Tag: ISIS
Peace picks July 21-25
- ISIS, Iraq, and the Gulf States Monday, July 21 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1799 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND A panel discussion with Dr. Shireen Hunter of Georgetown University, Dr. Abbas Kadhim of SAIS, Ali Al-Ahmed of The Gulf Institute, and Kadhim Al-Waeli, an Iraq military analyst, concerning the present and future of ISIS in Iraq and the Gulf States.
- Tariq Fatemi on Pakistan’s Vision for Regional Peace, Prosperity, and Economic Development Monday, July 21 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1799 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The upcoming U.S. exit from Afghanistan, the radicalization across the region, and persisting political rivalries continue to impede South Asia’s growth and economic integration. However, the election of business-oriented leaders in most of South Asia provides reason to hope that the quest for prosperity will at last become the main driver of political relations across the region. Ambassador Tariq Fatemi, special assistant to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, will discuss Pakistan’s vision for regional economic integration and enduring peace and prosperity.
- Iran’s Nuclear Chess: Calculating America’s Moves Monday, July 21 | 12:00 pm – 1:15 pm Woodrow Wilson Center, Fifth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The P5+1 and Iran have been negotiating since last January under a six-month deadline to convert an interim nuclear accord into a final agreement. The discussion will address the outcome of the negotiations—whether successful in yielding an agreement, extended to allow further negotiations, or at a point of breakdown. What are the implications for U.S. policy toward Iran moving forward? The meeting will feature discussion of the new Middle East Program monograph by Robert Litwak, vice president for scholars and director of international security studies at the Wilson Center.
- Libya: Update from the Field Monday, July 21 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Atlantic Council; 1030 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Libya’s democratic promise is more precarious than ever. The government recently reached a deal with armed groups over the oil field blockade; however, a political struggle is taking on an increasingly violent dimension. Fadel Lamen, nonresident fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council, will discuss the status of Libya’s transitional processes, including the National Dialogue.
- Obama’s Foreign Policy and the Future of the Middle East Monday, July 21 | 2:00 pm – 4:30 pm Rayburn House Office Building; 45 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Middle East Policy Council will hold its 77th Capitol Hill Conference. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings, following talks by Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, Paul R. Pillar, Senior Fellow at Georgetown University, Amin Tarzi, Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, and Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
- The Impact of Ukraine in the Neighborhood Tuesday, July 22 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center, Sixth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine is having ripple effects throughout Eurasia. But what has been the impact in the immediate neighborhood, the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Belarus as well as Ukraine itself? John Herbst, Atlantic Council, Eric Rubin, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Thomas de Waal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Hon. Kenneth S. Yalowitz, Former U.S. Ambassador to Belarus and Georgia, will examine recent developments and prospects in each focusing first on the situation on the ground in Ukraine, the performance of the Poroshenko government, and the latest Russian moves.
- U.S. Policy Today for Africa Tomorrow Tuesday, July 22 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm US Institute of Peace; 2301 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Home to burgeoning economies and brutal civil conflicts – sometimes coexisting in the same country – Africa is increasingly prominent in the foreign policy agendas of world powers. In early August, President Obama will convene most of the heads of state of the 54 nations of Africa in Washington, D.C. for the first-ever summit between U.S. and African leaders. Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Ambassador Princeton Lyman, and Ambassador George Moose will discuss Africa’s economic growth and poverty, growing trade between the U.S. and Africa, and concerns about closing political space in some countries, among many other topics.
- Hearing: Terrorist March in Iraq: The U.S. Response Wednesday, July 23 | 10:00 am – 1:00 pm Rayburn House Office Building; 45 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, D.C. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs will have witness Mr. Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant for Iraq and Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
- Confronting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: Challenges and Options Thursday, July 24 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Auditorium; 1619 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at SAIS will host a discussion about combating the rising influence of ISIS. MEI scholars Richard A. Clarke, Steven Simon, and Randa Slim will examine the current status of the organization and its support network, focusing on the steps that Iraqi political actors and the U.S. administration can take to address the spread of its influence. Daniel Serwer (SAIS, MEI) will moderate the event.
- The Congressional Role in U.S. Military Innovation: Preparing the Pentagon for the Warfighting Regimes of Tomorrow Thursday, July 24 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Root Room; 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND While conventional wisdom holds that the U.S. Congress can be a hindrance to U.S. military planning and budgeting, history tells a different story. Rep. Forbes, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, and Rep. Langevin, ranking member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, will discuss the proper force structure and defense strategy for the U.S. military.
A leopard proud of his spots
Former Vice President Dick Cheney, his wife Lynne, and their daughter Liz spoke on Monday at the Mayflower Hotel at an event hosted by Politico. The event was interrupted several times by members of Code Pink, who shouted, “Dick Cheney is a war criminal!” as they were dragged out of the auditorium.
The Vice President was unrepentant about the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. It was the right idea then, he said, and “in retrospect, it is the right idea now.” He added that the threat we face today is even greater than the threat we faced before 9-11. There is something more dangerous than box-cutter wielding terrorists, and that is a terrorist armed with weapons of mass destruction. According to RAND, Cheney said, there has been a 58% increase in al Qaeda type groups since 2010. The Islamic State, for instance, has attracted thousands of adherents over the last few weeks.
Cheney, who would “not going to into what [Iraq] did or did not have” in terms of WMDs in 2003, said that the proliferation of these weapons continues to be the greatest threat to our national security. After we invaded Iraq, he noted, Gaddafi immediately relinquished his WMDs. America’s current isolationism has made the situation more dangerous than ever. Pakistan has between 50 and 100 nuclear weapons, which could easily fall into the hands of terrorists. Today, our number one threat is a terror organization that controls large swaths of territory, which could allow it to develop its own WMDs.
Cheney blamed much of the situation on President Obama. The President, he said, denies that a problem exists. He claimed in 2011 that al Qaeda was dead. That is not to say that al Qaeda wouldn’t otherwise exist, but his isolationism has “left our allies out to dry.” Cheney admitted that Obama is responding to general battle fatigue in the US, as many people are “tired of war.” “It has been a long time since 9/11,” he added. However, “we cannot conclude but that ISIS and other groups” pose a direct threat to the United States.
He named two chief culprits for the chaos in Iraq. The first is Maliki, who failed to maintain the coalition the US built. Maliki purged many of the best generals because they happened to be Sunni. The second is Obama, whose unwillingness to maintain a military presence in Iraq led directly to the current situation. He accused Obama of knowingly allowing the Status of Forces negotiations agreement to break down. By 2009, he claimed, the terrorists in Iraq had been defeated. We allowed them to come back.
He commended Secretary of State John Kerry on securing a recount for Afghan elections. However, many of our allies do not believe in our ability to influence events. Israelis and Saudis are closer to each other than either one is to the US.
While Cheney declined to endorse any presidential candidates, he said he was worried about the growing isolationist strain in the Republican Party. His daughter Liz said of Senator Rand Paul, who is currently eyeing the nomination in 2016, that his foreign policy agenda “leaves something to be desired.” The Vice President added, “Anyone who thinks we can retreat behind our oceans” is out of their minds.
In a 2009 speech, Rand Paul accused Cheney of invading Iraq to line Halliburton’s coffers. He said that Cheney initially opposed the invasion, “saying it would be a bad idea. And that’s why the first Bush didn’t go into Baghdad. Dick Cheney then goes to work for Halliburton. Makes hundreds of millions of dollars, their CEO. Next thing you know, he’s back in government and it’s a good idea to go into Iraq.” Cheney called these accusations “totally fallacious.”
After the event, a throng of Code Pink protesters greeted guests outsides the hotel. One demonstrator, donning prison stripes and a papier-mâché Cheney mask, shouted derisively, “I admit, I was a little short on my prediction when I told you that we would make a stable democracy in Iraq!”
Eleven years after America’s invasion of Iraq, much of the debate remains unchanged. A leopard, it seems, does not easily change its spots.
Help, or else
Things are not going well for Iraqi President Nouri al Maliki, whose calls for foreign assistance have grown increasingly frantic. While Iraqi Kurds agitate for an independent state, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) consolidates power in northern and western Iraq. At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Lukman Faily Tuesday tried to make a case for increased military assistance to Iraq. His argument came down to this: if you don’t help us, someone else will.
The Obama Administration is understandably reluctant to send weapons into what has become an increasingly sectarian conflict. However, the ambassador said that his country needs American assistance “to turn the tide against ISIS.” Until more robust US aid materializes, Iraq cannot decline offers of assistance from other countries, including Iran, Syria, and Russia. Iraq will not get involved in the Syrian conflict, but he said that Maliki “welcomes” Assad’s help. He added that Iran and Iraq have a shared history, and Iran considers many of Iraq’s Shi’a shrines as within their sphere of influence. “Their expertise is welcome.” The two will continue to cooperate as long they face a shared enemy.
He claimed that ISIS has been cleared in Tikrit, contradicting a number of media reports. The area remains heavily booby-trapped, however, and Iraq’s security forces cannot win with ground troops alone. Echoing Maliki’s earlier statements, Faily said that air supremacy is key to defeating these insurgents. A political solution must arrived in tandem with military force.
Faily, who is Kurdish, said that the Iraqi constitution was written to ensure Kurds are adequately represented, and 95% of Iraqi Kurds agreed to these provisions. While acknowledging Kurdish president Massoud Barzani’s aspirations for an independent state, he said that Kurds are still expected to play a role in shaping Iraq’s future. He left open the question of whether Kurds deserved their own independent state. Still, as long as ISIS controls the border between Iraq and the Kurdish region, it will be difficult for the two sides to cooperate against ISIS. His government welcomes Kurdish cooperation, but an independent Kurdish state is not feasible in the current political situation.
I asked the Ambassador if he would be willing to involve ex-Ba’athists, including those who have colluded with ISIS, in any future reconciliation process. He answered that no members of ISIS could be included, but that he welcomes any homegrown elements of the insurgency, as long as they have “not been involved in bloodshed.”
Time Magazine’s Michael Crowley asked the ambassador about an attack on the al Askari, or Golden Dome, mosque, one of the holiest shrines in Shi’a Islam. Al Qaeda destroyed the mosque in 2006, sparking a civil war that claimed thousands of lives. Faily admitted that the outer perimeter of the mosque had been hit, and several people were killed, but would not say if the shrine itself had been damaged. He added that ISIS had been evicted from Samarra, calling the attack a “hit and run” operation.
Faily also acknowledged that dozens of Sunni prisoners had been executed while in custody of Iraqi forces and Shi’a militias, and said the government “was looking into it.”
300,000 people were displaced when ISIS came into Mosul, and 120,000 in Tal Afar. These displaced people also threaten Iraq’s stability, and his government needs material support from the US to deal with them. Last week, he told US Secretary of State John Kerry, “We need your help now. Do not put conditions” on assistance to Iraq, because the threat is to immediate. He called this an “acid test” for the US-Iraq relationship.
Both the US and Iraq are “forever tied together because of the lives we lost and the treasure we spent in the past decade in the fight against terrorism.” ISIS is not only a threat to all Iraqis, but regionally and indeed internationally. If they are allowed to consolidate the gains they have made, ISIS will have a safe haven from which to launch attacks on American interests. And if America does not help, Russia, Syria, and Iran are more than happy to step in.
Merging battlefields
The past several weeks have revolved around the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) insurgency in Iraq and the likelihood of a future divided state. With these recent advances, many have overlooked what this ultimately will mean for President Assad and the ongoing civil war in Syria. On Tuesday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS-US) hosted “Syria After Geneva, the Elections, and ISIS: Partition, Fragmentation, and Escalation.” Author and IISS-US Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, Emile Hokayem, led the discussion and examined Assad’s presidency and the effective merger of the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields.
President Assad’s regime is in a better situation right now than it has been at any point since 2012. The pressure on Damascus is at its lowest in years, which has given Assad the opportunity to rebuild the pretense that Syria will again be a functioning state. The presidential election in June has provided the president with the chance to put pressure on urbanites and “fence-sitters” in order to support the pretense of “rebuilding Syria.”
Hokayem highlighted that Assad’s main strategy in reconstruction lies in the conquest of land rather than of people. It has become futile for him to spend precious time and resources in an attempt to win back the loyalty of people he has left to suffer for the past several years. His priority is to push recalcitrant citizens out of important territory instead of attempting to gain control over them. This approach shifts the burden onto the international community and human rights organizations to address a massive displacement crisis.
“This humanitarian problem is not an unfortunate outcome of the ongoing civil war,” Hokayem said. It is a deliberate strategy to debilitate the people and continue the conquest of land. This is a strategy, not an accident, and need to be addressed as such.
Meanwhile, ISIS has made momentous gains in neighboring Iraq. It has now gained control of nearly half of Iraq and has declared a state. ISIS has been successful at mobilizing local resources and support in an area that transcends national borders. We are now seeing the effective merger of western Iraq and eastern Syria .
It is not clear what effect the ISIS offensive will have on President Assad. Some argue that President Assad will benefit. The ISIS success validates the narrative that Assad has attempted to craft since 2011. Assad will be satisfied with the heated debate in the West as to how to address the recent ISIS gains.
Others believe that the ISIS offensive doesn’t help Assad at all. He has failed to get Westerners to share his narrative. Secretary of State Kerry has remarked that Assad cannot be the answer to fighting ISIS because he is a magnet for terrorism.
All eyes are currently on Iraq and whether or not the country will emerge from the ISIS insurgency in one piece. The Iraqi conflict cannot be viewed as an independent issue and must be observed alongside Syria’s instability and humanitarian crisis.
The Syrian conflict can no longer be contained. The Iraqi battlefield has now merged with the Syrian battlefield and ISIS must now be addressed in this context.
Ba’athists are running the ISIS show
For two weeks, stories of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) spectacular takeover of large swaths of territory in Iraq have captivated the world. In a matter of days, we are told, a few hundred members of an irregular militia managed to subdue an entire army and millions of Iraqi civilians. At a Freedom House discussion on Thursday, however, Iraqi pollster Munqith al Dagher offered an alternative narrative. The uprising, he suggested, is led by former Ba’athists, while ISIS fighters only play a supporting role.
Al Dagher, who is of mixed Sunni-Shia heritage, has conducted hundreds of thousands of interviews in Iraq since 2003. Thursday’s discussion was based on results a survey of 200 households in Mosul, carried out between June 19 and 21. The interviews, conducted by telephone and in person, included those who had connections to ISIS fighters.
Today, ISIS is said to control almost half of Iraq, including the entire Anbar province, and territory stretching from Nineveh to Diyala. Nonetheless, Al Dagher said, the evidence suggests that ISIS controls at most 20% of the allegedly captured territory. Their strength has been vastly exaggerated by a central government that wants to characterize its opponents as terrorists and rally international help. Bashar al Assad used the same strategy at the outset of Syria’s civil war, painting every rebel group with the same “terrorist” brush. Like Assad, Nouri al Maliki wants to portray his regime as a bulwark against religious extremism.
In fact, ex-Ba’athists are running the show. These men smoke, and some of them drink. They sit in cafes until late at night, allowing women to amble about unaccompanied. While parts of Mosul are under the sway of other factions (including Islamist groups like Ansar al Sunna, tribal rebels, and ISIS), the city is primarily under Ba’athist control. ISIS benefits from the perception that they singlehandedly defeated the entire Iraqi army. Disaffected Sunnis are joining in droves because ISIS has been cast as the victor. People like to play for the winning team.
According to the survey, 81% of the Sunnis polled support separating religion from the state, up from 60% in 2004. Sunnis were also the most likely to identify themselves as Iraqi, and not by sect. Two-thirds of all respondents cited religious extremism as a very significant problem, and both sects were equally concerned about proliferation of terrorist groups inside Iraq.
In fact, only 2% of Sunnis claimed to support ISIS, while 55% said they support the Iraqi security forces (support among Shia was at 96%). This begs the question: if a majority of Sunnis oppose terrorism and Islamic law, and almost none profess to support ISIS, then how were a handful of these fighters able to take half the country in a matter of days?
Going forward, Al Dagher said, a return to the status quo ante is untenable. The current crop of politicians, on both sides of the sectarian divide, has lost all legitimacy, and the US Administration should seek out new faces to engage with. Obama should also recognize that a failure to act at all would lead to disastrous consequences, allowing ISIS to consolidate and increase the momentum they’ve gained in the last few weeks.
While 77% of Sunnis believe Maliki should step down, he is not seen as the main driver of sectarianism in Iraq. Most believe that discrimination is embedded in the system, which was shaped by Coalition Provisional Authority’s de-Ba’athification policies in 2003. Nonetheless, most of the respondents said that only the US could play the role of “honest broker” in any future reconciliation process.
That said, US air strikes would only fuel ISIS’s propaganda machine, and boost recruitment. The only viable option, then, is to empower moderates on both sides. In 2007, General Petraeus recognized that the way to defeat al Qaeda was by cooperating with tribal leaders. The Obama administration should replicate this model, although it can only be sustained if moderate Shiites are also included.
It is difficult to know precisely what is going on in Iraq amidst the rising levels of sectarianism and enveloping chaos. Due to the survey’s relatively small size, the results should be taken with a grain of salt. Still, the conclusions are clear: Iraq’s Sunnis need a reason to fight ISIS, which is fighting the central government many Sunnis see their enemy. The answer is not to send Americans to fight on their behalf, but to enable the Sunnis to fight ISIS themselves. Iraqis will rise up to defeat ISIS when they believe their interests are served by ISIS’s defeat.
