Tag: Japan
Stevenson’s army, September 21
Charlie says this is a PM edition, but I didn’t get the AM. Sorry about that:
Dan Drezner has more about AUKUS, including how France had done to Japan, what the US has now done to France.
Profs Barno & Bensahel says the AVF [All Volunteer Force] needs to rethink.
Air Force secretary reveals info about new B21 and raises doubts about hypersonics.
SCMP sees big drop in Chinese FDI in US
WaPo lists areas of US-Chinese tech competition.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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I hope we’ve learned unilateral withdrawal is a bad idea
Judging from my inbox, a lot of people around the world are thinking the US withdrawal from Afghanistan could be prelude to withdrawal elsewhere. I think the opposite is true. The Afghanistan debacle will make it difficult to discuss withdrawal almost anywhere for at least two and likely three years.
President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan completely, thus fulfilling (four months late) the terms of President Trump’s agreement with the Taliban, has strong support across the political spectrum in Washington. But the way it was done was shambolic. Biden failed to ensure either a negotiated “decent interval” from the Taliban or a commitment of the Afghan security forces to defend the country’s government. There appears to have been no serious transition plan. The Americans literally withdrew from Bagram air base, the biggest in Afghanistan, in the dark of night, without consulting or informing the local Afghan commander.
It may well be that this was done to prevent panic, as President Biden has implied. But that was an ill-considered plan. Did anyone really think things would go more smoothly without Afghan cooperation?
The “Saigon in Kabul” scenes will inoculate the Administration against any further withdrawals, at least until a second Biden term. There will of course be force adjustments for operational reasons, some of them potentially major, like getting the American aircraft out of Al Udeid in Qatar. They are exposed to Iranian missiles and will need to be moved if there are going to be hostilities, or even the threat of hostilities, with Tehran. I wouldn’t mind seeing fewer US troops committed in autocracies like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but those would need to be carefully considered and well-executed. We may not like their style of governance, but replacements could be worse. I would expect no major drawdowns in places like Iraq, Kosovo, Cuba (Guantanamo), Japan, South Korea, or Europe, unless they are negotiated and agreed with the local authorities.
The only major US commitment under discussion in Washington these days is to Taiwan. China is growing in military strength. Taiwanese, watching Hong Kong and Xinjiang, are less interested in reunification and increasingly interested in independence. It is no longer as clear as it once was that the US has both the means and the will to defend against a Chinese attack, even if it is eminently clear the Taiwanese would make a takeover difficult for Beijing. But there are no deployed American ground forces in Taiwan, so no question of withdrawal. I assume the US Navy will continue to make its presence felt in Western Pacific and seek to improve its posture in defending the first island chain.
It has been clear for two decades that the US does not want to be the world’s policeman, patroling worldwide. I doubt Americans even want to serve as the world’s fireman, reacting to conflagrations as a first responder. The arguments for retrenchment are strong. But the consequences of withdrawal, especially when unilateral, can be catastrophic. I hope we’ve learned that much.
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Stevenson’s army, July 14
But there’s no big news about France. Celebrate anyway.
NYT reports and speculates about disappearance of REvil from Dark Web.
But WaPo says lack of indicators it was offensive cyber op that did it.
HASC approved defense appropriations bill. But report criticizes Space Force.
Many Senate holds block defense nominees.
GOP Senators resist AUMF repeal.
Japan mentions Taiwan, climate change in new defense white paper.
I think Adam Gopnik is onto something in what he calls Biden’s “invisible ideology.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No first use of nuclear weapons
Pantelis Ikonomou, former IAEA inspector, writes:
Last week, the No-First-Use Act (NFU) was reintroduced in the US Senate to establish in law that the US policy is NOT to use nuclear weapons first in any conflict. This is a key initiative necessary to advance NFU policy in the US, in its nuclear allied countries (NATO, Japan. South Korea, and Australia), and ultimately in all other nuclear armed states.
President Obama, who had considered ruling out the first use of a nuclear weapon in a conflict, eventually abandoned the idea. Allied countries maintained the option of first use of US nuclear weapons was needed for their protection. There was conern in the US that NFU would embolden Russia and China.
President Biden could now run into these same problems. Armed conflicts in the NATO vicinity have grown stronger. Strategic tensions between the US and the two nuclear powers, Russia and China, are escalating. There is no clarity about their policy on first use of nuclear weapons.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated “Our nuclear weapons doctrine does not provide for a pre-emptive strike…” however, “… we are prepared and will use nuclear weapons only when we know for certain that some potential aggressor is attacking Russia, our territory.”
Beijing in its White Defence Charter 2011 underlines the posture of maintaining a “minimum nuclear deterrent,” with the commitment of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, but without a detailed analysis of the term “minimum.”
The need for NFU nuclear doctrine is becoming more important than ever. Continuously modernized nuclear arsenals are getting more capable. They can wipe out humanity and civilization on the planet (more than once). The probability of nuclear Armageddon due to accident or miscalculation is dangerously increasing.
Unfortunately, global peace and mankind’s existence depend currently upon an irrational equilibrium, that of Mutually Assured Destruction. The deadlock of of nuclear deterrence ought now be obvious to all: sensible superpower leaders, their expert advisors, and the terrified world public.
There is no better moment for a great world power, such as the US, to take the leadership and steer the world towards the adoption of global NFU. Doing so would challenge the Russians and Chinese to clarify their doctrines, lower the risk of nuclear war, and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons, the most dangerous invention the world has ever seen, must be prevented from ever being used again. May the US Senate open the door to this way.
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When long shots are worth taking, in soccer and foreign policy
The return to normal that started on January 20 is now palpable. America is administering more than 3 million COVID-19 shots per day, the economy is revving up, our days are not devoted to dealing with Donald Trump’s latest foolishness. Some things are noticeably better than before. The trial of the policeman who killed George Floyd in Minneapolis has featured testimony for the prosecution from his colleagues, including the police chief. That has rarely happened in the past. A Democratic-controlled Congress has passed a massive economic stimulus bill and is proposing to do more focused on infrastructure and health care. Republicans are fighting back by trying to limit voting state-by-state, most notably in Georgia and Arizona , but they are getting substantial backlash from the business community. Abusing minorities is no longer a winning market strategy.
In foreign affairs there is also a return to normalcy: the Administration is trying to negotiate its way back into the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actiton or JCPOA) and appears to have decided not to withdraw US troops completely from Afghanistan by May 1, as the Trump Administration had agreed to do. Secretary of State Blinken has reaffirmed American commitment to NATO and the Administration has met with Asian Pacific allies Japan and South Korea as well as India. Biden has been explicitly critical of China’s treatment of its Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority millions of whom have been put into reeducation camps. Trump had signaled no objection and even approval of this outrage. Biden has also signaled renewed support for a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians, but without reversing Trump’s relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem or for now withdrawing Trump’s recognition of Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights.
There are other areas of continuity between Trump and Biden on foreign policy. Trump’s tariffs on China are still in place, apparently as an incentive for Beijing to agree to beef up its respect for foreign intellectual property. Biden is continuing the Trump practice of more open engagement with Taiwan’s officials. So far, Biden, like Trump, has done nothing to respond to human rights violations by friends like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
A return to normal does not however guarantee success. The two biggest Biden foreign policy initiatives so far face long odds.
America was clearly better off with the JCPOA than without it. Return to the agreement will require not only complex choreography with Tehran but also with the US Congress, where even some Democrats are hardline. The US will need to provide sanctions relief while Iran will need to return its nuclear program to the status quo ante. Both will be difficult. Parsing which sanctions are “nuclear” and which were levied because of human rights and terrorism is not going to be easy. Nor will it be easy for Iran to give up the more advanced enrichment technology it has acquired. In both countries, domestic resistance will make the process more difficult, as will Iran’s June election.
Withdrawal from Afghanistan depends on an agreement between the Taliban and President Ghani, both of whom are notably consistent in pursuing maximalist goals. For now, the Taliban appear to have the advantage on the battlefield, but Ghani is not giving in to the American suggestion of a power-sharing government with some sort of Taliban participation. How can he? He advocates far more democratic, far less religious, far more inclusive, and far more normal governance than the Taliban do. They have no interest in a pluralist polity with equal rights for women and minorities. If there is no agreement, the Americans can of course still withdraw, but most of the smart money is betting that the consequence will be a Taliban takeover or, worse, a multi-faceted civil war. The experts are pessimistic. View this discussion Monday from the Middle East Institute:
That said, the experts are sometimes wrong. Long shots are worth taking when they are not costly and there is little or no alternative. That score against Spain is a fine example.
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Stevenson’s army, April 2
– Jake Sullivan meets with Japan and South Korea regarding North Korea.
– JCPOA signers [except US] meet with Iran.
– WSJ says US cutting forces in Middle East.
– Honduras hired lobbyists to stop investigation of corruption.
– Biden & congressional Democrats fight over Egypt policy.
– New report on counterspace capabilities.
– Former Speaker Boehner tells how GOP went crazy.
–Congressional norms are changing, not all for the bad.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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