Tag: Israel
Stevenson’s army, April 9 and 10
April 10:
Reading about the Russian law limiting what can be said about the conflict in Ukraine, I remembered that America’s record has blemishes, despite the first amendment. Read Geoffrey Stone’s Perilous Times. And look at the Sedition Law of 1918.
– In preparation for our discussion of the media in week 11, think about the NYTimes’ announcement by Executive Editor Dean Baquet this week limiting its reporters’ use of Twitter, discussed at CJR. In the memo, Baquet said that while Twitter can play a “helpful role,” particularly when it comes to “highlighting the concerns of underrepresented groups,” it has also had deleterious effects on the Times, its work, and its staff in four main ways, with journalists over-relying on Twitter echo chambers in their reporting, worrying too much about feedback from other users, damaging the paper’s reputation (and their own) with “off-the-cuff responses,” and suffering there from harassment and attacks.
– Also worth your time is Ezra Klein’s interview about Ukraine with Fiona Hill. [I’m linking the transcript; it’s from a podcast]
-WSJ reports on Israel’s 4-year air war across the Middle East.
April 9:
I’m concerned that many Americans are taking an overly narrow and naively optimistic view of the Ukraine war. Our media coverage comes mostly from the Ukraine side; we see the war as they do, brutal but with bravery. We’re understandably sympathetic to that side. But…remember that support for Ukraine is limited and perishable. Outside of Europe, governments are indifferent or even hostile [that is, pro-Russian]. Why? Because it’s in their interests.
Josh Rogin is mad at Israel. But already, disruptions in Ukrainian food supplies is already hurting people across the globe.
Even in Europe, Hungary’s pro-Putin Orban easily won reelection. And Marine Le Pen might become president of France. Remember that NATO requires unanimity for big decisions.
Even in America, nearly 1/3 of House Republicans opposed a mere sense of Congress resolution supporting NATO. And the current consensus is that Democrats will lose massively in the midterm elections.Trust in government is higher in Russia than US.
Can the current support for Ukraine continue in Germany, America, and elsewhere until the fall? Into next year?
Problems to be overcome: Shortage of 152 mm artillery. A new Russian general with Syria experience. Chinese expansion of its nuclear arsenal.
Meanwhile, take heart from this analysis of how Kyiv prevailed.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 24
– Remembering Madeleine Albright, first female secretary of state, whom I first knew when she worked for Sen. Muskie and on whose Policy Planning Staff I was privileged to serve.
– NYT says NSC set up Tiger Team to game responses to Ukraine.
– Politico details arms from many countries to Ukraine.
– Bill Arkin explains Russian air operations in Ukraine.
– Task & Purpose says CIA agents were in Iraq before US invasion.
– Paul PIllar says Revolutionary Guard doesn’t belong on terrorist list.
– AIPAC supports election deniers.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 17
– FT reports 15 point draft peace plan for Ukraine war.
– NYT reports morale & other problems for Russian troops.
– NYT also reports Russian battle losses.
– WSJ reports Ukrainian counteroffensives.
– In best battle report of the war I’ve seen, WSJ tells about the battle for Voznesensk.
– British RUSI analyzes war.
In other news, poll finds US still pro-Israel.
– Axios says US may drop terrorist label for Revolutionary Guard as part of renewed Iran deal.
– CJR has report on Moldova, one of our upcoming exercises in class.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Ukraine and Iran will make Syria harder
Ukraine may seem far from Syria. But it is not. Nor is Iran. What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine. What happens in Iran as well as Ukraine will affect the now more than decade-old war in Syria, through geography, markets, diplomacy, and politics.
The fighting and sanctions will hamper Russia in Syria
The Russians have been fighting insurgency in Syria since 2015, primarily with air power but also with some troops on the ground. The effort is not large, but Ukraine will take priority. Sanctions will severely limit Russian financial resources. This could affect not only military resources but also willingness to invest in reconstruction. The state-owned companies that might take such a risk are not going to have the cash to do it.
In addition, Russian relations with Turkey, the US, and possibly Israel will be strained. Cooperation with Turkey is important in northwest Syria, where Turkish troops and proxies are in control. Cooperation is important with the US in northeast Syria, where American troops are supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel depends on Russian restraint when its aircraft attack Iranian forces and shipments inside Syria.
Moscow will have little reason to segregate the diplomatic and deconfliction issues in Syria from Ukraine. A weakened Russia may well seek pressure points in Syria to respond to international pressure in Ukraine.
Iran will be emboldened
Russia and Iran both support the Assad regime in Syria, but they also compete for influence there. Assuming the Iran nuclear deal revives, Tehran will have a lot more money with oil at around $100/barrel. Some portion of that will find its way to military and financial support for Assad. Even if the JCPOA remains moribund, Iran will find itself strengthened in Syria relative to Russia. It will try to use that strength to embed itself more strongly into the Syrian regime, in particular its security forces (which have grown closer to Russia in recent years).
An emboldened Iran will be less likely to compromise on Syria issues than a weakened Russia, but Moscow has the vital veto in the UN Security Council. Tehran might be even more inclined than Russia to shut off vital cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but in the end Moscow will decide.
The West’s stake in Syria will increase
The Ukraine war increases the West’s stake in Syria. Abandoning its anti-regime fight there would raise serious doubts about American and European resolve to continue support for Ukraine. Credibility isn’t everything, but it is something. The Biden administration had already tacitly recommitted the US to its continuing presence in northeast Syria supporting the Kurds and allied Arabs, if only to avoid a second Afghanistan debacle and to continue the counter-terrorism fight.
Net net
Syria has not been going anywhere anyway. The UN-sponsored constitutional talks are stalled, humanitarian relief is falling short, terrorism threats are growing, and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is limited for now to gathering of documentation and the German courts. Russian weakness, Iranian strength, and Western resolve are going to make things harder, not easier.
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Stevenson’s army, February 28
– David Frum explains the economic problems Russia faces.
– NYT notes Germany’s pivot.
– NYT explains Israel’s balancing act.
– WaPo notes Russian military problems.
– WSJ says Putin manifesto was required reading in Moscow last summer.
– Tears on K Street.for Russia’s lobbyists.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine
Here are the speaking notes I prepared on the Balkans and Middle East for this noon’s event on “What’s Next for Russia, Ukraine, and the World?” It featured Johns Hopkins/SAIS faculty:
Balkans
- American policy since the end of the Cold War has aimed at “Europe whole and free.” That isn’t going to happen so long as Putin or someone of his ilk rules Russia.
- Serbia claims neutrality, but its current leadership advocates a “Serbian world” akin to Putin’s “Russian world.” Belgrade also refuses to sanction Moscow. De facto Serbia is siding with Russia.
- That puts Bosnia, Kosovo, and NATO member Montenegro at risk from Serb irredentism.
- The line between democracies and autocracies will therefore also be drawn through the Balkans unless Belgrade changes its inclinations.
Countering Russian ambitions and Moscow’s Serb proxies needs higher priority:
- Deployment of an additional 500 EU troops to Bosnia is a good first step. But more are needed. The UK should augment that deployment. The US should beef up the military presence in Brcko and move some troops to northern Kosovo .
- The EU should tell Serbia that continued adherence to neutrality in Ukraine will result in a halt to the EU accession process.
- The US, UK, and EU should end bilateral and multilateral assistance to Republika Srpska and threaten likewise to Serbia.
Middle East
In the Middle East, the situation is more ambiguous. The interests at stake are less compelling and US policy more accepting of autocracy:
- Syria backs Russia and Iran is attempting the Chinese straddle (for peace but against Ukrainian membership in NATO). Egypt, the UAE, and other small Gulf monarchies are ducking for cover. Saudi Arabia so far has decided to enjoy high oil prices.
- Israel has backed Ukraine, but cautiously to avoid Russian retaliation against its interests in Syria and domestic political complications. Turkey has also backed Ukraine, less cautiously.
- Ultimately, the Middle East will go with the flow. If Russia is successful, no one in the Middle East will refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with a puppet government in Kyiv.
- OPEC+ will gain traction and Russian inroads in the Middle East will expand.
- But if Russia fails, the Middle East countries, democracies and autocracies alike, will claim they supported Ukraine, even if OPEC+ suffers irreparable damage.
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