Tag: ISIS
Pompeo pontificates
Secretary of State Pompeo took the occasion of his speech in Cairo today to assert what few in the Middle East believe: that the US is a force for good in the region. Offering little evidence for this assertion that would be convincing to anyone but Middle Eastern autocrats, he instead focused on criticizing the Obama Administration.
He criticized it for failing to respond adequately to Sunni extremism, to the Iranian crackdown on the Green Revolution, and to Bashar al Assad. He also praised President Trump for destroying the Islamic State (ignoring completely Obama’s role in that fight) and for bombing Syria when it used chemical weapons (to little effect). The message was clear: American foreign policy is going to be unfailingly partisan. No more non-partisanship at the water’s edge. That’s for sissies.
Iran, Pompeo suggested while vaunting his evangelical credentials, is evil. He reviewed the full array of US efforts to counter Tehran, ignoring US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its negative implications for relations with Europe and its impact on America’s credibility in future nonproliferation efforts. He ignored the lack of progress in getting Tehran to renegotiate the agreement, which is what he has been pleading for.
While acknowledging President Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria and underlining that Middle Eastern partners will need to do more, Pompeo reiterated America’s maximal demands without considering the means available. The US won’t provide assistance to Syria until Iran withdraws and a political transition is irreversible. He also challenged Hizbollah and Iranian dominance of Lebanon, promised to work for peace in Yemen, and pledged an agreement on Israel and Palestine.
As Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass put it,
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@SecPompeo articulated ambitious goals-to expel every last Iranian boot from Syria, to reduce Hizballah’s missile arsenal, to help build an Iraq free of Iranian influence-while backing reduced US presence in the Middle East. No policy can succeed with ends and means so divorced.
In concluding, Pompeo claimed that the US had never been an oppressor or empire-builder. That betrayed a serious lack of education on American history, especially in the Western Hemisphere, and insensitivity to how Washington is viewed in the Middle East, where US interventions are often viewed as imperial. Pompeo pledged allegiance to all the autocrats of the region except Iran’s and ignored even the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. How should Middle Easterners who want more open societies and freedom of expression feel about that?
The disgrace
A presidency that has known few happy days is at a nadir, though it may well go lower. Russia and Iran are celebrating the American withdrawal from Syria, which President Trump decided to please Turkey. Ankara will now attack the Kurds who allied themselves with the US to fight ISIS successfully. The President has consequently lost a universally respected Defense Secretary as well as a capable lead for the diplomatic campaign against ISIS.
The economy is shaky. The stock market is correcting and the Fed is raising rates. Recession before the 2020 election is increasingly likely. The trade wars with China and Europe continue with no end in sight, devastating American agriculture and some American manufacturing. The budget deficit is exploding due to an ill-conceived tax cut for the very wealthy. Trump hasn’t spent already appropriated funds for border security, but he is demanding more for an unnecessary and extraordinarily expensive wall on the Mexican border, partly closing down the government through Christmas.
This is a record of unparalleled chaos and failure, even without mentioning the new North Korean missile sites and the Iranian refusal to discuss either their missiles or Tehran’s regional power projection until Trump reverses his decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal. Pyongyang and Tehran represent serious threats to US interests that Trump has no strategy to counter.
Nor has he been any more effective in changing Russian behavior, which the Congress and his Administration continue to sanction without any admission by the President of Moscow’s wrongdoing. The “deal of the century” Trump promised on Palestine his negotiators have botched completely. America’s diplomacy and international reputation have rarely known worse, more incoherent and less effective, moments.
What can be done?
Little is the serious answer. Even when the Democrats take control of the House little more than a week from now, they will have no ability to fix 90% of what ails the country. Their main role will be oversight: making clear to the public what the real situation is through hearings and reports. Beyond that, they can refuse to sign on to stupidities like the border wall, but no legislation can pass the Senate without a good bit of Republican support, especially if overriding a veto will be necessary. The Democrats cannot force the US back into the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate change agreement, or the Trans Pacific Partnership, all of which held substantial advantages for the US.
Meanwhile, Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation has produced indictments, guilty pleas, and convictions of high-ranking Trump campaign and administration officials as well as Russian intelligence operatives. There is no longer even a slight doubt that Moscow campaigned in 2016 in favor of Donald Trump, likely tipping the balance in his favor in key Midwest states and Pennsylvania. Trump is obsessed with legitimacy, as well he should be. He is not a fairly elected president, even if we accept the inequities of the Electoral College. He is the product of blatant, widespread, and illegal foreign assistance. We need barely mention Trump’s own illegal campaign contributions as well as his criminal use of Trump Foundation resources.
I doubt though that we have reached bottom. Still to come are revelations about massive Russian and Saudi financing for Trump real estate, as well as indictments of his co-conspirators in stealing and publishing emails. Trump really hasn’t hidden these things, but a report from Mueller that details them will be more than interesting. It will raise questions about whether a felon should be sleeping and watching TV in the White House, where he does little else except brood. If his former National Security Adviser can go to prison for years, why can’t the President be indicted and tried?
The short answer is that the toadies he picks as Attorney General won’t allow it, claiming that Justice Department regulations they could change prohibit it. Trump can no longer, with a Democratic majority in the House, avoid impeachment, if the Mueller report suggests it. But in the Senate he still has not only a majority, but one that hesitates to criticize, never mind convict. Trump has humiliated Mitch McConnell and his cohort repeatedly, but the Senate Republicans remain steadfastly loyal. It is hard to picture how conviction would gain a 2/3 majority it needs in the upper chamber.
The only remedy for this shambolic and bozotic presidency is likely at the polls, less than two years hence. There are no guarantees, but Trump’s path to re-election is narrowing, especially if recession happens. The disgrace is in the White House, not in the country.
Iraqi trends
The Washington Institute on Near East Policy hosted a panel on emerging political trends in Iraq’s post-election period on November 27th. The panel featured Munqith Dagher, CEO of Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Ahmed Ali, program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy, and David Pollock, Berinstein Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of its Fikra Forum.
While many Americans are tired of Iraq, Pollock reminded that it is still of strategic importance to American interests, which include preventing the country from incubating terrorism and tipping the region in a hostile, pro-Iran direction. It is also a potential demographic, economic, and religious powerhouse in the region. Iraqi oil exports are half those of the Saudis. Because of the 2003 invasion, the success of Iraq reflects on America’s political clout in the region, with many people seeing Iraq as a US responsibility.
Pollock pointed out the importance of public opinion polling in Iraq, a powerful but underutilized tool. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and the divisions arising from Kurdistan’s 2017 independence referendum were in line with Dagher’s polling at the time. To avoid being taken by surprise in the post-election space, public opinion-informed policy is crucial.
Dagher stated that we are at a crossroads in Iraqi attitudes, with three transformative shifts in public opinion.
1. A shift in inter-sectarian dynamics
For the first time since 2003, Sunnis are overall happier than Shi’a and Kurds. More specifically, they have more trust in the central Iraqi government than their Shi’a counterparts, an increase from 20% in 2016 to 50% today. Sunni Arabs have been reluctant to participate in the political process since Saddam’s ousting, and Dagher emphasized that this moment should be capitalized on to get them involved in the political process.
2. From inter to intra-sectarian conflicts
Iraq has a long history of sectarian politics. We are finally seeing a shift towards interest-based politics. Sectarian identity as the most important source of identity has dropped to below 10% for all three groups. It was as high as 61% in 2013 among Kurds. Iraqi citizenship as the most important source of identity has increased significantly among Shi’a. While it is still very low for Kurds at 6%, there are so signs of further decrease. Across various polling questions, namely if Iraq is heading in the wrong direction, geography is playing a more important role than ever. For example, Sunni Arabs in Mosul are significantly more likely to believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction (69%) than Sunni Arabs in general (55%), as are the Shi’a Arabs of Basra than Shi’a at large.
3. Less international polarization
The ability of regional actors to take advantage of Iraq’s traditional sectarian divisions has also diminished. Iran’s popularity, when asked if it is a reliable partner, has dropped from 75% to 44% among Shi’a Arabs in the last two years alone. The most significant drop was between 2017 (70%) and today (44%), which Dagher attributed to the protests in Basra as well as the visible interference of both the US and Iran in the recent election. Access to information has increased as a result of growing internet use among Iraqis. It jas increased from 40% in 2014 to 80% today. Ninety per cent of Iraqi youth have at least one social media account. Among Sunni Arabs, favorable views of Saudi Arabia have decreased from 90% in 2012 to 61% today.
These trends are overshadowed by more alarming shifts under the surface. The population thinks the country is heading in the wrong direction more than ever, with 80% of respondents agreeing compared to 50% in April 2012. The most recent election has been marred by the fact that less than 1 in 5 respondents thought it free and fair. Dagher warned that lack of trust in the democratic political system might explain why 66% prefer a “strong leader who doesn’t care about Parliament nor elections,” accompanied by dramatic decreases in voter turnout. Ali attributed this legitimacy crisis to the gulf between politicians’ and the public’s views. He cited the Basra anti-corruption protests, which were predictable, and the lack of serious response from the Iraqi government.
For Ali, the big area for policy makers is post-ISIS reconstruction. Addressing grievances in post-ISIS regions and reunifying the country requires institutional governance reforms. Most importantly, the electoral process needs to be transparent and accountable to improve public trust, as demonstrated by post-election fraud allegations. The new Iraqi government has its work cut out for it.
Awry
President Trump’s first tweet of September 11 was this:
“We have found nothing to show collusion between President Trump & Russia, absolutely zero, but every day we get more documentation showing collusion between the FBI & DOJ, the Hillary campaign, foreign spies & Russians, incredible.”
@SaraCarterDC@LouDobbs
An hour later he tried to mend the mistake, retweeting a picture of himself signing a “Patriot Day” declaration with this profound insight about the occasion:
Then there was this from his arrival at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, for a 9/11 ceremony there:
The President cares not a hoot about 9/11 and its meaning for Americans.
That meaning has become grossly distorted in the 17 years since the Al Qaeda attacks. President Bush got it at least partly right in the immediate aftermath: Americans needed to unify and respond to the attacks but not go to war against Islam. He chose instead to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan, seeking to punish the Al Qaeda leadership holed up there.
But things then went awry. Osama bin Ladin and most of the Al Qaeda leadership escaped the American invasion. Bush turned his attention to Iraq, which had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda scattered to Yemen, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere, even as more extreme competitors, including the Islamic State, emerged there and elsewhere. The US has tried to kill as many of these extremists as possible, but there are now demonstrably more of them in more countries than in 2001. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost about 7000 American lives and several trillion dollars, but failed to reduce the numbers, the appeal, and the ferocity of Islamist extremism.
President Trump is determined to make things worse. He has barred immigration, including refugees (by definition people escaping a well-founded fear of persecution), from some Islamic countries. He has loosened restraints on the use of drones, raising the number of civilians killed, especially in Yemen. He is squeezing Palestinians mercilessly, denying them vital humanitarian assistance as well as political representation. He supports autocrats in the Muslim world and ignores human rights. He denounces Muslim extremists but not white Christian ones, who have killed many more Americans in terrorist acts since 9/11 than Muslims have. He even managed to hold an Iftar dinner to break the Ramadan fast with no American Muslims, only friendly Muslim diplomats. In both symbols and substance, this Administration is anti-Muslim.
No good can come of continuing in this direction. We need new ways forward that do not mistakenly declare war on a means, “terror,” rather than an enemy, which should be violent extremism. We need to recognize that Americans are not on most days in most places at risk. We need to stop doing things that multiply the numbers of extremists and the places where they find safe haven. We need to ensure that Muslims see the United States as friendly to their religion, even if hostile to extremism conducted in its name.
This president won’t be able or willing to change course. The only question is how much worse he will make things before a leadership change saves us from the tragic direction in which we are heading: towards still more extremists in more countries determined to attack America. 9/11 should not be an occasion for vaunting empty patriotism, but for assessing our situation soberly and looking for more effective means to ensure our national security.
Peace Picks September 10 -16
1. The War on Something-ism: 17 Years and Counting | Monday, September 10, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
The devastating toll of the September 11, 2001 attacks galvanized the global community to fight Islamic extremism and defeat al-Qaeda. What began in Afghanistan, continues in Iraq and Syria, in Yemen and the Horn of Africa, in Europe. 17 years on, the engagement dubbed “the never-ending war” continues, as religious extremism takes new forms and continues to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa, and continues in Southwest Asia.
The Trump Administration has expressed optimism that victory will be achieved once the remaining Islamic State (ISIS) strongholds are eliminated. However, the intelligence community already sees signs of new extremist groups cropping up in Iraq, ISIS emerging in Afghanistan, extremist strongholds in Syria. Pulling the U.S. out too early and declaring victory without a strategy to win will enable old extremist groups to re-establish their hold on the region and allow new groups to compete for territory.
Thomas Joscelyn, Speaker – Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Bill Roggio, Speaker – Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Michael Pregent, Speaker – Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Michael Doran, Speaker – Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Catherine Herrridge, Moderator – Chief Intelligence Correspondent, Fox News
2. Countering Disinformation: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Policymakers | Monday, September 10, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
With the growth of social media, disinformation has become an increasingly potent political tool. State and non-state actors from various countries, among them Russia and China, have become adept at manufacturing and spreading disinformation or using covert campaigns to influence public perception and political outcomes in democratic countries around the world. Responding to this threat requires policy makers to integrate insights from different countries and from academic fields that are too often siloed, including communications, computer science, and social psychology.
Speakers:
Joshua Eisenman – Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin
Jakub Janda – Director, European Values Think Tank (Prague)
Saiph Savage – Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Director, Human Computer Interaction Laboratory, West Virginia University
Tabea Wilke – Founder and CEO, Botswatch
Jeffrey Mankoff – Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS
The event will be webcast live from this page.
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction and Cooperative Threat Reduction: Looking Ahead | Tuesday, September 11, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from falling into the hands of a state or non-state adversary has been a critical priority for the U.S.
A report of a workshop conducted by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control examines how the U.S. government is managing the threat posed by WMDs through its Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs. As argued in “Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs for the Next Ten Years and Beyond,” the cooperative dimension of CTR programs has allowed the U.S. to collaborate with other governments, nongovernmental agencies, and the private sector to reduce WMD threats outside of the United States. However, as the report co-chairs assert, more can and should be done. By tailoring engagement and enhancing the impact of the CTR programs through for example, more government-industry collaborations and better cooperation with multilateral organizations, cooperative threat reduction can continue to improve the long-term security of the U.S. and its allies.
On September 11, Hudson will convene a panel with the co-chairs of the new report to discuss their assessments of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. Copies of the report will be available.
David R. Franz, Speaker – Board Member, Integrated Nano-Technologies
Elizabeth Turpen, Speaker – President, Octant Associates and Non-Resident Adjunct, Institute for Defense Analyses
Richard Weitz, Moderator – Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute
4. Beyond DPRK, History and Prospect of U.S. R.O.K. Nuclear Cooperation | Tuesday, September 11, 2018 | 4:30 pm – 6:00 pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Rome Auditorium, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Eunjung Lim is an Assistant Professor at College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University. Before joining Ritsumeikan’s faculty, she taught at Johns Hopkins SAIS (2013-2017). Her areas of specialization are South Korean and Japanese political economy, comparative and global governance, and energy security policies of East Asian countries. More specifically, Dr. Lim has been working on nuclear issues of East Asian countries.
She has been a researcher and visiting fellow at several institutes, including the Center for Contemporary Korean Studies at the University of Tokyo, the Institute of Japanese Studies at Seoul National University, the Institute of Japan Studies at Kookmin University, and Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. She earned a BA from the University of Tokyo, an MIA from Columbia University and a PhD from SAIS, Johns Hopkins University. She is fluent in Korean, Japanese and English.
5. Russia and Arctic Governance: Cooperation in Conflict | Wednesday, September 12, 2018 | 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm | Stimson Center | 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 8th Floor, Washington DC, 20036 | Register Here
Finland, the country currently chairing the Arctic Council, proposed a high-level Arctic summit during a recent bilateral meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin. While discussion of the summit and a broader suite of Arctic and environmental issues proceeded smoothly, Russian concerns and protests over a large upcoming NATO alliance exercise in Norway, in which Finland will participate, were also raised. All of the Arctic states, including Russia, have long sought to primarily present the circumpolar region as one of peace – and potential wealth. While the question of whether there will be more cooperation or more conflict in the Arctic is a popular and easy one to pose, the more productive question is how cooperation against the backdrop of other, more global tensions has long characterized and continues to shape Arctic governance development. So, how does Russia – the largest Arctic state – engage in the process of pursuing cooperative outcomes and a regional peace conducive to economic gains? How do such cooperative efforts play out against a backdrop of security rivalry between Russia and most of the Arctic states? How robust are circumpolar cooperative venues to worsened relationships between Russia and its partners? Are the solutions produced by the Arctic states so far dimensioned to the challenges facing the region? The Stimson Center discussion will seek to address these key questions as part of a seminar based on Elana Wilson Rowe’s recently published book Arctic Governance: Power in Cross-Border Cooperation (Manchester University Press in the UK/Oxford University Press in the USA).
ELANA WILSON ROWE, Research Professor, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Elana Wilson Rowe holds a PhD in Geography/Polar Studies from the University of Cambridge (2006). Her areas of expertise include international relations in the Arctic, science and expert knowledge in global governance, climate politics and Russian foreign and northern policy. She is the author of Russian Climate Politics: When Science Meets Policy (Palgrave, 2009) and Arctic Governance: Power in cross-border cooperation (Manchester University Press, 2018).
YUN SUN, Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson Center
Yun Sun is Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Sun’s expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations and China’s relations with neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes. From 2011 to early 2014, she was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, jointly appointed by the Foreign Policy Program and the Global Development Program, where she focused on Chinese national security decision-making processes and China-Africa relations. From 2008 to 2011, Sun was the China Analyst for the International Crisis Group based in Beijing, specializing on China’s foreign policy towards conflict countries and the developing world.
MARLENE LARUELLE, Research Professor, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University
Marlene Laruelle is a Research Professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She is the Director of the Central Asia Program at IERES and co-director of PONARS (Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia). She received her PhD from the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures. She has authored Russia’s Strategies in the Arctic and the Future of the Far North (M.E. Sharpe, 2013), and edited New Mobilities and Social Changes in Russia’s Arctic Regions (Routledge, 2016).
6. Election Interference: Emerging Norms of Digital Statecraft | Wednesday, September 12, 2018 | 4:00 pm | the Atlantic Council | 1030 15th Street Northwest, 12th Floor | Register Here
The reemergence of great power politics in a digitalized global security environment has led to new tools of statecraft wielded by nation-states in advancing their foreign policy objectives. During this event, we will engage cybersecurity professionals, journalists and key stakeholders to discuss the development of norms around election influence and interference and lessons learned from the international community’s brief history with these new tools of statecraft. What toolsets will governments wield in the future as they attempt to control media narratives, target dissidents, and influence other states? And how will the toolsets and norms we currently see in play shape the future of state use of technology?
This panel will look into the future of digital statecraft as technology progresses at an unprecedented rate and nation-states consider ways to wield these persuasive and cunning new tools to potent effect. With recent reports of foreign influence and interference in elections around the world calling public trust in institutions into question, it has become imperative that governments work together to establish norms around nation-state behavior across digital borders and have an informed dialogue about future toolsets for political influence. A reception will follow the event.
Ms. Laura Galante, speaker – Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council;
Founder, Galante Strategies
Mr. Sean Kanuck, speaker – Director, Cyber, Space and Future Conflict, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Ms. Michele Markoff, speaker – Deputy Coordinator for Cyber Issues, State Department
Ms. Klara Jordan, moderator – Director, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
7. Battling Global Extremism: What Next? | Thursday, September 13, 2018 | 8:30 am | Council on Foreign Relations
Nearly twenty years after 9/11, extremist ideologies have survived global counterterrorism efforts. What have we learned from the response, and what new approaches are needed? Tony Blair, Farah Pandith, and Frances Townsend discuss challenges in the global response to extremism to date and the evolution in approach necessary to overcome terrorist threats.
Tony Blair, speaker – Executive Chairman of the Institute for Global Change; Former Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Farah Pandith, speaker – Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Senior Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Frances Fragos Townsend, speaker – Executive Vice President, MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc.; Former Homeland Security Advisor, White House
Tom Gjelten, presider – Religion and Belief Correspondent, National Public Radio
8. With Us and Against Us: Counterterrorism Strategy Post-9/11 | Thursday, September 13, 2018 | 5:30 pm – 7:00 pm | American University SIS | Abramson Family Founders Room, 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20016 | Register Here
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush drew a line in the sand, saying, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” Join the School of International Service at American University as we discuss Dr. Stephen Tankel’s new book, With Us and Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror,and the future of counterterrorism operations in a post-9/11 world more widely in a conversation moderated by Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin.
Participants:
Bruce Hoffman is a Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W Davis Senior Visiting Fellow for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Hoffman previously held the Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation and was also Director of RAND’s Washington, D.C. Office. From 2001 to 2004, he served as RAND’s Vice President for External Affairs and in 2004 he also was Acting Director of RAND’s Center for Middle East Public Policy. Dr. Hoffman was appointed by the U.S. Congress in 2013 to serve as a commissioner on the Independent Commission to Review the FBI’s Post-9/11 Response to Terrorism and Radicalization, which concluded its work in March 2015.
Audrey Kurth Cronin is Professor of International Security at the School of International Service, and American University’s Founding Director of the Center for Security, Innovation and New Technology. She was previously founding Director of both the International Security Program and the Center for Security Policy Studies at George Mason University. Dr. Cronin has held a vareity of positions in government, including time as a Specialist in Terrorism at the Congressional Research Service, advising Members of Congress in the aftermath of 9/11. She has also served in the Executive branch, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Secretary of the Navy; and the American Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Cronin is the author of a forthcoming book on terrorism and new technologies, to be published by Oxford University Press in early 2019.
Matt Olsen is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Appointed by the President to serve as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Olsen led the government’s efforts to integrate and analyze terrorism information and coordinate counterterrorism operations from 2011 to 2104. Prior to joining NCTC, Olsen was the General Counsel for the National Security Agency, serving as NSA’s chief legal officer and focusing on surveillance law and cyber operations.
Stephen Tankel is an Associate Professor at the School of International Service and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. In his recent book, With Us and Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror, Dr. Tankel analyzes the factors that shape counterterrorism cooperation, examining the ways partner nations aid international efforts, as well as the ways they encumber and impede effective action. His recent work considers the changing nature of counterterrorism, exploring how counterterrorism efforts after 9/11 critically differ both from those that existed beforehand and from traditional alliances.
This is real news
We are all transfixed with the anonymous Times op/ed that told us nothing new and with the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing, but really the outcome there is clear: he will be confirmed, because he opposes the right to chose abortion, resists accountability for police and companies, and will vote against any attempt to subpeona this president. That’s why he was nominated, and that’s why the Republicans will confirm him.
The new news today is President Trump’s decision to keep US forces in Syria indefinitely, not only to prevent the resurgence of ISIS but also to counter Iran. This means, like it or not, that the US is committed to trying to stabilize the northeastern part of Syria that it controls with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by by Kurdish YPG fighters. And once it has stabilized the area it will need to reconstruct it, if conditions for withdrawal have not yet been created. We broke it and we own it, until there is a viable alternative that meets American requirements: no Iran, no ISIS.
This is classic mission creep, but that doesn’t mean it is necessarily bad. The options were these:
- Leave northeastern Syria to its fate and watch while our friendly Kurds patch things up with Damascus and go to war against NATO ally Turkey.
- Stay to deny Iran its land route to the Levant and negotiate for a political outcome in Damascus more acceptable than simple restoration of Assad’s dictatorship.
Staying entails putting US forces at risk. The current number, around 2000, will have to grow significantly to protect the stabilization and eventual reconstruction effort required to prevent the return of ISIS or some other extremist group. Staying also means trying to prevent the Kurds from attacking inside Turkey or providing assistance to their PKK compatriots there.
These are not small responsibilities. The reconstruction effort should come in part from UNDP, the World Bank , the Europeans, and the Gulf, but will in any event require a significant American contribution in dollars and personnel. Preventing the Kurds from attacking inside Turkey is partly a question of incentives: both the Turks and Kurds want the Americans to stay, so they should lay off each other. But a lot of fevered negotiation will be required to maintain the standoff, a model for which is already operating in Manbij.
Negotiation is also the key to the political outcome in Damascus. Assad is looking for total victory, assisted by Iran and Russia. But the US has some leverage if it stays in northeastern Syria. The area was Syria’s breadbasket before the war and it produced most of the country’s oil and gas. The oil is now being shipped in part to a regime-controlled refinery and fuels an electric generator serving Damascus. Assad needs the oil and gas fields back under his control, which means he and his allies may pressure the US militarily while trying to convince the Kurds that Damascus will give them a better deal.
Presidents Assad, Putin, and Rouhani agreed today to put off an assault on Idlib, giving Turkey some time to arrange withdrawal of Al Qaeda-linked extremists and thus avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe involving the 3 million civilians in the province. American pressure against the assault may have had some impact, but I suspect the Russians were hesitant to saddle their newfound Turkish friends a new influx of refugees. Best to keep Erdogan on side, in particular because he has promised to buy Russian air defenses. The Iranians and Assad will be disappointed, but they can hope Turkey will fail and the assault will only be postponed.
The new American commitment in northeastern Syria is likely to be long-term and big. The President owes the American people an honest explanation of why it is necessary and how it will be staffed and paid for. That isn’t likely to happen. Instead, Jim Jeffrey, Trump’s capable and well-informed new Syria envoy, made the announcement to a gaggle of reporters. No offense to Jim, whose experience in Turkey and Iraq make him an excellent choice for his new role, but that is not adequate for a policy change of this magnitude.