Tag: Israel
The last error
Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear inspector, thinks out loud:
- Though nuclear proliferation is a paramount global threat, super powers fail to demonstrate sufficient competence in responding.
- World expectations based on the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that nuclear weapons states will preserve global peace in accordance with their responsibilities are plainly becoming wishful thinking.
- The authority and competence of the world’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has been downgraded by its founders and historical proponents, the nuclear weapons states.
- Denuclearization of North Korea is going nowhere. The pendulum-like rhetoric on both sides, Washington and Pyongyang, combined with the risk of miscalculation or a military error, enlarges the dangerous vicious cycle.
- Washington might seriously consider the mitigation of Pyongyang’s fears for its security, as Beijing suggests, rather than playing the military threat card. This was after all the prevailing approach in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal
- US withdrawal from JCPOA (2018) and Iran’s recent announcement of partial withdrawal from it lead to new risky situations. Tomorrow, no one should be surprised.
- At the same time, US National Security Strategy (2017) and the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review (2018) both stated that American nuclear capability will be strengthened and its nuclear arsenal modernized. Reason given: deterrence of Russia.
- On a precisely equivalent level are President Putin’s repeated statements (2018-2019): Russia needs to maintain its super power status through advanced nuclear capabilities.
- The rest of the “legal” nuclear club – China, the UK, and France – follow suit. Why not? – they might ask.
- In parallel, the de facto non-NPT nuclear weapons states, India, Pakistan, most probably Israel and now North Korea, keep developing their nuclear arsenals and ballistic capabilities.
- Moreover, more nuclear candidates, are getting ready for their geopolitical nuclear race.
- Unfortunately, nuclear issues are complex, making a sound solution of nuclear crises difficult even for strong, authoritarian, and ambitious world leaders.
- Nuclear armaments are not a financial or political game. They are the leading global threat to human civilization.
- It is time to getting serious. The speed of developments makes derailing of constraints on nuclear weapons control likely. That would be the last human error.
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Bluff to talk
Claiming that it is responding to Iranian attack planning, the Trump Administration has added military threat to its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. The President has denied what I take to be intentional leaks of a plan to deploy more than 100,000 troops, saying that he would deploy many more if it comes to that. Another American official suggested that Trump might rain 500 cruise missile per day on Iran for an extended period. Non-essential US government personnel have been ordered out of Embassy Baghdad. A carrier battle group and B52s have been deployed to the Gulf.
So far, this is escalatory bluff. The B52s flew from Al Udeid airfield in Qatar, which is too close to Iran to serve as a wartime facility. The war craft are serving statecraft: sending a signal. The Iranians, if they are planning attacks, won’t limit their targets to Iraq. Al Udeid would get its share of incoming. Real war preparations would require removal of aircraft from Al Udeid as well as withdrawal of at least families and other non-essential embassy personnel from throughout the Gulf. Deployment of 100,000 troops is far too many if the plan is for cruise missile strikes and far too few to mount an invasion of even part of Iran, a country of more than 80 million people. It would require months of visible and extensive logistical preparation.
Nor is there any sign at home that Trump is preparing for war. He might try to ignore the requirement for Congressional approval, but you can be sure the Democrats would be making much more noise if they thought he would attempt that. The stock market would also be signaling concern. American public opinion will not favor war with Iran, which would be a much bigger enterprise than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President was elected because he pledged to end US over-commitment in the Middle East, not expand it.
So what is all this about? Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo have made themselves clear for months: they want Tehran back at the negotiating table. The President has even offered to send his telephone number through the Swiss, who represent US interests in Tehran. National Security Adviser Bolton prefers war, but he has lost that debate on North Korea and Venezuela. He is likely to lose again.
The Iranians are reluctant to talk with the Americans, as they want the US back in the nuclear deal before agreeing to talk with the Americans again. Their internal politics require it. I spent a couple of hours yesterday on news outlets discussing the situation with Iranian thinktankers. They are unconcerned with the American military threat an recognize it as bluff.
So what will happen?
War could happen, more by accident rather than intention of the President or the Supreme Leader. Both the Iranians and the Americans have friends who might create an incident. The Iranian-backed Houthis have allegedly launched a drone attack on a Saudi pipeline. The Saudis have responded with belligerence. The attack on four oil tankers off the coast of the UAE’s Fujairah coast elicited a softer response. The Emirates have extensive trade and financial exchanges with Iran and have not identified the perpetrators. Israel could escalate its attacks on Iranian assets in Syria or elsewhere in ways that Iran might think require a response.
It is also possible the Americans and Iranians will do what they have done in the past: talk in secret. That is how the Obama Administration began its push for the nuclear deal. Tehran might prefer it that way, since otherwise it will be seen as abandoning “resistance” and giving in to the Great Satan. Such secret talks might leak, so anyone in Tehran who conducts them should anticipate being fired if they do. But if they lead to some relief from sanctions, the Supreme Leader might be prepared to run the risk.
Trump speaks loudly and carries a little stick. He is bluffing. He wants to talk.
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The Yemeni quagmire
Hudson Institute held a panel discussion April 18 about the crisis in Yemen and its strategic threat to US interests and allies. The panel included Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst at Arabia Foundation, Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.
Haykel gave an overview about the Houthis (who call themselves Ansar Allah), a group belonging to a particular caste of Yemeni society who ruled the country for a thousand years. Before rising again in 2000, They were marginalized since the late 1960s and displaced in 1992 with the revolution. Hussein El Houthi, founder of the group is influenced by Iranian ideology and draws inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini. El Houthi and the Supreme Leader share the view that the US and Israel are enemies of Yemen, the Arabs, and Islam. This ideological connection was cemented from the middle of 1990s between the Zaydis (a Shia sect which the Houthis belong to) and Lebanese Hezbollah, which provided military, ideological and media training.
Although a small group in Yemen, the Houthis are the most disciplined, best trained and most ideologically motivated group. They are unlikely to be defeated military. Haykel urges that other ways of dealing with Houthis be conceived. Yemen, a poor country, has never been integrated into the labor market of the Gulf. A broad strategy that encompasses development and socioeconomic elements is needed. But Riyadh is not going to be easily convinced to end the war because the Saudis see the Houthis as a Hezbollah-like force on their southern border.
Alasrar argues that neither a military solution nor a political one has worked so far in Yemen. Incentives for the Houthis to come to the table are insufficient. Even when they do negotiate, they are not sincere, due in large part to the ideological alignment with Hezbollah and Iran. The Houthis are likely to remain the de facto authority on the ground given the reluctance of the international community to solve this issue military or politically. The Houthi’s core belief is legitimacy through force. Yemen’s future is therefore bleak. ,
But Alasrar also argues that many in Yemen recognize that the state marginalized the Houthis. Younger Yemenis would like to see a political reconciliation process to help the Houthis become a legitimate political actor. The Houthis did not subscribe to the national reconciliation process conducted in the aftermath of Yemen’s “Arab Spring.” They seized power easily at a vulnerable time when the transitional government after had no army. Weapons and ballistic misled smuggled to Houthis created a means for Iran to attack Saudi Arabia.
Doran stated that the US as a super power has to create a stable regional order in the Middle East. The Khashoggi murder was immoral and ugly, but the campaign to shift US policy on Saudi Arabia is wrong. Its roots lie in President Obama’s outreach to Iran, which he hoped would become a partner in establishing regional stability, which meant down-grading US relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. There are only two American allies who are contesting Iranians on the ground: Israelis in Syria and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The argument that Mohammed bin Salman is unacceptable morally does not mean US should end its support for the Yemen war, which would weaken Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis Iran and leave a Hizbollah-like force on the Red Sea threatening shipping and hitting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles. Ending support to Saudi Arabia is not going to improve the Yemen situation or get the Iranians out.
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Similar interests, opposing views
The Middle East Institute (MEI) held a panel discussion on February 26 about potential future geopolitical scenarios in the Middle East with Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, Senior Vice President at MEI and Rolf Mützenich, Member of German Bundestag and Deputy Parliamentary Leader for Foreign Policy, Defense, and Human Rights.
Feierstein gave an overview of Trump priorities in the Middle East: defeating the Islamic state and violent extremism around the world, containing Iran’s ballistic missile program and interference in internal affairs of its neighbors, and advancing an Israel/Palestine “deal of the century.” According to Feierstein, the US and EU allies hold similar views on challenges Iran poses to regional security and stability.
But there are different views on the way to address those challenges, and in particular whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the US and Germany agree on the importance of resolving it but disagree on whether the Administration was correct in its decision to formalize the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. While the US has cut off fund for UNRWA, Germany made a big move by stepping in to replace it.
Regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Feierstein dwelt on the long history of cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia in establishing peace and security in the region. During the 1960s, Washington and Riyadh worked together to contain the expansion of the Soviet communism. In the 1980s, they stood up against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Today, they still share fundamental interests on global economy security, the energy market, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and concern over Iran. Despite these shared interests, the US and Saudi Arabia hold different values, especially in attitudes towards their citizens, reflected in their views of the Khashoggi affair.
Mützenich emphasized that solving the current crisis in the Middle East requires that people participate in socio-economic progress, not the conclusion of big arms deals. It is imperative to encourage the governments of the region to respect human rights and invest in their people, particularly young people. The killing of Khashoggi aroused a dispute in the EU over arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While Chancellor Merkel decided to no longer export arms to Saudi Arabia, France and Britain did not.
Mützenich expressed concern about ran’s behavior in the region, stressing the importance of international community pressure on Iran’s elite.
The deal with Iran was a great success because it limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities. There is no viable alternative.
While agreeing that the response to ISIS needs to be military, Mützenich argues that ISIS can only be defeated by social and economical inclusion. In Europe, there is a wide debate on whether human rights are a core value or just rhetoric. It was not only Merkel’s position to stop providing arms to Saudi Arabia; the issue was even raised during the negotiations over the coalition government. Ironically, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has allowed women to drive, but women who fought for this right are still behind bars. Mützenich welcomed discussions in the US Congress to try to make the Administration change its position on exporting arms to Saudi Arabia.
There are no grandiose solutions for the big problems facing our world, but humanitarian aid for internally displaced people and refugees can make a difference. The German BundeStag allocates every year €2 billion to humanitarian aid.
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Dim future
The Wilson Center held a panel discussion on February 26 exploring the future of the US-Iran relationship . The panel included Robin Wright, journalist and USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, Michael Singh, Managing Director and Senior Fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Robert Malley, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group.
Wright claims that Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif wanted to resign for several reasons. Internally, jealous rivals surround him and sought to impeach him in the parliament (but the issue never came to a vote). He is realist but does not represent the majority; the Supreme Leader and the hardliners are on top of him. Zarif was upset for not being invited when Bashar Assad turned up in Tehran for a meeting with the Supreme Leader. Externally, he failed to sustain the nuclear deal and prevent the Trump administration re-imposition of sanctions. He was also unable to respond to the pressure of Western governments to release a dual national American detainee in Iran or get Iranian banks to comply with international banking standards that were imposed post 9/11.
Singh pointed out that US administrations from Jimmy Carter until now had some engagement with Iran, but it was President Obama who took relations in a different direction with the nuclear agreement. At odds with US policy and interests, Iran does not operate according to conventional norms. It resorts to proxy wars in Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. These destabilizing actions in the region seek to keep Israel and Saudi Arabia focused on border problems and not Iran itself. Iran has wanted the US out of the region. Obama sought a balance of power in the Middle East between US friends and Iran. That did not happen, and more chaos is coming . While there are shared interests between the US and Iran on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan and ensuring a stable government in Iraq, the ways they pursue those interests tend to be diametrically opposed.
Malley asserted that Democrats and Republicans have engaged with Iran using a mix of coercion and engagement. Both have failed to establish normal relations with Tehran. Even Trump tried to meet Rouhani at the UN. Historically, the US relationship with Iran was not built on a strong basis: take for instance the hostage crisis, the ousting of Mosaddegh, and US support for the Shah.
Most importantly, the Iran-Iraq war, in which almost every country including the US backed Iraq, had a psychological impact on Iran’s attitude toward the US and the region, which is not only polarized between Iran and Saudi Arabia but also between Iran and Israel. Iran wants to play a key major role, but the US has deep strategic interests in oil, support for Israel, and counter-terrorism. Iran believes US backing for Tehran’s foes is an obstacle to its natural weight in the region: Iraq in the past or Saudi Arabia and Israel today.
According to Malley, the one agreement that could have sustainably changed Iranian behavior is the JCPOA. It was better to have that agreement, defuse the nuclear crisis, and prevent a catastrophic war. The JCPOA succeeded because there was pressure and a realistic outcome that Iran and the US with difficulty could accept. Without it, the future is dim.
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Needed: better Arab armies
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted a book talk on February 14 with Kenneth Pollack, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), former CIA intelligence analyst, and the author of Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness.
Pollack argues that since the second world war, Arab armies had underperformed. He believes that the size, material factors and the weaponry with which they waged war could have enabled Arabs to win easily, but instead they lost catastrophically. The few times they won were modest victories. Reflecting on the core reason for Arab military backwardness in the last seventy years, Pollack attributes it to Arab society itself. He argues that what defines a good and bad military in the industrial age warfare is a hierarchy based on mission-oriented orders in which the general gives the subordinate a sense of what he is trying to achieve and leaves it to them to figure out how best to do it. Arab culture’s educational system, though, inculcates a rigidly top-down system of organization and hierarchy.
Pollack explained that every culture develops in response to its own circumstances. And Warfare is usually a competitive activity against the organization of another society that organizes itself differently. Arabs were trying to fight industrial warfare in a way that their culture and society did not equip them to do, against foes who were way better equipped l(ike, for instance, the Israelis).
Strikingly similar patterns of underperformance in Middle Eastern wars suggest recurrent problems. Descriptions of Egyptian performance in 1948 and Iraqi performance in 2014 read like plagiarized versions of one another. Arabs have not experienced the industrial revolution, or the information revolution of today.
Apart from the cultural piece, Pollack identifies a set of problems Arab armies suffer. Most Arab generals were inexperienced and did not know what they were doing. Junior officers are passive, inflexible, unimaginative, and unable to respond to battlefield developments. At the bottom of Arab chain of command, personnel had difficulties handling their weapons and maintaining them properly. The more sophisticated a weapon it is, the harder for them to handle. For instance, All countries who trained Arab armies (the Russians, French, Americans, and British) attest that they performed better with the older Soviet MIG 17 and MIG 21 than they did with American F4 and F16. Providing Arab armies with sophisticated weapons did not improve their combat capability.
In addition, the Arab world is replete with bad civil military relations. Many regimes lacking legitimacy tend to be concerned the generals surrounding them, as the leaders themselves came to power by overthrowing others. They seek therefore to hobble the military so that can not do likewise. Saddam Hussein was an outstanding example, as he put people in charge whom he knew to be incompetent. The golden rule has thus always been loyalty over competence.
It is important for those who want the US out of the region that it not to be replaced by Iran, Hezbollah, ISIS, or Al-Qaeda. Without the US, it is imperative to leave behind a strong Arab army able of defending against these threats.
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