Tag: Israel

Stevenson’s army, July 15

– The FT asks but doesn’t really answer whether Russia can prevail over Ukraine.

– I’m worried that time is more on Russia’s side — because the Italian PM just resigned because of disagreement in his coalition over help to Ukraine.

– NYT says Israeli security officials are divided over value of Iran nuclear deal.

– The House passed its NDAA. For a complete list of action on amendments scroll down to House section of the Daily Digest.

– NYT says US armed forces falling short in recruitment.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, July 14

But let’s avoid “Aux armes, citoyens,
Formez vos bataillons,

Marchons, marchons !”

– NYT says there is an emerging deal to allow Ukrainian grain exports.

– Economist has background on the grain shortage.

– NYT says Israel has been cooperating with Arab states to shoot down Iranian drones.

– FP says China is a loser in the Sri Lanka conflict.

– US & China trade blame in South China Sea incident.

– After classified briefing on semiconductors, suggestions that Congress may carve out a separate bill.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Reaching for the Heights, but failing

I enjoyed a discussion today at USIP prompted by Fred Hof’s Reaching for the Heights. The book treats Fred’s ultimately failed negotiation for peace between Israel and Syria. It would have returned the Golan Heights (and more) to Syria in exchange for Syria’s strategic reorientation away from Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas. Chet Crocker presided. Barbara Bodine and Bernie Aronson provided perspective on Yemen and (mostly) Colombia. My assignment was the Balkans. Here are the talking points I prepared, but used only in part:

  • First: compliments to Fred for this forthright, interesting, and well-written account of an important but failed negotiation. We need to understand what makes things go wrong, even when so much has been done to make them go right.
  • My role here is to comment on how Fred’s experience compares and contrasts with that in the Balkans. I am struck in the first instance by the stark differences.
Stark contrasts
  • Both the Bosnia and Kosovo outcomes happened in the unipolar moment when the U.S. could do pretty much whatever it wanted, at least when it came to countries with a few million inhabitants. Working after America was weakened in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fred dealt with a potent ally and a substantial adversary, backed by Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas.
  • Richard Holbrooke in the 1990s wielded all the levers of American power—not only diplomatic but also political, military, and economic. Fred at no time had all the levers of American power in his hands: his role was diplomatic and vaguely economic, not military or even political.
  • Holbrooke’s objective in Bosnia was to end a war both sides were tired of fighting. Fred was trying to do something harde. After a long but not very hurting stalemate, entice Syria to reorient itself strategically, cutting ties with Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas that had helped the Assads survive in power for four decades. He was also trying to get Israel to give up attractive real estate on which it had settled tens of thousands of citizens.
  • Other contrasts: the soft-spoken, detail-oriented, and considerate George Mitchell and Dennis Ross vs. the bold, egotistical, and bombastic Holbrooke, the zero-sum territorial equation in the Middle East vs. the identity-focused Bosnian conflict and the sovereignty-focused Kosovo one, the static stance of the Middle Eastern protagonists vs. the rapidly changing situations on the ground in the Balkans, the deep knowledge of Syria that Fred brought to the challenge vs. Holbrooke’s comparatively superficial grasp of the Balkans.
Parallels: the negotiating framework
  • But there are also some enduring parallels. Most important is that negotiations need a mutually agreed framework. Holbrooke achieved this in a series of meetings leading up to Dayton that defined basic parameters: one country, two entities, mutual diplomatic recognition, return of DPs and refugees, a powerful international intervention.
  • Fred achieved it by building on a framework that John Kerry initiated. Holbrooke likewise often used Congressional pressure from both sides of the aisle to good advantage in the Balkans. State Department officers often complain about Congress but woe to the American diplomat who hasn’t learned to use Congressional clout with foreign governments!
Parallels: key US roles
  • The agreed frameworks in both the Balkans and the Syria/Israel negotiation were vulnerable to mutual mistrust and to domestic politics. The U.S. as guarantor was vital in both. Washington needed to be ready to play a major role not only in the negotiations but also in the implementation of any agreement.
  • In Bosnia, Holbrooke delivered America’s friend, Izetbegovic, to an unsatisfactory agreement. Only the side-agreement equipping and training Bosnian forces made that possible. The side-letter between Israel and the U.S. would have played a similar role in the Syria negotiation, but delivering Israel was certainly a heavier lift.
  • Fred notes the importance of “top cover,” protection from those in your own government who might have ideas of their own or not like yours. Holbrooke frightened off potential meddlers. That is different from the protection rooted in respect that Dennis Ross provided to Fred, but the effect was similar. Without top cover, no American negotiator can survive. It seems half an international negotiation is always with Washington.
  • Relief from sanctions played a key role in the Balkans, as it would have had to do also vis-à-vis Syria. Lifting sanctions is at least as important as imposing them if you want to get results.
Failure is always an option
  • It was Bashar’s violent crackdown on the demonstrators that made lifting sanctions impossible for Washington. Milosevic’s violent repression of the Kosovo rebellion did likewise in the Balkans. We shouldn’t expect autocrats to behave differently when challenged domestically. .
  • One concluding thought, admittedly beyond my remit.
  • Fred hasn’t entirely convinced me, or himself, that Bashar would have been able to reorient Syria in the Western direction, even if he regained every inch of territory he sought. The Iranians and Hezbollah would have made Assad’s life—and maybe his death—very difficult if he tried. Nor am I, or Fred, convinced that Bibi was prepared to give up the Golan Heights.
  • Such re-orientations more often come before international agreements, not because of them. That is what happened with Sadat’s Egypt. That also happened throughout Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and with Ukraine, though of course in Ukraine we haven’t yet seen whatever international settlement will emerge.
  • My reservations about Fred’s assessment of the situation only increase my admiration for what he tried to do. Negotiations are never a sure thing. The Dayton agreements were completed in penalty time. Kosovo was settled only after a negotiation failure at Rambouillet.
Courage merits admiration
  • Fred faults himself in the end for failing to convince American policymakers of the contribution a Syria/Israel peace agreement would have made to U.S. national interests and to a more comprehensive Israel/Arab peace.
  • My bottom line is different. Fred Hof is a courageous man who tried to do the right thing on the issue entrusted to him. This book enables his substantial successes and his ultimate failure to educate those who come next. I am grateful for the book and admire the courage.
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No sword dancing on treacherous terrain

President Biden’s op/ed in the Washington Post previews his visit next week to the Middle East. He will stop in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Jeddah (for a regional Arab meeting), and Riyadh. The piece has two audiences: the domestic one and the international one, especially in the Middle East but also in Europe and the Far East.

What the Americans want

There are four salient issues for Biden’s domestic audience: the Iran nuclear deal, support for Israel, oil prices, and human rights. America is split on the Iran nuclear deal. Half support Biden’s desire to re-enter it. The other half want to continue the so far unsuccessful effort to sanction Iran into submission, with the possibility of military action if that fails. On support for Israel’s security, there is overwhelming support. But Americans increasingly want accountability for Israeli abuses against Palestinians. Biden avoids that subject in the op/ed.

Most Americans want lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to increase production, partly in retaliation for Biden’s criticism of human rights practices in the Kingdom, particularly the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. That is not a dinnertime conversation topic in the US. But there are many informed voices calling for accountability beyond the minimum the Saudis have so far done.

What the world wants: nuclear deal and Iran’s regional power projection

The rest of the world has a somewhat different set of priorities: not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its regional power projection as well as oil prices. Beyond the US, there is little concern for Israel’s security or human rights, apart from the plight of the Palestinians.

Most of the world would like to see the Iran nuclear deal operating once again. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not, despite the risks to them of war if Israel or the US seeks to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. Biden should be aiming to understand their perspective better. My guess is they would be fine with re-entry into nuclear deal provided the US pushes back harder on Iran’s regional power projection.

That could mean doing more to weaken the Houthis in Yemen. It could also mean reducing Iran’s presence in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies are major players. Strengthening the nascent regional air defense system (see video above) or even Saudi entry into the Ibrahimic accords are other possibilities.

What the world wants: oil prices and Palestinians

On oil prices, the Saudis may seek some assurances on the downside while the Americans push for increased production. Europe and the Far East will wish the Americans success. Russia, Iran, Iraq, and other major producers will want prices to remain above $100 per barrel. That is what they all need to balance their budgets. No American president can promise sustained high oil prices. But the US is now a net oil and gas exporter. A nod to stability in the oil market is not out of the question.

While Biden will visit the West Bank, he has so far done little more than restore aid to the Palestinians President Trump had zeroed out. The op/ed fails to mention the two-state solution or Israeli responsibility for human rights abuses against Palestinians. It doesn’t even mention the rumored intention to re-open the US consulate in Jerusalem. That had acted for decades before Trump as a de facto embassy to Palestine. We can only hope Biden will be more forthcoming on those issues during his trip.

Treacherous terrain

The Middle East is treacherous terrain for any American president. Trump blundered by sword dancing with the Saudis, both literally and figuratively. He also wrote the Israelis a blank check (including for their territorial ambitions) and ended support for the Palestinians. Biden won’t commit those mistakes. He will try to build on the Ibrahimic accords that Trump initiated, strengthen and unify Arab defenses against Iran, and reach some sort of accommodation on oil production and prices. Odds are the trip will not be a brilliant success, but the ambitions are at least more realistic than his predecessor’s.

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Iran is already at the nuclear threshold

This video is more than a year old:

From April 2021

Iran, which is now enriching uranium to at least 60%, is already a nuclear threshold state. There are no difficult technical obstacles that remain before enriching to weapons-grade material. Moving beyond that to fabricating a nuclear device is more difficult, but certainly not beyond Iranian capability. The question is: what difference does this make? The answer to that question depends on who you are. Israel, other regional states, the European Union, and the United States have distinct answers.

Israel apparently doesn’t care

Iran is significantly closer to nuclear weapons than when President Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). This is in part because Israel urged the US to back out of the JCPOA and has done its best to prevent the US from re-entering it. The Israelis have preferred their own approach, which involves assassinations and attacks on nuclear infrastructure. But given the outcome so far, it appears they don’t care how much weapons-grade uranium the Iranians accumulate.

Why are the Israelis behaving this way? Is it because they are supremely confident of their ability to prevent weaponization of enriched uranium? Is it because their second-strike capability (from submarines) is thought to be a sufficient deterrent to an Iranian nuclear attack? Or is it because the Israelis believe American guarantees that Iran will never get nuclear weapons?

Whatever the reason, it is clear that Israel doesn’t really care about Iran accumulating weapons-grade uranium.

The region does, but what are they doing about it?

Major states in the region do care. Both Turkish President Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have said, more or less explicitly, that they will not be left wanting if Iran gets nuclear weapons. This is not how they have reacted to Israeli nuclear weapons, about which they complain readily but apparently do little. Neither country has used the decades since Israel became a nuclear power to mount serious nuclear weapons programs of their own, so far as is known. Instead, they have pleaded for a regional nuclear-free zone, which they know the Israelis won’t agree to.

Their reaction to Iran is rhetorically different. Riyadh and Ankara appear to see Iranian nuclear weapons as a threat to the regional power balance, one they need to counter. There are however still big questions about intentions and capability. Were Erdogan and MBS serious, or just rhetorical? Turkey has American nuclear weapons on its territory. Would Ankara risk losing those if it decides to go nuclear on its own? Does Turkey have the nuclear and high-explosive expertise required to enrich uranium or extract plutonium, as well as design a working nuclear weapon? Does Saudi Arabia? Has either obtained the needed materials, technology, and even weapons from Pakistan?

Egypt has been more circumspect than Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It has lived with Israeli nuclear weapons on its border for decades, apparently confident they won’t be used against a neighbor who has made peace, even if a cold one. American influence in Cairo is far greater than in Riyadh and Ankara, which is likely another factor in Egyptian reluctance to move in the direction of nuclear weapons.

Europe cares, but not in the same way as the United States and Russia

The European Union has exhausted itself in nuclear negotiations with Iran. This is not because of any threat to Europe from Iranian nuclear weapons. Most European states would like to normalize relations with Tehran. The unresolved nuclear issue makes that impossible. Hence the diplomatic efforts, first to negotiate the 2015 JCPOA and, after Trump left office, to revive it.

For the United States and Russia, the concern is nuclear proliferation, or to put it another way maintenance of their exclusive status as global nuclear powers. Both were unhappy with India and Pakistan getting nuclear weapons, but neither Delhi nor Islamabad has challenged the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the Perm 5), all of which are nuclear states. Instead they have accepted the subcontinent nuclear balance and avoided nuclear contests beyond South Asia. This is true even though India views its nuclear weapons as necessary to balance China more than Pakistan. But nuclear balance has not been a factor in outstanding border disputes between New Delhi and Beijing.

The Middle East is not South Asia

It is harder to picture easy adjustment to Iranian nuclear weapons in the Middle East, especially if the Turks and Saudis follow suit. In a Middle East with four nuclear powers, or even five if Egypt joins the party and six if you count Pakistan, a stable balance will be far more difficult to achieve than between two parties like Pakistan and India. A nuclear arms race in a region with few stabilizing institutions and lots of destabilizing conflicts will be extraordinarily difficult to contain.

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Stevenson’s army, June 10

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6ka4TFgGAM&ab_channel=ABCNews

How many wars are in involved in today?  Fifteen plus, according to the latest war powers report to Congress. The uncertainty comes because the report says” approximately 90,000 United States Armed Forces personnel are deployed to North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries in Europe” without naming the countries. The conflicts are basically the same as in recent reports: Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Niger, Cuba [at Guantanamo], Philippines, Egypt, and Kosovo plus NATO. The law requires reporting of places where troops equipped for combat are deployed; there does not have to be active combat.

FP, citing an unnamed “senior defense official” on Gen. Milley’s plane to Singapore, says the US wants more hotlines with China to prevent miscalculations.

WSJ says Ukrainian forces are being outgunned.

Nicaragua welcomes Russian troops.

Writer in Foreign Affairs says China is “using the global South to constrain America.

WSJ says US is trying to get Israel and Saudi Arabia to work together on air defenses against Iran.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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