Tag: ISIS
დავითი and Голиаф (David and Goliath)
On Wednesday, USIP hosted a talk by the Defense Minister of Georgia, Tinatin Khidasheli, entitled Seeking Security: Georgia Between Russia and ISIS. William B. Taylor, Executive Vice President, USIP, moderated. Khidasheli made a forceful argument that NATO membership or at least a path to NATO membership for Georgia would help deter Russia and maintain NATO credibility.
In his introductory remarks, Taylor noted that Georgia is a strong US ally that has demonstrated its military and diplomatic capabilities. Georgia is committed to integration with the West and NATO.
Khidasheli said Georgia proves success for a former Soviet Socialist Republic is possible without Russia in charge. This is why Russia fights everything they do. Putin is trying to recover from the weakness of the Yeltsin era. He won’t let any country in Russia’s immediate neighborhood have a say without Russia’s permission.
The European Neighborhood’s Eastern Partnership started with six countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, at the 2015 Riga Summit, only Georgia was fully present. This was disappointing.
Khidasheli cited two motives for her trip to DC:
- To strengthen Georgia’s partnership with the US and achieve more tangible results and military cooperation.
- To seek advice on Georgia’s path to NATO membership.
NATO needs Georgia more than Georgia needs NATO, she said, in order to maintain its mission and credibility. The Alliance has been talking for years about its commitment to partners and its open-door policy. It must prove it is still a courageous organization. Some argue that expanding NATO will force Russia to act, but after NATO made it clear in 2008 that it wasn’t expanding, Russia invaded South Ossetia. By 2009, the West viewed Russia as a partner again, but Russia’s actions in Ukraine made it clear that is not true.
As soon as the Riga summit ended in disappointment, Russia started actions in Georgia. There are daily Russian movements on the artificial border with South Ossetia. The Russians sometimes advance up to a kilometer or two. Georgia won’t be provoked and won’t allow war on its territory. The checkpoints that Russia has marked are now just .5 km from Georgia’s main East-West highway. Is Russia targeting it or trying to distract Georgia?
NATO will hold its Warsaw Summit in July 2016. Georgia will hold parliamentary elections in October 2016. A bad outcome at Warsaw won’t make Khidasheli’s voters fall in love with Russia, but it could decrease their turnout, leading to a more pro-Russian parliament. The situation in Ukraine is adding to doubts about Georgia’s integration into NATO and the EU. There are two possible outcomes of the Warsaw summit:
- NATO allows Russia a veto over new members, rejects expansion and cedes additional areas to Russian dominance.
- NATO pursues enlargement, sending a clear message to Russia that partners matter as much as members.
NATO brings peace. It is the only reason the Baltics are currently safe. The current situation won’t deter Russia. The world hasn’t been able to stop the war in Ukraine.
The dominant argument from the Kremlin now favors a strong Russia. Putin has no trouble presenting the West as the enemy. But sanctions alone against Russia won’t help and will play into Putin’s “evil West” narrative. The West needs to understand that Russia is a country where people ate rats and cats in World War 2 and still won. Western notions of hardship and happiness aren’t relevant there.
Khidasheli recognizes that a realistic outcome of the Warsaw Summit won’t be NATO membership but an intermediate step towards membership. Georgia wants a statement that it is on a membership track.
While Georgia recently acquired an air defense system from France, Khidasheli did not specify how Tbilisi plans to deter Moscow or draw red lines. Georgia will make decisions about whether to shoot down a Russian plane violating Georgian airspace based on the threat level. With respect to Russia’s creeping annexation policies, Khidasheli reiterated that Georgia won’t be provoked. Georgia will not make a decision regarding countering Russia without its partners.
Russia is trying to use soft power to influence Georgia through NGOs and the media. There are political parties that openly align with Russia, including a former parliamentary speaker.
Khidasheli also spoke briefly about the problem of ISIS recruitment in Georgia, especially in the Pankisi Gorge. This poses a great danger. Georgia has failed to pay enough attention to the problems in this region. More integration, education and targeted employment programs are needed to decrease the feelings of isolation and abandonment among locals. The government must also examine other areas of Georgia where the demographics suggest future problems and address those issues now.
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Tehran calling
Unlike many colleagues around Washington, I have decided to talk with and answer questions from Iranian media willing to publish them. I think it important for Americans to try to be understood in Iran. Certainly Tehran is making big efforts to be understood in the US. While I find some of what the Iranian media broadcast objectionable and even odious, most of the questions they ask me are straight up, like these from Hamid Bayati, published this morning in the Tehran Times:
Q: As you know Iran and Russia begin new initiative to bring peace to Syria, so how do you evaluate these efforts?
A: There really is nothing to evaluate yet. The Iranian four-point proposal, which has been public for some time, requires a good deal more detail before it can be evaluated. The key question is how the transition will be handled. No political solution will work that keeps Bashar al Assad in power, because the Syrian opposition will continue fighting.
Q: Some experts believe that after nuclear deal reach between Iran and world powers, Western countries especially the US begin to cooperate with Iran in regional issues such as Syria, and a new era begins in Middle East. Do you agree with this view?
A: Not really, even if I would like to see it happen. Iran with the nuclear agreement will have substantial resources. The question is how it will use those resources. Hardliners in Tehran will presumably argue for more support to Iran’s allies in the region: Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, Houthi forces in Yemen and Hamas. The US and Europe will not welcome moves of that sort. There will be enormous pressure on the US administration to push back, especially against Hizbollah.
Q: Turkey launches airstrikes against ISIL and PKK positions in Syria and Iraq, are these acts helpful to peace process in Middle East or not?
A: The Americans think more Turkish help against ISIL is vital. The US and Turkey have different opinions about the Kurds in Syria, though at this point PKK attacks inside Turkey are making that irrelevant.
Q: How do you evaluate the US-led Coalition against ISIS after one year of its creation? Does this Coalition reach its goals?
A: The Coalition has not reached its goals, but it has blocked ISIS advances and has rolled them back in some areas (Tikrit, Kobane, Tal Abayd). Without a better formula for who will govern in ISIL-controlled territory, I don’t see how the Coalition can “win.”
Q: As you know US congress is reviewing the Iran nuclear deal and it is possible US lawmakers will kill this deal. If this event happen what will we have after that?
A: It is possible but not likely that US lawmakers would kill the deal, but in order to do so they would need a 2/3 majority in both houses of Congress. That will be difficult to get. If they do kill the deal, Iran and the P4+1 will have some important decisions to make. Do they abandon the deal completely, or do they implement it without the US? If the deal is abandoned, what will Iran do?
Q: In an interview aired Sunday on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS,” Obama said the United States’ role in global politics could be affected by the deal, how do you explain this sentence?
A: Defeat of the deal would separate the US from its allies and undermine confidence in American leadership in many countries. It would be like the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations almost 100 years ago, a move that isolated and weakened the US.
Q: If US congress kills the deal, is it possible United States and EU continue a different strategy toward Iran? I mean is it possible they have different relations with Iran and EU that don’t follow US policy?
A: It is possible, though the US might try to apply “secondary” sanctions by barring European companies from doing business with the US if they do business with Iran. That would create big problems with America’s closest allies.
Q: It seems European countries have been more eager than US to revive their relations with Iran, how do you explain this view?
A: Europe needs Iranian oil and gas much more than the US does. Our companies are far less interested in doing business with Iran than some European countries. Geography is destiny I’m afraid.
As I failed to respond adequately to his question about the PKK, Hamid sent more, which were not published with the rest of the interview:
A: What do you think about Turkey military attacks on PKK positions? Some experts said these attacks are because the AK party lost in elections. Some experts said Turkey attacks the PKK because Turks don’t want Kurds to be strong, what do you think about it?
Q: The PKK made the mistake of ending the ceasefire with the Turkish government, which reacted forcefully. Some think this was the result of a split among the Kurds between those who did well in recent elections and the military component, which feared irrelevance.
It might have been better for the Turks to escalate more slowly; some think Erdogan may be seeking to regain some of the popular support he has lost recently by vigorously responding to every Kurdish provocation. But the PKK is a terrorist organization that attacks the Turkish state and can’t expect safe haven in Iraq or Syria. Iranian support for the PKK is a big concern for Turkey.
The complication of course is that the most effective Syrian fighters against ISIL include Kurds affiliated with the PKK. The Americans prioritize the fight against ISIL, which is an international threat. The Turks prioritize the fight against the PKK, which is a domestic threat. Iran does likewise when it faces a domestic threat of the PKK variety. The US and Turkey will work out their differences in dealing with the Kurds. I’m less sure that Iran and the US, or Iran and Turkey, will do likewise, though it would be desirable.
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Peace picks August 17-21
1. The Defense Economy and American Prosperity | Monday, August 17th | 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At just over 3 percent of gross domestic product, U.S. military spending totals more than $600 billion annually. A number of recent developments and long-term trends, however-including sequestration and contractor consolidation-threaten the health of the U.S. national security industrial base. The American defense industry is being squeezed on multiple fronts, but just how important is the defense sector to the overall strength of the American economy? Do specific cities or regions have more to worry about than others should defense spending continue to decline? What impact does defense spending have on regional and national job creation and technology innovation? On August 17, the Foreign Policy and Economic Studies programs at Brookings will host a discussion of the American economy and the role that defense industry could play in the nation’s continued recovery and economic health. Panelists include Ben S. Bernanke, Brookings distinguished fellow in residence, and Mark Muro, senior fellow and policy director of the Metropolitan Policy Program. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, will also participate and moderate the session. Following discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
2. Assessing Japan-Republic of Korea Relations after Prime Minister Abe’s Anniversary Statement | Tuesday, August 18th | 10:00-11:30 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s statement commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II has the potential to either repair or further impair Tokyo’s current strained bilateral relations with Seoul. In recent months, both countries have endeavored to repair the relationship by addressing and compartmentalizing historic issues. But real progress on the nascent rapprochement initiative remains dependent on Abe’s anniversary statement and President Park Geun-hye’s response. Strained relations between two critically important allies is of grave concern to Washington since it hinders U.S. security interests in Asia and constrains effective integrated responses to the North Korean military threat. Questions remain over what role the U.S. can play in helping Japan and the Republic of Korea achieve reconciliation. Speakers include: Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS, and Associate Professor, Georgetown, Evans J.R. Revere, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings and Sheila A. Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, CFR. Host: Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage.
3. Examining Arctic Opportunities and Capabilities: Does the U.S. Have the Infrastructure, Ships and Equipment Required? | Tuesday, August 18th | 1:30-3:30 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On April 24, 2015 the United States began a two-year term as Chairman of the Arctic Council. The Council is composed of eight Member States: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S. Clearly, the capabilities of these eight countries to operate in the Arctic differ quite significantly. As Arctic opportunities arise, so, too, has the interest of an increasing number of non-Arctic countries. Twelve countries have been deemed Arctic Council “Observers:” the People’s Republic of
China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Several of these “Observers” are also actively developing and advancing their potential Arctic operations capability. The United States, under its Chairmanship over the next 20 months, will have numerous policy questions worthy of examination and assessment. Can any Arctic policy be sustained without enduring U.S. capabilities? Does change in the Arctic region encourage other countries to become more actively operational in the area? While the U.S. has the capability to operate around much of the globe, does
it really have a robust ability to be a presence in the Arctic? How might the U.S. better operate side-by-side with Arctic allies? Are Arctic Council “Observer” nations already more capable of Arctic operations than the U.S.? Join us for a most timely and important discussion. Keynote speaker: Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., USCG (Ret.), Special Representative for the Arctic, U.S. Department of State. Host: James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, The Heritage Foundation. Other speakers include: H.E. Geir
Haarde, Ambassador of Iceland to the United States and former Prime Minister, Isaac Edwards, Senior Counsel for Chairman Murkowski, U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and Luke Coffey, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation. Moderator: James E. Dean, Manager, International and Diplomatic Programs, The Heritage Foundation.
4. China’s Missiles and the Implications for the United States |Wednesday, August 19th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While China’s ongoing island-building in the South China Sea has garnered headlines, Beijing has quietly continued a ballistic missile modernization program that increasingly threatens U.S. and allied naval vessels—and challenges existing U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense capabilities. The United States is particularly concerned about the development of the DF-21 “carrier killer” that is designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pacific. Additionally, the commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Gortney, confirmed in April that China has deployed three ballistic missile submarines capable of striking the U.S. homeland. On August 19th, Hudson Institute will host five noted experts for a discussion of China’s expanding missile arsenal and the role of that arsenal in Beijing’s broader strategic objectives. Trey Obering, Dean Cheng, Mark Schneider, and Bryan Clark will join Hudson Adjunct Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs to analyze China’s military capabilities, national strategy, and possible U.S. responses. Speaker: Henry A. “Trey” Obering III, Executive Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton. Panelists include: Dean Cheng, Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy, and Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Moderator: Rebeccah Heinrichs, Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute.
5. Seeking Security: Georgia Between Russia and ISIS | Wednesday, August 19th | 3:00 – 4:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As world headlines focus elsewhere, international security remains at risk in Georgia: Russian troops last month continued a creeping seizure of new Georgian territory, including part of a strategic pipeline. ISIS is recruiting fighters throughout the Caucasus for its war in Syria. Georgian Defense Minister Tinatin Khidasheli, in Washington to meet with top U.S. officials, will make her remarks at USIP August 19. She will discuss how her country is navigating regional security threats that have deepened in the 18 months since Russia attacked Ukraine.
6. US-Israeli Relations After the Iran Deal | Wednesday, August 19th | 6:30-8:30 | Located at Thomson Reuters but sponsored by PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After July’s historic nuclear deal between the P5+1 great powers and Iran, what is next for relations between the United States and Israel? Moderator: Warren Stroble, Reuters DC diplomatic editor. Panelists: Alexandria Paolozzi, Senate Legislative
Director and Issue Specialist on Israel for Concerned Women for America (CWA). She visited Israel in September 2014 on a Millennial Leaders tour. She has organized Capitol Hill panels on religious freedom in the Middle East, rallies and demonstrations in support of Israel, and has lobbied on pro-Israel policies in the United States Senate. Dr. Guy Ziv is an assistant professor at American University’s School of International Service (SIS), where he teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy, the Middle East, and international negotiations. He is the author of the Why Hawks Become Doves: Shimon Peres and Foreign Policy Change in Israel. He is founder and director of the Israel National Security Project (INSP), a repository of statements by Israeli security experts concerning the strategic imperative of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ari Ratner is a former State Department official and current PS21 board member.
7. Cyber Risk Wednesday: Hacks, Attacks, and What America Can Do about It | Wednesday, August 19th | 4:00-5:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Two months ago, the OPM discovered the biggest breach of US government data in history, described by many as the long-feared “Cyber 9/11”, exposing sensitive information on millions of Americans. While the Obama administration has refrained from publicly attributing the attack, many officials have privately pointed the finger at China. In July, hackers penetrated the Joint Chiefs of Staff email network in what has been described as the “most sophisticated” cyber breach in the history of the US military. Although the investigation is still underway, suspicion has quickly fallen on Russia. And just days ago, news broke about Chinese cyber spies having had access to the private emails of top US officials since at least 2010. In light of the unprecedented scale and scope of these recent data breaches, the Obama administration faces difficult questions: Does political cyber espionage warrant retaliation? Would retaliating effectively deter US cyber adversaries? Or would it further escalate the conflict, especially as the United States itself has been caught spying on other nation states? To answer these questions and suggest a way forward for the US government, this moderated panel discussion brings together recognized cybersecurity and espionage experts Siobhan Gorman, Director at Brunswick’s Washington, DC office; Jason Healey, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative and Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs; and Robert Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow for Cyber Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
8. Taiwan’s China Tangle | Thursday, August 20th | 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm | Stimson | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Taiwan was a symbol of “Free China” during the Cold War era. Democratization and the rise of local identity after the 1990s transformed the nature of the society into an indigenous regime. Under the double pressure of globalization and the rise of China, Taiwan is searching for a new route to cope with increasing domestic and international challenges. This presentation by Stimson’s Visiting Fellow Dr. Tse-Kang Leng will discuss the impact of the “China factor” on Taiwan public opinion toward cross-Strait relations, Taiwan’s economic links with the Mainland, and Taiwan’s strategic positon in a globalizing world. Speaker: Dr. Tse-Kang Leng, Visiting Fellow, East Asia Program, Stimson Center, Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica (IPSAS), and Professor of Political Science, National Chengchi University. Moderator: Alan D. Romberg, Distinguished Fellow and Director of the East Asia Program, Stimson.
9. A New Kind of Conflict: Cyber-Security on the Korean Peninsula | Thursday, August 20th | 3:00-5:30 | SAIS- The Bernstein-Offit Building, Room 500 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | ‘A New Kind of Conflict’ is a simulation exploring a cyber-security incident between North and South Korea, with the goal of highlighting the gaps between modern capabilities and international legal frameworks designed to combat cyber-crime. Networking reception with food and drink will follow. Event starts at 3pm, check-in begins at 2:45pm. Seating is limited.
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The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
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Jeb, the anti-Trump
Jeb Bush’s foreign policy speech at the Reagan Library yesterday merits careful attention. In a campaign for the Republican nomination dominated so far by Donald Trump’s verbal antics, this speech ranks as the most serious effort yet to challenge Barack Obama’s approach to threats from the Islamic State and Iran.
I won’t quarrel much with the Governor’s analysis of the current situation. Yes, the Islamic State in particular and Islamic extremism in general are more of a threat today than they were in 2009, even if American civilian deaths from terrorist acts since 9/11 have been minimal. Iran is a bad actor likely to cause more problems in the Middle East once sanctions are lifted. The situation in Syria, which Iran has exacerbated with support to Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, is catastrophic and needs a more effective approach.
But Bush confuses cause and effect in ways that make his policy prescriptions screwy. It is apparent that the mainly military approach both the Bush and Obama administrations have taken to fighting Islamic extremism in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen has made the situation worse, not better. Yet in Iraq Jeb suggests we only need to do more and better on the military front in order to fix the situation. I don’t see any reason to believe that will work well. Nor is his hand-waving confidence about Iraqis “coming through for their country” convincing.
The Iraq war is the basis for much of what Bush thinks Obama has gotten wrong. In Bush’s narrative, the “surge” was a military success that Obama squandered by withdrawing American troops. Only by showing more military resolve region-wide can the US reverse that mistake.
But that is a false account of what actually happened. Obama withdrew American troops from Iraq on a schedule negotiated and agreed by the George W. Bush Administration. Republicans neglect that fact, because it disrupts their portrayal of the Obama Administration as weak, vacillating and prone to ignore the importance of military power. When challenged, they claim that George W. thought the agreement would be renegotiated. Obama tried that and failed, not because he was weak, vacillating and prone to ignore the importance of military power but because political sentiment in both the US and Iraq leaned heavily against a continuing US military presence.
If anyone is to be blamed for the rise of the Islamic State’s takeover of Sunni portions of Iraq, it is Nouri al Maliki, who was hand-picked as prime minister by the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration compounded that error when it backed Maliki for a second term even though his party had lost its plurality in parliament. Maliki thereafter proved himself an aggressive Shia sectarian who alienated both Sunni and Kurds, thereby weakening the Iraqi state and setting the stage for the ISIS takeover. It is vital always to remember that the problems in Iraq and generally in the region are at their heart political, not military.
But that narrative is too complicated for Jeb Bush. He prefers a simpler one that echoes his older brother’s worldview:
What we are facing in ISIS and its ideology is, to borrow a phrase, the focus of evil in the modern world.
I can think of a lot of other foci of evil in the modern world, and I’d have thought that “axis of evil” was a Manichean phrase no one would want to echo, given its association with the catastrophic mistake of invading Iraq and the less catastrophic but still serious mistake by George W. of failing even to try to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran before it had installed almost 20,000 centrifuges and enriched enough uranium to make a nuclear weapon.
On that subject, Jeb takes up the prevailing Republican unequivocal opposition to the nuclear deal. He offers no idea what his alternative is. He promises to undo the alleged damage Obama has done if elected, but of course withdrawal from the deal at this point would also have consequences he fails to consider: either Iran will race for nuclear weapons or the Europeans, Russians and Chinese will implement the deal and lift sanctions. The US then ends up either 1) having no alternative to war (without any allies except Israel), 2) watching its European allies make common cause with Moscow and Beijing against American efforts to unilaterally enforce sanctions. This is no formula for restoring American leadership, which is what Jeb says he wants to do.
Only on Syria does Bush offer any substantial suggestions worth examination: protected zones in parts of Syria and a no-fly zone over the whole country. Assad, not just ISIS, would be his target. Those are propositions President Obama has resisted because they take the US down the slippery slope towards greater involvement in the chaos that the multi-sided Syrian civil war their has generated. But his refusal to get involved hasn’t improved the situation or made it easier to solve. We shouldn’t have to wait for a new president to correct course on Syria.
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Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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