Tag: ISIS
Iraq explodes
Escalating Protests
The current protests in Iraq have been the bloodiest since 2003, with over 300 people killed and thousands injured. The October protesters started off demanding services, but quickly escalated to broader grievances against the Prime Minister, his cabinet, and the Iraqi democratic system as a whole. These protests should not be a surprise to the Iraqi government nor the international community. The government has been eroding for 16 years. Layers of grievances have led to the current protests.
President Barham Salih has said Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi will resign once the political parties pick a replacement, but it’s highly unlikely this would quell protests. The demonstrations are not backed by, nor do they back, any political party. There is no leadership for the government to negotiate with. Ideas, demands, and slogans are being churned out. The basic demand is for an upheaval of the political system.
Underlying Issues to Broader Instability
Two years after the fall of ISIS, Iraq is still unstable. The government lacks the ability to meet the basic needs of its citizens. An estimated $160-$275 billion is needed to rebuild, but a mix of mismanaged resources and corrupt politicians has left the country with vital infrastructure still destroyed, high levels of unemployment, and a lack of services, especially in health and education. Despite having the world’s fourth largest oil reserves, Iraq’s cities face frequent power cuts, making life unbearable for many. The only option separate from the national power grid is to purchase electricity from privately owned generators, but that is unaffordable for most Iraqis.
There are still roughly 1.67 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-ISIS Iraq. Most of those who could voluntarily move back to their place of origin have likely already done so, yet authorities are closing and consolidating IDP camps, causing conditions in the remaining ones to deteriorate.
Civil documentation is a major barrier to IDPs re-integrating into communities as well as returning home to their places of origin. Strict Iraqi laws make life difficult for an estimated 80,000 families, who lack legal documentation. Without proper paperwork, these Iraqis lose access to available public goods and freedom of movement. Although international aid is provided to IDPs, it is not nearly enough for them and other Iraqis in dire need of basic commodities. Corrupt politicians take the money for themselves. The mishandling of IDPs adds to the perception that the Iraqi government is corrupt and ineffective.
The Islamic State remains a serious threat for both Iraq and Syria. ISIS fighters have moved into the valley of a remote mountainous region in northern Iraq that is not patrolled by either the Kurdish peshmerga or the Iraqi army. This allows them free movement, mainly at night, and the ability to go to local cities, farms, and villages to shake down the population and extract resources. Currently, there are only a few hundred ISIS militants in the area at most, but it could be the beginning of a new territorial caliphate if they are able to consolidate power and create a base for nearby sleeper cells to flock to.
What’s Next?
The Prime Minister has lost the support of Iraqi students, unions, and even the army. It is difficult to predict what will happen in coming weeks, but the protests have continuously increased in size and intensity, a trend that will likely endure. The government has lost the confidence of the Iraqi people. Replacing current politicians will not address the grievances protestors have. A new mandate is needed to move forward and reestablish Iraq.
Iraq exploding with a wide range of problems that could push the government over the edge at any moment. A military coup by either the Iraqi army or the Iranian backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is a possibility, but how will the people respond to rule by either as both have used unnecessary force against the protesters? Civil conflict would be devastating for Iraq and could be the perfect opportunity for ISIS to reestablish its caliphate.
The protests are not going to just disappear. The Iraqi people will continue to persist despite the violent reactions from security forces. There seem to be no “good” options for Iraq now and in the immediate future.
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Walking back
President Trump and his minions are walking back a lot of things:
- No, the Trump Doral resort will not host the G7;
- No, Trump did not greenlight the Turkish invasion of Syria and attack on the Syrian Kurds;
- No, the President’s chief of staff did not confirm that the President wanted an investigation into Joe Biden and his son in exchange for Congressionally mandated military aid to Ukraine.
None of these corrections comes even close to erasing the original mistakes. If it is wrong for Trump to host the G7 at one of his resorts, it is also wrong for foreign governments and US agencies to be padding his income at the Trump hotel in DC and a resort in Scotland. He definitely did yank the US troops who were preventing a Turkish invasion of Syria, without apparently thinking about the consequences, which are catastrophic for both the Kurds and Arabs who did the bulk of the fighting against the Islamic State in Syria. Chief of staff Mulvaney’s denials don’t pass the laugh test, or Chris Wallace’s grilling.
Trump is reaching his limits. Public opinion among Democrats and independents is turning against him on the impeachment inquiry. John Kasich may not be a typical Republican today, but he is an intelligent one calling for impeachment. At least a few Senators may not be far behind. The damage to America’s standing in the world, and to their hopes for re-election, is becoming all too evident. Still, most rank and file Republicans are backing Trump. If that starts to change, the Senate dam will break.
Ron Chernow, who knows more American history than anyone else alive, has the most interesting and compelling take on impeachment today: it was designed, he says, precisely for someone like Trump. I confess to me it seems almost too good for someone of his ilk, but Chernow helpfully notes that prosecution can come once he is out of office. I do hope to live long enough to see that happen.
Meanwhile, American interests worldwide are suffering mightily. Everyone who depends on the US has to see the instant betrayal of the Kurds as a warning. No American friend or ally should be neglecting to hedge by seeking support elsewhere. America’s adversaries are enjoying the spectacle, which has handed Russia and Iran a leg up in Syria and enabled both of them to gain invaluable intelligence on US military operations both from the abandoned bases and from erstwhile US allies.
Trump’s move has also signaled, once again, that he is a pushover who yields easily to adversaries. Turkish President Erdogan rolled him, the Iranians have apparently gotten away with a serious attack on Saudi oil production facilities, Russia is enjoying impunity for its invasion of Ukraine, and the North Koreans have given Trump an ultimatum if he wants them to make even small moves to limit their nuclear program. Make America Great Again is not only isolating the United States but diminishing it. Even at the end of the Vietnam war, which was unquestionably a low point for US influence in the world, American influence was greater than it is today.
The spectacle of the United States walking backwards is demoralizing, not only to Americans but also to much of the rest of the world. Let’s hope we get Trump out of office within the next year or so. If he gets re-elected, the damage will be irreversible.
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Green light
President Trump, whether intending to or not, has made it eminently clear that the US would do nothing militarily to avoid a Turkish push into Syria against the Syrian Kurds who have fought for years with the US against the Islamic State. With the US troops on the border withdrawn from their buffer role by Trump, Turkish troops are now pressing into Syria in an effort to destroy the YPG, the Syrian Kurdish forces President Erdogan characterizes as terrorists because they are an adjunct of the PKK, Kurdish forces that attack inside Turkey.
President Trump has threatened the Turkish economy, but he won’t go through with it. He is anticipated to veto a sanctions bill working its way through Congress, where the votes to override are not available.
It was hard to imagine that the situation in Syria could be made worse than it already was, but Trump has managed it. Instead of negotiating the US withdrawal with Turkey and Russia, he simply pulled the plug on the US presence at the border. I’d be the first to say that presence was not sustainable and needed to be withdrawn. But vacuums get filled. The trick is to make sure they get filled with something that protects US interests. Trump failed to even try to do that.
Now the outcome is all too predictable: the Turks will chase the Kurds from the border area, which is where most of them have lived for generations. The Kurds will respond not only by resisting the Turkish attack but also by conducting terrorist operations inside Turkey and Turkish-controlled Syria. One has occurred already in a Turkish border town, according to press reports. Distracted by the fight against Turkey, the Syrian Kurds will not be able to sustain the fight against resurgent ISIS forces or perhaps even maintain the camps in which they hold ISIS prisoners.
Damascus will seize this opportunity to offer some protection for the Kurds, who will not have any other option. They will go back to the purpose for which their military units were created by Damascus: attacking inside Turkey. So a war that today looks like it is between Turkey and the Kurds will soon be a war between Turkey and Syria, with unpredictable results.
It is not impossible that Damascus and Ankara will reach a pact restoring Syrian authority along the border in exchange for repression of the Kurdish threat to Turkey and return of large numbers of Syrian Arab refugees from Turkey back to Syria. But of course a messy continuation of war between Turkey and Syria is also possible.
The big losers in all of this will be Syria’s citizens, both Kurdish and Arab. They will suffer major humanitarian challenges as civilians are used as human shields or flee to escape the fighting. Eventually large numbers of Syrian refugees inside Turkey are likely to be forced back to Syria, violating their non-refoulement right.
Assad, the Russians, and the Iranians have reason to be pleased. Trump has demonstrated once again that US support is unreliable, the Russians are strengthening their foothold in Syria and the region, Assad is getting a chance to restore his authority over northeastern Syria, and the Iranians will enjoy his triumph as well as the smashing of the Kurds. Make America Great Again once again means weakening the United States by failing to use diplomatic instruments to enable a withdrawal that could have been executed without the risks we are now running.
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Ends and means after the caliphate
On September 10 the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion entitled “The Counter-ISIS Coalition: Diplomacy and Security in Action.” The panel featured two former special presidential envoys to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL: General John Allen, current President of Brookings, and Brett McGurk, a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Lise Grande, who served as Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq during the height of the campaign against ISIS, joined the panel through a video link from Amman. The New Yorker’s Susan B. Glasser moderated.
Allen emphasized that ISIS remains a threat through its residual forces in Syria, the presence of its affiliates in countries like Nigeria, Libya, and the Philippines, and its online influence. McGurk also pointed to the danger of the next generation of jihadi fighters coming from Syria’s al-Hol camp, where 73,000 ISIS women and children are held. Neither the Syrian Democratic Forces who administer the camp nor the US have sufficient resources to manage the threat.
America’s objectives in Syria have broadened under the Trump administration to include countering the remaining ISIS threat, promoting regime change, and removing Iranian forces from the country. Simultaneously, America has reduced the number US troops to around 1000. McGurk stressed that this widening gap between America’s goals in Syria and the resources it has in the country will make it hard to respond to the next crisis. The Turkish-US joint patrols of the safe zone in northern Syria that began last weekend will further draw these limited resources away from managing critical threats like al-Hol.
Both McGurk and Allen attributed the coalition’s successes to three factors: strong American leadership, commitment from an unusually large number of allies, and working by, with, and through local partners that America had previously developed in Iraq. Both argued that in the event of a crisis it would be harder to create a coalition now due to some allies’ loss of trust in American leadership. McGurk also speculated that John Bolton’s departure from the White House will not change these conditions, stating that the Trump administration lacked a functional communication process between the President and the national security adviser prior to Bolton’s tenure.
Grande noted that while UN stabilization usually begins by trying to fixing entire systems, in Iraq they took a bottom-up approach to repairing electricity, water, and sanitation grids. During the stabilization of Ramadi, UN workers coordinated with Iraqi forces to enter cities as soon as they were liberated and set up mobile electricity grids consisting of generators on trucks. They hired local engineers to connect each house to the generators as families returned to them. While past stabilization programs have taken 2 years to reconnect electricity grids, in Ramadi families had power within 2 hours of returning home. Grande described this as both the largest and most successful stabilization effort in the UN’s history, which she said was possible due to the strength of the Iraqi government’s commitment, an Iraqi private sector with great engineering capabilities, and support from the coalition and the United States.
Grande also credits the success the UN had in stabilizing these cities to the premium Iraqi forces placed on protecting civilians and keeping them in their homes when possible. Each morning during the liberation of Mosul, the UN sent the number of empty beds available in their camps to the Iraqi commanders, who structured their battle plan to ensure only that number of civilians were evacuated from their homes. The Iraqi security forces escorted these families across the front lines, checked them for weapons, and delivered them to aid workers, who got them into temporary housing by nightfall.
Grande contrasted this to the average of four weeks it takes civilians to get humanitarian assistance in most active conflict zones. The Iraqi security forces were also able to protect 90% of the residents of East Mosul in their homes, limiting the number of evacuees needing immediate assistance. She concluded that the commitment of the Iraqi government to protecting civilians, support from the Iraqi private sector, and the strength of America’s coalition leadership were critical to the UN’s success in stabilizing newly liberated cities. Without those conditions the UN will not be able to recreate this success in stabilizing future conflict zones.
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Peace Picks | September 9 – 13
1. Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Perspective | September 10, 2019 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington D.C. | Register Here
Instability in Libya after the revolution that toppled the 42 years’ authoritarian rule of Muammar Gaddafi has become a golden opportunity for extremist groups, including DAESH, Ansar al-Sharia, and Madkhali Salafis, to gain territory and influence in the country. Concerned about rising radicalism and violent extremism in Libya, external actors have attempted to address as well as exploit this emerging problem. States, international organizations, and regional organizations have strived to play a decisive role in restoring Libyan stability but their efforts have proven insufficient. Libya has been driven into a bloody civil war due to political and social fragility and external interventions. Based on an extended study and field research, Dr. Talha Köse will present a CVE model based on the peacebuilding perspective. This event will feature the initial findings and summary of the SETA Foundation’s latest field research on Libya, “Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Perspective” authored by Dr. Talha Köse, a researcher at SETA Istanbul, and Bilgehan Öztürk, a researcher at SETA Ankara. Please kindly join us for an important discussion on the external players’ perspectives on countering violent extremism in Libya. Speakers: Dr. Talha Köse, Senior Researcher at the Strategy Program of the SETA Foundation in Istanbul and Chair of the Political Science and International Relations Department at Ibn Haldun University Dr. Karim Mezran, Director of the North Africa Initiative and Resident Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Moderator: Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.
2. The counter-ISIS coalition: Diplomacy and security in action | September 10, 2019 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM | Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium | Register Here
On September 10, 2014, the United States announced the formation of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Since then, ISIS has lost nearly all the territory it once claimed authority over, simultaneously losing most of its sources of revenue. Even as the caliphate’s power has significantly waned, the fight continues in an effort rout out the remnants of the group. Today Coalition partners are dealing with the challenges of returning foreign fighters, securing and rebuilding territory formerly held by ISIS, and addressing the humanitarian challenges in communities who experienced ISIS’s brutality. On September 10, the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will host an event commemorating the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Coalition, discussing the early days of the diplomatic and military efforts to bring together a diverse coalition of partner nations, how their efforts were organized, and recommendations on where the Coalition can go from here. General John Allen, president of Brookings, will be joined by Brett McGurk, nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie, in a conversation moderated by Susan Glasser. Following the discussion, the participants will take questions from the audience.
3. Qatar Inside and Out: A Close Look at the Gulf State’s Politics, Human Rights, and Foreign Policy | September 10, 2019 | 2:30 PM- 4:00 PM | Project on Middle East Democracy, Suite 617 | Register Here
The tiny Gulf state of Qatar, the world’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, is the wealthiest country in the world per capita. A close strategic partner of the United States, Qatar is home to the largest U.S. military base in the region, Al Udeid Airbase, and among the world’s top purchasers of American weapons. Criticism of U.S. policy toward Qatar has largely focused on its foreign policy, with its internal politics and human rights record receiving far less scrutiny. This relative lack of attention is curious, given the well-documented human rights abuses in Qatar, especially toward migrant workers, and the autocratic nature of its political system, an absolute monarchy. Please join us for a special Human Rights Watch-POMED event that will examine these domestic issues in the context of Qatar’s regional role and why they matter to the United States.
Speakers: Marti Flacks Deputy Director & Head of North America Office, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Andrea Prasow Acting Washington Director, Human Rights Watch Kristian Ulrichsen Fellow for the Middle East, Baker Institute, Rice University David Weinberg Washington Director for International Affairs, Anti-Defamation League
Moderated by: Stephen McInerney Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy
4. Weaponizing Justice: Rule of Law and Cuba’s New Constitution | September 11, 2019 | 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Inter-American Dialogue, Suite 800 | Register Here
In April 2018, the Cuban National Assembly anointed Miguel Díaz-Canel as the country’s president, the first non-Castro to lead the island nation in almost 60 years. With new leadership came a new Constitution, which ostensibly reflects expanded due process protections for Cuba’s citizens. However, these constitutional rights coexist with a Criminal Code that is routinely employed by judicial authorities to silence dissent and punish political opposition. What kind of constitutionality exists in Cuba’s one-party state? What nominal rights exist, and are they respected? Does the new Constitution—effective as of April 2019—augur hopes for more freedom of expression and respect for the rule of law? To answer these questions and pursue a broader discussion on the administration of justice in Cuba, the Inter-American Dialogue is pleased to partner with the International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights to present “Weaponizing Justice: Rule of Law and Cuba’s New Constitution.” The discussion will include a presentation of the Institute’s new report, “Premeditated Convictions: An Analysis of the Situation of the Administration of Justice in Cuba.”
OPENING REMARKS Carlos Quesada Executive Director, International Institute for Race, Equality and Human Rights (@Raceandequality)
SPEAKERS Luis Carlos Battista Cuban-American lawyer and host of the Nuestra América Podcast (@lcbattisa) and Caitlin Kelly Legal Program Officer, International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights
MODERATOR Michael Camilleri Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue (@camillerimj)
5. Pathways Out of Crisis: Views from Venezuelan Civil Society | September 12, 2019 | 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM | Woodrow Wilson Center | Register Here
As the political, economic, and social crisis in Venezuela deepens, civil society organizations are playing a vital role in resisting authoritarianism and defending fundamental rights. As Venezuela’s opposition engages in negotiations to achieve a transition, Venezuelan civil society is also advancing meaningful proposals for a democratic, peaceful solution that reflect urgent human rights and humanitarian needs on the ground. Please join us for a discussion of the latest in the country’s crisis, and of the role of the United States and the international community in supporting a peaceful return to democracy. Spanish to English translation will be provided.
Speakers: Feliciano Reyna President Acción Solidaria, Luz Mely Reyes Editor Efecto Cocuyo Marino, Alvarado Coordinator Venezuelan Program of Action Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), Beatriz Borges Executive Director Justice and Peace Center (CEPAZ), Alfredo Romero Executive Director, Foro Penal Venezolano Lowenthal Fellow, Wilson Center
6. Impact of the Arab Muslim Ban on Migration | September 12, 2019 | 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM | Gulf International Forum | Register Here
Nearly four years ago when the possibility of the current Administration was shrugged-off by many pundits and experts amongst the political elite, the already controversial Trump Presidential campaign on December 6, 2015 released a memo calling for, “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” While the response among many to the proclamation was swift and oppositional, in some ways the eventually elected President Trump was able to deliver on parts of this promise when on January 27, 2017 the Trump Administration issued Executive Order No. 13769, effectively banning entry into the United States for those from countries including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Since then there has been a struggle in the courts in which several aspects of the travel ban have been struck down, however many restrictions on travel for individuals from these countries remain in place. In response, in May 2019 legislation colloquially referred to as the “No Ban Act” was introduced in both chambers of Congress, a symbolic yet largely ineffectual means to undo the remaining aspects of the executive order. Meanwhile, the order is not alone in a series of measures enacted under the Administration that limit the ability of individuals from GIF’s region of focus from travelling to the United States, either as immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees. Where do efforts stand to overturn the Arab and Muslim ban? How has the ban affected people from Yemen, Iraq and Iran? What allowed Iraq to eventually be excepted from the ban? Has the ban had consequences for United States Foreign Policy in the Muslim World? In what ways has the grassroots community collaborated in order to challenge the ban? While none of these questions have easy answers, Gulf International Forum and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee are pleased to invite you to this discussion, where our assembled panel of experts will address issues related to the Arab and Muslim ban’s effect on Gulf populations, and the efforts taken to address the mandates of the Trump Administration.
Featured Speakers: Dania Thafer (moderator), Dr. Debbie Almontaser, Abed Ayoub Esq., Dr. Erdoan A. Shipoli, and Wa’el Alzayat
7. The Potential U.S.-Taliban Deal: A Step Forward for Peace in Afghanistan? | September 13, 2019 | 10:00 AM – 12:00 PM | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
After nearly a year of extensive negotiations in Doha, the United States and the Taliban have reportedly agreed in principle on a deal addressing U.S. troop withdrawal and Taliban anti-terrorism guarantees. This is intended to be just the first step toward a durable peace in Afghanistan. Next, intra-Afghan dialogues are planned to arrive at a political settlement and a permanent cessation of hostilities. Adding further complications is the upcoming presidential election—currently scheduled for September 28—with key actors disagreeing about the sequencing of the polls and the peace process. At this pivotal juncture, USIP is bringing together a panel of distinguished experts to discuss what a U.S.-Taliban agreement means for the possibility of peace in Afghanistan. Recent Taliban attacks have raised questions about whether the group is serious about a political settlement or are simply looking to be rid of foreign troops. Prospects for a sustainable, inclusive peace forged through compromise among Afghan stakeholders hang in the balance.
Nancy Lindborg, welcoming remarks President and CEO, United States Institute of Peace Ambassador
Roya Rahmani, opening remarks Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United States
Clare Lockhart, Director and co-founder, Institute for State Effectiveness Barnett Rubin Senior Fellow and Associate Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University
Michael Semple Visiting Professor, Queen’s University Belfast, Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice
Scott Worden, moderator, Director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, United States Institute of Peace
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Stevenson’s army, August 20
– An Australian think tank says China is strong enough to make surprise military moves.
-The Pentagon suggests China’s SCS buildup has peaked.
– US and Iraqi military and intelligence sources say ISIS is rebuilding.
– And it’s still miserably hot in DC. The Guardian is right to call the climate changes “global heating.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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