Tag: Jordan
Real reform requires organized action
Marwan Muasher, former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan, is now a vice president at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A leading figure calling for reform in Jordan, he was interviewed by Ala’ Alrababa’h of peacefare.net:
Click here to view this interview in Arabic.
Q. How do you expect events in Egypt to impact the Muslim Brotherhood and the reform process in Jordan? Would they weaken the Muslim Brotherhood? And would they be used as an excuse to hinder the reform process?
A. I think the Arab World should establish the rules of democracy in a way that allows everyone to work. I don’t believe in excluding anyone from the political sphere, whether it is the Muslim Brotherhood or otherwise. I also believe that excluding the Muslim Brotherhood by force, or not involving them in governance by force, has helped to strengthen rather than weaken them. If we look at the Egyptian or Tunisian experience, we see that the Brotherhood did not become weak among the population using force. [They were only weakened] when they took power and had to apply the slogans they called for, whether economic or political [slogans].
In the short term, I am not optimistic about Egypt, because the other side, the civilian forces, treat the Brotherhood with the same exclusion it accused the Brotherhood of. They [civilian forces] accuse the Brotherhood of wanting to exclude others, while they do the same thing. And I believe that the best would be to agree on the rules of the game from the outset, such that everyone receives guarantees that all political and social forces in the society would not be marginalized or excluded, and that they can participate in ruling before writing a new constitution that gets the approval of all sectors of society.
As for us in Jordan, it is possible to read what happened in Egypt in two ways. The first way, which is happening now, and I think it is wrong, is to see that the Muslim Brotherhood was excluded in Egypt, and thus we can do the same in Jordan. And as I said, I don’t think that exclusion happens by force, and if it happens by force, it would help to strengthen, rather than weaken, the Muslim Brotherhood. Or it could be read in another way, which is what I hope the Jordanian society would reach, with the help of the wise people in the society, that this is time to agree on the rules of a game, which allows everyone to participate in the political process, and that prevents anyone from monopolizing this process in the future. Would this happen soon? The signs so far are not encouraging.
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It’s Trayvon Martin’s fault
Murhaf Jouejati, a leading light of the Syrian opposition, complained on Twitter:
I watched ABC “Worldnews” tonight. Despite today’s killing of tens of Syrian civilians by the Assad regime, ABC reported nothing about Syria.
He added:
NBC also had nothing on Syria. Still wondering why American public opinion is so uninformed?
At least in the United States, the horrors of Homs and Aleppo seem to have been driven not only off the front pages but out of the press entirely, presumably because the trial of George Zimmerman for killing Trayvon Martin used up all the ink (and electrons). The exception was this morning’s New York Times, which has a good overview of the Syrian regime’s recent military successes.
I confess to my own fascination with the trial, which is like a Rohrschach test: if you see race as a factor, then the inkblot points toward conviction for something; if you don’t, you might agree with the jurors who acquitted someone who profiled, followed, quarreled with and shot an unarmed seventeen-year-old. How the prosecutors failed to anticipate the racial factor is a mystery to me. And why the press calls a self-appointed vigilante ready to use his firearm a “neighborhood watch volunteer” I cannot fathom.
Though far from our shores, the plight of Homs really is more heinous than this unsuccessful prosecution, which allowed a single sociopath to go free. Those who are watching see mass murder of a civilian population, including even those trying to mediate. In Aleppo, people are starving. Sociopath Bashar al Asad is killing upwards of one hundred Travon Martins, or his parents, every day. Asad’s mostly Alawite and Shia (including Hizbollah) collaborators are busy chasing the Sunni population north and presumably plan to fill in with Alawites and other minorities whenever conditions allow.
The shape of things in Syria is becoming all too clear. The regime is seeking to establish a robust corridor linking Damascus to the relatively concentrated populations of Alawites in the west, which is conveniently adjacent to Lebanon’s Shia population (and Hizbollah fighters). Asad seems intent on pushing north as far as he can: first to Homs, then Aleppo if possible. But his supply lines will be getting longer and help from Lebanon less convenient. At some point the confrontation lines will likely stop moving north, at which point both opposition and regime will turn to their own rear areas and try to mop up any continuing resistance and ethnically cleansing as much as they think necessary.
The result will be de facto, partly sectarianized, partition, likely with opposition-controlled areas both south and north of the regime’s main axis from Damascus to Tartous and Latakia and extending in the east to Deir Azzour. The opposition will have supply lines to Turkey in the north, Iraqi Kurdistan in the east and Jordan in the south. The regime will continue to depend on Russian and Iranian supplies shipped mainly to Tartous.
This partition could persist for a long time. It is now forgotten, but during the Bosnian war the confrontation lines moved little for 3.5 years. Only with the American bombing did the Croat and Muslim forces tip the balance of war and begin to sweep through western Bosnia. A soft partition with fairly clear confrontation lines could likewise last for years in Syria, provided both sides are able to maintain their international supply lines.
This kind of persistent stalemate would push both sides in more radical, sectarian directions. The opposition, many of whose most aggressive fighters are militant Islamists, will likely move more in that direction. Moderates do not fare well in polarized situations. The regime will continue to claim the mantle of secularism and multiethnicity, but in fact its core is increasingly Alawite and Shia, with Christians, Druze and lots of Sunnis trying to duck, or sit on the fence, or whatever you want to call what people do when fear outweighs the desire for freedom.
The American jilting of the Syrian rebels may seem the easiest way out to an Administration that is taking retrenchment seriously. But it isn’t going to be cheap. US expenses for Syria, mostly humanitarian aid, are climbing close to $1 billion. Next year could easily double that figure, especially if the other states (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq) in the Levant start to collapse. You know: a billion here and a billion there and pretty soon we are talking about real money. I’d prefer we worry about the people, but if that doesn’t grab high-level attention maybe the expenditures will.
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Tabler and Lynch go ten rounds
The Obama administration’s decision to arm the Syrian rebels is controversial in Washington. While some support the decision, others consider it “probably [Obama’s] worst foreign policy decision since taking office.” Last week, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy hosted a debate on Arming the Syrian Rebels: Sliding Toward Iraq or Inching Toward Stability. Andrew Tabler, a senior fellow in the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute, argued for arming the rebels. On the other side stood Marc Lynch, associate professor at George Washington University and editor of Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel. Robert Satloff, executive director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy at the Washington Institute, moderated the discussion. Read more
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Syria options
With Washington still undecided what to do about Syria, it is time to look again at military options. The regime is doing well enough on the battlefield that it won’t be much interested in a serious negotiated solution. The opposition won’t want one on the terms the regime would accept.
I see three basic military options at this point:
- Arm the rebels. It takes time. It will kill more people. The arms may fall into the wrong hands and be used for the wrong purposes. But it makes the Syrians responsible for their own fate and may strengthen relative moderates, if we can get weapons into the right hands. Some might prefer it be done covertly, though it is unlikely to stay secret for long. Nothing does these days.
- Safe haven/humanitarian corridor/no-fly zone. These are all to a first approximation the same thing. If successfully instituted, they would presumably save lives and enable the opposition to begin governing, as the Kurds did in northern Iraq under Saddam Hussein. But they require patrolling by US (or allied) aircraft, which means the Syrian air defenses have to be taken down first. That is an act of war that would provide invaluable intelligence to the Syrians (and therefore also the Iranians) on our operating capabilities and signatures. Safe havens did not work well in Bosnia–it was their failure that led to the bombing that turned the tide of war, not their success.
- Nail the Syrian air force, Scuds and communication nodes. This too would be an act of war, but one that does not require continued patrolling. It might even be possible without taking down the Syrian air defenses (the Israelis don’t seem to have bothered with that in nailing missile shipments to Hizbollah or Syria’s clandestine nuclear reactor). But we won’t get everything. The Syrians will bunker their more precious items under ground and park their tanks and artillery next to schools and mosques, fearing they will be the next targets. If the Bosnian war is to be taken as a guide, it would be best also to go after military communication nodes. The regime’s ability to coordinate its forces, which depends on communications, is a big advantage over the fragmented opposition.
Options 2 and 3 require the use of US forces, which needs to be justified on the basis of vital American interests. Two are most in evidence right now:
- A regime victory in Syria would be a major regional triumph for Iran, ensuring its link to Hizbollah in Lebanon, putting pressure on Iraq to toe ever more Tehran’s line, and endangering Israel.
- Continued fighting will weaken state structures in the Levant, including Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. The resulting chaos could create a breeding ground for Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.
The use of force, presumably without UN Security Council approval, would infuriate Russia and China. Their cooperation is still important to the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. Russia’s cooperation in maintaining the Northern Distribution Network is important to the drawdown of American troops from Afghanistan.
Then there are the American people. War weary and budget fatigued, they are not anxious for another Middle East war, especially since domestic oil production is up dramatically and dependence on Middle Eastern producers declining.
Not a pretty set of options, but if we do nothing at this point we’ll have to live not only with our consciences but also with the results.
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Power, Power and Rice
While some are predicting (or hoping for) big changes in American foreign policy in the liberal interventionist/human rights first direction with the appointments of Susan Rice as national security adviser and Samantha Power as UN ambassador, I doubt it.
Both have already left marks on US foreign policy, Samantha through the Atrocities Prevention Board and Susan in the Libya intervention and many other efforts at the UN, including the successful use of its Human Rights Commission to report on atrocities in Syria. I wouldn’t suggest these are enormous departures from the past, but they certainly reflect the view that saving foreigners from mass atrocity has its place in US p0licy and needs to be given due consideration along with more traditional national interests of the military, political and economic varieties.
The main “to intervene or not” issue today is Syria. Susan and Samantha have both already been involved in internal debates on Syria, where President Obama ignored the advice of Hillary Clinton, David Petraeus and Leon Panetta. They all advised a more interventionist stance. It is the president, not the advisers, who is choosing not to try to stop the Syrian civil war, largely because of issues unrelated to Syria: Russian support on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, not to mention the American public’s war weariness and the parlous budget situation. No doubt someone at the Pentagon is also telling him that allowing extremist Sunnis and Shia to continue killing each other in Syria is in the US interest. Read more
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No narrow way out
This rare interview with Salim Idriss, who (sort of) commands the forces in Syria that call themselves the Free Army, is telling. It demonstrates three things:
- The rebels are still in need of weapons.
- Their fragmented structure makes supplying them a dicey proposition.
- Disunity is a serious impediment to their military progress.
This is not an unfamiliar situation. It is comparable to the Bosnian army during the first year of that country’s miserable war, which started more than twenty years ago and went on for three and a half years before the Federation forces started winning and the Dayton accords ended it.
By then, the Bosnian (ABiH) was unified under General Rasim Delic and fighting in tandem with the Croat Defense Force (HVO) and the Croatian Army (HV) against the Republika Srpska army (VRS). But things hadn’t started that way. The HVO and the ABiH had even fought with each other in 1992 and 1993, just as some rebel forces inside Syria have in recent months.
Likewise in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army was not completely unified at first and fought occasionally with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), a less well-known group that also fought against the Yugoslav security forces.
The Syrian rebel forces will need greater unity if they are to make further progress against the Syrian army, which has been gaining ground in the past few weeks. That is at least in part due to Iranian and Lebanese Hizbollah forces fighting inside Syria. The regime’s objective is to relieve Damascus and secure the route to the Alawite-populated areas of the northeast, where ethnic cleansing of Sunnis has been proceeding apace.
The rebel forces are also going to need more international help, at the very least arms supplies, but some want a much narrower focus. Aram Nerguizian wants American intervention to focus exclusively on chemical weapons and extremists among the rebels:
How U.S. military power could be used is to selectively target risks tied to proliferation of chemical weapons and other strategic capabilities in Syria. It could be used to contain and curtail the expansion of al Qaeda in the Levant and to prevent the preeminence of radical forces in the region.
The chemical weapons seem to me strategically irrelevant. If used, they have killed a tiny fraction of the more than 80,000 dead. It can still be argued that the President’s “red line” has to be enforced, lest failing to do so sends the wrong message to Iran. Certainly a credible threat of military force to block Tehran from getting nuclear weapons is vital to the diplomatic strategy the President is pursuing. But the notion that chemical weapons, like nuclear bombs, are “weapons of mass destruction” is hyperbole. Syria’s use of chemical weapons has nothing like the implications of Iran gaining nuclear ones. Finding and destroying Asad’s stocks of sarin and other poisons would be a major military enterprise, not the limited intervention some may imagine.
Extremists are likewise a difficult target to engage. Muslim extremists also emerged in Bosnia and Kosovo but were quickly undone once the fighting was over. That will be a far more difficult process in Syria, as it will not be getting the tens of thousands of NATO peacekeeping forces that made it happen quickly, and in retrospect easily, in the Balkans. But how, precisely, does one target Jabhat al Nusra in Syria? Do we really want to be hunting them down with drones while they are fighting the Asad regime? Or encouraging the Free Syria Army, which is less than fully effective against the regime forces, to engage against them while the extremists are fighting Asad? We have made it clear that Jabhat al Nusra is not acceptable to the international community, something the UN reinforced last week with financial sanctions. But do we really need to do more than that right now?
The higher priority is to focus on protecting civilians in Syria. The regime is targeting civilians in rebel-held areas daily, trying to make life there unbearable and governance impossible. The purpose is to get the civilians to expel the insurgents, in the hope doing so will provide some measure of relief from artillery and air bombardment. Protecting Syria’s civilian population from these ravages should be our priority concern.
The costs of failing to do so are high. US humanitarian relief in Syria could total $1 billion by the end of this year. Unless we focus on civilian protection we are not likely to recover some measure of confidence in Syria’s Sunni Muslim population and prevent its youth from further radicalization. A post-Asad Syria dominated by extremists will be a problem for the Middle East and the US for decades into the future. We should want a Syria that respects the rights of its citizens (regardless of sect or ethnicity) as well as its borders with Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. That will take time and effort. There is no shortcut. A narrow focus on chemical weapons and extremists will not serve these broader strategic purposes. There is no narrow way out.
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