya is second only to the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in posing a threat to U.S. interests.
21. Though chased recently from Derna by other extremists, ISIS has established itself in centrally located Sirte, Qaddafi’s hometown. A rebellion there last month failed.
22. ISIS despises both Dawn and Dignity. It will try to destabilize a Government of National Accord.
23. So whatever forces back the GNA will need to be prepared to fight ISIS, in addition to other spoilers who refuse to acknowledge its authority.
24. What will the U.S. role be if the 70% solution goes forward?
25. First Washington has to be prepared to press the parties in Libya to adhere to the UN-brokered agreement. This will likely include sanctioning recalcitrants. It also needs to include support for those who are prepared to support the peace process, whether nationally or locally. It would be particularly important if the Misratan and Zintani militias can be convinced to come to a truce.
26. Second, Washington needs to help ensure Libya’s neighbors back the 70% solution to the hilt. The Tunisians and Moroccans, who have hosted some of the negotiating sessions, are on board.
27. The big question mark is Cairo, which under President Sisi has in the past backed Dignity and in particular Haftar. I am told the Egyptians are ready to abandon that support.
28. Third, Washington should support any international peacekeeping mission with air and sea logistics, intelligence and air strikes.
29. Fourth, Washington will need to train Libyan forces, especially for counter-terrorism.
30. This is more controversial than it sounds, because a previous U.S.-supported effort to train a General Purpose Force (GPF) came a cropper several years ago due to misbehavior of the Libyans involved. Some refused to return to Libya. Others did worse.
31. CT training and assistance will have to occur in Libya. It will be expensive and dangerous. Congressional support for the effort will be vital. I suggest we prepare to spend as much as the $600 million we planned for the GPF, over three to five years. That will be a hard sell.
32. But we have to decide whether we are serious about defeating the Islamic State or not. A failed UN political agreement in Libya could open the door to ISIS, which is still relatively weak there.
33. We know however how quickly and suddenly ISIS can expand and take over territory.
34. Libya is an enormous country with a small population–only 6.4 million when everyone is at home, likely no more than 5 million or so today. Its hinterland would be ideal as an ISIS safe haven, giving it strategic depth as it loses territory in Iraq and Syria.
35. The Libyans deserve better, in particular if they sign on to the UN-brokered agreement. I hope we’ll be prepared to support their efforts.
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The Russians are coming
Of course they’ve already been present in Syria for decades and throughout the current civil wars. They have been holding on tight to their naval facilities at Tartus, supplying Bashar al Assad’s forces with weapons, training Syrian forces, and protecting Syrian diplomatic interests, in particular at the United Nations. But now Moscow seems to be constructing a base for a thousand or so troops at on air field outside Latakia, 50 miles to the north of Tartus. What are they up to? What does this move signify?
Building a base of these dimensions is a serious deepening of Russian commitment to the Syrian regime. Secretary Kerry called it escalation. But it betrays the weakness of the regime more than its strength. Latakia is the heartland of Alawite support for Bashar al Assad. If it requires Russian troops for its defense, the regime is either in deeper trouble along the coast than many had imagine, or perhaps preparing to relocate Assad from Damascus. Either way, it wouldn’t be necessary if things were going well for Bashar. Those who had hoped (I once counted myself among them), that Moscow would realize the folly of its support for him are going to be disappointed.
The Russians have reason to be concerned. Syrian government forces have palpably weakened over the last two years. Regime-organized militias (National Defense Forces) and Lebanese Hizbollah, sometimes under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps command, are now doing much of the fighting, as the regular army is disintegrating. The opposition has taken Idlib, 80 miles or so from Latakia, and much of the surrounding countryside.
They are within striking distance of Latakia, though the topography and demography will make getting there difficult. Alawite militias as well as Syrian regular forces, Hizbollah and now the Russians will defend Latakia and its approaches with vigor.
Moscow will portray whatever it is doing as support to a legitimate government fighting off a terrorist assault. The Russians I’ve talked with about Syria are fully committed to killing as many Sunni extremists as they can abroad, before they get to Mother Russia. The Islamic State has significant Chechen support. Moscow figures it is better to kill them in Syria than to risk their coming home to roost. The parallel with Bush Administration rhetoric should be noted.
Neither the regime nor Moscow will, however, make much distinction between the Islamic State and other more moderate forces that have taken up arms against Bashar al Assad. Their efforts on behalf of the regime are likely to radicalize the majority Sunni population of Syria further and help the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra recruit cadres. Russian escalation will also sink American diplomatic efforts to bring about a political solution in Syria. Neither the regime nor Moscow has ever shown interest in a solution that displaces Bashar, which Washington regards as a sine qua non, in order to convince at least some of the rebels to stop fighting.
Moscow will enjoy acting to fight ISIS in defiance of the Americans, whose anti-ISIS Coalition has had only a modicum of success. The situation in Syria is the mirror image of the situation in Ukraine, where the Russians are supporting insurgents and the Americans are supporting a legitimate government. Great powers, Putin feels, can do as they like, not least because that is how he thinks the Americans behave. The many differences between the trumped-up rebellion in eastern Ukraine and the all too genuine (and initially peaceful) uprising in Syria are of little interest to Putin.
So rather than just an escalation, it is better to see the Russian base-building as a further deterioration of the Syrian situation. It means heightened fighting, more displaced people and refugees, and less hope for a political solution. Europe had better brace itself for a much greater flow of what it prefers to call migrants, especially in anticipation of winter. The Russians are coming is not good news.
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Refugees are not the problem
The flow of refugees into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa is now attracting widespread attention. The 71 Syrians who suffocated last week in a truck in Austria, and the three-year-old who drowned in the Mediterranean, have done what close to 250,000 dying in Syria over the past 3.5 years (that’s an average of about 200 per day) could not: they have mobilized public opinion. Germany and Sweden are rightly praised for opening their doors. Hungary is trying to seal itself off. The Americans may take more than the trickle of refugees they have accepted so far, but still an insignificant number. The UN is appealing for funds, which have been sorely lacking. More than $8.4 billion is needed.
But refugees are not the root of the problem. Nor are the ones who arrive in Europe and the US the Syrians most in need or most at risk. They are the symptom–a relatively small and distant one–of a much larger and more challenging problem: the multi-sided conflict in Syria, to which we’ve become unfortunately inured. Four million people have managed to escape Syria, mostly fleeing to neighboring countries. They are the relatively fortunate ones, when not jammed into a truck in Austria or drowning in the Med. Seven million have been displaced inside Syria, where relief is much harder to find.
Of course problems are much more visible when up close and personal. But we need to keep the focus on the disease, not only the spreading ripple of symptoms.
The disease has its origins in the Syrian dictatorship’s response to peaceful pro-democracy protests. Determined to stay in power, it cracked down violently, concentrating its efforts against relative moderates and the majority Sunni community, both of which were a real threat to Bashar al Assad’s hold on power. The natural result was the growth of Sunni extremism, which has helped Bashar demonstrate that the only alternative to his rule is Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. To this day, his forces continue to focus disproportionately not on jihadi terrorism but rather on those who say they want a secular, democratic state.
There is no way to run this history backwards. The extremists will not disappear if Assad falls. It is highly unlikely that relative moderates would replace him. The best we can hope for now is to create some relatively safe places inside Syria where moderates can govern, providing protection for civilians and beginning to service their needs so that they don’t flee.
The northern area that the Americans and Turks are contemplating for this purpose is hardly ideal. Large parts of it are barren rural areas over which control will be hard to establish. Turkomans populate much of the border area with Turkey, along with Kurds against whom the Turks have been fighting. The Kurds already control much of the rest of the border, where the key to making things safer for civilians will be cooperation between them and the Arabs who live both among them and farther south.
The area along the Jordanian/Syrian border in the south is another possible protected zone, one dominated by relatively moderate Sunni insurgents, including some with US training, and the non-Muslim, Arab Druze. The Druze have tried to hold their fire and avoid close alignment with either the regime or the insurgents. Self-preservation is their priority. Bringing them into closer alignment with the insurgents would require giving them the confidence that they will be protected from the vindictive reaction of the regime.
Protected areas north and south would not solve Syria’s problems, but with Coalition (read US plus at least some European and Gulf) support, they might begin to stem the tide. If nothing is done to enable Syrians to remain in their country, it is a virtual certainty that next year’s outflow will be much greater than this year’s, with economic and political consequences for both the neighboring countries and Europe that will dwarf what we are seeing today. But the refugees will still not be the root of the problem.
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Anatomy of a possible “safe zone”
In late July, it was announced that the US would be allowed to use Incirlik airbase in Turkey to conduct airstrikes against ISIS. This move came immediately after ISIS claimed responsibility for a bombing in Suruç, Turkey that killed 33 people. It has been widely reported that the US/Turkey deal also included a provision for some sort of safe zone, or ISIS-free, zone along the Turkish-Syrian border.
US officials have denied that this zone would be a true safe zone or no-fly zone, but rather that the US and Turkey would collaborate to clear a zone from ISIS control and look to man it with moderate opposition fighters. According to Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said that the zone will not be an official no-fly zone but will have US air support. President Erdoğan has stated that the zone could allow for 1.8 million Syrian refugees to be repatriated.
News sources are generally in agreement that the zone would extend west along the Syrian border from Jarablus on the Euphrates. Some reports state that the zone will extend as far as Marea, while others state that it will extend as far as A’zaz. The depth of the zone is less certain, but reports indicate that it will be 40-50 km deep. Assuming a depth of approximately 45 km, the zone would look like this if it extends to Marea:
Here is a larger zone extending to A’zaz:
- The red line is the Turkey-Syrian border and the yellow line is the possible extent of the zone, if it goes to A’azaz.
The larger population centers, as well some towns and villages where fighting has recently taken place, are marked with pins. Those marked in black are under ISIS control and those in green are under rebel control. Zahraa, in red, is a Twelver Shiite, regime-controlled city, and Aleppo, in white, is under mixed rebel and regime control. It is worth noting that the eastern portion of the zone is sparsely populated, but Manbij and Al-Bab are larger cities, with populations of ~100,000 and approximately ~60,000, respectively. The Western part of the zone is more heavily cultivated and densely populated; whether the zone would contain the sizeable towns of A’zaz (population ~30,000) and Tel Rifat (population ~20,000) is an important question.
Below is a map of areas of control created by Dutch student Thomas van Linge and updated on August 18. I have overlayed a portion of the map onto a Google Earth view of the zone:
If the zone extends to Marea it will encompass almost entirely ISIS-held territory (shown in gray). Marea itself is under ISIS siege and is controlled by a mix of the FSA, the Islamic Front and Jaysh Al-Mujahideen. A’zaz is controlled by a mix of the FSA and the Islamic Front and Tel Rifat is controlled by a mix of the FSA, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, the Islamic Front, Faylaq Al-Sham (also known as the Sham Legion–a group of moderate Islamists who have had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, but are trying to distance themselves from it).
Andrea Taylor and Abigail Kukura have suggested that a coalition of rebels known as the Levant Front (or Jabhat al-Shamiyya) could be at least partially relied upon as a ground force to protect the zone. The Levant Front is an alliance between the Islamic Front (which includes Ahrar Al-Sham), Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, and three other Islamist rebel groups. Ahrar Al-Sham is a hardline Islamist group, that supports the creation of a Sunni Islamic theocracy in Syria. It coordinates tactically with the Nusra Front, but also works with more moderate and secular rebel groups. Ambassador Robert Ford and Ali El Yassir have argued that the US should open a dialogue with Ahrar Al Sham, because it is one of the most powerful rebel groups. Given the composition of rebel groups in the western portion of the zone, the US will be forced to cooperate with Ahrar Al Sham, at least indirectly through Turkey.
The zone has been the scene of significant fighting in the past few weeks. In the following maps, I have once again used Thomas van Linge’s map of areas of control, and marked the sites of recent clashes with red flames. I excluded clashes in Aleppo proper. I obtained information about these clashes primarily from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
There are four primary hotspots:
- The area along the front lines between ISIS and the rebels, especially around Marea.
- A cluster of villages and a gas factory near the Turkish border on the front lines between ISIS and the rebels.
- Areas on the far edge of the zone where clashes have occurred between rebels and regime positions in the Twelver Shiite cities of Zahraa and Nubl.
- Clashes between the regime and the rebels in the northern outskirts of Aleppo.
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Two birds with one stone
There are still a few weeks before the Congressional votes are completed September 17 on the Iran nuclear deal, but it looks as if President Obama will win enough votes to prevent his veto of disapproval from being overridden. He will have then hit a political grand slam: I am counting as the first three wins gay marriage, Obamacare and Trade Promotion Authority, which opens the possibility of completing negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and continuing negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
Let’s leave aside the reopening of full diplomatic relations with Cuba, a win in the Supreme Court on housing discrimination, executive action to limit greenhouse gases that cause climate change, and half a dozen other less visible items.
The latest GDP growth number, a revised 3.7% in the second quarter, is icing on the cake.
Whether you agree or disagree with him, this has been a remarkably successful few months for the lame duck. He is on a roll.
But his approval rating is down.
The biggest reasons are apparently his handling of the Islamic State (ISIS) and Iran. The Administration clearly underestimated ISIS, which has proven far more dangerous and resilient than anticipated. It poses a serious threat to US and European interests, for the moment mainly in the Middle East and North Africa. Post-deal Iran, with its pockets full of old sanctions money and new revenue from increasing oil exports, will also pose a serious regional threat to US and European interests. Even a supporter of the deal like me should recognize that.
Syria is where those two issues combine. ISIS has thrived on the ongoing civil war there. Iran has invested enormous resources in supporting Bashar al Assad. The United States has engaged from the air against ISIS but not against Assad’s forces.
This isn’t working. It can’t, because Assad is an important part of the reason that ISIS thrives in Syria. He is pummeling the country’s civilians. Sunnis are perhaps 75% of the population. The pummeling by an Alawite-based regime is radicalizing some small portion of that community, which is all ISIS needs to fill its ranks with young fighters. Iran, which has good reason to fear ISIS, responds with ever more support for the regime, including providing it with Lebanese Hizbollah forces Tehran controls.
This escalation is bad for Syria, bad for the region, and bad for the United States and Europe, where refugees are flooding in unprecedented numbers. President Obama needs to rethink his standoffish attitude toward Syria and his single-minded focus on countering only ISIS there. He has good reason to be concerned about what comes next in Syria if Assad falls suddenly, but there is little prospect the inevitable succession will move Syria in a positive direction from the American perspective if the US does not engage.
There are basically two ways to do so: militarily and politically. The best approach will combine the two. Washington is already talking with Turkey about creating a so-called “safe zone” along Syria’s northern border, extending from the Euphrates west for close to 70 miles. That could provide the Syrian opposition with an opportunity to govern and Syrians an opportunity to seek refuge. Widening US air strikes to respond to regime barrel-bombing of civilians or to respond to Hizbollah attacks on civilian population centers is another option.
The diplomatic effort has to focus on the transition from Bashar al Assad to a successor regime that excludes Islamic extremists like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nustra but includes a wide spectrum of Syrian political perspectives. This is critical: no one should want Syria to fall into the hands of a regime that presents the West, the Gulf, Russia and Iran with even greater problems than Bashar al Assad has done.
It makes sense for the pushback against both Iran and ISIS to come in Syria. Two birds with one stone.
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