Tag: Israel
Stevenson’s army, March 11
– Chinese diplomacy secures Saudi-Iranian rapprochement.
– Some analyses.
– WSJ says China also winning in South China Sea.
– Lawfare piece sees mild congressional restraints on use of force.
– SAIS profs Barno & Bensahel analyze US military recruiting problems.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 10
– Alerted by FT’s John Thornhill, I want to share the UK Defence Ministry’s commissioned Sci-Fi stories to help think about future warfare.
– Lithuanian intelligence says Russia can fight two more years at current pace in Ukraine.
– NYT reveals what Saudis want from US in return for normalizing relations with Israel.
– There still aren’t many budget details for defense and foreign policy. Defense News has this summary.
– And Indopacom has leaked its wish list.
– Politico notes European differences over China.
– Max Boot confesses he has been wrong about foreign policy.
– WaPo earlier had interesting maps about US & Ukraine.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 7
– Atlantic cover story warns of extremist violence in US
– WSJ begins series arguing US isn’t ready for great power conflict.
– Chinese blast US — Xi himself; and the foreign minister.
– At Taipei request, McCarthy will meet Taiwanese leader in California.
–Dissent against Netanyahu in Israeli military.
– NYT magazine tells of Chinese spy operation.
– Lawfare has favorable review of new cybersecurity policy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Trump is history, Trumpism is not
Donald Trump has embarked on a massive campaign to monetize his presidency. It is not only the NFT playing cardsj. It is also Truth Social (his social media site that caters to right-wing white supremacy and other extremisms), the political funds he collects for challenging election results and supporting extemist candidates (but spends mostly on himself and his family), and the millions his Gulfie friends are loaning him and investing in his golf courses. Most of this will fail, like his much-vaunted steaks. But he’ll come out enriched, which is ultimately the only purpose he is serious about.
He needs the cash
He is going to need the money. His company has already been convicted of tax fraud. He faces more or less a dozen other investigations. Several of which seem close to bringing charges against him. Today the House committee investigating the January 6 attack on The Capitol will recommend that the Justice Department bring serious, unprecedented criminal charges against Trump. He is a cheapskate when it comes to hiring lawyers and stiffs many of them. But even two or three indictments will generate enormous legal bills. Not to mention the likelihood that his tax cheating will end with hundreds of millions in penalties.
No he won’t be president again
No, this man is not going to be President of the United States again. He has led his party into three losing elections: 2018, 2020, and 2022. What loyal GOPer would want to see a fourth? A large part of the Republican Party is already abandoning him, including Senate Minority Leader McConnell and lots of other members of Congress. Those who aren’t are mostly extremist flakes and committed thieves. Americans are looking for compromise, not further polarization. Serious money and media will steer clear. Florida Governor De Santis is already beating Trump in the polls. He won’t be the only serious contender.
But the alternatives are all tainted
But De Santis, Texas Governor Greg Abbott, Texas Senator Ted Cruz, former Vice President Mike Pence and others are all tainted with Trumpism. Of the top 10, the Washington Post lists only New Hampshire Governor Sununu as leaning hard against Trump. Whoever is nominated (it won’t be Sununu) will have to satisfy the Trump wing of the party. It will turn out for the primaries while many more moderate people stay home. The Trumpians want to block immigration, make voting more difficult, reduce constraints on police violence, cut taxes for the wealthy, ban abortion and gay marriage, challenge election results, and prevent the government from taking necessary public health measures.
American elections are not predictable
These are not positions the American public generally supports. But there is nevertheless no predicting the outcome of the 2024, any more than there was in 2022. There is a large part of the electorate that votes not on particular issues, but rather on the “direction” of the country. Concern about the future direction of American democracy gave the Democrats an edge this year, compared to what would normally be expected in a mid-term election with the economy in trouble, high inflation, and the President under 50% approval. Who knows how the economy and American democracy will be faring in 2024?
Some continuity in foreign policy
Does any of this make a difference to foreign policy, which after all is the main concern of peacefare.net? We don’t really know, though there are indications within the Republican Party that support for Ukraine, NATO, and especially the EU is soft, sympathy with Russia rampant, enthusiasm for Netanyahu’s Israel and Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia higher than in the Biden Administration, and hostility to Xi Jinping’s China marginally stronger.
That said, there has been a good deal of continuity in foreign policy between Trump and Biden, on Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and even China, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. It isn’t easy to pursue a pro-democracy foreign policy in the Middle East, or in China for that matter. Whether that signals a return to bipartisan foreign policy “at the water’s edge” is not yet clear. Trumpism will have to be thoroughly obliterated for that to happen. But it could happen.
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Stevenson’s army, November 7
Warning: election results may be a long time coming. RollCall notes that floor maneuvers could delay organizing the new House.
The polls are suspect this year [only 1% response rates lately] and quite close for Senate tossup seats. Nate Cohn is right to see 4 possibilities.
Reuters notes growing opposition to machines.
GOP lawsuits oppose mail-in ballots.
The Hill speculates on a GOP House and defense.
In other news: SAIS wins Space Force training role.
Lawfare compares Biden and Trump NSS
WaPo says administration has urged Zelensky to be open to peace talks.
Jake Sullivan has secret contacts with Russia.
Israeli elections could affect US defense relations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Iran enigma post-November 8
I am no expert on Iran. I’ve never even visited. But it is an important country that interests me. So let me review what I perceive of its current situation, subject of course to correction by those more knowledgeable.
Widespread protests
The protests are widespread. The initial impetus for the demonstrations was the death of a Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, whose hijab was supposedly not worn correctly. It allegedly did not cover all of her hair. She died after physical abuse in police custody.
This triggered the current wave of protests, which have retained a focus on women’s rights. But they also have a distinct political direction. Some are calling for an end to the Islamic Republic, with slogans that focus on the Supreme Leader (“down with the dictator!”).
The regime has responded with violence against the protesters, killing something like 250, arresting thousands, and injuring many more. Demonstrations and regime violence have been particularly intense in Iranian Kurdistan.
Iran’s economic situation is not a focus of the demonstrations, but it is certainly a contributing factor. Suffering from both international sanctions and internal mismanagement, many Iranians are impoverished while regime supporters thrive. The contrast is glaring.
Power projection
Even as it tussles with domestic unrest, the Islamic Republic is increasing its power projection abroad. Iran joined in OPEC+’s decision to maintain high oil prices as the world economy declines. It is helping Russia use Iranian drones in the Ukraine war and mobilizing forces on the border with Azerbaijan. Tehran has maintained support for Syrian President Assad and continued its assistance to the Houthis in Yemen.
The JCPOA is at risk
These are fairly low-cost operations in financial terms, but they are high-impact in political terms. They signal a growing alignment with Russia, which also wants to maintain oil prices, supports Assad, and favors Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. The EU, which has a mediating role at the nuclear talks, has imposed new sanctions on Iran because of its drone exports to Russia.
Iran’s current power projection also signals disinterest in renewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka Iran nuclear deal). The repression inside Iran and power projection in the region and Ukraine make it difficult for the Biden Administration to revive the JCPOA even after the November 8 election.
Failure to renew the JCPOA will leave Iran free to continue to enrich uranium to levels needed for nuclear weapons. It is already at the nuclear threshold. It could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Turkish President Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both stated that they will pursue nuclear weapons if more countries in the region do.
Uncertainties are unsettling
Some hope that the demonstrations will collapse the regime and lead to one that does not pursue nuclear weapons. But hope is not a policy. The relevant timeframe is short. Iran could have the material it needs for a nuclear weapon within 6 months if the JCPOA is not renewed. No one can be sure the demonstrators will succeed. Nor can we be sure the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will not dominate a successor regime. That could lead to an accelerated nuclear program.
If Iran does gain the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, it will likely want to maintain ambiguity about whether it has actually made them or intends to deploy them. This would mirror the Israeli stance, which has been successful in reducing awareness of its wepons and protests against its nuclear power status. But Iranian adoption of such an ambiguous stance would introduce one more uncertainty into the Middle East.
The Iran enigma
Iran presents a puzzling problem for Washington. Renewal of the JCPOA is certainly the best currently available answer to the nuclear issue. The demonstrations give some hope for internally-generated regime change. But even that would not guarantee a non-nuclear Iran. Meanwhile, the current regime’s commitment to power projection abroad and violent repression of the demonstrations makes JCPOA renewal difficult.
It will be interesting to see how the Biden Adminstration solves the Iran puzzle once the November 8 election is over.
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