Tag: Israel
Bolton and Trump unleashed
John Bolton and Donald Trump were always an odd couple: the one a consistent hawkish interventionist and bureaucratic operator in mustachioed professorial guise, the other an erratic big-talking little-stick narcissistic braggart. They found common cause on withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) maximum pressure against Iran, thus trading the 10-year delay in Tehran’s ability to build a nuclear weapons for less than one year, but as soon as the President started looking for negotiated settlements with Tehran, Pyongyang, and the Taliban, Bolton resorted to undermining Trump’s efforts. Ironically, Bolton was fired only a few days after he won his battle against the Afghanistan agreement.
Zal Khalilzad was trying to do the right thing: exchange the withdrawal of US troops Trump wants before the November 2020 election in exchange for Taliban promises
a) to negotiate a political settlement with the Kabul government and
b) not to harbor international terrorists.
The reported deal involved withdrawal only to the number of Americans in Afghanistan at the end of the Obama Administration, and the Taliban promises would have been hard to enforce. But it was a start.
Bolton didn’t want the withdrawal at all. But that’s not what blew up the agreement. It was Trump: he apparently decided he wanted a meeting with the Taliban at Camp David, with the president himself trying for a better deal in the role of closer. This was a terrible idea, in particular a few days before 9/11. The Taliban however never agreed to come to the US, so Trump cancelled the non-existent meeting, supposedly because of the death of an American soldier. That isn’t credible, since more than a dozen Americans died during Zal’s negotiations without any dramatic American reaction. Negotiating in the absence of a ceasefire is always a dubious proposition.
Poor Zal is left holding the bag. We’ll know when he abandons hope: he’ll resign. In the meanwhile, Afghan President Ghani, who is competing in a presidential election September 27, is breathing a sigh of relief–he wants the US troops to stay–and Bolton has the satisfaction of watching the US re-escalate the air war, even as he looks for a tell-all book deal and a cushy spot in the private sector. Unleashed, he will also no doubt become a cheer leader for military action against Iran and support for Israel’s annexations.
The President is also unleashed. He is desperate for some sort of international triumph before the election only 14 months hence. The Chinese are holding their own in the tariff war, the Middle East “deal of the century” has evaporated, the North Koreans are thumbing their noses, and Iran is demanding sanctions relief in exchange for deigning to talk with Washington. Trump is left with little alternative in Afghanistan but escalation and unilateral withdrawal, unless Zal succeeds in putting Humpty Dumpty back together again.
Everyone wants to know how US foreign policy will change as a result of Bolton’s firing. I focus mainly on the Balkans and the Middle East. On the latter, it is clear enough that Trump will back the Jewish state to the hilt, no matter who the next national security adviser is. He will also likely try to complete the US withdrawal from Syria, over Pentagon objections. He’ll continue to support the war in Yemen, unless the UAE and Saudi Arabia fall out so catastrophically that there is nothing left to support.
The Balkans is a bit harder to predict, as the Administration has been less than clear about its approach. Bolton was open to a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo that would have destabilized the entire region, likely killing two Clinton birds with one stone: rump Kosovo might have become the eastern province of Albania and Bosnia might have descended into chaos as Republika Srpska tried to secede. But there is no guarantee Bolton’s successor won’t take a similar approach. Ethnonationalists of a feather flock together. An American serving a white nationalist president is always going to give Balkan nationalists a hearing.
Here is the podcast I did with Mark Goldberg shortly after writing this piece.
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Stevenson’s army, September 6
In most administrations, the National Security Adviser, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense speak to each other often — in weekly breakfasts and/or lunches, by phone perhaps daily, and of course in White House meetings. CNN reports that relations between John Bolton and Mike Pompeo are so bad that they have gone weeks without speaking to each other outside of formal WH meetings. CNN also says that acting chief of staff Mulvaney has installed his own foreign policy team. Historically, there have been some strong rivalries among these officials, but they still consulted frequently on many issues. This is a dangerous situation if their personal conflicts prevent the Government from doing its basic security job.
Alice Hunt Friend of CSIS says that the border wall funding raid politicizes military spending in unfortunate ways. [I think the reprogramming is politically stupid and unjustified, but I actually think DOD under the circumstances made reasonable choices on where to take the money — mostly from activities that contractually and logistically were less urgent. They could have done it in even worse ways, such as taking the money only from Democratic districts or overseas.]
Americanized Brit Andrew Sullivan thinks Boris Johnson can pull it off.
At FP, another writer thinks Netanyahu maybe can’t, even if Likud wins the election Sept 17.
CSIS has papers on some of the splits between SASC and HASC in their NDAA bills, which they hope to reconcile before October 1. Here’s their paper on the space force.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, September 4
– NYT has long article on the US-Israeli conflict over attacking Iran.
– Politico has a neat graphic on the trade wars.
-State admits political reprisals.
– Lawmakers angry over mil con funds shifted to border wall and delays in releasing military aid to Ukraine.
My long Labor Day weekend in Atlanta made me miss a couple of other editions of Stevenson’s army, so here they are:
September 3
– NYT says North Korean missile tests show much improved capabilities, which Trump minimizes. Even SecState Pompeo said to believe DPRK is just stringing US along.
– NYT also says sharp disagreement inside administration over future CIA role in Afghanistan.
– Media have more details about US-Taliban agreement.
– Hill has long potential agenda this month.
– Xi tells Duterte that China rejects international court ruling on South China Sea.
– Iraq imposes new ROEs for US air operations.
September 1
Today marks the 80th anniversary of the start of World War II in Europe — Hitler’s attack on Poland.
It also marks a new round of US tariffs on Chinese goods. NYT has a summary of the where the trade war stands.
WaPo has an interesting story of how the Russians tried to interfere in US politics in Maryland, of all places, in 2016. It reveals their divisive playbook, which they and others are likely to use again next year.
The FT has a fascinating article on the East India Company by the author of a new book on that company. With its own private armies and taxes, bolstered by lobbyists and investors in London, the EIC was the first, but certainly not the last, private company that really functioned as a government.
And now for some reading suggestions. I like revisionist histories that force me to re-think my understanding of the past. Here are four from the past couple of years that I found especially persuasive.
World War I: I’m now persuaded that Russia shares much of the blame for the start of the Great War by its policies to dominate Turkey and by mobilization during the July 1914 crisis. After deep dives into long-hidden Russian archives, Sean McMeekin showed that even Barbara Tuchman got the sequence wrong by relying on the falsified memoirs of the Russian Foreign Minister. McMeekin’s books on Russian diplomacy and the July crisis changed my view of German war guilt, though Austria-Hungary still deserves shared blame with Russia.
FDR’s boldness: I had long admired Franklin Roosevelt’s strategic bravery in maneuvering the United States in support of Britain and against Hitler, believing that he was just ahead of public opinion, skillfully pulling it along. Lynne Olson”s Those Angry Days persuaded me that, much of the time, FDR vacillated, doing less than many of his advisors urged and hoped. He still was a great leader, just not quite as bold as I had thought.
Slave Power’s influence on foreign policy: I never thought that slavery and its perpetuation had much impact on American foreign policy until I read Matthew Karp’s eye-opening history. Karp details how the South dominated key foreign policy posts and consciously advocated policies to protect and even extend slavery in the decades before the War of the Rebellion. Defenders of slavery really had a “deep state.”
The Revolutionary War: I used to have a typical American high school student’s view of our war for independence as a story of brave patriots, toughened at Valley Forge and led by George Washington, who finally triumphed at Yorktown. Two books have changed my understanding of that conflict. One was Andrew Jackson O’Shaunessy’s study of British politics during the conflict, The Men Who Lost America. He argues that the British gave up for broader strategic reasons. Add to this Holger Hoock’s Scars of Independence, which describes the local violence on both sides and the mistreatment of Loyalists during and after the war. The good guys won, but they won dirty.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 29
Today the NYT does the hat trick with three important stories.
– Administration officials reveal [brag?] that US conducted a cyber attack on Iran in June that complicated Iranian efforts to target oil tankers.
– Background on Israel’s “shadow war” against Iran. Note that Israeli elections are Sept 17.
– US promises amnesty for Venezuela’s Maduro if he steps down.
– WP has background on South Korea’s ending of intelligence cooperation with Japan.
– Politico notes Hill complaints as administration slow walks military aid to Ukraine.
– I like this Lawfare piece recommending changes to IEEPA.– SecDef Esper and CJCS Dunford have first news conference in a year. Here’s the transcript.
– Finally, could Trump pull a Boris Johnson? Yes. Look at Article II section 3 of the Constitution. The president can call either house into session and “he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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With regret: adieu, Syria
Most of the time I try to write with passion and conviction. This piece for MEI suggesting if not quite advocating a negotiate US withdrawal from Syria I wrote with sadness and regret. I thought for a long time that we should stay and try to get Syria right. Certainly courageous Syrians advocating for reform deserved better than they got, and Bashar al Assad merits accountability for the slaughter and displacement of a good part of his country’s population. But I am now convinced Syria is too far gone and would require far more resources than are available.
There is unquestionably a risk, maybe a certainty, of ISIS resurgence. Just yesterday the Department of Defense Inspector General chronicled it. I could well see maintaining some counterterrorism forces on bases in northeastern Syria. But that would be quite different from those who advocate that we continue to partner indefinitely with Syrian Democratic Forces to control territory. ISIS learned how difficult that is. We shouldn’t be foolhardy.
A negotiated withdrawal is what is called for, one that seeks to encourage those who remain (Turkey and Russia in particular) to counter ISIS and Iran. Assad would remain in power for the time being, but with little hope of reconstructing most of what he controls. Israel would keep the Iranians and their proxies off its border, with Russian nulla osta. It’s not a pretty picture, especially for the Kurds, who ideally would cut a deal with the Turks but who more likely will be forced by Turkish intransigence to cut a deal with Assad.
There are limits to power. We have unfortunately found them in Syria. The American people won’t tolerate serious losses there. Best to retrench and preserve our forces and treasure for another day.
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Proliferation without borders
Dr. Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA Safeguards inspector asks:
After 30 years of service as a senior officer in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the world’s watchdog for nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament, an organisation that primarily you, US and Russia, created and continue to support, I dare to address to both of you a rhetorical question:
“How could an international nuclear safeguards inspector comprehend and explain to the stunned public your recent nuclear behavior, in particular your withdrawal from the bilateral Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that you achieved in 1987 on prohibiting the development and deployment of a wide range of nuclear weapons?”
In March 2018 President Putin stated that nuclear weapons are essential for his county to maintain its position as a great world power. In order to convince the international community, he presented the terrifying capabilities of new Russian nuclear weapons that could target any place on the planet without been detected, thus, rendering nuclear deterrence a useless myth.
Six months later, in October 2018, President Trump replied that the US would unilaterally withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, claiming that Russia does not comply with its obligations.
Moscow rejected the accusations, blaming Washington for refraining from the negotiations on the extension beyond 2021 of the New START treaty, which controls strategic nuclear weapons.
In a continuous blame game the Russian president warned that any deployment of intermediate range missile by the US in Europe will force Russia to respond equally. Moreover, he made it terrifyingly clear that the increase nuclear threat could «result to the global destruction of human civilization and perhaps even of our planet».
Europe reacted immediately urging INF’s survival. The treaty’s elimination will turn Europe into a launcher and target of the ‘’new and modern’’ nuclear weapons of both the US and Russia, respectively. Furthermore, the European strategic objective of an autonomous defense policy will become difficult to achieve.
China, knowing that it will become the target of new US intermediate-rang nuclear missiles deployed in Japan and South Korea, immediately and firmly excluded its possible involvement in a new multilateral INF treaty, which eventually could embrace China’s nuclear adversary, India.
Several nervous countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, maintain active programs to develop intermediate ballistic missiles suitable for carrying nuclear weapons.
If the two super powers, the US and Russia, assisted by the rest of the NPT nuclear weapons states (China, UK and France) won’t proceed to the creation of a new international INF treaty, they will owe the world answers to vital geopolitical questions:
- Do the US and Russia not realize that their nuclear policy contradicts their basic NPT undertaking (Article VI) «…to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…»?
- Do they not recognize the immediate risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East and north-east Asia?
- Is North Korea not enough?
- Why do they risk their own loss of global geostrategic primacy?
- Is it possible that they ignore the increasing global nuclear threat?
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